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ABSTRACT PAGE 
British forts in the colonial American backcountry have long been subjects of American 
heroic myth. Forts were romanticized as harbingers of European civilization, and the 
Indians who visited them as awestruck, childlike, or scheming. Two centuries of 
historiography did little to challenge the image of Indians as noble but peripheral figures 
who were swept aside by the juggernaut of European expansion. In the last few decades, 
historians have attacked the persistent notion that Indians were supporting participants and 
sought to reposition them as full agents in the early American story. But in their search for 
Indian agency, historians have given little attention to British forts as exceptional contact 
points in their own rights. This dissertation examines five such forts and their surrounding 
regions as places defined by cultural accommodation and confluence, rather than as 
outposts of European empire. Studying Indian-British interactions near such forts reveals 
the remarkable extent to which Indians defined the fort experience for both natives and 
newcomers. Indians visited forts as friends, enemies, and neutrals. They were nearly 
always present at or near backcountry forts. In many cases, Indians requested forts from 
their British allies for their own purposes. They used British forts as trading outposts, news 
centers, community hubs, diplomatic meeting places, and suppliers of gifts. But even with 
the advantages that could sometimes accrue from the presence of forts, many Indians still 
resented them. Forts could attract settlers, and often failed to regulate trade and traders 
sufficiently to please native consumers. Indians did not hesitate to press fort personnel for 
favors and advantages. In cases where British officers and soldiers failed to impress 
Indians, or angered them, the results were sometimes violent and extreme. This study 
makes a start at seeing forts as places that were at least as much a part of the Native 
American landscape as they were outposts of European aggression. At Forts Loudoun, 
Allen, Michilimackinac, Niagara, and Chartres, Indians used their abilities and influence to 
turn the objectives of the British fort system upside down. As centers of British-Indian 
cultural confluence, these forts evoke an early America marked by a surprising degree of 
Indian agency. At these contact points people lived for the moment. The America of the 
future, marked by Indian dispossession and British-American social dominance, was an 
outcome few could imagine. -
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INTRODUCTION 
As the confused and timid throng, left the protecting mounds of the fort, and 
issued on the open plain, the whole scene was, at once, presented to their eyes. At 
a little distance on the right, and somewhat in the rear, the French army stood to 
their arms, Montcalm having collected his parties, so soon as his guards had 
possession of the works. They were attentive, but silent observers of the 
proceedings ofthe vanquished, failing in none of the stipulated military honours, 
and offering no taunt or insult, in their success, to their less fortunate foes. Living 
masses of the English, to the amount, in the whole, of near three thousand, were 
moving slowly across the open plain, towards the common center, and gradually 
approached each other, as they converged to the point of their march, a vista cut 
through the lofty trees, where the road to the Hudson entered the forest. Along the 
sweeping borders of the woods, hung a dark cloud of savages, eyeing the passage 
of their enemies, and hovering, at a distance, like vultures, who were only kept· 
from swooping on their prey, by the presence and restraint of a superior army. A 
few had straggled among the conquered columns, where they stalked, in sullen 
discontent; attentive, though, as yet, passive observers of the moving multitude. 
--James Fenimore Cooper, The Last of the Mohicani 
The scene described in this excerpt from Cooper's famous novel is the British 
retreat from Fort William Henry in August 1757. Orderly English troops march glumly 
toward a bloody end they cannot foresee. French victors stand by nobly and review the 
vanquished redcoats as they pass through the gates of their fort for the last time. No 
mention is made in the passage of the many British-allied Indians accompanying the 
surrendered British troops, though their presence is noted in other parts of the novel. In 
this paragraph the author chooses to draw a contrast between the orderly European 
soldiers and the "dark cloud" of skulking "savages," who occupy the "sweeping borders 
1Cooper, The Last of the Mohicans: A Narrative of 1757 (Albany: State 
University ofNew York Press, 1983), 174. 
3 
of the woods" as if they were dangerous features of the natural environment. Their 
violent potential is effectively demonstrated throughout the book, but here the superior 
French and English forces keep them in a temporary state of passivity. This oppositional 
structure oflndians as dark, furtive, and primeval and Europeans as orderly, thoughtful, 
and culturally superior is a common feature of the romantic literature of Cooper's era. 
Unfortunately for the Indians who actually interacted with British troops, traders, and 
cultural brokers near backcountry forts, this image of furtive natives waiting in the 
forest's shadows, overawed by orderly 'European personnel and imposing fortress walls, 
has come to typify fort-based cultural interactions in the American imagination? 
More than many other fixtures of American popular mythology, frontier forts and 
the people associated with them have been incorporated into a heroic interpretation of 
colonial Indian-white relations. This historical model, popularized during the nineteenth-
century romantic era by writers such as Cooper and historian Francis Parkman, saw 
British (and to a lesser degree, French) colonizers as spreaders of advanced European 
civilization. In short, those who encountered and overcame the challenges of the "savage" 
American wilderness and its inhabitants deserved the rewards of conquest. Soldiers 
manning forts were nothing less than the forbears of America's republican promise. 
Indians, though admirable for their skills and primitive nobility, were considered features 
ofthe natural landscape. They were to be subdued by more civilized conquerors along 
with the forests and soil. Forts themselves were portrayed as cultural and economic 
entrepots and battlegrounds of superior European civilization, overshadowing and 
2For a study of the literary and historical treatment of the reduction of Fort 
William Henry that explains the event's impact on subsequent French, British, and 
American nationalist mythologies, see Ian K. Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henry and 
the Massacre (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 149-85. 
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overawing the "primitive" natives who visited them. This nineteenth-century heroic view 
of the frontier and its outposts fits neatly into American nationalist mythology and 
remained powerful in history textbooks and popular culture well into the twentieth 
century.3 
Heroism was fine for descendents of the victors in the cultural contests of the 
American colonial period, but not for the American natives whose ancestors bore the 
brunt of the European invasion. Indians knew well that their ancestors were always full 
participants in the continent's colonial-era struggles and grated at their continued 
relegation as secondary figures in early American history. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
encouraged in part by the American civil rights movement and increased Indian activism, 
some historians began looking for new historical models that would amplify native 
agency in colonial affairs and correct some of the nationalistic, heroic depictions of white 
3People growing up in the mid-twentieth century should be familiar with this 
romanticized image of the relationship between fort personnel and native Americans, 
though in the consensus-driven atmosphere ofthe 1930s-1950s, the British soldiers in 
such forts were often portrayed as villains who sought to subvert Indians for their own 
imperial (and hence undemocratic) purposes. See Walter Edmonds, Drums Along the 
Mohawk (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936) and Kenneth Roberts, Northwest Passage (New 
York: Doubleday, Doran, 1938), and the films based on those novels, for examples of 
enduring, heroic fort-based fiction. Northwest Passage became a popular television show 
in the 1950s, taking its place beside The Wonderful World of Disney and Daniel Boone 
(in the 1960s) as purveyors of romantic frontier ideals set in colonial America. For an 
overview ofParkman's views on Indians and their place in the heroic historical tradition, 
see Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered 
(Kingston, Ont.: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 9-19. The foundational essay 
on the frontier and its relation to American democratic values is Frederick Jackson 
Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association (1893): 197-227. For discussions of Turner's thesis of 
frontier-based democratic rejuvenation and of frontier-oriented mythology in general, see 
Henry Nash Smith, The Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 250-60, and William Cronon, George 
Miles, and Jay Gitlin, "Becoming West: Toward a New Meaning for Western History," in 
Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western Past (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1992), 3-27. 
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colonizers. 4 Some historians argued for models of analysis using anthropological 
methods to free the researcher from the colonialist cultural baggage that permeates much 
literature. Historians using these methodologies could view colonial intercultural 
meetings as diffusions of traits rather than impositions of dominant or superior cultures 
over lesser ones. In this view cultures borrowed from each other, with Indians acting as 
full players in a society that eventually came to be dominated by white Britons. Because 
backcountry forts were themselves important cultural contact points, an ethnohistorical 
perspective helps redefine the interactions that took place in such outposts, emphasizing 
cultural accommodation and Indian agency instead of the imperatives of the forts' 
builders.5 
Historians have taken different paths to this goal of locating and emphasizing 
Indian agency in the cultural mix of colonial America. Some have resorted to global 
economic models to explain natives' eventual cultural and demographic loss. In these 
studies Indians are connected to a larger Atlantic exchange economy, either to cast them 
as victims of a coercive global trade system or to include them as socioeconomic actors 
4Gary B. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind," William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. (hereafter cited as WMQ, 3rd ser.) 29:2 (April1972): 197-
230; Nash, Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1974), 1-6; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of 
the American Indianfrom Columbus to the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 1-
31. 
5Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant 
of Conquest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 10-14. For the 
merits and promise of the ethnohistorical approach, see James Axtell, "Ethnohistory: An 
Historian's Viewpoint," in The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of 
Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981 ), 1-15. For some of 
the problems encountered by historians using this method, see James H. Merrell, "Some 
Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians," WMQ, 3rd ser. 46:1 (January 
1989): 94-119, and Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?" WMQ, 3rd ser. 50:2 
(Aprill993): 379-95. 
6 
alongside colonists and slaves.6 But some have criticized these deterministic economic 
models for a basic teleological flaw: they look at Indians' stories through the lens of their 
eventual loss. 7 A more fruitful method for analyzing the kinds of interactions that took 
place near military posts is to highlight Indian experiences in more localized geographic 
or conceptual contexts. This does less well at explaining native participation in global 
systems, but comes closer to capturing Indian-European cultural interplay as it happened 
at the local level. Indians did not usually consider themselves part of a global system or 
an extended multicultural American republic. They knew that dependence on European · 
6The most familiar and thorough exposition of this application of Immanuel 
Wallerstein's world systems analysis to changing conditions among Indians in colonial 
America is Richard White's study ofthe Choctaws in The Roots of Dependency: 
Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and 
Navahos (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1983), 1-146. Daniel K. Richter has 
argued for the deterministic role of trade in the dissolution of Iroquois society in The 
Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European 
Colonization (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1992). For the world 
systems model itself and the effects of global markets on Indians in Spanish America, see 
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the 
Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 
1980), and Steve J. Stem, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World System in the 
Perspective ofLatin America and the Caribbean," American Historical Review 93:4 
(October 1988): 829-72. For a world-systems model that incorporates Indians into an 
expanded colonial society alongside Europeans and slaves, peripheral in the British 
imperial system but dynamic in its own right, see Edward Countryman, "Indians, the 
Colonial Order, and the Social Significance of the American Revolution," WMQ, 3rd ser. 
53:2 (Apri11996): 342-62. Countryman's arguments are informed by the work of Jack P. 
Greene. See Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended 
Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1990), and "Transatlantic Colonization and the Redefmition ofEmpire in the 
Early Modern Era," in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 
1520-1800, eds. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 267-82. 
7For critiques of the world system model, see Steven P. van Hoak, "Untangling 
the Roots ofDependency: Choctaw Economics, 1700-1860," The American Indian 
Quarterly 23:3-4 (Summer-Autumn 1999): 113-28, and Michael Zuckerman, "Through a 
Glass Darkly: Countryman's Radical American Revolution," WMQ, 3rd ser. 53:2 (April 
1996): 373-78. 
7 
trade changed the way they lived and some native cultural revivalists, such as the 
Delaware prophet Neolin in the 1760s, argued for a return to traditional native lifeways. 
But many more Indians throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries chose 
European trade for the benefits it gave them and became well-informed and capable 
consumers. 
8 
Emphasizing the local conditions and social strategies that influenced and bound 
individuals and small groups together in the backcountry is valuable in interpreting the 
kind of dynamics that typified fort-based relationships. Indians and Europeans were not 
simply their national imperatives writ small. In close company and at the mercy of a 
frequently unsympathetic natural environment, they often found cultural common ground 
in spite of their larger purposes and prejudices. Indians' concepts of power and 
spirituality influenced their resistance and diplomacy efforts as much as trade and 
politics.9 Local cultural accommodations took place wherever Indians met Europeans in 
8For Indians' use of consumerism for their own purposes, see James Axtell, "The 
First Consumer Revolution," in Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125-51, and Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as 
Consumers in the Eighteenth Century," in Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the 
Third North American Fur Trade Conference, eds. Carol M. Judd and Ray (Toronto: 
University ofToronto Press, 1980), 255-71. 
9Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian 
Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
8 
the Great Lakes region, redefining the entire notion oflndian-European diplomacy.10 
Cultural brokers, negotiators and translators who moved seamlessly between cultural 
worlds helped bridge the differences between Indians and Europeans at the local level in 
pursuit of larger colonial goals. 11 One recent essay collection concentrates on 
backcountcy contact points to redefine the concept of frontiers, identifying several 
physical and conceptual arenas of cultural change with diverse, permeable meanings. 
These studies suggest an early American world where no outcomes seemed inevitable to 
the participants. They reveal frontiers that were constantly negotiated using strategies 
informed by local priorities and outside imperatives. Most importantly, they move closer 
10Richard White describes the process of cultural accommodation as one where 
"diverse peoples adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative, 
and often expedient, misunderstandings." His "middle ground" was a place "in between 
cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages" where 
Indians and Europeans could negotiate cultural parameters in multitudes of localities. 
White's influential model created a paradigm that presents a powerful method for 
locating cultural diffusion in local geographic and conceptual arenas, though his 
application of this model is only intended to represent cultural negotiations in the Great 
Lakes region. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x. White's view of 
cultural accommodations forming in small, multiethnic native refugee towns has been 
challenged since the publication of his groundbreaking study. See the articles in the 
William and Mary Quarterly's January 2006 forum on The Middle Ground, especially 
Heide Bodaker, '"Nindoodemag': The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in 
the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701 ," and Brett Rushforth, "Slavery, the Fox 
Wars, and the Limits of Alliance," WMQ, 3rd ser. 63:1 (January 2006): 23-52, 53-80. For 
a study ofthe historiographical impact ofWhite's study, see Catherine Desbarats, 
"Following The Middle Ground," 81-96, in the same volume. 
11Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York-
Iroquois Relations, 1664-1701," Journal of American History 75:1 (June 1988): 40-67; 
James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier. 
New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), esp. 28-34. Merrell's study challenges 
notions of ubiquitous, small-scale, creative cultural negotiations and instead asserts the 
role of experienced cultural brokers in bringing people together in the backcountry. For a 
historiography of this literature, describing its promise and pitfalls, see Philip Levy, 
Fellow Travelers: Indians and Europeans Contesting the Early American Trail 
(Gainesville: University Press ofFlorida, 2007), 149n9. 
9 
to interpreting Indian-white interactions from a native vantage. Viewing fort studies from 
the perspectives of Indians emphasizes the efforts and importance of individual contact in 
the backcount:ry, the fluidity of cultural exchange and influence, the difficulties and 
promises fostered by mutual misunderstandings, and the degree to which backcountry 
contingencies could often squelch larger political, military, and economic purposes. 12 
This study examines five British forts in colonial America to emphasize the 
interweaving of local and general socio-cultural imperatives at backcountry contact 
points. In each case Indian traditions and cultural imperatives mixed with colonial 
military missions and everyday challenges of life in and near outposts. Imperial 
12 Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute, eds., Contact Points: American 
Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750-1830 (Chapel Hill: University 
ofNorth Carolina Press, 1998), 1-15. Seeing backcountry contact points as touchstones 
for cultural dynamism helps illuminate the kinds of interactions that took place near forts. 
A "contact point" vantage reorients the notion of frontiers as small places full of dynamic 
potential and promise, rather than large geographic boundaries or empty places. It also · 
helps avoid the Eurocentric perspective contained in older notions of frontiers. From the 
localized perspective of a fort or Indian town, the only frontiers that mattered were the 
ones that defined personal meetings and exchanges between people from diverse 
backgrounds. For a particularly rich example, see Lucy Eldersveld Murphy's study of 
accommodation between Indians, Europeans, and Metis in fur trading and mining 
communities in the Fox-Wisconsin river country. She posits that negotiation of gender 
roles in such communities determined the success and failure of accommodation. "To 
Live Among Us: Accommodation, Gender, and Conflict in the Western Great Lakes 
Region, 1760-1832," in Contact Points, 270-303. Examples of studies that provide 
models for understanding Indian-European motives from a native perspective include 
Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British 
Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), James Axtell, "Through 
Another Glass Darkly: Early Indian Views of Europeans" in After Columbus: Essays in 
the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
125-43, James H. Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from 
European Contact through the Era of Removal (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), and 
Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples, 
1724-1774 (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1992). Daniel K. Richter has argued 
for a complete redefinition of colonial American history based on the Indians' point of 
view in Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
10 
objectives and pan-Indian concerns run through each of these case studies. But this 
dissertation moves toward a view ofbackcountry contact points as places where local 
concerns often trumped outside strategies. This often created tension between the liminal 
worlds of fort-based relations and the responsibilities and goals of outside Indian and 
British societies. But for the Indians and military people who met, traded, and parleyed at 
forts, immediate concerns defined a kind of cultural exchange separate from outside 
traditions, values, and imperatives. One of the hardest parts of fort-based interactions for 
both British and Indian participants was negotiating the terms of these small liminal 
arenas while still answering the pressures of outside responsibilities. Forts were their own 
little worlds. This study seeks to recognize elements of interaction that could take place 
only in backcountry contact points, instead of seeing forts merely as peripheral outposts 
of empire. Looking at these cases from an Indian perspective, as much as possible, helps 
to prevent being lead astray by the overwhelming European cultural saturation of the 
primary documents. 
Unfortunately, this Eurocentric documentary bias is difficult to avoid when 
studying forts. Documents from the American colonial period were almost all recorded 
by Europeans, and even those documents relating Indian speech were taken down by 
European scribes and filtered through English and French interpreters. This problem is 
I 
exacerbated by the military requirements of fort life. Commandants and Indian agents 
filed regular reports and wrote many letters, but almost all of them were official in nature 
and dealt with military matters, operations relating to their European rivals, and the 
everyday logistics of fort life. Indian affairs were frequent topics of these 
communications, but fort personnel usually recorded only 'vital' information: Indian 
11 
threats, amounts and costs oflndian presents, minutes of diplomatic congresses, and 
other details deemed important enough to send on to military and political superiors. 
Ethnographic information is difficult to glean from most fort-related source material. 
There are notable exceptions to this dearth of useful Indian material. Raymond 
Demere, the South Carolina officer who commanded Fort Loudoun in what is now 
eastern Tennessee, seems to have spent every waking moment writing in great detail 
about Indian activities. Colonel John Wilkins, the penultimate commandant of Fort 
Chartres in Illinois, kept a detailed journal oflndian activities at the fort during his 
command. But even these rich sources are laden with the biases of the writers and are 
problematic sources for studying Indian activity. Archaeology does not help much in this 
regard either. Fort sites have presented sparse evidence of the presence oflndians, which 
is surprising given our documentary knowledge of abundant Indian activity near such 
posts as Crown Point, Michilimackinac, Niagara, Chartres, and many others.13 Since all 
of the source material must be sifted for European bias and military and trade 
prerogatives, any attempt to reconstruct Indian activities wholly from these sources 
remains problematic. What emerge from the sources are stories of the European 
13 A good example of this paucity is David R. Starbuck's survey of British military 
sites in upstate New York, where thousands oflndians joined British soldiers in staging 
military operations during the colonial wars of the eighteenth century. The material 
culture found or reported relates much useful information about army life, but little about 
native activities. Fort archaeology is often limited by the goals or preconceptions of 
historical societies, donors, or the archaeologists themselves. If archaeologists look for 
military evidence instead of native culture, then that is what they are more likely to find. 
But in the case of Crown Point, Fort Edwards, and other New York sites, it is more likely 
that Indians stayed for short periods of time, and used European materials and transient 
settlement methods that might not easily appear in the archaeological record. British fort 
sites tend to tum up the expected evidence of military and trading activities, but 
frustratingly little about the efforts oflndian allies and neighbors. Starbuck, The Great 
Warpath: British Military Sites from Albany to Crown Point (Hanover, NH: University 
Press ofNew England, 1999). 
12 
occupation of these posts that are complicated by the ethnohistorical Indian vantage, 
rather than true histories oflndian participants.14 But even iflndians' activities near 
British forts cannot be described in rich detail, it is still fruitful to examine the substantial 
extent of Indian agency apparent in the sources. 
Fort personnel always found out quickly that Indians and their lifeways would 
matter greatly to their missions. The initial interaction processes certainly followed 
pragmatic guidelines; both Indians and Europeans knew what had worked before, and 
used experience and common sense to learn the "rules" of their new surroundings and 
neighbors. Often an experienced cultural broker, usually an Indian agent or trader, would 
help with this process. Negotiating a working relationship with local and visiting Indians 
was vital. Garrisons, traders, and Indian agents, far from the support and conveniences of 
European culture, had to fmd ways to accommodate the pressures of the natural 
environment in order to find food, traverse the backcountry, and conduct warfare. This 
necessitated establishing peaceful relations with local natives who already possessed the 
information and skills necessary to establish a successful outpost. 
While immediate confrontation and violence could ensue from these meetings, 
especially in times of heightened political tensions, cooperation was often the first 
instinct ofboth natives and newcomers. Forts were places where Indians could 
temporarily put aside their mistrust of newcomers and receive news of far-off events and 
material gifts. Soldiers, traders, and craftsmen living in backcountry outposts had 
separated themselves from many of the rules and structures of their own societies, despite 
14A recent exception is James H. Merrell's study of the multiethnic Indian trading 
village of Shamokin, whose residents experienced significant change when Pennsylvania 
located Fort Augusta there. "Shamokin, 'The Very Seat ofthe Prince of Darkness': 
Unsettling the Early American Frontier," in Cayton and Teute, Contact Points, 16-59. 
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their maintenance of military rigor and discipline. In their new zone of interaction, they 
inhabited a cultural arena separate from their European-colonial world, where 
cooperation with their new neighbors meant success and survival. Indians seeking trade 
and other perceived benefits ofEuropean friendship entered the same arena when they 
interacted with fort personnel. This stage of backcountry interaction contained great 
promise for coexistence and mutual benefit, as long as the powerful outside pressures of 
European and Indian objectives allowed forts and their surrounding landscapes to remain 
centers of cultural confluence rather than sites of opposition and conflict.15 
For British officers and soldiers, these outside pressures were constant, especially 
during wartime. Forts served a multitude of roles in colonial America. First and foremost, 
fortifications served as bulwarks against military incursions by European enemies or as 
marks of possession for Great Britain or its colonial governments. During conflicts such 
as the Seven Years' War, forts and garrisons were almost always on alert and anned as 
well as finances would allow. Carts and bateaux would traverse fragile supply lines 
through harsh terrain to support the posts. Still, forts and other outposts were self-
sufficient to a degree corresponding with their remoteness. Soldiers worked as hunters, 
fishermen, woodcutters, and farmers to supply posts with food and fuel. Communication 
with outside authorities was as fragile as the supply lines. Fort commandants were 
15Liminality is a useful framework for understanding this stage of cultural 
meetings, even though many people interacting near military forts did not allow 
themselves to change culturally. The theory posits a middle stage of change defined by 
heightened communication and cooperation, and a partial, sometimes temporary 
abandonment of previously held cultural values and structures. Though the theory 
initially described social and cultural rites of passage, the concept is helpful in 
understanding places and situations where all manner of interactions took place. Victor 
Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites of Passage," in Betwixt and 
Between: Patterns of Masculine and Feminine Initiation, eds. Louise Carus Mahdi, 
Steven Foster, and Meredith Little (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 3-19. 
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expected to keep the peace with Indians who controlled the country and its lines of 
communication and to punish them if they attacked British travelers or troops. This was 
especially important at small outposts and blockhouses, which were almost wholly at the 
mercy of the local populations. In larger forts like Niagara, Pitt, or Chartres, garrisons 
could hold off Indian attacks but were always subject to siege warfare; only trenches and 
European artillery could reduce a substantial stone or earthen fort. But in most places, 
British forts needed Indian help to carry out their primary mission of holding the 
continental interior against French and Spanish foes. 16 
Forts were also centers oftrade and thus attracted Indian activity. Not all forts 
allowed trade activities within the walls ofthe palisade. Frequent Indian visitors, some of 
them unfamiliar with unsure allegiances, created an unacceptable breach of security if 
allowed the run of the post. Instead, traders would travel to Indians' villages or operate 
from trading towns adjacent to the fort, as was the case at Pittsburgh, Detroit, and many 
other locations. Valuable loads of trade goods would often be stored in the forts for 
protection against theft by natives or Europeans. But the main object of forts in the Indian 
16The most complete social history of British military experience in the American 
backcountry is Michael N. McConnell, Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the 
American Frontier, 1758-1775 (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 2005), esp. 32-52 
for an overview of the various kinds of forts used west of the Appalachians. For the roles 
ofbackcountly forts and soldiers in Virginia and Pennsylvania during the Seven Years' 
War, see Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia 
and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 
100-07, and R. S. Stephenson, "Pennsylvania Provincial Soldiers in the Seven Years' 
War," Pennsylvania History 62 (1995): 196-213. Establishing larger European 
backcountcy forts in the second half of the eighteenth century transformed Indian-
European combat. Guerilla fighting, which dominated North American warfare 
throughout the previous century, gave way to siege warfare as French, and later British, 
military contingencies demanded more substantial forts to guard larger regional army 
units and naval operations. Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 221-22. 
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trade was to protect trade operations themselves. Indian consumers knew that British 
garrisons could launch small-scale punitive expeditions and offer refuge for traders 
against Indian breaches of trust. However, it was often the Indians' themselves who 
needed protection against disreputable traders. Fort commandants were not only guards 
of English interests, but often the only representatives of English authority available. This 
made them responsible for enforcing trade agreements between the crown or individual 
colonies and Indian groups. Indians never ceased to request British intercession in trade 
. h "d d c. • 17 practices t ey cons1 ere un1arr. 
Given the extent to which backcountry forts have been imagined as agents of 
Indian dispossession and oppression, it is surprising that Indians found so much use for 
them. Enforcement of trade regulations was one of the reasons. Protection of Indian 
families against French and native aggression was another. This was especially true in 
Iroquoia during the Seven Years' War, when the British military sought the aid of allied 
Iroquois groups in their efforts against France. Iroquois leaders made it clear that their aid 
would never materialize unless New York agreed to build forts to protect Indian families 
while their men assisted in military operations. These requests for forts and blockhouses 
to be built near Iroquois "castles" were frequent during the early years of the war, though 
colonial governments strained to provide the funding. Sir William Johnson, who later 
became Superintendent of the Indian Department in the North, adamantly argued for the 
establishment of as many forts as the Iroquois requested at the outset ofthe Seven Years' 
17See chapter 1 for many examples ofthis role of fort personnel. 
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War.18 In addition to the refuge forts would offer Iroquois families, they would also 
invigorate the fur trade, which was often depressed during wartime because of the lack of 
adequate protection. The Six Nations understood their importance to British wartime 
objectives. They used their influence to demand forts when necessary and to control the 
shape and mission of forts and garrisons when possible. For example, in February 1756 
an Oneida speaker, Canaghquaeson, reminded Johnson of the many Oneida requests for a 
fort. His requests were more like demands. He informed Johnson politely of the Oneidas' 
"unanimous resolution of having one," and insisted on a reputable garrison that would 
prevent trade irregularities and excessive sales of rum.19 
Indians demanded friendly and dependable garrisons, even ifthey did not always 
get along with them. During King George's War, William Johnson pointed this out to 
New York governor George Clinton, who wished to employ Iroquois men as permanent 
scouts at Fort Saratoga. Indians would rather fight the French directly in Canada, 
according to Johnson, rather than "keep in a Garrison among so many Christians."20 
Regular soldiers often possessed little experience with Indian contact or knowledge of 
their customs. Provincial troops were occasionally settlers, serving in defense of their 
farms and families against French and Indian threats. More often they were day laborers 
or artisans who were unfamiliar with military rigor or Indian affairs. 21 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that garrisons sometimes treated Indians with less tolerance or politeness than 
18Johnson to Shirley, Apr. 9, 1756, in The Papers of Sir William Johnson, eds. 
James Sullivan, et al. (Albany: University ofthe State ofNew York, 1921-65), 9:424-25 
(hereafter cited as W JP). 
19
"An Indian Conference," WJP, 9:378-79. For other instances oflroquois 
requests for forts, see WJP 2:488-90, 768-69; 9:334,370, 414-16, 457-58, 498, 568-69. 
20Johnson to Clinton, Mar. 18, 1746, WJP, 1:80-82. 
21Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 107-21. 
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native customs demanded. For example, during the Seven Years' War, a young Mohawk 
man approached Fort Johnson in New York to welcome the newly arrived garrison. 
Instead of being greeted with hospitality and presents, the young man was insulted and 
sent away. Soon afterward some ofthe garrison entered the town surrounding the fort and 
assaulted Indians there, injuring one seriously. Several Mohawk chiefs complained 
angrily to Johnson, demanding that he either replace the garrison with men who were 
"acquainted with them and their Customs" or face the violent consequences. 22 
British affronts were often simple acts of disrespect or impoliteness, which stoked 
suspicions that officers and enlisted men did not have the Indians' interests at heart. This 
was especially true in areas such as New York and Pennsylvania where forts had been 
built with the permission oflndian allies. For example, in 1762 an Onondaga speaker 
complained that officers at frontier posts would not speak with his people as friends 
should. "The Officers at the several Posts, when we want to Say anything to them on 
Business, Trade, etc. will not hear Us, or look upon Us, but tell us they have nothing to 
say, or do with Us, nor with the Trade," he complained to Johnson. "So that really we are 
in a very bad Situation, and wish that there were such Officers as wou'd behave more 
friendly to Us." The Onondaga speaker also wished that there were more trained 
interpreters available to prevent such "misunderstandings."23 
22Threats oflndian violence were almost never made explicitly to British allies; 
such threats would be considered breaches of polite diplomacy. Instead, headmen would 
warn of the unstable tempers of their ''young men" and how difficult it was to keep them 
under control if offended. "Journal oflndian Affairs," WJP, 13:104-07; Johnson to James 
Abercromby, Jan. 14, 1758, WJP, 2:771-73. 
23
"An Indian Conference," WJP, 10:505-08. For a Pennsylvania example of 
Indian complaints against garrisons, see Croghan to Johnson, Sep. 4, 1762, WJP, 3:873-
75. 
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As much as Indians complained about fort personnel, their greater fears were that 
backcountry forts would attract British civilian settlers. Indian groups throughout eastern 
North America actively and consistently resisted increased settlement. "The Indians are 
much more dissatisfied at the appearance of Settlers, than ever at a Garrison," Johnson 
wrote to British commander-in-chiefThomas Gage in 1767, "As the former increases and 
overspreads the country."24 Conflicts between Indians and backcountry colonists 
occurred frequently throughout the colonial period. English settlers, unlike many of their 
French forbears, were mainly farmers bent on clearing woods for arable land. This 
destroyed hunting and fishing sites and upset the environmental balance of Indian 
lifeways. After the devastating geographic dislocations of the seventeenth century, many 
Indian groups, especially those in the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region, were 
determined to oppose increased English settlement into the West. The Proclamation of 
1763, which forbade new settlements west of the Appalachian range, was intended to 
placate disgruntled Indians as well as to forestall individual colonies' land claims. But as 
Indians knew well, colonial governments needed backcountry settlements to strengthen 
their land claims and to profit from commodities produced in the West. Only settlers and 
their plows could successfully transform sections of the American West into British or 
provincial strongholds. Examples ofviolent incidents between backcountry settlers and 
Indians are too numerous to mention here. Of the five forts included as main topics in this 
24Johnson to Gage, Sep. 22, 1767, in the Thomas Gage Papers, American Series, 
William C. Clements Library, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor, vol. 70 (hereafter 
cited as Gage Papers AS). 
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study, four feature Indian-settler animosities as primary sources of regional conflict.25 
Even during wartime some English-allied Indians looked upon forts and large 
garrisons as agents of domination, despite their other advantages. An Onondaga 
delegation made this clear to the proprietors of Pennsylvania in 1756 when the province 
announced plans to build Fort Augusta near Shamokin. "We cannot comprehend the 
method of making war which is made use of, by our Brethren the English," they 
complained. "When we go toWar, our manner is to destroy a Nation & theres an end of 
it. But the English Chiefly regard building Forts, which Looks as if their only Scheme 
was to take possession of the Lands. "26 Cherokees treating with the French governor of 
Louisiana spoke openly of English forts as sites of oppression and scorned them as 
"Houses of Force" and "horred Magazines.'.27 This attitude only worsened during times 
of peace when threats ofFrench depredations decreased. Kanadiohara, a Genesee Seneca 
chief, complained in April 1762 that British blockhouses built between German Flats and 
25Indian-settler relations were not always, or even usually, contentious. Indians 
and settlers often found much common ground, and their mutual animosities are only 
accentuated here because it was a common source for native fears of forts. Studying 
relations between European settlers and Indians in the backcountry demands a nuanced 
approach that takes into account the religious, racial, cultural, national, and economic 
issues involved. Just about every study of the trans-Appalachian frontier examines a facet 
of this relationship. For a concise discussion and synthesis ofthese issues, see Gregory H. 
Nobles, "Breaking Into the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early American 
Frontier, 1750-1800," WMQ, 3rd ser. 43:4 (Oct. 1989): 641-670. For lower Mississippi 
examples ofindian-settler-slave interactions, see Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers, 
and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783 
(Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1992), 149-218. For a post-Revolution 
look at New York Indian-settler issues, see Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, 
Settlers, and the Northern Borderlands of the American Revolution (New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006), 128-41. For a full-length study ofindian-settler violence and how it 
affected notions of frontiers and nationalism, see Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: 
Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). 
26
"Extracts ofindian Papers," WJP, 9:517. 
27
"Preliminary Articles ofPeace Between Kerlerac and the Cherokees," WJP, 
9:574-81. 
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Oswego in New York had been represented originally as temporary wartime outposts, but 
now looked more pennanent. He outlined several abuses by officers and soldiers and 
asked that the forts be removed immediately, "as the French are now entirely 
Conquered. "28 Iroquois speakers made the same request in the multiethnic village of 
Oquaga later that year and warned of imminent violence. "Some of our Warriors are 
foolish," they warned Johnson, "And some of our Brothers soldiers don't fear God." 
They pleaded that the forts be "pull'd down & kick'd out of the way" before conflict 
ensued?9 Indian acceptance of British forts was based upon necessity and the degree to 
which they could detennine the goals, size, and pennanence of the posts. 
If Indians decided that British forts did not answer their needs, the consequences 
could be severe, especially for smaller posts. The cost of failing to meet native 
expectations was made most apparent during the 1763-1764 Indian uprising, sometimes 
called Pontiac's Rebellion. In the space of a few weeks, every Great Lakes and Ohio 
Valley post that France had ceded to Britain in the 1763 Treaty ofParis fell to Indian 
attack save the large posts at Detroit, Niagara, and Pittsburgh. Both Detroit and Fort Pitt 
endured months-long sieges, and Niagara's portage was attacked and held in a virtual 
state of siege by Genesee Senecas. Forts throughout the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes 
region either succumbed to attack or were abandoned. The story of this rebellion has 
undergone years of interpretive rigor, from Parkman's early depiction of a desperate last-
ditch battle of the races, to modem studies that emphasize Indian agency, power, and 
28
"Indian Proceedings," WJP, 3:707. 
29Indians at Oquaga to Johnson, Aug. 30, 1762, WJP, 3:870-72. Iroquois groups, 
feeling crowded and threatened by the mid-eighteenth century, resented new forts except 
when military contingencies demanded them. For more examples of requests for the 
destruction of forts after the French threat had passed, see WJP, 4:125, 196-203; 8:644-
47. 
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geographic defense as motives.30 But the attacks of the Indian uprising show much from a 
localized perspective as well. Military reports show a remarkable level of familiarity at 
small outposts between Indians and soldiers. At Michilimackinac, soldiers casually 
enjoyed watching a game of bag' gat' iway, an Indian ball game, moments before the 
Ojibwa attackers overran the fort. Fort Miamis was taken by surprise when the British 
commandant, Ensign Robert Holmes, was (perhaps unintentionally) lured into a fatal trap 
by the native woman who shared his bed. The garrison of Fort Edward Augustus, 
formerly Fort La Baye in Wisconsin, listened to the warnings of their native friends from 
across Lake Michigan and abandoned their post before it was attacked. Despite mutual 
fears and distrusts that were great enough to spark a wide-scale Indian rebellion, British 
fort personnel and Indians enjoyed considerable closeness at the localleve1.31 
Indians viewed British forts with ambivalence. They visited them frequently for 
trade goods, protection, and information. In some cases Indian women found European 
30After many years in which Parkman's The Conspiracy of Pontiac and Howard 
H. Peckham's Pontiac and the Indian Uprising remained the only familiar and full 
studies ofthe conflict, recent writers have contributed a wave of scholarship on this 
important period. Richard White asserts the reemergence of Indian diplomatic agency 
because ofthe rebellion. The Middle Ground, 269-314. Michael N. McConnell sees the 
uprising as a collection of local conflicts woven together, including a "Western Indian 
Defensive War" against further British encroachment in the Ohio Valley. A Country 
Between, 182-206. William R. Nester revisits an older model, blaming the whole thing on 
British commander-in-chief Jeffrey Amherst's incompetent and intolerant Indian policies. 
Haughty Conquerors": Amherst and the Great Indian Uprising of 1763 (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2000). In War Under Heaven, Gregory Evans Dowd reinterprets the 
war in terms of the increasingly polarizing qualities of both British and Indian 
combatants; each side's notions of leadership, autonomy, and spirituality led to a 
breakdown in efforts to interact amicably. See also David Dixon, Never Come To Peace 
Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), and Richard Middleton, Pontiac's War: Its Causes, 
Course, and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
31For sources describing the fall of forts during the Indian uprising of 1763, see 
WJP 10:690-746. See also Dowd, War Under Heaven, 124-28. 
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husbands in these outposts. But many Indians hated the posts, even while they found 
them useful. Forts provided presents of useful goods, provisions, and rum. But they also 
attracted British farmers, to whom Indians were simply in the way. Fort commandants 
used their power to confer presents and regulate trade to treat Indian visitors as 
underlings and dependents, though the visitors were often less than impressed with 
British attempts to act tough and appear manly. Forts were also bases for military 
operations, where thousands oflndiansjoined British and colonial military forces during 
the imperial wars of the eighteenth century. But when British allies failed to treat Indians 
as real friends and partners, Indians could easily tum against them. 
British imperial and provincial authorities shared the natives' ambivalence about 
the outposts, but for different reasons. Colonial policy depended upon capitalizing on 
American natural resources and manufactures. This involved expanding the Indian fur 
trade and increasing agricultural output through proliferation of settlements, and both 
enterprises demanded military protection. Indians approved of and depended on trade, as 
long as it was properly regulated. But the settlements that would inevitably follow 
angered Indians, making most backcountry operations difficult, dangerous, and 
unprofitable. Threats from European enemies mandated keeping military posts 
throughout the backcountry. But British plans to hold the region only made sense if the 
expense of forts and armies in the West was justified by eventual profit. Private joint-
stock companies that provided most of the operating capital for new colonial ventures 
would only invest in backcountry operations if they could be assured of military 
protection. But the Lords of Trade found it difficult to justify the expense of operating 
forts iftrade revenues did not sufficiently enrich the mother country. Provincial 
23 
governments found these expenses even more onerous. How much British policy makers 
remained devoted to an image of America filled with forts flying Union Jacks depended 
upon whether they believed that they could profit from the continental interior. 
Provincial officials often found balancing these concerns difficult. Two of the 
forts in this study, Fort Loudoun in Tennessee and Fort Allen in Pennsylvania, were built 
by provincial governments prompted by the exigencies ofthe Seven Years' War. Fort 
Allen was constructed as part of a defensive line protecting Pennsylvania's cities and 
towns from French and Delaware attacks. Because it was a response to an emergency, 
Fort Allen's construction was not controversial or challenged by the provincial 
government. But as time went on and the fort seemed to offer more advantages for 
visiting Indians than for Pennsylvania's traders or settlers, its continued maintenance 
became problematic for provincial officials. 
Fort Loudoun's story presented a different set of problems for South Carolina's 
government. The fort would be hundreds of miles from Charlestown in the Tennessee 
Overbills country, and seemed to be proposed almost entirely to please the British-allied 
Overhill Cherokees. No emergency prompted its building except persistent rumors of 
imminent French incursions into the region and reports of Cherokee duplicity. But 
colonial officials argued that the long-term economic strength of the colony demanded 
that staunch Cherokee friends guard the ''wild" backcountry. Of course, the personnel at a 
fort built largely to please Indian allies had to put Indian affairs above all other concerns. 
In the end, Fort Loudoun did poorly in guaranteeing South Carolina's prosperity because 
it failed to please its Cherokee neighbors. 
24 
Enforcing military policy in the trans-Appalachian West fell to the British army. 
This made the political balancing act even more troublesome because military readiness 
mandated holding forts won from France during the Seven Years' War. But the 
operations were so expensive and dangerous that even commander-in-chief Gage became 
an ardent opponent of the fort system. Anything that annoyed Indians made little sense to 
Gage. Unhappy Indians undermined the fur trade and made the continental interior 
unprofitable. He argued that forts had proven incapable of protecting Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and the Carolinas during the Seven Years' War. They were unsuited to 
managing the Indian trade because of their stationary locations; traders and Indian agents 
living near native population centers were preferable. Colonists would do no better in 
Indian country than forts to enrich the empire because the backcountry's remoteness 
made any crops raised or merchandise produced there too expensive. Gage's biggest 
concern was Indian dissatisfaction with British encroachment. "I know of nothing so 
liable to bring on a serious Quarrell with the Indians, as an Invasion oftheir Property," 
Gage wrote to the Earl of Hillsborough, the British Secretary of State for the colonies. 
"Were they drove from their Forest, the Peltry Trade would decrease, and it is not 
impossible that worse Savages would take refuge in them." By the early 1770s he was 
proposing that forts be abandoned, new settlements restricted, and Britain's Indian 
trading partners be left alone. "Let the Savages enjoy their Deserts in quiet, little 
Bickerings that will unavoidably sometimes happen," Gage recommended, after many 
years of failing to provide Britain with a profitable backcountry.32 
32Gage to Hillsborough, Nov. 10, 1770, Gage Papers, English Series, William C. 
Clements Library, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor, vol. 19 (hereafter cited as Gage 
Papers ES). 
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Sir William Johnson knew that maintaining former French forts would be 
difficult. French Indian agents, traders, and habitants had spent decades spreading stories 
of British native-extirpation plans. New British garrisons, usually much larger than those 
employed by France, seemed to many Indians a fulfillment of those threats. Backcountry 
forts, according to Johnson, could "in no way prevent the Invasion of the Indians," who 
could easily skirt the forts in small parties, elude the pursuits of garrisons, destroy and 
sack boats and settlements, and cut off supply routes. More importantly, the forts were 
increasingly seen by natives as an effort to "hem in" and check Indians' movements, 
making it more likely that natives would reject the posts' advantages and attack them. 
Settlers were familiar with the kind of devastation and cruelty Indians sometimes could 
visit upon backcountry inhabitants during times of conflict, and fleeing colonists 
provided no advantages to Britain. Johnson believed that smaller posts, using the "French 
Maxim" of rewarding Indians with presents, were the best way to maintain trade and 
good relations with the native masters the trans-Appalachian country.33 
Presents were the key to keeping Indians happy. at forts because they answered the 
Indians' need to believe and trust in their European partners. Part of the present exchange 
was functional from the Indians' perspective. They had come to depend upon presents of 
food, ammunition, clothing, rum, and other necessities and had incorporated presents into 
their materiallifeways. Restricting them caused economic harm to native groups. But 
even more importantly, presents were physical signs that the people giving them were 
truly friends. Indian notions of hospitality demanded that visitors receive good treatment 
33Johnson to the Earl of Egremont, May 1762, WJP, 460-65; Johnson to the Lords 
ofTrade, Aug. 20, 1762, WJP, 3:865-69; Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, June 9, 1764, 
WJP, 4:442-44. 
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and something of value from their hosts. When Indians came to forts their visits were 
leaps of faith, at least in part. They had no way ofknowing the efficacy ofBritish or 
French words. But to give valuable goods to a friend was a step toward proving one's 
love and trustworthiness. Indians reasonably intetpreted any restriction or retrenchment 
of presents as an alteration ofthe tenns ofEuropean-Indian friendship. Such actions 
could have dire consequences for future amities.34 
Indian expectations of presents made forts very expensive propositions. Sir 
Jeffiey Amherst, Gage's predecessor, wondered why Indians should be rewarded for 
simply visiting forts when other occupants of the Americas made their livings through 
labor and trade. During the Indian uprising in 1763, Amherst told Johnson that when 
hostilities ended, the Indians involved should only expect a resumption of trade. "As to 
presents, it would certainly be the highest presumption in them to expect any," he told his 
Indian supervisor. "They can never be considered by us as a people to whom we owe 
rewards, and it would madness, to the highest degree, ever to bestow favors on a race 
who have so treacherously, and without provocation on our side, attacked our Posts, and 
34A classic study oflndian gifts is Wilbur R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: 
Anglo-French Rivalry along the Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 17 48-17 63 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1950). For a more recent exploration of the ways Indians 
understood and used gifts, see David Murray, Indian Giving: Economies of Power in 
Indian-White Exchanges (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 27-38. On 
the social and cultural meanings of Indian presents, see White, The Middle Ground, 112-
15, 403-04. For a concise study showing the importance of gift-giving in maintaining 
Indian-European reciprocal relations, and how Indian pleas for pity and claims of poverty 
were often more ritual than reality, see Bruce M. White, "Give Us a Little Milk': The 
Social and Cultural Meaning of Gift Giving in the Lake Superior Fur Trade," in 
Rendezvous: Selected Papers of the Fourth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1981, 
ed. Thomas C. Buckley (St. Paul, MN: The Conference, 1984), 185-97. 
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butchered our Garrisons."35 Amherst's effort to restrict presents was an important trigger 
ofthe 1763 uprising.36 
Gage knew better than Amherst the extent to which Indians saw presents as 
persistent proofs of friendship, and he understood the inseparability of maintaining forts 
and giving gifts. "As long as there are Forts in the Indian Country," he wrote to 
Hillsborough, "The distant Indians accustomed to transact all Business there, will still 
haunt the Forts, on many Pretences, of Business with the Commanders, whether on the 
subjects of Trade or Negotiation, and they are never to be turned away, without some 
Present."37 Indians understood the importance oftheir friendship to British colonial plans, 
and availed themselves of the proofs of that friendship whenever they could .. Indians did 
not see this as bribery; they knew the difference between gifts and payment for services 
rendered. As long as Indians equated gifts with friendship and trustworthiness the fort 
system would remain expensive. 
One gift that troubled British fort personnel more than any other was liquor. 
Physical dependency not the issue; Indians were almost never addicted to alcohol. 
Though it was one of the most popular trade goods plied in the backcountry, the supply 
was never constant or dependable enough for many Indians to become dependent upon it. 
35 Amherst to Johnson, Sep. 30, 1763, in Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of the State of New York, eds. E. B. 0' Callaghan and Berthold Femow (Albany, 
NY: Weed, Parsons, 1853-1887), 7:568-69 (hereafter cited as NYCD). 
36Generations of historians have placed most of the blame for the uprising on 
Amherst's unfortunate Indian policies. Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and 
the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, 2 vols. (1851, repr., Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1994), 1 :181,195; Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994), 70-72; Nester, "Haughty Conquerers," 
passim. Dowd sees Amherst's gift policy not as the cause of the uprising, but as a trigger. 
War Under Heaven, 72-78. 
37Gage to Hillsborough, Sep. 9, 1769, WJP, 6:356. 
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Nor were Indians any more susceptible to its intoxicating effects than anyone else in 
colonial America. The difference between Indians and Europeans was in how alcohol 
was used. To native consumers, alcohol was almost purely a means of intoxication, which 
had many social and cultural advantages. While intoxicated, Indians swept aside the cares 
and responsibilities ofthe world. The normal restrictions of social reciprocity did not 
hold for actions committed while drunk. Furthermore, intoxication was a state similar to 
dreaming, in which Indians could communicate with lost friends or the spirit world. 
Strong drink also fulfilled native social roles, such as welcoming and mourning rituals. 
Indians did not share the European concept of drinking as a social pleasure or as a brace 
against illness or cold. But drunkenness and alcohol abuse brought all the same 
devastations to native lifeways that existed in European culture, including violence, 
disease, poverty, and domestic upheaval. Despite attempts to control its sale and spread 
by both Indians and Europeans, rum and brandy became important consumables in native 
life. Indians would purchase it ifthey could, but they also expected presents of liquor 
when visiting their friends in French and British forts.38 
This tendency oflndians and traders to use British forts as alcohol markets 
bothered British authorities, but there was little anyone could do about the problem 
except scold the participants. Indians expected rum at the posts and left "disgusted" if 
they did not receive it.39 Liquor provided a perfect excuse for native activities that the 
38For a recent study that covers the topic in detail, including alcohol's importance 
in native rituals and social practices, see Peter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and 
Alcohol in Early America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). See also Dowd, 
War Under Heaven, 103-04; Axtell, The Invasion Within, 64-67. 
39William Dunbar to Gage, Aug. 31, 1763, Gage Papers AS, vol. 9. 
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British found troubling, such as intelligence gathering and raiding settlements.40 Most 
worrisome for fort personnel was when Indians used the fort itself as a drinking 
establishment or store. Johnson berated Iroquois leaders for not restricting these 
activities. "Your People are daily coming hither with Numbers of Kegs as if this was a 
Trading House for Rum," he scolded Six Nations representatives at Fort Johnson.41 Gage 
observed that native leaders "constantly complain that it is brought to them," but despite 
their complaints ''they can't refrain from drinking it and even demand it, and are angry 
when it is refused.'"'2 Fort commandants attempted to restrict the sale of rum repeatedly, 
and tried to include less alcohol in their allocation of presents. When Indians obtained 
alcohol near a fort, they were sometimes required to consume it some distance away. 
Liquor struck at the heart of British attempts to impose mastery over a region. If 
Indians viewed military posts as places for entertainment and alcohol, then the forts' roles 
as intimidating outposts of empire would be undermined. Because liquor was one 
commodity that only Europeans could provide in volume and one that the military felt the 
need to guard and restrict, Indians would continue to associate forts and alcohol 
throughout the colonial period and beyond. 
For these reasons and others, Indians continued to visit British forts wherever they 
existed, despite their frequently held resentments. Some of those forts were built at the 
behest oflndians, who took care that posts not be used to subvert Indian culture or to 
destroy Indian lives. Other forts were strongly opposed, but native diplomats, warriors, 
and women did their best to ensure that the forts and garrisons would not attract settlers 
40Johnson to Gage, Mar. 1759, Gage Papers AS, vol. 2; "An Indian Conference," 
Aug. 11, 1762, WJP, 10:480-83. 
41
"Indian Proceedings," Apr. 26-27, 1757, WJP, 9:693-94. 
42Gage to Hillsborough, Sep. 8, 1770, Gage Papers ES, vol. 18. 
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or endanger their people. In every case Indians saw British backcountry forts as fixtures 
upon their native landscape. Forts often occupied important geographic points that 
Indians were bound to pass. But despite the redcoats and British colonial aspirations 
within, Indians did not see forts as alien. There was nothing unusual to Indians about 
firearms, fighting men, and wooden pales. 
British fort personnel hoped that their outposts would be harbingers of the 
successful spread ofEuropean trade and culture. Indians had other ideas. Some used 
violence to advance their aims; others used friendship and diplomacy. Those who did not 
advocate tearing forts down immediately worked to incorporate them into their native 
topography and lifeways. But native acceptance of, and opposition to, military posts in 
the backcountry were not dichotomous features oflndian-white relations. They were 
connected functions in Indians' attempts to negotiate the terms of an unwanted European 
invasion that, by the 1750s, had clearly come to stay. The most surprising notion that 
continually springs from the primary documents of colonial America is the extent to 
which Indian agency persistently affected, redefined, and reordered the missions of 
British frontier forts and their personnel. Far different from the cowering, suspicious 
natives of Cooper's novels and subsequent popular imagination, Indians saw forts as 
Indian-European places, and they were full actors in the dramas played out in these 
centers of cultural confluence. 
Cherokee leaders in the remote Tennessee Overbills provide a potent example of 
this agency. Accommodationist Cherokee headmen wanted coexistence with their British 
allies and fair trade as much as other Indian groups in eastern America. Their undisputed 
command ofthe Tennessee country and military value allowed them to dictate the terms 
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of this alliance to an unusual degree. Powerful headmen such as Overhillleaders Little 
Carpenter and Old Hop used their advantages to negotiate a Cherokee-British frontier 
alliance that would satisfY their desire for fair trade, social status, and domestic security. 
If the Cherokees were the "Key to Carolina" described by South Carolina's governor 
James Glen, then a provincial fort near the headmen's village was the key to maintaining 
the alliance. Little Carpenter and Old Hop wielded a surprising level of control over 
almost every facet ofFort Loudoun's construction. But building Fort Loudoun was only 
the beginning. Unless the fort successfully answered the Cherokees' needs for trade 
regulation and fair treatment, it would only fuel the tempers of anti-British Cherokee 
nativists. Fort Loudoun was built to capture powerful Cherokee leaders' hearts, but its 
failure to navigate the tricky waters of Cherokee village diplomacy helped lead to a 
general Indian uprising and its own downfall. The fort is best known for its violent 
destruction during the Cherokee War, but its construction and maintenance at the behest 
of Cherokee leaders and troubled tenure among the Overbills reveals better the 
complicated role English forts could play in Indian societies. 
While Old Hop and Little Carpenter prodded South Carolina into giving them a 
manned fort, Pennsylvania's provincial government sought protection against new 
Delaware attacks on its northern frontier. Indians did not force the construction of Fort 
Allen or the defensive fort chain of which it was a part. The forts were a response to 
dangers posed to backcountry settlers and Northhampton County's towns. Fort Allen was 
raised on the site of one of the bloodiest raids of the Delaware-British conflict, the 
Moravian Indian village of Gnadenhutten. Once the posts were manned and settler 
communities were secured, Pennsylvania's provincial troops could proceed into Indian 
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country and punish belligerent Delaware groups. But though Indians did not influence 
Fort Allen's construction, they defined its use to a degree unexpected by Pennsylvania's 
officials. Throughout its short history, Indians stayed in and near Fort Allen, using their 
own traditional expectations to remake the fort into a place of native hospitality. The post 
became an Indian way-station, a diplomatic checkpoint, an alcohol-laden ''tippeling 
house," and a trading post. Instead ofkeeping Pennsylvania's settlers free of Indian 
influence, the fort mandated an almost constant Delaware and Iroquois presence in the 
Blue Mountain region. Indians imposed their cultural traits on this tiny post and made 
Fort Allen a place of anxious hospitality instead of frontier protection. 
Coexistence was the first instinct of many Indians, even when their new neighbors 
were despised enemies. This was apparent at Michilimackinac, the important trade depot 
that guarded the strait between Lakes Michigan and Huron. All of Michilimackinac' s 
Ottawa and Ojibwa neighbors possessed longstanding ties to French soldiers and traders. 
They grated at the news that the French king had ceded this important point to the hated 
British at the close of the Seven Years' War. After first attacking and overcoming the fort 
at the straits, local natives accepted the inescapable reality of a British occupation. They 
then used their mastery of foodways to ensure their importance in the new British regime. 
Outside provisioning could not supply all the demands of the post until well after the 
American Revolution, and substantial British garrisons relied on their neighbors to supply 
them with food. By keeping the peace and helping the Michilimackinac garrison, Indians 
reinvigorated their trade, which had suffered during the Seven Years' War and the 17 63 
Indian uprising. Michilimackinac' s commandants, traders, and commissaries provided 
rum to local natives for profit and as gifts. While this relationship lasted, through war and 
peace, food and drink defined a system of social interdependen~e that challenges 
deterministic economic models oflndian decline. Hundreds of miles from any English 
town, in a place where snowfall is measured in meters, Ojibwas, Ottawas, British 
soldiers, and French habitants each brought their own contributions to the cultural mix. 
Only when the continuing British influx overstressed the local food system did the 
Indians' power in the interdependent Michilimackinac culture begin to decrease. 
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While Michilimackinac's Indians negotiated an interdependent relationship with 
their new British neighbors, Genesee Senecas living near the Niagara fort system settled 
for an uneasy coexistence. Genesee Indians occupied a geographic middle ground 
between the British (and their Iroquois allies) in New York and the French regime in 
Canada. For decades they had played the empires off each other to maintain equitable 
trade conditions and to retain their power in western New York and the Niagara corridor. 
With the loss of their French allies at the end of the Seven Years' War, the Genesee 
Senecas had to fmd ways to recreate their customary diplomatic balance. They found 
their opportunity during the Indian uprising of 1763, when they allied themselves with 
Ohio Valley and Great Lakes Indians in defiance of the new North American superpower. 
Fort Niagara's strength proved useless against the Senecas, who knew that the narrow 
portage around Niagara Falls was the most vital point in the entire Great Lakes 
communication system. In the space of a single year, the Genesee Senecas dealt the 
British their worst military defeat of the Indian uprising and then successfully negotiated 
their forgiveness by giving up territory that they had ceded to the British military 
command twice before. The Genesee Indians' violent actions have been interpreted in the 
past as simple exasperation over trade or outrage at losing a few hundred porting jobs at 
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Niagara. But their violence and humility were two parts of the same strategy. After 
France's defeat, they knew they would have to live with British neighbors, and like their 
counterparts at Michilimackinac they sought coexistence under the best terms they could 
manage. At the close of the Niagara peace conference in 1764, both Senecas and Britons 
felt they had reached an equitable concord, despite the appearance of a humiliating 
Seneca land cession. But as the British presence in the Niagara region increased during 
the late 1760s, the Senecas began to realize how far their influence in the region had 
already deteriorated. 
Illinois experienced no such diminution of the uprising's tensions in the mid-
1760s. The region's native groups knew that logistical problems and geographic 
unfamiliarity would hamper any British attempt to hold their newly won western 
holdings. Consequently, Indians resisted the notion of peaceful coexistence at Fort 
Chartres, the seat of British authority in the region, more than Indians in other parts of 
North America. Fort Chartres's personnel would have to impress Illinois's Indians and 
others visiting the fort with displays of their power and toughness if they wished to 
establish the idea of Britain's mastery of the West in the minds of resentful and rebellious 
natives. With the first arrival of British representatives at the huge French fort on (and 
sometimes in) the Mississippi, the contest of intimidation and manliness was on. But 
British troops would soon learn that without control over trade, familiarity with the 
physical and cultural terms of survival in the region, and sufficient material means to 
maintain the promise ofBritish military might, they did not stand a chance. Unable to 
impress Indians at the westernmost edge ofthe empire, British commandants relied on 
continued use of the "French Maxim" of gift-giving to gain Indians' cooperation. But 
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Illinois and Wabash Indians viewed these exuberant displays of love and friendship as 
more evidence ofBritish weakness. In Illinois, Indians did all the intimidating. Fort 
Chartres's unhappy commandants spent worrisome years suffering the threats and 
pandering to the demands of the native masters of the region, until the mission became 
too expensive and the fort literally fell into the muddy Mississippi waters. At Forts 
Loudoun, Allen, Michilimack.inac, and Niagara, Indians glumly understood and accepted 
the British presence in their countries. At Fort Chartres, nothing could convince Indians 
that descendents of these hapless British occupiers would someday dominate the 
continent. 
These five forts and their native visitors illustrate the complicated texture of 
backcountry cultural encounters and relations. They share several attributes. In each 
location, British authority is revealed as malleable and open to negotiation, despite the 
firm imperatives of provincial governments and Britain's American military command. 
Trade availability was a primary concern for Indians, but fairness and sound regulation 
emerge as more important factors. Indians held fort commandants responsible for 
managing disreputable traders. In each location, Indians expected their cultural practices 
to be followed, or at least respected. They also understood the trepidation with which 
British fort personnel held their French enemies, and used that fear to demand presents, 
gun and tool repairs, and interpreters to prevent trade inequities. In none of these cases 
did Indians feel that forts and military personnel endangered their lifeways or control of 
their territories. At worst, they feared that forts would bring civilian encroachment. Large 
armies such as John Bradstreet's punitive expedition into the Ohio Valley in 1764 caused 
much more native consternation than permanent posts, which Indians felt they could 
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overpower through attack or siege if necessary. Most importantly, Indians were involved 
in just about every aspect of fort operations: scouting, staging military operations, 
provisioning, diplomacy, and even fort planning and construction. Even at Fort Chartres, 
where Illinois and Wabash Indians did not fear or even respect the British regime, Indians 
were heavily involved in British fort life. In these five locations, and throughout North 
America, forts were Indian as well as European places. 
Despite the occasional appearance of British incompetence and ineffectiveness, 
this study is not intended as a critique of the British fort system or military regime in 
North America. In Indian country, just as in Ireland, Africa, and India, British colonial 
outposts were implanted with multiple objectives. The first was to create a "mark of 
possession" in a remote and possibly hostile natural and cultural environment. But 
negotiation followed; especially in America, colonial conquest was a series of dialogical 
or multilogical puzzles that involved mutual understandings, revelatory 
misunderstandings, brash hauteur, and pragmatic solutions to unforeseen contingencies. 
In this sense, forts and garrisons could not conquer Indian country at all. They could only 
hope hold their positions long enough to negotiate agreements with their native neighbors 
before their military mission ended, bureaucrats withdrew their funds, or Indians ran out 
of patience. But the mark of a fort's success was not always measured by how well its 
military might held a region for Britain or one of its colonies. In military posts from the 
Mississippi to the Susquehanna, success was often decided by how well British forts 
pleased Indians. Natives' considerable agency in defining fort-based cultural relations 
and determining the means of life and death in the backcountry made them indispensable 
and unavoidable fixtures of everyday colonial military life. The wooden pales and 
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earthen breastworks of British backcountry forts did cast lasting shadows over the West, 
but for Indians the shadows blended with those cast by familiar trees and hills. As often 
as they plunged Indians into darkness, they occasionally gave them shade and comfort. 
Indians even treated forts as they did trees. They used them as points on the landscape, as 
shelter, and as providers of important material goods. And on occasion, if deemed rotten 
or incapable of supplying anything useful, forts could be toppled. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FORTS IN THEIR HEARTS: 
Old Hop, Little Carpenter, and the Making ofFort Loudoun, 1756-1759 
In July 1753, South Carolina's governor James Glen met with Cherokee and 
Creek emissaries to prevent further fighting between the two nations and to establish a 
firm alliance between his colony and prominent Cherokee leaders based in the Overhill 
town of Chota. This was the governor's first meeting with Little Carpenter, nephew and 
deputy ofOverhillleader Old Hop, and their short conversation exemplified English-
Cherokee parlance in the 1750s.1 Little Carpenter opened by reminding Glen that he had 
met personally with King George II in London in 1730, and that the monarch had 
promised to supply the Cherokees with guns and ammunition to avenge themselves 
against all their enemies. If they were to quit fighting the Creeks, Little Carpenter insisted 
that the order must come from the king himself. 
Glen suggested that Little Carpenter had forgotten the particulars of the 1730 
treaty, and that the Cherokee leader should take Glen's words as "the great King's Talk." 
Little Carpenter refused, and asked to be allowed to travel to England and reaffirm the 
treaty with the king in person. Glen claimed that the Cherokees could not spare such a 
1English documents use the names Little Carpenter and Old Hop to refer to the 
Cherokees Attakullakulla and Connecorte, respectively. This study uses the English 
names to avoid confusion with material quoted from the original documents. Titles of 
entries in the South Carolina Indian Books use many variations of the two leaders' 
names. In these citations the English names are used instead, to avoid further confusion. 
For a biography ofLittle Carpenter, see James C. Kelley, "Notable Persons in Cherokee 
History: Attakullakulla," Journal of Cherokee Studies 3:1 (1978), 2-34. . 
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great sachem in those dangerous times. "There are other Countries and Places to go to 
England from besides this," warned Little Carpenter, but Glen insisted that the king 
would never meet with the Indian emissary without his authorization. Little Carpenter 
immediately shut down the talk, telling Glen, "We can not do any Thing without the 
Consent of Old Hop." This was a surprise to Glen, who had organized the conference 
months before and assumed that Little Carpenter's delegation had been given full 
authority to negotiate peace. Glaring at the Cherokee leader, he fumed, "I have been 10 
Years here and never saw this Man before." But Little Carpenter had established his 
status with the governor and, handing Glen a pipe sent by Old Hop, smoked with the 
South Carolinian delegation and continued the talks? 
Little Carpenter's meeting with Glen anticipated the style of negotiations that 
would dominate Cherokee-British relations throughout the 1750s. From the British 
perspective, the Cherokees were valuable allies, necessary to the vital deerskin trade and 
protectors of the exposed Virginia-Carolina backcountry. But Cherokee leaders did not 
intend to provide those services for free. Dependent on European trade goods by the 
middle of the eighteenth century, they needed British protection of trade routes and 
regulation of traders and prices. But they also fought to preserve their status among their 
own people and their influence and dignity in the face of British allies and European and 
Indian enemies. Little Carpenter pointed out to Glen that he was the governor's equal. He 
had met and treated with King George II, walked London's streets and parks, and wished 
to be acknowledged as the king's good servant. He reminded the governor that other 
2Proceedings ofthe Council Concerning Indian Affairs," July 4, 1753, in 
Documents Relating to Indian Affairs. The Colonial Records ofSouth Carolina. [Ser. 2: 
The Indian Books.], ed. William R. McDowell, Jr. (Columbia: South Carolina Archives 
Department, 1958-1970), 2:433-34 (hereafter cited as DRIA). 
colonies and countries desired the Cherokees' favor as trading partners and military 
protectors. Finally, as a stalling tactic, he demonstrated the fractious and, to Britons, 
confusing nature of Cherokee village politics by feigning his insufficient authority to 
conclude diplomatic agreements. After bringing the governor down to his level, he and 
Glen continued to discuss trade from a position of strength and equanimity. 
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Cherokees dominated the Carolina backcountry in the eighteenth century, and 
despite their numbers and importance in the region their existence was fraught with 
anxiety. Already allied with the British and immersed in the European deerskin trade for 
three decades by the 1750s, the westernmost group of Cherokees in the Overbill region 
still felt isolated and threatened by the French and their Indian allies to the north and 
south. Cherokee leaders such as Little Carpenter and Old Hop knew that colonial 
governments desired back:country forts to protect settler communities and trade, and 
thought that British forts in Cherokee country might also answer many of their own 
needs. Forts brought status and respect in the eyes of their French-allied enemies and 
other Cherokees living in the Lower and Middle regions. British garrisons could provide 
regulation of the skin trade and prevent the abuses of unscrupulous Indian traders. 
Outposts could also serve the social and material needs of Cherokee men and women by 
creating safe marts of commerce. Cherokee women especially desired new forts as places 
where they could sell surplus crops and handicrafts, and, in some cases, find husbands. 
Those Indian motives fit well within British colonial plans to fortify the backcountry. 
Trader Edmond Atkin thought that to obtain permission for such fort building, 
British authorities needed to create favorable and fair trade practices with the Indians, 
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which he described as "building Forts in their hearts."3 But Atkin may not have counted 
on the conceptual fortresses already guarding Cherokee ambitions. Defensive Overhill 
Cherokees, adjusting to life in a new Indian-European consumer economy and involved 
unhappily in European political entanglements, needed more than just physical bulwarks 
and sentries. To obtain true status among friends and foes alike, Cherokee leaders forced 
Europeans to build forts on Indians' terms, in the places they chose, to guard their own 
goals and purposes. They used all the diplomatic means at their disposal to force the 
South Carolinians to build a fort in the Overbills according to their wishes. Eventually, 
Fort Loudoun's failure to satisfy the Cherokee's expectations led to its downfall.4 
By the 1750s, the Cherokee Nation played a vital role in South Carolina's 
expansion plans. Cherokees had established themselves as protectors of British 
backcountry interests during the Yamasee War in 1715, when a British-Cherokee alliance 
helped save Charlestown from possible destruction. Military cooperation and dramatic 
increases in trade revenues during the 1730s and 1740s made the Cherokees vital to the 
continued health and happiness of the province.5 Glen described the Cherokee nation as 
the "key to Carolina," a "natural Fortification thrown around us, as a Bulwark to our 
3Wilbur R. Jacobs, ed., The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin 
Report and Plan of 1755 (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1967), 40. 
4Previous studies of the fort have taken into account the prodigious effort 
expended by Cherokee leaders to influence the construction ofFort Loudoun, but still 
maintain the prominence of perceived British motives to "control" the Cherokees. See 
James C. Kelley, "Fort Loudoun: British Stronghold in the Tennessee Country," East 
Tennessee Historical Society Publications, 50 (1978): 72-91. 
5Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the 
Era of the Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 67-71. 
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Backs."6 He knew well that Cherokee friendship had been beneficial in the past, but he 
also knew the great danger that would ensue if they were to become enemies. The 
Cherokees were a large nation, "far more numerous than all the Six Nations together," 
claimed Glen in 1755. Should they become enemies, they were well situated to attack the 
Carolina backcountry without fear of pursuit over the rugged mountains they called 
home.7 
Construction ofF ort Prince George near the Lower Cherokee town of Keowee in 
1753 helped guard the passes from the South Carolina backcountry into the mountains, 
but trader Atkin, who would later serve as Indian Superintendent for the Southern 
District, knew that a single lower-country fort would be insufficient. If the English would 
not build an Overhill fort, he argued, the French inevitably would do so, and that would 
move the Cherokees closer to French interests and domination. 8 Trader Ludovic Grant 
agreed, arguing to Glen that an Overhill fort would be as much an encouragement to the 
Cherokees in the mountains as Fort Prince George had been for the Lower towns. With 
the fort to protect their women and children, Cherokee men would be more likely to 
venture out against South Carolina's enemies.9 If the Cherokees were the key to Carolina, 
an Overhill fort seemed to be the key to establishing a strong South Carolina-Cherokee 
alliance. 
6Ibid., 71; Glen to the Board ofTrade, Mar., 1751, William Henry Lyttelton 
Papers, William C. Clements Library, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor (hereafter cited 
as Lyttelton Papers). 
7Glen to the Commons House of Assembly (hereafter CHA), Mar. 7, 1755, in The 
Colonial Records of South Carolina: Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, eds. J. 
H. Easterby, et al., (Columbia: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1951), 12:157-
59 (hereafter cited as JCHA,). 
8Jacobs, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 51; Atkin to Thomas Robinson, Aug. 29, 
1755, Lyttelton Papers. 
"Ludovic Grant to Glen, Aug. 20, 1755, DRIA, 1:74-75. 
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In order to achieve his diplomatic objective, Glen would have to win over the 
Overhill headmen, especially Old Hop and Little Carpenter, two emerging leaders 
seeking to maintain their status and authority in the face of constant challenges from 
within and without. For decades Cherokee numbers had been diminished by disease and 
war with the Creeks and other Indian groups in the region. But the structure of Cherokee 
village authority ensured that headmen faced challenges from their own people as well, 
especially young men who took a less diplomatic approach to European expansion. It was 
only by the acclimation of their own people that Old Hop and Little Carpenter maintained 
their positions and status, and that approval could be withdrawn at any time.10 This status 
anxiety made it necessary for headmen to temper their accommodation of English 
objectives with demands for English favors. For example, in an April1752 talk 
addressing rumors that Cherokees were planning to attack English settlers, Old Hop 
started by establishing his status, claiming that despite his old age "he is much looked 
upon in this Nation." He then assured the British delegation that he had notified all the 
Upper Towns ''to be careful of the white People and not to hurt any of them." He then left 
it to another Cherokee leader, Tacite, to relate the long ''tedious" list of trade goods that 
would be required to ensure the Cherokees' favor. 11 But even a respected elder diplomat 
like Old Hop faced suspicions from within. Little Carpenter himselflater told Fort 
Loudoun's commandant Raymond Demere that Old Hop would treat with anyone who 
brought him presents. 12 Another Cherokee later told Demere's brother Paul that Old Hop 
was not to be trusted, and that while his speech seemed "very fair," the "old Rogue" 
10Hatley, Dividing Paths, 10-12. 
11Talk of Old Hop et al., Apr. 22, 1752, DR/A, 1:253-54. 
12Raymond Demere to William Henry Lyttelton, July 30, 1757, DR/A, 2:392; 
Hatley, Dividing Paths, 11. 
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spoke with "two tongues."13 Even with the benefit of age and wisdom, Old Hop needed 
to constantly reaffirm his status with Cherokees and Englishmen alike. 
Little Carpenter possessed an advantage in his dealings with the British because 
he had met the king personally. In 1730 he was one of seven Cherokees who 
accompanied traveler Alexander Cuming to London to meet King George II and to be 
awed by the spectacle of one ofthe world's largest cities. The delegation agreed to a 
treaty of perpetual friendship between the Cherokees and the English which was often 
cited in subsequent years. 14 For example, Old Hop reminded Glen that when "his People 
was in England" they had personally talked with the king, that the agreement made with 
the king ''was still in their Town House," and that the king's word ensured that the 
Cherokees "would always love the English as Brothers that sucked one Mother."15 But 
Little Carpenter might have been the last of that delegation still alive in the 1750s, and he 
enjoyed reminding Glen and others that he had met, eaten with, and parleyed with the 
king. In 1753 he asked to see the true copy ofthe treaty given to him personally by "the 
great King George." When Glen said he lacked the original, Little Carpenter insisted that 
it did not matter because he had committed "the great King's Talk" to memory .16 
13Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Jan. 1, 1759, Lyttelton Papers. 
14The visit ofthe Cherokee embassy to London is described in Verner W. Crane, 
The Southern Frontier, 1670-17 32 (1928; repr., Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 
Press, 2004), 295-302. For a full study oflndian experiences in Britain, see Alden T. 
Vaughan, Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1775 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), esp. 137-50 for a more recent description of 
the Cherokees' London visit. Hatley emphasizes the persistence ofthe memory ofthe 
Yamasee War of 1715 in English-Cherokee relations, and views the London treaty as a 
solidification of the uncertain alliance promised after that conflict. Hatley, Dividing 
Paths, 67-68. 
15Talk of Old Hop to Glen, Apr. 29, 1752, DRJA, 1 :258-59; Ludovic Grant and 
Joseph Axson to Glen, Mar. 23, 1759, DRIA, 2:47-48. 
16
"Proceedings of the Council Concerning Indian Affairs," DRIA, 1:439. 
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When William Heney Lyttelton succeeded Glen, Little Carpenter continued to 
emphasize his royal connections with the new governor. He told Lyttelton, "Tis been 26 
Years since I was in England, but (I) still remember our Father King George's Talk and 
hope to hear from him by you."17 In July 1759 he told the governor that he knew the king 
must have given orders to provision the Cherokees, because when he was in London the 
king had promised to supply them with "every thing that would be necessary."18 Personal 
congress with the king was more than a bargaining tool for Little Carpenter. It conferred 
status on the Cherokee leader that few English people and only a handful of living 
Indians enjoyed. 
Status and authority in the eyes of British leaders helped ensure continued and 
equitable trade, which by the 1750s had become a mainstay of Cherokee village life. 
Indians of the region were shrewd and practiced consumers and traders, and sought fair 
prices and quality goods from the traders who lived in their villages. If traders cheated 
them or offered substandard goods, Cherokees could travel to Virginia or North Carolina 
for better bargains, or deal covertly with French traders.19 But South Carolina's traders 
were the Indians' most direct source for their "necessaries," and the Cherokee headmen 
always sought to maintain strict regulation of trade and fair prices. 
This was made difficult by frequent abuses by traders. Some would sell only 
liquor for deerskins because of alcohol's great profit potential, causing some Indians to 
17Little Carpenter to Lyttelton, Aug. 15, 1756, DR/A, 2:166. 
18Speech ofLittle Carpenter to Raymond Demere," July 13, 1756, DR/A, 2:137-
38. 
19Hatley, Dividing Paths, 43-44, 47-48. On Indian consumerism in general, see 
James Axtell, "The First Consumer Revolution," in Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial 
North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125-51. 
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fall into poverty after having "drinked all their Skinns."20 Shortages of supplies, often 
imposed deliberately by traders to keep prices high, were frequent sources of conflict. 
Cherokees always encouraged colonial governors to license and send as many well-
supplied traders as possible because the added competition would benefit the Indians. For 
example, Old Hop complained in October 1755 that only one trader, John Eliott, served 
the needs of the seven towns in his neighborhood and asked Glen to send others. Though 
Glen promised to find more traders to send, he reminded the Cherokee leader not to rely 
on credit, but to "pay for what you get," in order to keep trade goods plentiful.21 
Cherokees increasingly engulfed in a system of credit and consumer exchange required 
responsible on-the-spot oversight and regulation of trade. 
Traders provided clothing, guns and ammunition, tools, body paint, and a long list 
of other trade mainstays by this time. But as necessary as the traders had become to the 
natives, they were also a source of resentment. In one instance, a Virginia trader, Richard 
Pearis, had attempted to sneak past Chota to avoid a Cherokee trade conference. He was 
headed to the town ofToquo for an assignation with an Indian woman there. When Old 
Hop learned that the trader meant to bypass Chota, he sent men to capture him and bring 
him in. Old Hop had heard that Pearls bore a letter for him from Glen, but Pearls told the 
old headman that the letter had been stolen?2 According to trader Ludovic Grant, who 
was present at the meeting, Old Hop proceeded to humiliate Pearls. "As he had brought 
no Letter nor was a Messenger," Grant reported to Glen, Old Hop suggested that Pearis 
20James Beamer to Glen, Feb. 21, 1756, DRIA, 2:104-06; Old Hop to Raymond 
Demere, and Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Aug. 3, 1756, DRIA, 2:157-61. 
21Glen to Old Hop, and Old Hop to Glen, Oct. 14, 1755, DRIA, 2:77-79. 
22The letter had, in fact, been stolen by Cherokees sent by rival trader Nathaniel 
Gist, and had already been read to Old Hop. David H. Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: 
Conflict and Survival, 1740-62 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 55-56. 
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"should only mind his Trade." Because the trader had no goods with him "save Whiske, a 
spirituous Liquor it seems made of rye ofwhich he had twenty Caggs," Old Hop ordered 
him to leave the country. To further humiliate the trader, Old Hop revealed that he knew 
of the planned assignation. Since Pearis did not bear a letter to him from Glen, he asked if 
the governor "had sent any Message to his Woman," and then compared the trader to "a 
young Buck in rutting time, who run hither and thither, not minding where, after a Doe 
till he found her.'m Many traders maintained long relationships with Indians in the 
region, including Grant, who traded for many decades among the Creeks, Catawbas, and 
Cherokees. But Cherokees were quick to complain about improprieties, and based their 
respect for traders on the amount and quality of goods or services they supplied and the 
equitable terms they offered. 
Short supplies of goods were a frequent complaint against traders and English 
trade policy, but these shortcomings were compounded when traders deliberately cheated 
their Indian customers. Little Carpenter explained to Glen that traders used faulty weights 
and measures to swindle his people. Glen had sent the Indians measuring sticks and 
weights authorized by the Assembly, but the traders still found ways to cheat. "Do what 
we can, the white People will cheat us on our Weights and Measures, and make them 
less," Little Carpenter complained. "What is it a Trader can not do? They cheat us in the 
Measure of our Powder. Some of the white Men borrowed my Y eard and cut it, and then 
gave it back for which I was blamed."24 Ludovic Grant confirmed these practices, and 
claimed that despite colonial statutes to regulate trade and measures, "there has not been 
one single Article observed by a Trader." He described the traders' use of"fals Stilliards" 
23Ludovic Grant to Glen, Mar. 27, 1755, DRIA, 2:40-45. 
24
"Proceedings ofthe Council Concerning Indian Affairs," DRIA, 1:442. 
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(scales), short Yards, and little Measures," and noted that the official standard measuring 
devices sent upcountry for the Cherokees' use often never arrived, ''the Traders 
pretending they had no punctual Orders to carry them."25 Mankiller of Tellico, a 
Cherokee headman from one ofthe largest towns in the region, knew the value of trade 
goods and what he and his people should pay for them. He tried setting specific prices 
with Raymond Demere for everything from match coats to petticoats, and complained 
that traders greatly inflated prices and would "impose on them with their Stilliards," 
which Mankiller hoped would be investigated because it was a serious source of 
discontent among his people?6 Regulation of traders and their methods was a constant 
Cherokee demand and a necessary prerequisite to friendly Indian-English relations 
throughout North America. 
In their efforts to maintain status and protect their people from belligerent 
enemies and unscrupulous traders, Overbill Cherokee leaders had long sought an 
expanded British presence in the region. Atkin reported that as early as 17 46 Cherokee 
agents had asked that two forts be built in the Overbill region, "for the protection of their 
Families, and to enable them to keep out the French." Cherokees would help build and 
garrison the forts, they promised, and provision it for two years. If this were done, the 
Cherokee agents argued, Indian relations would inevitably move favorably toward the 
English; ifthe French were able to build there first, ''then every thing would be as they 
pleased."27 
25Grant to Glen, Mar. 27, 1755, DRIA, 2:41-42. 
26Talk of the Mankiller of Great Tellico to Raymond Demere, Jan. 15, 17 57, 
DRIA, 2:320. 
27Jacobs, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 51. Emphasis is added by the author. 
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Glen had long argued in the South Carolina Assembly for an Overbill fort. At a 
conference in Saluda Old Town in the spring of 1755, he promised Little Carpenter and a 
large assembly of Cherokee headmen that he would build them one soon, in exchange for 
their cession of all Cherokee lands to the British.28 Little Carpenter took Glen's promise 
seriously enough that throughout the following year he and his fellow sachems 
continually demanded immediate action on the project. They knew well how their 
numbers and mastery of their terrain impressed Glen, and they used it to induce the 
governor to build a fort quickly. "We expect that you will perform your Promise," 
warned Little Carpenter in October 1755, "But ifyou don't let us hear anything from you 
we shall think you have forgot us, and we shall have our own Thoughts."29 Glen begged 
off as best he could, complaining that the king had not yet authorized the fort's 
construction and that he could not yet set a building date.30 In fact, it was not the king or 
his provincial council standing in the way, but the province's Lower House of Assembly 
and the frightful cost of the proposed mountain outpost. 
Funding the construction of a fort in the Overbill country brought the friendly 
competition between Virginia and South Carolina into the fore. Both colonies were eager 
to gain the Cherokees' help in protecting and facilitating trade in the backcountry and 
with military campaigns against the French and their Indian allies. In addition, George 
Washington's failed campaign in Pennsylvania and the outbreak of open hostilities with 
the French made the construction of a defensive fort in the Cherokee backcountry 
28Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 58-61; Hatley, Dividing Paths, 75-77. Glen took 
the Cherokee land cession at face value, and disregarded the largely symbolic Indian 
perception of the exchange at Saluda. 
29Little Carpenter to Glen, DRIA, 2:77-78. 
30Glen to Little Carpenter, Oct. 14, 1755, DRIA, 2:75-76. 
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necessary, lest the French build outposts there first. To this end, the crown had in October 
1754 appropriated £20,000 in credit and specie to Virginia's governor Robert Dinwiddie 
to form an expedition against the French and construct necessary defenses, and instructed 
him to assist South Carolina in constructing an Upper Cherokee fort as soon as possible.31 
But Dinwiddie was willing to part with only £1,000 to help Glen with the project. 
In March 1755, the Committee on Indian Affairs in South Carolina's Upper House 
suggested that Glen appeal to the king and the governors of the surrounding colonies for 
more funds, and that South Carolina issue the necessary funds immediately and worry 
about reimbursement later. The Upper House agreed, but the Assembly did not see why 
their colony should bear the brunt of the expense. After all, they argued, Glen had 
promised them in 1751 that they would never be burdened with funding an Overhill fort, 
and they considered it "a matter of doubt" whether the Cherokees we,re even British 
subjects. Besides, they had just appropriated £5,000 the year before to build Fort Prince 
George, and balked at another huge capital outlay for a questionable enterprise hundreds 
of miles away in the mountains. Glen was disappointed, and so was Dinwiddie, who 
chided the South Carolina governor for his inability to fund the project despite South 
Carolina's professed "Oppulency and Riches."32 
After Glen's promises to the Cherokees at the Saluda conference, he tried again to 
extract funding for the proposed fort. He reminded the Assembly that "when a public & 
positive Promise is made to Indians, they are very impatient to have it perfonn'd." He 
31Dinwiddie to Glen, Oct. 25, 1754, in The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, ed. R. A. Brock (1883; repr., 
Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1971 ), 1 :3 79 (hereafter cited Dinwiddie Records). 
32
"Committee on Indian Affairs Report," Mar. 12-13, 1755, Upper House of 
Assembly (hereafter UHA) to CHA, CHA to Glen, and CHA to UHA, Mar. 14, 1755, 
JCHA, 12:168-69, 181, 182-83, 183, 188; Dinwiddie to Glen, Dinwiddie Records, 2:26. 
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also noted that since the conference the Cherokees had sent letters "in very strong Terms" 
to discover the progress Glen was making in funding the project. "So eager were they to 
have a Fort," Glen continued, that the Overhillleaders had commissioned a delegation 
led by Little Catpenter to travel to Charlestown to lobby for the fort's construction. Glen 
again asked for immediate funding, and promised again that the king would reimburse it, 
but the Assembly still hesitated and asked for more documentation from the king and the 
Indians' letters.33 
When Glen supplied the necessary paperwork, the Assembly assented to funding 
the fort, which they agreed should be "a Place of strength, & such an One as may be 
capable to defend our Allies, the Indians, & strike a Terror into our Enemies, the French." 
But they still issued only an additional £1,000 for the project, despite continued urging 
from both Glen and Old Hop.34 Glen argued that for a good, solid fort he would need 
£4,000 to £5000, but for an additional £1,000 he promised to construct "a regular Fort, 
with a good large Fasse35, & a solid Rampart & Parapet." As an example ofthe 
spectacular costs of constructing such a large project almost five hundred miles from 
Charlestown in the rugged mountainous terrain, he noted that just to obtain and transport 
sufficient flour for the project and to garrison the fort, the price could be as much as 
£6,000.36 Finally, Glen borrowed £2,000 personally for the project and waited while the 
33Glen to CHA, and CHA to Glen, Jan. 23, 1756, JCHA, 13:46-47, 48. 
34JCHA, 13:78-79, 91-92; Old Hop to Glen, Mar. 20, 1756, DRIA, 2:108-09. 
35 A fosse, or surrounding ditch. 
36Glen to CHA, Apr. 8-9, 1756, JCHA, 13:206-07, 210-11. 
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Assembly argued over passage of a tax bill. 37 Only after the accession of Glen's 
replacement, William Henry Lyttelton, did the Assembly agree to provide £3,000 for the 
Overbill fort without promise of reimbursement, but instead as an outright gift from the 
colony to the crown.38 
While South Carolina's governor and Assembly negotiated terms for building the 
new fort, Cherokees used the animosity and competition between Virginia and South 
Carolina to hurry the project along. In September 1755 several Cherokee representatives 
led by one of Old Hop's sons met with Dinwiddie in Williamsburg to give reasons why 
they had failed to send men to join in General Edward Braddock's failed expedition that 
summer. They told the Virginia governor that they had fully intended to, but were 
stopped by a letter from Glen urging them to meet with him at the Congaree trading post 
instead. Dinwiddie was furious, and accused Glen of never seriously pressing the Indians 
at Saluda to aid the Virginia expedition. 39 
At that point Dinwiddie needed Cherokee military aid desperately, and over the 
ensuing months he decided to take the fort project on himself. He placed the blame for 
Cherokee intransigence on Glen's inability. to fund the project, and feared that the Indians 
would join the French ifthe fort were not built that summer.40 "The Cherokees propose 
send'g in 600 Men, if we build them a Fort in the Upper Cherokee Co'try," he promised 
George Washington, and announced that he planned to send Major Andrew Lewis and 
37JCHA, 13:xxviii, 247, 251. For an overview of James Glen's prominent role in 
negotiating the construction of the Overbill fort, see Stuart Stumpf, "James Glen, 
Cherokee Diplomacy, and the Construction of an Overbill Fort," East Tennessee 
Historical Society Publications 50 (1978): 21-30. 
38Lyttelton to CHA, and CHA to Lyttelton, June 30, 1756, JCHA, 13:263, 266. 
39
"Minutes of a Council with the Cherokees," Sep. 5, 1755, and Dinwiddie to 
Glen, Sec£. 25, 1755, Dinwiddie Records, 2:187-88, 215. 
4 Dinwiddie to Arthur Dobbs, Apr. 13, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, 2:382. 
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sixty men to Chota immediately to build the fort.41 Dinwiddie instructed Lewis to tell the 
Cherokees that Virginians were building them a fort to protect their women and children 
while their men went to war, and the governor clearly expected the Cherokees' help in 
planning and constructing the fort. "They will assist You with their young Men," 
Dinwiddie told Lewis, and ordered him to leave behind a small cannon and garrison if the 
Indians so desired, though he hoped that the South Carolinians would arrive and supply 
those if necessary. 42 Dinwiddie's hopes of success against the French depended fully on 
Cherokee aid, and he despaired that without the help of the Overhill men the Virginia 
provincial troops would "not be able to defeat the Enemy, who are chiefly lnd[ian]'s."43 
By June 1756 the South Carolina fort expedition began staging at Fort Prince 
George, and the party's commander Captain Raymond Demere promised the Overhill 
headmen that he would lead his men to Chota soon to begin building the fort.44 Old Hop 
and Little Carpenter lost no time in sending word that the Virginians had beaten South 
Carolina to the punch. "The Virginia People promised us a Fort the other Day and are 
now here a building it," the Cherokee leaders wrote to Demere, and urged him to quickly 
send his company up and begin building a separate fort.45 
pemere understood the Cherokees' nuance of a promise made and kept by the 
Virginians as a rebuke to the South Carolinians for their delays, and so did Lyttelton. Old 
Hop wrote the governor to tell him that the Cherokees and the Virginians lived at Chota 
41Dinwiddie to Washington, Apr. 23, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, 2:388. 
42Dinwiddie to Lewis, Apr. 24, 1756, and Dinwiddie to William Shirley, Apr. 28, 
1756, Dinwiddie Records, 2:389-90, 395-96. 
43Dinwiddie to Lewis, Apr. 28, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, 2:393-94. 
44Lyttelton to Old Hop, June 3, 1756, DRIA, 2:115-16; Talk ofRaymond Demere 
to Old Hop and Little Carpenter, June 30, 1756, DRIA, 2:128-29. 
45Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 2, 1756, DRIA, 2:129-34; Old Hop and 
Little Carpenter to Raymond Demere, July 12, 1756, DRIA, 2:134. 
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as loyal subjects of King George, ''together as Brothers" and asked Lyttelton for one 
hundred men from Virginia and the same from South Carolina, "no more nor no less," to 
garrison the fort, th9ugh he also promised that Cherokee men would help them if any 
enemies showed up.46 This request surp~ised Dinwiddie, who hoped that Lewis's Chota 
fort alone would spur an immediate outpouring of Cherokee milit~ help, and that 
Lewis's vital company would be able to return to Virginia soon. "We never tho't of 
send'g a Garrison to it as it is so great a Distance," Dinwiddie wrote Lyttelton, but he 
promised to put it before his Assembly immediately and to send a few men in the 
meantime.47 "Every Thing sho'd be done to keep 'em in good Temper," Dinwiddie told 
North Carolina's governor Arthur Dobbs, and proposed that once the South Carolinians' 
completed their fort, that each colony should send a twenty-five men garrison.48 In 
gaining the Cherokees' help in their war with France, the colonies would have to supply 
more than logs and bulwarks. 
Andrew Lewis understood better than the colonial governors the extent to which 
the Cherokees influenced Virginia's fort project. When he suggested to the Chota 
headmen that South Carolina and Virginia combine their efforts to build one substantial 
fort, the chiefs would not hear of it. As Lewis told Demere, ''they insisted on our 
Building them a fort at Chota and told me that they had Layed off a Spot (for) the 
Carolina People to Build another, and to SatisfY them I was obliged to Comply." The 
Cherokees also induced Lewis to ask Demere for more powder and shot, and Demere 
460ld Hop to Lyttelton, July 2, 1756, DRIA, 2:141-42. 
47Dinwiddie to Lyttelton, Sep. 18, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, 2:510. 
48Dinwiddie to Dobbs, Sep. 18, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, 2:511-12. 
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granted the request after hesitating initially because his own supplies were low.49 Overbill 
Cherokee leaders knew that the Virginians and Carolinians needed them, and insisted on 
determining the number and locations of posts built near their villages. 
Cherokee headmen would not budge in their demands for two Overbills forts, and 
used their value as military allies to get what they wanted. Despite Lewis's best efforts to 
enlist Overbill warriors for Virginia's campaigns, Cherokee men preferred staying home 
until the fort was garrisoned. In addition, Dinwiddie complained that a few Cherokee 
men who had been in Virginia had stolen livestock from settlers on their way home. Little 
Carpenter was not pleased by the accusation, and wondered if Dinwiddie complained "of 
the few Men that were in Virginia pray what might he expect from the great Number he 
wants." Little Carpenter also requested more guns, ammunition, and trade goods, and 
apparently told Dinwiddie that if the Cherokees could not have them, "they should be 
obliged to tell the White People to leave their Nation they being of no Service to them."50 
Old Hop was even more direct, telling Dinwiddie that if they did not send trade and a 
garrison for the fort, it would be a sign that the Virginians did not value them as allies. He 
also told Dinwiddie that the French threatened to occupy the empty Chota fort, and he 
promised to hold the governor responsible. "Ifwe should get hurt by the French," he 
warned Dinwiddie, "I shall Lay all Blame on you for Ever, for This is the second time I 
have sent to you about it."51 Virginia's Overbills fort was clearly not having the effect 
Dinwiddie desired. 
49Lewis to Raymond Demere, July 7, 1756, Raymond Demere to Lewis, July 17, 
1756, and Raymond Demere to Lewis, Aug. 7, 1756, Lyttelton Papers. 
50Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 19, 1756, DRIA, 2:143-45. The quotes are 
Demere' s, describing Little Carpenter's letter to Dinwiddie. 
51 0ld Hop and Little Carpenter to Dinwiddie, Aug. 23, 1756, Lyttelton Papers. 
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While the Virginians worked to ease Cherokee disappointments, the South 
Carolinians faced their own pressures. Since early June when the fort expedition left 
Charlestown for Fort Prince George, rumors had sent ripples of fear through the 
backcountry.52 Fort Prince George's commander Thomas Harrison started the rumor mill 
grinding. "Some Days past we had a great Talk," Harrison wrote Lt. William Shrubshoal, 
commander of the expedition, "The Indians was going to kill all the White People, but I 
think it is over for this Time and when you come it will give a great deal of Easiness to 
the Indians which really are Friends to the English." He noted that there were certainly 
many younger Cherokees who might wish to attack the British, but he remained confident 
that they could be kept in check through "Fear of the few which will not agree to it."53 
Four days later he was not so sure. Harrison wrote again to Shrubshoal to report 
daily rumors that Indians intended to kill all whites in Cherokee country, and that only 
Old Hop and five others stood against rebellion. Apparently some Indians had spread a 
rumor that the fort expedition actually intended to kill all the Cherokee men in the region 
and to enslave the women and children. Little Carpenter suggested that Lyttelton himself 
come to Keowee to assure the young men that the English were their friends and would 
protect them. Ominously, Harrison reported that Cherokee messengers had been sent to 
52Gregory Evans Dowd has shown how rumors oflndian activities affected 
Indian-English policy in Cherokee country, and how they must be accounted for in 
writing those histories today. Separated by hundreds of miles controlled by Indians 
whose loyalties were always a matter of speculation for the South Carolinians in 
Charlestown, communication between the Overbill region and the colonial capital was 
infused with often-uncorroborated claims of intended Indian depredations that were often 
exaggerated or spun ofwhole cloth. However, the effects of the rumors on those who 
listened to them were real enough, and usually played a role in the mutual distrust and 
cautiousness that colored the Cherokee-British alliance in the late 1750s. See Gregory 
Evans Dowd, "The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumors on the South Carolina-
Cherokee Frontier," WMQ, 3rd ser. 53:3 (July 1996): 527-60. 
53Harrison to Shrubshoal, June 2, 1756, DRIA, 2:116-17. 
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Chota to discover Old Hop's sentiments. If the old leader gave the order, the Indians near 
Keowee would kill all the white people in Fort Prince George, a post so inconsequential 
and easy to besiege that the Cherokees regarded it as "nothing."54 Seemingly not all 
Cherokees desired an Overbill fort or an expanded English presence in the region, and 
even Old Hop, the most assiduous fort proponent, might have had his doubts. 
Despite the grim warnings of Cherokee disaffection, Demere's arrival at Fort 
Prince George offered him plenty of evidence that Cherokees desired forts for their own 
purposes. Upon his arrival, he experienced the bountiful hospitality that Cherokee women 
customarily bestowed upon visitors. Three hundred Cherokees from both Keowee and the 
Middle towns performed a "formal ceremony" that consisted of feasting and a dance 
given by the "Ladies of the Town." As Demere would discover later, Cherokee women 
had good reason to welcome the Carolinians. British garrisons and forts offered them 
ready markets for surplus com. As part of the welcoming ceremony at Fort Prince 
George, Keowee's women lavished presents upon Demere in a great showing of their 
food production capabilities as well as their generosity. In return for some "refreshment" 
that Demere had sent to their town the day before, the women gave him "a great Number 
of Cakes of Bread of their own make and green Peas and Squashes," despite their 
apparent lack of provisions. 55 Demere quickly learned that the Cherokees at Keowee 
would soon solve their provision shortage when the com crop came in. Com grew in 
great abundance near Keowee. Demere noted that the garrison of Fort Prince George had 
produced 700-800 bushels the previous year, and expected to exceed that amount in the 
54Harrison to Shrubshoal, June 6, 1756, DRIA, 2:117-18. 
55Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, June 23, 1756, DRIA, 2:125-26. 
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fall. 56 Indian women hoped that the busy men at the new Overhills fort would not be as 
productive, at least in the beginning, and would be happy to purchase their com 
surpluses. Demere later found that Indian women would be indispensable to the success 
of his fort, and that the fort offered women attractive social possibilities. 57 
Contrary to reports of imminent Indian aggression, Demere and his men found no 
hostile Cherokees at Fort Prince George, only some "old stayed men" from the Lower 
villages who promised to serve Governor Lyttelton and answer all the king's requests. 58 
After the welcoming celebration was over, the fort party began consolidating the food 
and materials that they would need to lug over the mountains, while curious Indians 
prodded them for information. On July 12 an Overhill delegation including Little 
Carpenter and the brother of Oconostota, the Great Warrior, arrived at the fort to 
ascertain the expedition's progress. Demere noted happily that they did not seem 
interested in talking business, but instead "only great Compliments did pass from either 
Side."59 The Indians regretted that they could not meet with Lyttelton in Charlestown, as 
both Demere and the governor had requested, because traveling was too difficult in the 
summertime and they preferred to stay at Keowee to observe the expedition's 
• 60 preparations. 
On July 20, Little Carpenter decided that the time for compliments was over. He 
assembled some of his chiefs and demanded to know when Demere would proceed to the 
56Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, June 24, 1756, DRIA, 2:127. 
57 0n Cherokee women and vegetable production, including their views on trade 
and hospitality, see Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-
1835 (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1998), 72-74. 
58 Answer of the Cherokee Chiefs to Raymond Demere, June 20, 1756, DRIA, 
2:124. 
59Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 13, 1756, DRIA, 2:136. 
60Speech of Little Carpenter to Raymond Demere, July 13, 17 56, DRIA, 2: 13 7. 
Overbills, and seemed satisfied to learn that the expedition would set out in a few days. 
He also suggested that the fort be built near his own town, Tomatly, which was only a 
couple of miles from Chota.61 But the next day Little Carpenter and his chiefs returned 
59 
and demanded that the force proceed at once. When Demere told him he thought the issue 
had been settled already, Little Carpenter flew into a rage, calling Demere a "great Lyar" 
and characterizing the English captain as more a "little Boy" than a potent warrior. 
Demere believed the abrupt change stemmed from an old grudge (James Glen's broken 
promise to supply Little Carpenter with rum), but he was not taking any chances. He 
ordered his men under arms, and that seemed to satisfy Little Carpenter for the moment.62 
Demere hoped that Little Carpenter's hostile behavior was an isolated personal 
outburst rather than a serious indication of Cherokee frustration, and not without some 
justification. On July 25 Little Carpenter returned and apologized to Demere, blaming the 
outburst on rum. "I take him to have a great deal of Deceit in him even when sober," 
Demere wrote to Lyttelton, adding that Cherokees at Keowee worried about Little 
Carpenter's behavior "when in Drink.'.63 But Little Carpenter's frustration may have been 
a serious indication of Cherokee fear and mistrust rather than an intoxicated impropriety. 
Old Hop apparently shared his nephew's impatience with the expedition's lack of 
progress, and began to take steps to hurry Demere along. On August 3 he informed 
Demere that an Overbill Cherokee hunting party had encountered an enormous party of 
61Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 20, 1756, DRIA, 2:145-46. 
62Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 21, 1756, DRIA, 2:146-47. 
63Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 25, 1756, DRIA, 2:147-48. 
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enemy Savannah Indians in the area. 64 Demere concluded that this alarm was deliberately 
designed to frighten and spur on the fort expedition.65 
When Demere's surveying group arrived at Tomatly, they confirmed that Old 
Hop intended to frighten the English into action and to play off South Carolinians against 
Virginians. The old chief told Sergeant William Gibbs, commander of the survey party, 
that he was disappointed that construction of the Carolina fort had not yet begun and that 
he bet it would never be built.66 The party found little evidence of Savannah incursions 
into the Overhill towns, despite Old Hop's continued warnings that they continually 
stirred up trouble among the Creeks and Choctaws.67 The old chief wrote to Dinwiddie 
that "the Carolina Men ... have promised us a great many Things but we cannot find one 
Word ofTruth in any thing they say or promise us," knowing full well that the accusation 
would migrate back to Lyttelton.68 By August 28 Old Hop was furious at the lack of 
progress, and sent word to Demere that he regarded the captain's continued promises as 
"nothing but Lies."69 
Demere continued to offer a number of excuses for not proceeding to the 
Overhills, including a lack of reinforcements for Fort Prince George and a dearth of 
provisions, but others felt that Cherokee manipulation might have been a cause. Engineer 
William Gerard De Brahm, who had been lured from his job as surveyor general of 
Georgia to plan and build the Overhill fort, claimed that Indians and traders worked to 
64
"Paper Signed by Captain Raymond Demere," Aug. 3, 1756, DRIA, 2:158. 
65Demere consulted the report's bearer, Tiftoa, who told him that the large body 
oflndians were in actuality French-allied Nottowagoes and that Old Hop always received 
the Savannahs as friends. Ibid. 
66Gibbs to Raymond Demere, Aug. 6, 1756, DRIA, 2:163. 
67Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Aug. 11, 1756, DRJA, 2:161-62. 
680ldHoptoDinwiddie,Aug.15, 1756,DRJA, 2:167-68. 
69Cherokee Headmen to Raymond Demere, Aug. 28, 1756, DRIA, 2:182. 
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capitalize on English insecurities. "Every Day is another Day appointed to set off, Every 
Traider & pack horse man has his peculiar Friend among the Indians, of whom he brings 
great and bad new intelligences," the engineer informed Lyttelton, "After which the 
Indians are ask'd to give there Ta[l]ks, which are taken as memorandum, Sent Down to 
Town, Your Excellency, ye Council & publick Set in uneasiness." He claimed that these 
rumors were "but inventions and compositions of old & new histories mixt together" and 
served no purpose "but to get a Caske of Rum or Some Shearts."70 
Meanwhile, Old Hop continued his plan to frighten the English into action. On 
September 9 he supposedly sent a letter to the headmen ofKeowee asking if the garrison 
ofFort Prince George had "used them and their Women ill" and had barred them from 
trading at the fort. Demere told Lyttelton that the people ofKeowee remained perfectly 
happy with the garrison, and he feared that Old Hop had begun to "embrace the French 
interest" and was trying to lay the groundwork for a Cherokee rebellion. 71 Andrew Lewis, 
nearing his completion of the Chota fort, also feared that Little Carpenter sought an 
uprising. The promised Cherokee help to Virginia had still not materialized, and Lewis 
suspected that Little Carpenter may have been involved in French plans to build a fort 
near Great Tellico. "Little Carpenter, who has the ruleing of this Nation, is a great Villain 
and will do every thing in his Power to serve the French," Lewis wrote to Lyttelton, 
confirming British fears even as De Brahm sought to debunk them. 72 
When Demere finally arrived at Tomatly on October 1 he received a friendly 
reception from Old Hop, surrounded by two hundred Cherokees in full regalia. The old 
70DeBrahm to Lyttelton, Sep. 7, 1756, Lyttelton Papers. 
71Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Sep. 9, 1756, DRIA, 2:197-98. 
72Lewis to Raymond Demere, Sep. 11, 1756, DRIA, 2:203-04; Lewis to Lyttelton, 
Sep. 14, 1756, DR/A, 2:205. 
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chief was enthusiastic about the arrival of the fort expedition, and hoped "that all the bad 
Talks and every thing that was passed might be forgot a1,1d remembered no more." 
De mere finally understood part of their frustration with British delays: The Overhill 
Cherokees had fallen into a state of genuine and fearful poverty, "very poor and all 
naked," according to Demere, and he understood why they would "embrace any Proposal 
made to them to get Relief."73 But after the initial diplomatic presentation of Cherokee 
goodwill, Old Hop returned to matters of business. He promised to comply with any of 
the king's and the new governor's wishes, and seemed happy at the change in 
government in South Carolina, since his "friend" Glen's promises for a fort had turned 
out to be "nothing but Lies." Old Hop then spoke of his desires regarding "his" forts. "I 
have one Fort at Chote," he told Demere, referring to the still unmanned Virginia fort. "I 
want another one here," he asked, "Then do you fix on a Spot to build one for yourself 
that a Gun being fired at one may alarm all three."74 Demere had no authority or intention 
to build any other forts, but he welcomed Old Hop's promises of help after months of 
rumors and threats. He even induced Old Hop to confess to sending people to talk with 
French-allied Indians, though the old Cherokee claimed unconvincingly that he "did not 
73Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Oct. 13, 1756, DRIA, 2:216. Descriptions of 
Indian poverty by both European and native observers often describe such "nakedness" 
and starvation, and while this was often a figurative conception of the Indians' condition, 
stressing their desires for comparative levels of status and authority, the descriptions must 
have been at least partially true given the verifiable Indian hardships evident throughout 
Eastern North America in the eighteenth century. In English sources such as this report 
by Demere, the descriptions of poverty seem real enough, and this is not surprising 
considering the extent to which Indians had begun to rely on trade, the interruptions in 
commerce brought on by the conflict with France, and the remoteness of the Overhill 
region. On Indian descriptions of nakedness and poverty as reflections of status anxiety, 
see Hatley, Dividing Paths, 10. 
74Reply of Old Hop to Raymond Demere, Oct. 3, 1756, DR/A, 2:224. 
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do it with any Intent to hurt the Carolinians, or the Virginians."75 But Demere was even 
more impressed with Little Carpenter's promises to prevent the French from building at 
Great Tellico or anywhere else among the Overbills. "He has got at this present Time 
more Power and Influence over the Indians than Old Hopp," Demere claimed, and he 
hoped that with the headman's help the fort could be built quickly. 
Old Hop and Little Carpenter further established their authority by deciding the 
final location of the fort. On October 4 they accompanied Demere and De Brahm to 
examine the engineer's chosen site, which was one mile farther from T omatly than 
surveyed previously.76 Demere thought the engineer's change in location was "more for 
Contradiction's sake than any Thing else," but he and the two Cherokees humored the 
temperamental engineer. Old Hop and Little Carpenter argued against the new location 
immediately. It was "almost a desert" without good planting ground for com, they 
insisted, and they knew it to be frequented by "lurking" enemies. But their main objection 
was that it was too far away from their towns to be of any use. When De Brahm insisted 
on the location because of its strategic position at a fork in the Tennessee River the 
Cherokee leaders denied this advantage, claiming that only insignificant canoes could 
navigate the river safely. Demere agreed gently with the Cherokee position that the 
ground was too sandy for the garrison to plant com, and suggested that they should try to 
keep the Indians happy, though he still left the decision up to De Brahm. Angered at the 
captain's implicit preference for the Indians' input, De Brahm handed his pistol to 
Demere and asked him to "shoot him through the Head" if he would not listen to expert 
75Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Oct. 16, 1756, DRIA, 2:225. 
76Glen had sent a surveyor to Tomatly in February 1756 to check out available 
conditions for a fort and to confer with Little Carpenter to decide upon a good site. Glen 
to Little Carpenter, Feb. 17, 1756, DRIA, 2:99-100. 
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advice. Demere suggested that the engineer "blow up his own Brains himself' if he so 
wished. This display alarmed the two Cherokees, who had endured De Brahm patiently 
but had finally had enough. They demanded outright that the fort be built at the original 
location near Tomatly, and after more "discussion" the engineer consented. Old Hop 
knew how to behave diplomatically, but he and Little Carpenter would not consent to 
have "their" fort built in a place that would not serve their needs for protection and status.· 
Old Hop had a fort near his town, and Little Carpenter required one just as close to 
Tomatly.71 
De Brahm's conduct of the fort's construction, which began on October 4 right 
after the location argument, can only have increased Cherokee anxieties about the value 
of their alliance with the British. On the one hand, De Brahm went right to work, issuing 
stern commands regarding the conduct ofDemere's soldier-workers and not even 
allowing them time to build adequate shelters. 78 However, despite early progress on the 
fort, the engineer's mercurial management style caused morale to drop quickly. "He 
fanceys himself a verry great Monarch and wants the whole Command to himself," 
complained Demere. Apparently De Brahm had hoped to win an appointment as 
Surveyor General of South Carolina. When this did not materialize, he became insolent 
and threatened to return to Georgia, "where he should be thank'd for his Service."79 By 
November the strain had begun to show in the lack of progress on the fort. Soldiers still 
77Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Oct. 13, 1756, DRIA, 2:217-18. De Brahm's 
description of the argument over the fort's location is somewhat different, and makes it 
seem as though the Indians bowed to his better judgment. [William Gerard] De Brahm 's 
Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of North America, ed. Louis De 
Vorsey, Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 101-02. 
78Raymond Demere to De Brahm, Oct. 14, 1756, Lyttelton Papers. 
7~aymond Demere to Lyttelton, Oct. 26, 1756, Lyttelton Papers. 
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had not been allowed to construct houses for themselves, while De Brahm had moved 
into an Indian house in Tomatly after hearing of a possible French attack on their camp.80 
The dispute between Demere and De Brahm became more heated with the arrival 
of winter. When the engineer decided that the fort was nearly complete, he tried to turn 
the provincial troops' sympathies away from Demere and almost provoked a mutiny.81 
As for the fort, Demere professed his astonishment at the lack of progress. "Can you call 
this a fort, no Guns or Platforms, no Barracks, no Guard, no necessary Houses or Drains 
so requisite for the Health of the Garrison, no Houses for the Officers, but miserable 
Hovels built at their own Expences ... in short Nothing as yet to be seen deserving the 
Name of a Fort," Demere complained after De Brahm declared his job complete, left 
instructions for finishing the fort, and deserted the operation.82 With the project's two 
principle British representatives locked in combat over the fort's progress, the Cherokee 
headmen were less than enthusiastic. 
Earlier in October, with Demere and De Brahm at loggerheads and the fort project 
stalled, Old Hop had taken matters into his own hands. He told Demere that Indians from 
Great Tellico, the largest Overbill town, had been among the French eliciting support for 
an attack on the Tomatly camp by French, Creek, Choctaw, and Savannah forces, and 
that the new fort must be made defensible immediately. Demere ordered De Brahm to 
finish the palisades, and for once the engineer agreed and set to work. 83 Though these 
rumors were grounded in reality, they also reflected Old Hop's fears oflosing his health, 
80Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Nov. 18, 1756, DRIA, 2:248-51. 
81Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Dec. 16, 1756, and "Council of War," DRIA, 
2:274-75. 
82Demere and Other Officers to De Brahm, Dec. 23, 1756, and Demere to 
Lyttelton, Dec. 24, 1756, DRIA, 2:287-90. 
83Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Oct. 28 and Nov. 7, 1756, DRIA, 2:232-34, 241. 
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status, and influence over the young men. The old headman believed that he would soon 
die, and told Demere to trust only the Great Warrior of Chota and his brother. 
Surprisingly he did not recommend any of his many sons or any other headmen, 
including his nephews Little Carpenter and Willanawa, because he did not know how 
they would "behave" after his passing. 84 
Old Hop may have been warning Demere about actual divisions rising amongst 
his people regarding the British alliance, but his immediate purpose was to encourage 
Demere to finish the fort quickly and prepare for trouble. By late November the 
Cherokees had little to show for their negotiations with the South Carolinians and 
Virginians except an unmanned fort at Chota and De Brahm's watery, unfinished mess at 
Tomatly. No additional traders had come to supply them, and the renewed alliance with 
Britain only increased their danger. When Andrew Lewis returned to Williamsburg, he 
took only seven Cherokee fighting men, far fewer than the one hundred warriors Little 
Carpenter and Old Hop had promised Dinwiddie. The governor told them angrily that he 
suspected the French had induced them to renege on their treaty. Unfazed, the Cherokees 
· promised to send more men once Virginia garrisoned the Chota fort. 85 As later events 
showed, the Overbill Cherokees were perfectly willing to help their British allies, but 
they knew that to do so before they had the forts and garrisons they had requested would 
display weakness before allies and enemies alike. 
To make matters worse for Overhillleaders, they were probably facing pressure 
from another group they could not afford to disregard or disappoint. Cherokee women 
840ld Hop to Raymond Demere, Oct. 28, 1756, DRIA, 2:234-37. 
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"Dinwiddie's Message to the Cherokee Indians," Nov. 14, 1756, Dinwiddie 
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67 
wanted the new forts and garrisons as protection for their families and crops, but the forts 
would also provide them with small amounts of income. Provisioning a fort in the 
mountains had always been a source of concern, and the Carolinians had intended from 
the beginning to buy food from Indians until the garrison could produce their own. 86 By 
January 1757, Demere had become convinced that Indian provisioning would have to 
sustain the fort for a while. He had been able to procure only five canoe loads of corn to 
get the fort builders through the winter and was forced to send an "Indian Wench" off 
with several wagons to buy all the corn she could find. It is not unusual that Indian 
women would be experts at buying corn, even ifthey did it infrequently. Crops and home 
economy were a woman's responsibility, and women knew how to make the most of their 
opportunities. Because Cherokees desired trade goods, both necessities and "trifling 
Things," they would charge as much as they could for their crops. "We are obliged to pay 
very dearly for Corn," Demere complained to Lyttelton, adding that because traders 
brought "no Goods proper for the purchasing of Corn," women selling it only wished for 
the goods he and his men had brought with them.87 Until more traders came to the 
86Glen to Little Carpenter, Feb. 17, 1756, DRIA, 2:99-100; Lyttelton to Old Hop, 
June 3, 1756, DRIA, 2:116. 
87Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Jan. 2 and Jan. 6, 1757, DRIA, 2:303; 310; Talk 
ofthe Mankiller of Great Tellico to Raymond Demere, Feb. 6, 1757, DRIA, 2:333. 
Cherokee women also made baskets of renowned quality, though by the mid-eighteenth 
century this commodity had decreased in importance and Indian women usually sold 
them through intermediary traders. Perdue, Cherokee Women, 74-75. Cherokee women 
were shrewd consumers, and put pressure on their men to maintain peaceful relations 
with the provinces and ensure a healthy trade. "Their Women are so much used to our 
Commodities, Ribbands, Paint, etc. that they soon feel the want of it," an officer at Fort 
Prince George wrote to General Gage in 1764, "That contributed by all Accounts as 
much at least to the last Peace with the Cherokees as the Burning oftheir Towns." 
Augustine Prevost to Gage, May 20, 1764, Gage Papers AS, vol. 15. 
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Overbills region to trade for skins, Cherokee women would have to depend on the new 
fort and its garrison for the goods they needed. 
Some Cherokee women depended on the fort for more than economic benefits. 
As soon as the garrison settled itself at Tomatley, some native women married soldiers. 
On both sides this was not unusual. Traders and Indian agents had long valued native 
wives, especially since being adopted by an Indian family gave white men special 
opportunities for trade and diplomacy. The benefits for Cherokee women were also 
substantial. As the wives of traders and soldiers, Cherokee women could become 
important cultural go-betweens and increase their own level of status. Children of such 
intermarriages remained Cherokees, because kinship was determined by matrilineal 
succession. Such children often grew to become influential in both white and native 
societies, increasing the value of intermarriage for Cherokee women and their kin. But 
these were not merely marriages of convenience or practicality. Cherokee women often 
sided with their soldier-husbands against their own leaders, providing Demere with 
reliable intelligence and bringing food to the fort when provisions were low or 
threatened. British forts and personnel sometimes offered levels of social autonomy and 
economic security to Cherokee women that were unattainable in their own society.88 
Internecine Cherokee animosities created yet another problem for the fort project. 
Overbill headmen had argued for a fort near their homes partly because of their 
competition with the Keowee people after Fort Prince George's construction. With new 
forts guarding Chota and Tomatly,jealousy among leaders from other Upper towns was 
predictable. In November Demere learned that Mankiller and others from Great Tellico 
88Perdue, Cherokee Women, 82-84, 100-01. 
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had visited the French at Fort Toulouse on the Alabama River, and rumors spread that the 
Tellico people had agreed to abandon their town and move to Hiwassee Old Town, where 
the French planned to build a new fort. 89 When Demere confronted Mankiller in 
December, the Tellico headman convinced him that Old Hop and Little Carpenter had 
ordered him to go, and that when he met with the French, he still had "Old Hop's 
Commission," a string ofbeads, hanging from his neck. Demere delighted that Mankiller, 
a man who had "been always disafected to the English," had been so easily brought over 
to the British interests.90 
Subsequently, Demere was sorely disappointed to hear in January that some of 
Tellico's people had indeed moved to Hiwassee.91 Lt. Robert Wall went to Tellico to 
investigate, and met there with a "throng" of Indians still living in the town and eager for 
trade. Wall gave them presents sent by Demere and promised that trade would soon 
return to the village.92 Meanwhile at Chota, Old Hop and Great Warrior eagerly pressed 
Demere for information about what had transpired with Mankiller. He told them he 
would placate the Tellico people with presents, but that he would never again reward the 
"very deceitful Villain" Mankiller.93 When Wall reported back, he confirmed that as long 
as trade goods were in such a short supply in Tellico and nearby villages, ''those Towns 
will always be uneasy and dissatisfied."94 Mankiller confirmed this, making it clear to 
89
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De~ere that until a regular trader came to Tellico, he would have nothing more to say to 
the English.95 
By January 1757 Cherokees began to learn how much their aspirations for an 
expanded British military presence among them would interfere with their own goals 
rather than encourage them. James Glen and other fort proponents had always stressed 
that maintaining good relations with key Cherokees was reason enough to fortifY the 
backcountry, but with the onset of the Seven Years' War, Britain needed Indian allies for 
their military campaigns. Fort Loudoun, as the Overhill fort would soon be named, 
represented an extension of British military policy in the remote mountainous region. 
Indians there who hoped for increased trade, better regulation of traders, and more status 
and authority among their own people would have to take on British motives along with 
their own. This involved promises of Cherokee participation in far-flung military 
ventures, like the 1758 Forbes campaign in Pennsylvania, but provincial war policies also 
infused British-Cherokee relations in the Overhills. Fort Loudoun and the policies that 
accompanied it quickly became more trouble than they were worth for Overhillleaders. 
Cherokees would not readily fight nearby French soldiers and their Indian allies 
without pay, and enemy scalps soon joined woven baskets and deer skins as hot 
commodities in the Overhill towns. At the end of January 1757 Demere had little with 
which to impress the Cherokees. Fort Loudoun had been hastily palisaded after De 
Brahm's abrupt desertion and cannot have been a very attractive inducement to Cherokee 
cooperation. With trade goods sparse in the region, Demere turned to direct payment for 
Cherokee participation in the war. "Nothing is more valuable amongst brave Men and 
95Talk ofMankiller of Great Tellico to Demere, Jan. 15, 1757, DRIA, 2:319-20. 
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Warriours than Trophies ofVictocy," he told the headmen at Chota, ''Nothing is more 
worthy Acceptance than the Scalps of our Enemies; I want some and hope that some of 
you will soon bring me some French Scalps, or some Indian Scalps that are in Friendship 
with the French." He promised to give the equivalent value of thirty pounds of leather in 
exchange for each scalp.96 
South Carolina's Assembly supported the scalp bounty initiative. They agreed to 
defray the cost of"a Gun, one Pound Powder, three Pounds of Bullets, a Matchcoat, a 
Blanket, a Flap, a Check Shirt, a laced Hat, a Knife & two Ounces ofVermillion" for 
each enemy scalp brought in from remote areas. Even larger rewards would be granted 
for killing enemy interlopers in the Cherokee towns themselves.97 Scalp bounties were 
nothing new in British North America, but the increased use of them among the 
Cherokees led to trouble almost immediately. In August a group of young Cherokee men 
brought in five scalps to Fort Loudoun, supposedly taken from enemy Savannahs, and 
asked for their reward. Little Carpenter knew immediately that the scalps were from 
friendly Chickasaws, and warned that the error was likely to cause trouble with longtime 
friends.98 He blamed the new English policy for causing the mistake. "I can think of 
nothing that induced them to do this Action, but their hurry to return home to receive the 
reward," he complained to Demere, upset that a group of upstanding young men had 
96Talk of Raymond Demere to Old Hop and the Upper Cherokee Headmen, Jan. 
25, 1757, DRIA, 2:331-33. On the prevalence and uses of scalp bounties for colonial 
purposes, see James Axtell, "Scalping: The Ethnohistocy of a Moral Question," in The 
European and the Indian, 215-23. 
97Lyttelton to CHA, Feb. 3, 1757, JCHA, 13:321; JCHA, 13:325-26. 
98Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Aug. 26, 1757, DRIA, 2:404-05. 
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"returned like Thiefs With a Lye in their Mouths." He asked Demere to stop the scalp 
bounties immediately. His Cherokees preferred open and honest trade to blood rewards.99 
With most ofthe Seven Years' War action far away from the smoky hills of 
Cherokee country, Demere looked for any opportunity to make his fort, his garrison, and 
his Cherokee allies useful. In June 1757 he found an opportunity. Beneath constant 
rumors of French-Cherokee machinations swirling through the Overbills, Demere heard 
that seven French-allied Savannahs had been seen visiting Tellico. Demere told Old Hop, 
the Standing Turkey, and other Cherokee headmen that killing the Savannahs would 
prove conclusively their allegiance to the king. Old Hop wondered skeptically why 
Demere thought seven Savannahs represented such a dire threat, and the. captain replied 
that they were enough to start with. The headmen resisted creating such a provocation. 
Old Hop liked to keep his options open with the French, and did not wish to endanger 
anyone at Tellico. He asked if they might wait and kill the conspirators after they left 
town. 
While the headmen retired overnight to think about the proposal, Demere 
remained adamant that the Savannahs be killed "some Way or other," and organized a 
party composed of provincial volunteers and two Indians to attack the enemy. They 
succeeded in killing three of the seven Savannahs, much to Demere's delight.100 "The 
Blow is now given," he proclaimed to Lyttelton, sure that the Cherokees' participation in 
the raid would force them into an open war with the French-allied Savannahs.101 He 
publicly rewarded the two Cherokees, making their friends regret not joining the party 
99Summaty of Talks of Old Hop, Little Carpenter, and Paul Demere, Aug. 30, 
1757, L?:elton Papers. 
00Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, June 10, 1757, DRIA, 2:381-83. 
101Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, June 13, 1757, DRIA, 2:383-86. 
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and receiving bounties. But the Overhill headmen did not like being forced into such a 
confrontation by Demere, who they had hoped would bring more trade goods to the 
region rather than increased bloodshed. Demere fmally convinced Old Hop, Standing 
Turkey, and their fellow headman, the Smallpox Conjurer, to agree that the killings were 
justified, but only after bribing them with new matchcoats and promises of more 
ammunition and trade goods for their towns. Still, Demere's rash action did nothing to 
allay Cherokee disappointments, and worsened relations with the Savannahs and 
T 11. 102 e lCO. 
At the bottom of Cherokee disaffection was the issue of trade, which the headmen 
had hoped would be improved by an official South Carolina presence in the region. On 
February 5 Old Hop angrily accused the British of reneging on their 1755 Saluda 
agreement. South Carolina had built them a fort and manned it with a garrison, but 
traders still charged prices far above those to which Glen had agreed, making Old Hop 
regard Charlestown's promises as ''Nothing but Lies." He was particularly upset about 
Chota's trader John Elliot, whom Demere agreed sold goods at a "most exorbitant 
Price."103 A week later Old Hop apologized for his anger, but argued that his people 
would make poor bulwarks against the French without decent guns and ammunition. 
Demere agreed, knowing that the Cherokees' guns were old and in bad repair, and he told 
Lyttelton that Old Hop could hardly be expected to "send his People to fight with their 
Fists."104 
102John Stuart to Lyttelton, June 12, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
103Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Feb. 5, 1757, DRIA, 2:333-35. 
104Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Feb. 15, 1757, DRIA, 2:338-40. 
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But Cherokees could not wait for Lyttelton to act, and used all the advantages 
they possessed to improve trade practices. Fort Loudoun's garrison needed Indian-
produced com to augment their provisions, and Cherokees forced Fort Loudoun's 
commissary John Chevillette to make the traders offer good trading terms and prices in 
exchange for food. 105 The Cherokees also knew that the British feared a French-Cherokee 
alliance above all, and they reminded Demere and other British authorities that the 
French had always promised them an abundance oftrade.106 Those fears only increased 
when proof of a late-1756 French-Cherokee agreement emerged. In April1757, "Articles 
ofPeace and Friendship concluded between the French Governor (of Louisiana) & 
certain Deputies from the Cherokee Nation" were found aboard a captured French 
merchant ship, the Revanche. Lyttelton hurriedly urged the Assembly to enforce strong 
trade regulations, "as may remove, as far as possible, all cause of Discontent in the Minds 
of the Indians."107 
Fort Loudoun's presence did as little to instill ethical practices among 
backcountry traders as it did to enforce fair prices, which further exacerbated Cherokee 
tempers. In July 1757 Little Carpenter asked that John Elliot be recalled from the 
Overhills. He had never stopped cheating Indians with faulty weights and measures, and 
refused to bring sufficient amounts of goods to the towns, which caused "so many Talks" 
among the Cherokees and was a direct source of their disaffection. Little Carpenter told 
Demere outright that without trade improvements they would soon be forced to resort to 
"the French at Tuskegee" and that the quicker Lyttelton corrected the situation the less 
105Chevillette to Lyttelton, Mar. 1, 1757, DRIA, 2:344. 
10~aymond Demere to Lyttelton, Apr. 1, 1757, DRIA, 2:357-59. 
107Lyttelton to CHA, Apr. 1, 1757, DRJA, 2:402; DRIA, 2:413, 422. 
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his people would plot and complain.108 Indian poverty forced the headmen to insist on 
speedy progress in trade matters, but status and conspicuous consumption also played a 
role. At a Fort Loudoun meeting with Elliot and Demere, Cherokee headmen complained 
that ''the Creeks does Laugh at em for being not well Supplyed with them as they are 
them selves."109 Their animosity with Elliot was not personal, and Little Carpenter and 
Old Hop agreed to give him the benefitofthe doubt ifhe would start bringing the arms 
and supplies they needed instead of more rum and flour. 
In August 1757 Paul Demere replaced his brother Raymond as commander of 
Fort Loudoun, but complaints about trade continued. The new commandant reminded 
Cherokee leaders that French-allied Choctaws and Savannahs complained constantly of 
. their treatment, and that Cherokees had never obtained anything from the French but 
promises.110 He urged patience with Elliot, and Overhillleaders had little choice but to 
complain and hope for the best, hating the abuse of their trade but afraid to lose their only 
trader. Those complaints increased for the next two years as John Elliot continued using 
faulty measures, watering down his rum, and charging prices that ensured Cherokee 
poverty. 111 
With Fort Loudoun failing to provide the economic relief Cherokees expected, 
new rumors oflndian schemes began to fly throughout the region. In April1757 Indian 
Superintendent Edmond Atkin told Lyttelton that Cherokees had attacked western 
Virginia settlements. He further suspected that Little Carpenter had become Britain's 
108Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 11, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
109Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 23, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
110Talk ofPaul Demere to the Indians at Fort Loudoun, Aug. 25, 1757, Lyttelton 
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lllPaui Demere to Lyttelton, Feb. 20, 1758 and Sep. 30, 1758, Lyttelton Papers. 
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"Secret Enemy" and had concluded an alliance with the French-allied Shawnees.112 
Indian agent John Stuart also reported a "visible Alteration in the Behaviour of the 
Indians" after Little Carpenter returned from a visit to Charlestown, but he assured 
Lyttelton that the headman remained firmly attached to British interests and maintained 
his status among the Overhill Cherokees.113 Next month a new rumor emerged that 
involved a Nottawagoe-Cherokee alliance to attack Fort Loudoun from without and 
within and to kill the entire garrison.114 In August Paul Demere remained convinced that 
Old Hop and the Tellico people remained the fort's greatest threat, but he assured 
Lyttelton that "Little Carpenter and a great many other Head Men are as good Friends 
and Wellwishers as we can expect.''115 
Demere's mistrust of Old Hop may or may not have been misplaced, but it is 
understandable given the old leader's continual manipulations of Cherokee-British 
relations and his assertions of authority. For example, in July 1757 Old Hop had forced 
Raymond Demere to purchase one of his slaves, "a French Deserter that has been Some 
time in this Nation & his own Property." Demere did so, fearing that if he refused, Old 
Hop would "throw him in the River for the fish to eat."116 Old Hop needed to reaffirm his 
power and influence over Demere, especially in the increasingly unsure political arena of 
the Overhills, with French agents and anti-British Cherokee nativists vying for position 
with the old chief and his people. But such loyalty tests only added increased British 
doubts about Old Hop's influence and reliability. With official opinions about Old Hop's 
112Atkin to Lyttelton, Apr. 30, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
113Stuart to Lyttelton, May 29, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
114Daniel Pepper to Raymond Demere, June 27, 1757, DRIA, 2:390. 
115Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Aug. 18, 1757, DRIA, 2:401-04. 
116Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 11, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
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and Little Carpenter's loyalties shifting constantly, Fort Loudoun's situation grew 
increasingly precarious. 
Reports of possible Cherokee plots came amidst other unsettling news at Fort 
Loudoun. Little Carpenter reported in July 1757 that the French had built a new fort on 
the Savannah River. When Raymond Demere offered to send to Charlestown for help, 
Little Carpenter felt they should act immediately because "Things are Generally too Long 
before they are Determined in Carolina," and he proposed a general Carolinian attack.117 
Demere then learned that Old Hop had been conspiring at Chota with French John, a 
trader in league with the Creeks and Savannahs. Little Carpenter sought to dispel 
Demere's distrust of the old chief, saying the "old fool" would listen to anyone ''that 
brought him a small String of Beads." Not knowing if his Cherokee allies would protect 
him or thwart him, Demere was relieved when fifteen Cherokees brought in a French 
scalp taken near Fort Toulouse because he thought it would provoke his long-anticipated 
Cherokee-French war. 
But the commandant could not disregard French John, a known French ally 
treating with headmen practically under the fort's walls.U8 Demere put a bounty on him 
equal to five hundred pounds of leather, but killing the conspirator would be a delicate 
matter because he was under Old Hop's protection. When the trader learned about the 
bounty and ran off to Tellico for protection, Demere tried to contract the Mankiller's 
help. Mankiller agreed to kill French John and his friend Savannah Tom in secret within 
twenty days.119 Amidst the general confusion created by Demere's meddling, Savannah 
117Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 9, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
118Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, July 30, 1757, DRIA, 2:391-96. 
119Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Aug. 10, 1757, DRIA, 2:396-401. 
Tom allegedly killed a white woman at Tellico. This finally prompted Cherokee 
declarations of war with the Savannahs, a convenient victory for Demere, but a tragedy 
for the Overbill people.120 In less than one year, Raymond Demere and the policies he 
represented had disrupted relations between Overbill towns, contracted Cherokee 
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headmen to act as covert assassins, and drawn the Cherokees into European conflicts they 
would have preferred to avoid. 
Disappointed though the Overbill leaders may have been, their new promises to 
oppose the French still provided an excellent opportunity for presents. In October 1757 
Little Carpenter prepared to set out with a small party to destroy the new French fort on 
the Savannah. Paul Demere was dismayed at the headman's requests for guns, hatchets, 
ammunition, and war paint, but he could do nothing but comply after his brother had 
urged them on for so long. Demere reported being ''tormented" on a daily basis with 
Indian requests for gifts of food and repairs for their guns, hatchets, and tools. 121 Little 
Carpenter and Old Hop were happy to learn in December that a store was planned for 
Chota and all the Overbill towns would be supplied, including Tellico, despite their 
recent fraternizing with the French. 122 
But new Cherokee campaigns against the French would increase the demand for 
scalp bounties dramatically. In January 1758 Little Carpenter's party took fifteen French 
scalps, and the headman wrote to Demere to put in his order: "I hope you will have white 
Shirts made ready against we come. Make them large. Our Paint is gone. Please send to 
me two Pounds of Paint by the Bearer and four Bottles of Rum. I hope you have kept four 
120Talk ofWallanawa, Oct. 9, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
121Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Oct. 11, 1757, Lyttelton Papers. 
122Lyttelton to Paul Demere, Dec. 15, 1757, Lyttelton's Letterbook Commencing 
in 1757, Lyttelton Papers, 57-58 (hereafter cited as Lyttelton Letterbook). 
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Keggs ofRum."123 With dozens of Cherokees pledged to Forbes's spring campaign, the 
demands would only increase. "They expect to be entairten'd when they go to War, and 
when they come back, and Every time they come to give a Talk in the Fort, and on other 
Meeting," despaired Demere, who had no choice but to accede because he was "on the 
Spot" and knew the dangerous consequences for refusing.124 By April Cherokees had sent 
men north to help the Virginians, and a huge force prepared to set out against the French 
to the south. Demere depleted his stores outfitting the Cherokee parties, and feared that 
when they returned he would have no goods to give them.125 
Inability to maintain sufficient supplies of trade goods and constant warfare 
· strained relations between the Overhill Cherokees and the men at Fort Loudoun 
throughout 1758. As young Cherokees agitated against British authority, their leaders 
began refusing promised help and feigning lack of authority in order to hedge against 
uncertain outcomes. In March Little Carpenter refused a request from Lyttelton to bring a 
French prisoner to Charlestown because ''the young Man was not willing," and the 
Overhillleader insisted that he would "never force his Inclination" on another. 126 The 
following month Old Hop refused to help Demere capture a trader, Samuel Jarron, who 
was wanted for an unnamed crime, either sedition or conspiring by letter with the French. 
"He has done Nothing but writing," complained Old Hop, and since Jarron had lived 
among them for many years, the Cherokees considered him a relative and would not give 
him up.127 In June Old Hop and Standing Turkey refused a reward ofthree hundred 
123Little Carpenter to Paul Demere, Jan. 4, 1758, DRIA, 2:434-35. 
124Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Mar. 2, 1758, Lyttelton Papers. 
125Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Apr. 2, 1758, DRIA, 2:455-56. 
126Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Mar. 7, 1758, DRIA, 2:439-40. 
127Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Apr. 2, 1758, DRIA, 2:455-56. 
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pounds ofleather to send men after two deserters, claiming that the fugitives "had too 
much the start," and that "the Path was too Bloody and dread:full."128 
When Lyttelton accused Overbill Cherokees from Settico of attacking settlers in 
Halifax and Bedford counties, Old Hop protested his helplessness in the matter. "I told 
them ... to be kind to the White People," he insisted, "But some will be Rogues, and we 
have too many amongst us, Especially the lower Towns." When Demere reminded him 
that Overbill Settico people had taken part in the attacks, he denied any influence over 
them. "What can I do?" Old Hop shrugged, and claimed that since most of his people 
wished only to hear anti-British lies, he had lost his authority over them because he 
would tell them only the truth.129 As Old Hop knew very well, Virginian and South 
Carolinian authorities could do nothing but forgive unfriendly Cherokee actions. 13° Fort 
Loudoun had not altered the Cherokee-British balance of power among the Overbills at 
all, and its failure to supply Cherokee needs only helped to weaken the older Indian 
leaders' status and influence and to encourage anti-British nativist sentiments. 
Over the following year Paul Demere's influence with Overbill leaders 
diminished as new reports of Cherokee disaffection in the region made Fort Loudoun 
more a lightning rod for dissatisfaction than a beacon ofhope. Some of this may have 
been caused by Demere himself, whom Little Carpenter claimed was "not so attentive to 
the Indians & so kind to them" as his brother Raymond had been.m More tension 
resulted from Lyttelton's unfair efforts to brand Little Carpenter a deserter for quitting 
128Paul Demere to Lyttelton, June 24, 1758, Lyttelton Papers. 
129Lyttelton to Paul Demere, July 5, 1757, Lyttelton Letterbook, 148-50; Paul 
Demere to Lyttelton, July 30, 1758, Lyttelton Papers. 
13~yttelton to Old Hop, Little Carpenter, Standing Turkey, and Woolinawa, Aug. 
28, 1758, Lyttelton Letterbook, 207-08. 
131Lyttelton to Paul Demere, May 2, 1759, Lyttelton Letterbook, 341. 
the Forbes expedition without leave, an action well within Cherokee fighting 
traditions. 132 But by early 1759 British-Cherokee relations had already deteriorated 
beyond the control or influence ofFort Loudoun. In April1759 Cherokees ofSettico, 
eager to avenge earlier deaths at the hands of Virginia settlers, raided settlements in 
western North Carolina, killing dozens of settlers and spreading fear throughout the 
backcountry. 133 Lyttelton's plan to use Cherokees as foot soldiers in a general southern 
campaign changed as a frightened South Carolina populace demanded that the 
government control their Indian allies. Lyttelton ordered trade suspended at Settico in 
August 1759, and stopped sales of arms to the Overbills altogether. 
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For Indians already dissatisfied with trade and always in need of ammunition and 
guns for hunting, this was a giant step backwards in their relations with the colonies. But 
Lyttelton cared little for Cherokee complaints because he had already decided that only a 
military confrontation could compel the Cherokees to meet their treaty obligations. 
Ignoring a last-minute Cherokee peace delegation to Charlestown in September, Lyttelton 
declared the Cherokees to be in open rebellion, sent letters to all surrounding colonial 
governors and the headmen of the Chickasaws, Creeks, and Catawbas, and prepared 
South Carolina for open war with the Cherokee Nation. This was an outcome few had 
expected. 134 
132Lyttelton to Paul Demere, Feb. 2 and Mar. 20, 1759, Lyttelton Letterbook; 206-
07, 315; Hatley, Dividing Paths, 102. 
133Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 168. Settlers had killed Settico Cherokees 
returning home from fighting as British allies in the Forbes campaign as they passed 
through the backcountry. Hatley, Dividing Paths, 100-01. 
134Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 168-90; Hatley, Dividing Paths, 107-15. 
Lyttelton's warnings of the onset of hostilities are in the Lyttelton Letterbook. 
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Fort Loudoun would eventually meet its end at the Cherokees' hands in August 
1760 when they besieged the fort and forced its capitulation, despite Little Carpenter's 
efforts at moderation. Indian wives ofBritish soldiers showed great courage in sneaking 
food into the fort and arguing for leniency, but to little avail. As for Old Hop, by then his 
shifting loyalties no longer mattered. The old headman had succumbed to disease earlier 
that year, and nativists led by Standing Turkey and the Great Warrior of Chota held 
authority in the Overbill region. After the garrison's surrender, Cherokees killed Paul 
Demere and thirty-two of the fort's men, and enslaved or adopted the rest. 135 
But the making of the fort revealed as much about the Cherokees' lives and 
desires as did the fort's breaking during the Cherokee-British War. Cherokee leaders 
desperately wanted forts near their towns to regulate trade and conspicuously define their 
status among Indians and Europeans alike. They exercised their influence to have forts 
built on sites of their choice, where they would serve Cherokee interests best. They knew 
that Glen was right to characterize them as the key to South Carolina's success, and they 
understood that the colonists needed them more than they needed the Virginians or the 
Carolinians. 
Contrary to Cherokee expectations, allowing forts in their country also brought 
British military operations and expansionist policies closer to home. Cherokee headmen 
finally realized their desire for a British Overbill fort, but then they had to live with it. 
The result was increased tension between pro-French nativists and pro-British moderates 
among their own people, and conflicts with ever-encroaching Europeans on the colonial 
135Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 216-21; Hatley, Dividing Paths, 133; Perdue, 
Cherokee Women, 100. For a detailed account of the surrender ofFort Loudoun and the 
fate of its garrison, see Richard G. Stone, Jr., "Captain Paul Demere at Fort Loudoun, 
1757-1760," East Tennessee Historical Society Publications 41 (1969): 30-32. 
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frontier. Native American dispossession should seldom, if ever, be seen as the Indians' 
own fault, especially when their leaders tried their best to navigate the waters of the new 
Indian-European world to their peoples' best advantage. But the making of Fort Loudoun 




Loitering at Fort Allen, 1756-1761 
Of the many occupations Benjamin Franklin held during his storied life, one of 
the less acclaimed was that of a frontier fort builder. Franklin's contributions to 
philosophy, politics, and science are so significant that his contribution to the dirty work 
of defending Pennsylvania during the Delaware War has slipped past many of his 
biographers. But given the unexpected developments at Franklin's Fort Allen, it is fitting 
that it was designed and built by such an enigmatic individual. Intended as part of a chain 
of defensive outposts to protect Pennsylvania's towns and cities from Indian attack, 
Franklin's small fort became a diplomatic way-station, a drunken watering hole, and a 
moderately successful trading post. In fact, the fort became many things, but never really 
fulfilled its original purpose in Pennsylvania's frontier defense plans. Instead of 
protecting Pennsylvania's people and property, the fort became a source of confusion and 
anxiety for its Indian and European neighbors. 
Most of the anxiety caused by Fort Allen's brief existence on the northern slope 
of the Blue Mountains stemmed from its frequent Indian guests. Situated at a vital 
passage through the mountains, the fort was sure to attract Indian passers-by. But the fort 
was also well situated for Indian diplomatic visits to the nearby towns of Easton, 
Reading, and Bethlehem. Indians visiting the fort for such purposes expected the full 
hospitality of the garrison and commandant, as they would of any host throughout Indian 
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country. Fort Allen's role as an Indian diplomatic checkpoint and resting place replaced 
its original role as a frontier base for punitive expeditions against belligerent Delawares. 
With hundreds oflndians visiting each year, and with a garrison that never exceeded one 
hundred men, it is understandable that Indians came to define the identity and nature of 
the small wooden stockade. Meant to reassure local settlers and to bring stability to the 
liminal space that existed between Indian country and British Pennsylvania, Fort Allen 
became an enigma. Instead of preventing Indians from troubling the Blue Mountain 
region, it attracted them. Instead of regulating unscrupulous British traders, the fort 
brought them a ready, native customer base. Fort Allen became as much an Indian place 
as an English one, where the most famous resident was not Franklin or some other 
provincial celebrity, but the renowned Delaware chief Teedyuscung. Colonial anxieties 
merged with Indian notions ofhospitality and reciprocal obligation at Fort Allen, 
producing a place of anxious hospitality for both Europeans and Indians.1 
It is not surprising that Pennsylvania's Indians would expect hospitality in a fort 
built to defend the province against native interlopers. Hospitality toward visitors was a 
1Fort Allen has received scant historical attention as a cultural contact point. The 
most complete description of the fort's history is William A. Hunter, Forts on the 
Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, 1960), 233-59. See also Charles Morse Stolz's valuable illustrations and 
description in Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and English in Western 
Pennsylvania: Their Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764, 2d ed. (Pittsburgh, 
PA: University ofPittsburgh Press, 2005), 106-07. For descriptions ofthe political and 
social contexts in which Fort Allen was built, see Anthony F. C. Wallace, King of the 
Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1990); Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 92-122; Ralph M. Ketcham, 
"Conscience, War and Politics in Pennsylvania, 1755-1757," WMQ, 3rd ser. 20:3 (July 
1963): 416-39; Louis M. Waddell, "Defending the Long Perimeter: Forts on the 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia Frontier, 1755-1765," Pennsylvania History 62:2 
(1995): 171-95; R. S. Stephenson, "Pennsylvania Provincial Soldiers in the Seven Years' 
War," Pennsylvania History 62:2 (1995): 196-213. 
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fundamental fixture ofEastem Woodland Indian life. Throughout eastern North America, 
Indians felt obligated to extend generosity to their guests, and friendly visitors expected 
polite treatment when visiting allies or kin. This type of reciprocal social exchange 
exemplified native life. It helped prevent destructive conflicts between native groups, and 
made tmveling far from home bearable. This level of hospitality was sure to create 
friction when tested against less patient Europeans. When Indians made extended visits to 
European towns and forts, their hosts sometimes complained, to other Europeans at least, 
about native "loitering." Indians would have found such frustmtion with the length of a 
guest's stay disrespectful and possibly offensive. 
French missionaries commented on Indians' effusive, and sometimes impractical, 
extension of generous cordiality, and hoped it could be harnessed as a conduit for 
teaching Christian virtues. Claude Allouez reported that hospitality was a common moml 
virtue among Indians he had encountered in New Fmnce. As an example, he noted an 
instance when Indians of the Ia Prairie mission near Montreal unexpectedly hosted over 
800 friends, and used up their whole two-year supply of com, "giving the strangers a 
warm reception."2 Francesco Bressani agreed, and claimed that hospitality was so 
common among Indians that it was not considered a virtue, just a standard feature of life. 
He remarked that Hurons would receive any visitor, "never driving him from the hut, but 
serving him and giving him whatever he needed just as to the most intimate members of 
the household, without asking any pay for it."3 Paul Rageuneau elaborated on this facet of 
Huron life, especially in times of war or during mass population displacements: "Seven 
2 Rueben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels 
and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791 (Cleveland: 
Burrows Brothers, 1896-1901), 58:79 (hereafter cited as JR). 
3JR, 38:267. 
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or eight hundred persons, would find, from the time of their arrival, benevolent hosts, 
who stretched out to them their arms, and assisted them with joy: who would even divide 
among them a share in lands already sown, in order that they might be able to live, 
although in a foreign country, as in their own.'>4 Missionaries had every reason to 
emphasize Christian-like virtues among potential converts in their relations to superiors 
in France, and their descriptions of native hospitality glow with proselytizing idealism. 
But to Indians, hospitality was simply a rational function of their reciprocity-based social 
interactions. Expecting hospitable treatment from friends, kin, and allies, and being 
willing to supply it, was necessary for survival. 
In Pennsylvania, hospitality was planted firmly in Indian culture. When 
Europeans arrived in Pennsylvania, Delawares extended them all the favors they would 
have bestowed on well-known friends. In fact, this instinctive generosity led to their 
ceding lands easily to the newcomers, without fully understanding the permanent nature 
of European land tenure.5 Moravian missionary David Zeisberger experienced Delaware 
hospitality personally. He wrote, "It is recognized as a duty to care for the wants of a 
guest as long as he may choose to remain and even to give him provisions for the journey 
when he does make up his mind to go.'' Food was always provided immediately to weary 
travelers. Zeisberger observed, "If the guests are from a distance and are very good 
friends, the whole kettle of food is set before them, they are given dishes and spoons and 
4JR, 35:207-09. 
5 C. A Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1972), 51;, Paul A. W. Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: 
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1964 ), 129; James H. Merrell, Into 
the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1999), 137-43. 
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allowed to help themselves first to as much as they wish.'.6 Zeisberger's friend John 
Heckewelder noted that on "more than one hundred instances" he had experienced such 
effusive hospitality and that it was not reserved exclusively for Indian guests: "A person 
is never left standing, there are seats for all; and if a dozen should follow each other in 
succession, all are provided with seats, and the stranger, if a white person, with the best." 
Heckewelder also insisted that these favors were given out of a sense of social 
responsibility, and that hosts would expect the same treatment themselves. But 
reciprocity did not imply a quid pro quo relationship, according to Heckewelder: 
I have seen a number of instances in which a return was out of the question, 
where poverty would not admit of it, or distance of abode put it out of the power 
ofthe visitor to return the same civilities to his host; when white people are 
treated in this way, with the best entertainment the house affords, they may be 
sure it is nothing else than a mark of respect paid to them, and that the attentions 
they receive do not proceed from any interested view.7 
Hospitable treatment became doubly important when guests were diplomats. 
Before European contact, Indians did not fight wars or enter into conflicts they did not 
expect to end through negotiation. Given small Indian populations in the Eastern 
Woodlands region and the harsh dictates of the natural environment, diplomacy was an 
indispensable safeguard against overly destructive conflicts. Ambassadors on peace 
missions usually enjoyed the hospitality of the chiefs house, and nothing would be 
6David Zeisberger's History of Northern American Indians, ed., Archer Butler 
Hulbert and William Nathaniel Schwarze (Columbus: Ohio State Archaeological and 
Historical Society, 1910), 116, 120, 129. 
7John Heckewelder, Account of the History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian 
Nations Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States (1876; repr., New 
York: Amo Press, 1971), 148-49. 
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spared to make such delegates comfortable. To do otherwise would degrade a headman's 
reputation among other nations and weaken his status among his own people.8 
Presents for guests were also an important part of hospitable treatment. They 
served as physical examples of generosity that went beyond supplying visitors with 
provisions, which was expected of everyone. In Indian societies, where material goods 
and abstract favors were deemed to exist in a constant state of reciprocal redistribution, 
exchanging presents served as concrete examples of love, alliance, and peaceful 
intentions. These obligations were especially important in times of great danger, as when 
help in battle was requested and given. Indian notions of generosity, hospitality, and 
reciprocal exchange informed dealings between native groups and between Indians and 
Europeans. Favors were not to be refused among friends. Presents and hospitable 
treatment were the glue that held friends together in the face of natural challenges and 
human belligerence.9 
Indians expected even more than gifts and hospitality for their participation in 
British military operations. Native women and children fended for themselves regularly 
when men left their settlements to hunt and trade. When Indian men joined British 
military excursions, they expected their allies to help protect and provision their 
dependents. For example, George Croghan reported to Pennsylvania's governor Robert 
Morris in July 1755 that twenty-five Indian women and children from his trading post at 
Aughwick had arrived in Berks County asking for food. Their husbands and kin had 
8Zeisberger's History, 93; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs, 181-82. 
90n Indian generosity and the ambiguities of native notions of reciprocity, see 
David Murray, Indian Giving, 31-38. See also Axtell, The European and the Indian, 136, 
348n8. For the "redistributive" reciprocal nature oflndian exchange, especially among 
the Iroquois, see Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 21-22, 4 7. 
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joined Major General Edward Braddock's campaign against Fort Duquesne, but the 
women and children had been sent away after reports that some of the women had 
consorted "scandalously" with English officers.1° Croghan argued that they should be 
provisioned, "as they had no Body to hunt for them they co' d not live without being 
somehow assisted by their Brethren."11 This expectation of aid, based on pragmatic 
European necessities and native traditions of reciprocal social responsibility, affected 
English-Indian relations at nearly every turn. 
Implicit in Croghan's report was the notion that some Indians preferred resorting 
to provincial authorities rather than settlers or traders for provisions. With the outbreak of 
hostilities between Delawares and Pennsylvanians in 1755, Indians could no longer 
expect to approach white backcountry residents safely. Many settlers made little 
distinction between Indian allies and those with less certain allegiances, and thought even 
less oftheir provincial leaders supplying possible enemies with goods. "Our People are 
very malicious against our Indians," Croghan reported. "They curse 'em to their Faces 
and say 'must we feed You, and your Husbands fight in the mean time for the French."12 
Indian families disrupted by war and living near fearful backcountry settlers needed to 
tread carefully. Without permanent military forts, where Indians could expect more 
assured compliance with provincial agreements and friendlier conduct, everyday 
encounters between whites and natives always carried the possibility of confrontation and 
violence. 
10Weslager, Delaware Indians, 223. 
11Croghan to Morris, July 21, 1755, in Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, ed. 
Samuel Hazard (Harrisburg: T. Fenn, 1851), 6:494-95 (hereafter cited as CRP). 
12Ibid. 
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As more Delawares joined French-allied Ohio Indian groups in their rebellion 
against English rule in late 1755, the need for protective forts became crucial in 
maintaining British-native alliances. Some Delawares living near the multicultural 
villages of Wyoming and Shamokin requested that forts and trading posts be constructed 
to guard those increasingly important population centers. The province was not yet ready 
to fund military outposts so deep into Pennsylvania's interior, but increasing numbers of 
Indian attacks on white settlements forced the government to consider frontier 
fortifications. In October, Conrad Weiser and other leading men wrote from Reading to 
report the town's susceptibility to French-allied Indian attack. "We are all in Uproar, all 
in Disorder," they wrote to Morris. They lacked experienced military leadership and 
warned that if the province failed to supply them with able officers and men, they must 
abandon their town and wait out their fate with Philadelphia's inhabitants.13 Panic and 
rumors spread quickly throughout the frontier, prompted by reports of actual Indian 
attacks farther west. But in November 1755, reports from Moravian mission towns near 
the Blue Mountains brought the threat of war closer to Philadelphia and its surrounding 
• 14 
counties. 
Relations between Pennsylvania and Munsee Delawares, living near Wyoming on 
the North Branch of the Susquehanna River, had already become strained. Two late-
October attacks on English traders near Shamokin had nearly destroyed any hopes of 
maintaining a Delaware-English alliance. Though no Wyoming Indians took part in those 
13Conrad Weiser, et al., to Morris, Oct. 31, 1755, Timothy Horsfield Papers, 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia (hereafter cited as Horsfield Papers). 
14For descriptions of the spread of panic following Braddock's defeat and 
subsequent English problems maintaining Delaware alliances, see Wallace, King of the 
Delawares, 67-72; Weslager, Delaware Indians, 226-32. 
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attacks, they listened to backcountry rumors and assumed that the English would blame 
all Delawares alike. In early November, Moravian missionaries and traders brought 
frightening accounts from the Delaware towns. Indians near Shamokin told Moravian 
traders that many there had joined the French cause and intended to kill all English 
people on the frontier. Moravian missionaries traveling in the Susquehanna region 
·reported seeing massed Indian tracks and hearing rumors of French and Indian incursions 
closer to Philadelphia. The missionaries tried to allay the Delawares' fears and suggested 
that they communicate their innocence to the governor immediately, but to little avail. 
Tensions had brought economic hardship to the Delawares because traders no longer 
visited Indian towns, and many feared that conflict was inevitable.15 
Of more immediate concern to the inhabitants of Easton and Bethlehem were 
reports of unfamiliar Indians seen near the Moravian mission town of Gnadenhutten. The 
town's Indian converts maintained old contacts with friends and kin throughout eastern 
Pennsylvania. When the Moravian Indians heard about growing tensions on the 
Susquehanna and that hostile Delawares intended to strike the mission soon, panic swept 
through the town. David Zeisberger reported that belligerent Indians had offered the 
Christian converts safe conduct out of the area and had promised that the converts would 
suffer along with their European friends ifthey did not comply. Gnadenhutten's residents 
planned to take refuge in Bethlehem until the danger passed, but tragedy struck before 
they could evacuate their village.16 
15 Horsfield to Morris, Nov. 2 and Nov. 10, 1755, Horsfield Papers; Horsfield to 
Morris, Nov. 15, 1755, Timothy Horsfield Letterbook, 1754-1755, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (hereafter cited as Horsfield Letterbook). 
16
"Examination ofDavid Zeisberger," Nov. 22, 1755, Horsfield Papers. 
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On November 24, 1755, a large band ofMunsees attacked Gnadenhutten, killing 
several inhabitants and partially burning the village. Gnadenhutten's Indian converts had 
long been a source of suspicion for Delawares living in Pennsylvania's interior, who saw 
the Christian Indians as too closely allied to English settlement ambitions and too eager 
to reject native culture for European lifeways. By attacking the mission town, they hoped 
to establish their ability to kill allies of the English and thwart provincial plans quickly 
and easily. The town was taken by surprise, despite the warnings of the previous month. 
Those who survived fled to Bethlehem, and on the way they met Timothy Horsfield and a 
company of provincial troops on their way to protect the mission settlement. Descriptions 
of the attack shocked Horsfield, who saw it as a harbinger of doom for the entire region. 
"Unless some Speedy Measures be fallen upon to stop the Depredations and Incursions of 
these Blood Thirsty Villains, I see nothing but the inevitable Ruin of our Country," he 
wrote to Morris. Without proper defensive measures, a small number of attackers using 
native stealth tactics could "disturb the Peace of a Whole Province, and baflle the 
Attempts of Thousands. "17 These fears were confirmed almost immediately, when settlers 
began fleeing their homes for the more populated region. To make matters worse, Easton 
residents had resorted to vigilantism. In one instance, Easton men captured and 
imprisoned an innocent Indian without any cause and promised further reprisals against 
natives.18 With frontier tensions at the breaking point, Philadelphians feared that this 
17Horsfield to Morris, Nov. 26, 1755, in Pennsylvania Archives, 1st series, ed. 
Samuel Hazard (Philadelphia and Harrisburg: s. n., 1852-56), 2:520-23 (hereafter cited as 
PA). 
18Horsfield to Morris, Nov. 29, 1755, Horsfield Letterbook. 
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attack on a peaceful mission town would bring the Delaware War into the heart of the 
• 19 provmce. 
If GnadenhUtten's attackers had hoped to drive a wedge between Christian 
Indians and their European friends, they must have been disappointed by the results. 
Terrified and impoverished by the loss of their village, Gnadenhutten's Delaware and 
Mahican residents sought refuge among the Moravians in Bethlehem. They· lost no time 
in contacting Governor Morris, denouncing the recent attacks in the Susquehanna region, 
and denying any connection to acts of violence. As for the attack on their homes, they 
accepted it as the price for their allegiance to the Moravian Brethren and the province. 
Because the attack left them destitute, the Indian converts placed themselves at the mercy 
ofthe province, declaring that they were "entirely devoted to the English Government" 
and wished the province "Success and Prosperity ... against their and our Enemies."20 
Morris commended the refugees and promised that they would receive aid commensurate 
with their status as full citizens of Pennsylvania. 
Morris also promised that he would build and garrison a fort at Gnadenhutten. 
This would help the refugees reclaim and guard their property and offer them "equal 
Security with the white people" on the frontier.21 Pennsylvania's Assembly has already 
authorized a grant of £60,000 for frontier defense on November 26, and a fort at 
Gnadenhutten would be just one in a line of forts stretching along the Blue Mountains 
19For a description of the Gnadenhutten attack, its causes, and its significance, see 
Jane T. Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 
1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2003), 184-86. 
20 Address of Gnadenhutten Indians to Morris, Nov. 30, 1755, Horsfield Papers. 
21Morris to the Gnadenutten Indians, Dec. 4, 1755, Horsfield Papers; Answer of 
Gnadenhutten Indians to Morris, Horsfield Letterbook. 
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from the Delaware River in the north to Maryland's border in the south?2 The attack on 
GnadenhUtten had surely terrified the frontier's residents, but it drove the village's 
Indians even closer to the provincial establishment. Burned and empty, GnadenhUtten had 
been converted from an Indian place, albeit a Europeanized one, into an unoccupied 
terrain upon which English and Indian ambitions would be contested and negotiated for 
the next few years. 
Morris's promise to fortify the frontier came just in time for white settlers, already 
terrified by the increasing level ofviolence. Even before the Gnadenhutten attack, 
magistrates Horsfield, William Parsons, and James Martin had ordered local townships 
and districts to maintain rangers in the woods and hills near their homes. They warned 
frontier settlers that people in Easton, Reading, Bethlehem, and other large towns shared 
the same dangers as those in more remote areas. Town justices possessed no arms, forces, 
or expertise capable of defending the region, so smaller settlements and individual 
farmers would have to fend for themselves. 23 This request carried its own risks, 
especially in remote areas where settlers were accustomed to taking matters into their 
own hands. On December 1, a Bucks County vigilante stopped and threatened one of 
Horsfield's express riders. The incident ended without injury, and though Horsfield 
promised to make an example of this "villain," the danger from such individual actions· 
was clear.24 Vigilantism would only increase the danger of Indian reprisals and make it 
difficult for magistrates and militia commanders to stabilize the region. 
22C. Hale Sipe, The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph 
Press, 1929), 252. 
23 Address of Horsfield, et al., Nov. 24, 1755, Horsfield Papers. 
24Horsfield to Morris, Dec. I, 1755, Horsfield Letterbook. 
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A few days later, a body of two hundred Indians attacked and cut off a settler 
family north of the Blue Mountains. Forced to work with the resources he had, Horsfield 
notified Northampton County constables to give their inhabitants ''timely Notice to be 
upon their Guard and to Assemble themselves to March against our Barbarous and Cruel 
Enemy" with whatever arms and provisions they could muster. This could not have been 
very encouraging to settlers, already afraid to leave their homes for even short periods. 
Even Horsfield was despondent, telling Morris, "When we have the People, we have no 
Proper Persons to lead them, and what can we Expect?"25 Without an organized militia to 
protect the frontier, county officials could not expect to hold off Indian attacks 
indefinitely. 
Though the line of defensive forts was a provincial initiative, the concept of a fort 
at GnadenhUtten began with the Bethlehem Moravians. Days after the attack, Moravian 
bishop Augustus Spangenberg offered ten acres of land for the province to build a fort at 
the site.Z6 This appealed to Morris, who saw GnadenhUtten as a strategic key to 
safeguarding passes through the Blue Mountains. The governor's original idea was to 
supply the Moravian Brethren with funds and have them construct the fort, provided that 
they kept their goals modest. "The Fort intended to be built will only be a Wooden one," 
he instructed, "Or a Stockade thrown round the Buildings there, as shall be found most 
• ,27 
convement. 
The Moravians had other ideas. While they had already begun to fortifY and arm 
Bethlehem to a degree unusual for pacifists, they claimed little expertise in fort 
25Horsfield to the Constables ofNorthhampton County, and Horsfield to Morris, 
Dec. 12, 1755, Horsfield Letterbook. 
26William A. Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 234. 
27Morris to Horsfield, Dec. 4, 1755, Horsfield Papers. 
97 
construction and asked that Easton's justice William Parsons undertake the project. Time 
was of the essence: Horsfield notified Morris that a family had been killed within five 
miles of GnadenhUtten, and that settlers nearby were so frightened that nobody could be 
found to salvage the Indians' corn stores from the burned village?8 The Assembly agreed 
to send Capt. William Hays and a small company of provincial troops to GnadenhUtten to 
guard the remains ofthe town. On December 17, Spangenberg sought to spur on the 
province with new reports. Friendly Indians had informed the Moravian Brethren that 
hostile natives would soon attack their mission towns ofNazareth, Gnadenthal, and 
Friedenthal. Spangenberg asked the province to supply 170 men to help defend the 
settlements. Such a body of men, Spangenberg argued, would do as well as a fort to 
defend the villages until outposts could be built.29 Provincial Commissioners James 
Hamilton, Joseph Fox, and Benjamin Franklin arrived in Easton on December 20 to begin 
coordinating defense efforts. At the same time, William Hays's company arrived in 
Gnadenhutten to guard the Indians' property and to secure the site for a planned fort.30 
Hays's small outfit proved ineffective against GnadenhUtten's Indian attackers, 
with their superior backcountry fighting skills and intelligence-gathering abilities. On 
January 1, 1756, the Munsees struck at Hays's company in GnadenhUtten, burning what 
was left ofthe town and routing the defenders completely. Twenty of Hays's 72 men died 
in the attack, and more deserted after fleeing the town, reducing the company to only 18 
28Horsfield to Morris, Dec. 8, 1755, Horsfield Papers. 
29Spangenberg to Morris, Dec. 17, 1755, Horsfield Papers. 
30Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Fron_tier, 234-35. 
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men. 31 This new attack on the very force sent to secure the area panicked the region. On 
January 3, a handful ofindians attacked settlers near Allemangel, a few miles from 
GnadenhUtten, and set the entire population of seventy people fleeing for their lives over 
the Blue Mountains.32 
Benjamin Franklin, in Bethlehem organizing the expedition to build the 
Gnadenhutten fort, was appalled at the chaos on the frontier and in the Moravian capital. 
"We found this place fill'd with Refugees," he wrote to Morris, ''the Workmen's Shops, 
and even the Cellars being crouded with Women and Children.'' He warned the governor 
that all the regions' settlements had requested additional militiamen. Lehigh Township 
had been entirely deserted after news of Hays's defeat. Refugees from the Irish 
Settlement on the Lehigh promised to retreat from the area entirely unless thirty men be 
sent to guard them and their property. Franklin was hesitant to begin moving troops 
around at the whims of panicked residents, especially refugees who had chosen to flee 
rather than to "behave like Men." He immediately ordered local magistrates to raise 
troops or risk losing their settlements and authorized a bounty of $40 per Indian scalp. He 
also prepared to set out for GnadenhUtten with his party and suggested to Morris that he 
complete the "Ranging Line ofForts" as soon as possible.33 
31William Hays to Morris and the Provincial Commissioners, Jan. 3, 1756, in The 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, eds. Leonard W. Labaree et al. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959), 6:341-42 (hereafter cited as Franklin Papers). 
32Franklin to David Hall, Franklin Papers, 6:348-49. The settlers fleeing from 
Allemangel soon met a party of 17 men led by trader Jacob Levan, and they regrouped 
and fouf]t,t off the pursuing Indians. 
3 Franklin to John Vanetta (Van Etten), Jan. 12, 1756, PA, 2:546-47; 
Franklin to Morris, Jan. 14, 1756, PA 2:548-50. 
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Franklin left Bethlehem on January 15, confident that he and his party of 130 men 
could reach Gnadenhutten and have the fort line finished in a few weeks. 34 According to 
Thomas Lloyd, an ensign in the expedition, the route was a desolate and frightening 
scene of chaos. Houses and farms had been burnt. Bodies lay unburied, exposed to the 
elements, wildlife, and "all Kinds ofMischiefperpetrated that wanton Cruelty can 
invent."35 Despite the danger to the exposed party from Indians who. had already proven 
their inclination to attack large bodies of troops, the expedition arrived in Gnadenhutten 
on the 16th and began burying the dead, laying out their fort, and cutting palisades. 
Nine days later, Franklin declared the fort finished and named it for his friend 
William Allen, Pennsylvania's chief justice. The finished fort was 125 feet long and 50 
feet wide, with triangular bastions, a twelve-foot high palisade, a surrounding trench, and 
three buildings for the garrison. "We had one swivel Gun, which we mounted on one of 
the Angles," Franklin wrote later in his autobiography, "And fired it as soon as fix'd, to · 
let the Indians know, if any were within hearing, that we had such Pieces, and this out 
Fort (if such a magnificent Name may be given to so miserable a Stockade) was finished 
in a Week." He hoped that the "contemptible" fort would still be "a sufficient Defence 
against Indians who have no cannon."36 Despite Franklin's uncomplimentary description, 
the small fort was a substantial symbol for the chaotic Lehigh region. It was well built 
34Benjamin Franklin to Deborah Franklin, Jan. 15, 1756, Franklin Papers, 6:360-
61. 
35Thomas Lloyd to [Unknown], Jan. 30, 1756, Franklin Papers, 6:380-82. 
36Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography and other Writings on Politics, 
Economics, and Virtue, ed. Alan Houston (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 123-24. Franklin's later self-deprecation was probably an effort to downplay the 
importance of a fort that ended up being manned for a short period. For some of 
Franklin's contemporaneous letters describing Fort Allen's construction, see Franklin 
Papers, 6:365-71. 
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despite its speedy construction, unlike Fort Franklin, the next fort down the defensive 
line, which would stand only for a few months.37 With a proper garrison, Fort Allen could 
anchor the province's defense of the Blue Mountains. 
Procuring and provisioning garrisons quickly became a harsh burden for the 
province, despite the fort chain's speedy construction. By early February, the project had 
nearly devoured the £60,000 authorized by the Assembly.38 Lack of experienced officers 
and proper measures for establishing military law and discipline also threatened the 
enterprise. 39 Fort Allen's original garrison consisted of 50 men under Captain Isaac 
Wayne, and the combined garrisons on the fort line totaled only 389 men.40 Many of 
them spent much of their time away from their forts, escorting wagon trains and friendly 
Indians, ranging the frontier, and protecting settlers if requested. For example, John Mee 
and Joseph Leacock, farmers living a couple of miles from Fort Allen, asked for men to 
protect them while they erected new fences and fertilized their fields.41 Farmers needed 
protection to perform their most basic chores during the Delaware uprising, and they 
stressed undermanned militia units to their limits. Without sufficient numbers of well-
trained soldiers and officers, the fort line garrisons were stretched too thin to guard 
against Indian incursions. 
In addition to tactical difficulties, it soon became clear to the province's leaders 
that the original strategic basis for the line of forts was unworkable. Pennsylvania's 
commissioners had hoped that after the frontier was secured and its women and children 
6:408. 
37Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 259. 
38Morris to George Washington, Feb. 2, 1756, PA, 2:564-65. 
39Morris to William Shirley, Feb. 9, 1756, PA, 2:569-70. 
40
''Position ofTroops in Northhampton County," Feb. 23, 1756, Franklin Papers, 
41Petition of John Hughes to Morris, Apr. 21, 1756, PA, 2:638. 
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possessed safe refuges, provincial troops could invade the Susquehanna country and take 
the fight to the attackers' homes. But settlers and militiamen preferred defending their 
own territory to invading Indian country. Attempts to motivate colonial raiding parties 
with scalp bounties failed.42 Settlers living under the constant threat of attack had little 
desire to further infuriate the Munsees or other hostile Indians, and valued the fort line for 
the defense it offered them rather than for its role in any overall strategic scheme. As long 
as soldiers remained nearby, settlers were satisfied to wait out the situation and hope for 
the best. 
By the ~ummer of 1756, Fort Allen had already fallen into a state of 
mismanagement and confusion. When James Young, Commissary General ofthe 
Musters, inspected the fort in June he found only fifteen men present without any 
commander. The rest ofthe garrison was scattered throughout the country between Fort 
Allen and Bethlehem, escorting friendly Indian delegations and Moravians. Jacob Meis, 
the commanding lieutenant, was in Easton petitioning for soldiers' back pay. Young 
could not even find most of the fort's provisions, though he noted seeing a "large 
Quantity of Beef very ill Cured.'.43 When Fort Allen's new commander, Capt. George 
Reynolds, arrived in late June, he reported the poor condition of the garrison and a 
shocking lack of decent arms and ammunition, "not above fifteen Gunes any ways 
Good," and asked that he be allowed to raid Bethlehem's armories for decent 
42Pennsylvania Commissioners to Morris, June 14, 1756, CRP, 7:153-54. As 
noted in Chapter 1, scalp bounties were a commonly used method of motivating settlers 
and Indians to participate in military activities and punitive missions. Axtell, The 
European and the Indian, 215-23. 
43
"A Journal from Reading to the Sundry Forts and Garrisons Along the Northern 
Frontiers ofthe Province," June 21, 1756, PA, 2:677-78. 
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munitions.44 But other fort commanders in the region had already coveted and 
confiscated some of the Moravian Brethren's best weapons.45 After six months, the Blue 
Mountain forts had done little to improve the province's position in the ongoing 
Delaware war and seemed barely capable of maintaining their own garrisons and 
protecting the region. 
However ill-suited Fort Allen may have seemed as a protector of region's settlers, 
it soon began to emerge as an Indian refuge. Nearby Bethlehem had been drowned in 
white and Indian refugees since the beginning of the year. "Most of our Rooms have been 
obliged to lodge 20 or 25 Persons and Seventy of our Indians have lived in one Small 
House where they had but 2 Rooms," wrote one of the Moravians in April. But many 
Indians preferred the cramped quarters of Bethlehem or Fort Allen to the uncertain 
interior of the province. For example, two Moravian Indians, Nicodemus and his son 
Christian, had tried moving to the multicultural Indian town of Tioga. When they learned 
that French-allied Munsees dominated the town, they fled back to the safety of Fort Allen 
and the protection of Captain Newcastle, an Iroquois delegate who had come there to 
negotiate peace between the Delawares and the Pennsylvanians.46 Indeed, much of the 
congestion in Bethlehem had come in response Newcastle's earlier requests for friendly 
Indians to meet him in Bethlehem for a May conference. 
Although Newcastle's invitees claimed to be friendly to the English, Moravians 
noted that the new arrivals kept their arms ready and could fall upon the townspeople at 
44Reynolds to Parsons, July 10, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
45William Franklin to Horsfield, June 21, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
46Horsfield to Morris, June 21, 1756, Horsfield Papers; "Memorandum Regarding 
Unfriendly Indians," June 30, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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any time. 47 Under normal circumstances, Indian ambassadors meeting in English towns 
would be afforded the benefit ofthe doubt, but inflamed tensions increased the likelihood 
of unintended conflict. While at Fort Allen, Newcastle elicited promises from the 
garrison that any friendly Indians on diplomatic business would be protected and 
provisioned. He also set up a signal of friendship: The lead man in any party of friendly 
Indians approaching a fort should carry a green bush. 48 Over the next few weeks 
Newcastle continued sending Indians to Bethlehem and Fort Allen, promising that he and 
visiting Shawnee chief King Paxinosa would see to it that they were well treated and 
supplied. 49 Soon, most of these Indians would be shuttled to Easton for a larger peace 
conference. But many Indians would end up appreciating the hospitality of the Fort Allen 
area more than the intolerant atmosphere of Easton. 
As the Easton Conference approached, Morris ordered that all Indian refugees and 
visitors be moved there from Bethlehem. Hopefully, this would relieve crowding in the 
Moravian city and allow the province to better help displaced natives. It devolved upon 
William Parsons, Easton's chief magistrate and the region's military commander, to 
prepare the town for their arrival. Morris asked Parsons to post guards to ensure that the 
Indians remained safe "from the Insults of the People," but also to watch the Indians 
themselves "in case they should not be so Friendly as they pretend."50 Parsons's job was 
unenviable: he must watch out for Indian intrigue and keep his own intolerant "Jersey 
People" in check. In addition to those worries, he needed to maintain order among the 
47Letter from Unnamed Bethlehem Resident, Apr., I756, Horsfield Papers. 
48
"Captain Newcastle's Instructions," June 28, I756, Horsfield Papers. 
49Captain Newcastle to the Captain of Fort Allen, July I, I756, CRP, 7:I89; 
Newcastle to Spangenberg, July I, I756, Horsfield Papers. 
50Morris to Parsons, July II, I756, Horsfield Papers. 
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guards themselves. Easton's tavern keepers loved new customers and sold rum to Indians, 
townsfolk, and soldiers alike. With Indians, civilians, and soldiers "being all drunk," 
complained Parsons, the town would be "in the Utmost Confusion and Danger" during 
the conference.51 
Parsons's responsibilities were heavy and the guest of honor had yet to arrive. On 
July 14, Captain Reynolds sent word to Bethlehem that Delaware chiefTeedyuscung and 
his retinue would arrive soon at Fort Allen, en route to the Easton conference. 52 
Teedyuscung, a Munsee chief living at Tioga, whom the English sometimes called "King 
of the Delawares," had led a few violent forays against settler communities during the 
preceding months and his participation was vital to securing peace. 53 When he arrived in 
Easton on July 18, he lost no time in taking advantage of the hospitality commonly 
offered at peace conferences. No traders had traveled up the Susquehanna for some time, 
and Teedyuscung hoped that he would find plenty of provisions and rum available at the 
conference. He told Parsons that his journey from Tioga was a long way to go without 
any rum and continued hinting until Parsons supplied the chiefwith two small bottles. 
Parsons hoped that this would satisfy the "King," and he quickly retired to bed before 
Teedyuscung could request more liquor. 54 
Morris's July conference with Delaware and Six Nations Iroquois representatives 
was a just preliminary meeting, held to make arrangements for broader talks later on. 
This did not keep many attending Indians from enjoying the accoutrements of friendly 
Indian-European diplomacy. This merriment frustrated the conference's organizers, but 
51Morris to Horsfield, July 14, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
52Reynolds to William Edwards, July 14, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
53Wallace, King of the Delawares, 83-86. 
54parsons to Horsfield, July 18, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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was rare entertainment for the delegates. 55 Morris's secretary Richard Peters reported that 
Teedyuscung and his "wild Company" started the conference off"perpetually Drunk, 
very much on the Gascoon [bragging], and at times abusive to the Inhabitants" of Easton. 
Peters found the "King of the Delawares" to be a formidable figure. He described the 
Munsee Delaware chief as a "lusty rawboned Man, haughty and very desirous of Respect 
and Command," who could "drink three Quarts or a Gallon of Rum a Day without being 
Drunk." Conrad Weiser, who had never before met the Delaware chief, spent most of the 
conference trying to form an opinion ofTeedyuscung's reliability and keeping the revels 
from getting out of hand. In one instance, Newcastle, who had also been drinking, 
accused Teedyuscung of threatening to kill him with witchcraft. 56 Weiser mediated the 
conflict between the two headmen, but these episodes of drunkenness suggest that 
diplomacy might not have been Teedyuscung's only concern at Easton. 
When Robert Morris suggested that Bethlehem might be a better place to continue 
the proceedings, Teedyuscung was indignant. He did not wish to interrupt his enjoyment 
ofthe conference, especially since he had just come from Bethlehem. The King was 
comfortable where he was and could not understand why the governor would send him 
"from place to place like a Child. "57 Easton might have been the home of intolerant 
Indian-hating Pennsylvanians and New Jersey immigrants, but it still offered a full array 
of amenities not available in Susquehanna country. Teedyuscung, certain of his 
55For an amusing and informative description of how treaty conference organizers 
worried about attendees' revels, see Merrell, Into the American Woods, 262-64. 
56Parsons' Diary of a Council Held at Easton, July 24-27, 1756, in Early 
AmeriCan Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, gen. ed. Alden T. Vaughan, 
vol. 3, Pennsylvania Treaties, 1756-1775, ed. Alison Duncan Hirsch (Washington: 
University Publications of America, 1979), 106-09 (hereafter cited as Pennsylvania 
Treaties}. 
57Reply ofTeedyuscung to Morris, PA, 2:721-22. 
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importance in the peace process, expected the full hospitality accorded to native 
ambassadors in his own culture and insisted upon staying where he could find suitable 
entertainment. Morris relented and held the conference at Easton. In the end, 
Teedyuscung and Newcastle agreed to convince other influential Delawares to meet 
again at Easton later in the year. But the conference's completion did not mean the end of 
the delegates' appetite for revelry. By then, Easton's townsfolk were ready for some 
peace and quiet, and Bethlehem still stretched at the seams with refugees. Luckily for 
Teedyuscung's band, another entertaining location lay just across the Blue Mountains. 
Fort Allen had already become a popular stopping point for Indians traveling from 
the Susquehanna country to towns south of the Blue Mountains. With the conference 
underway at Easton, provincial officials were alarmed by rumors ofhundreds oflndians 
massing near the fort, ready to attack it or cross the mountains and set upon the 
conference itself. Horsfield asked Reynolds to send any passing Indians straight to 
Easton, where the mediating power of attending chiefs and provincial guards could keep 
them in check. 58 By early August, Teedyuscung had concluded his talks with Morris and 
had started his journey back to Wyoming and Tioga to convince more Indians to make 
peace with the province. But he stopped at Fort Allen upon crossing the Blue Mountains 
to wait for his baggage train to catch up and apparently liked it so much that he settled in 
for a short stay.59 
Richard Peters was alarmed at news ofTeedyuscung's delay at the fort, and 
insisted that the chiefbe sent on his way so that he would have time to convince Tioga's 
58Horsfield to Parsons, Aug. 9, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
59Teedyuscung to Horsfield and Parsons, Aug. 9, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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Indians to come to Easton before winter.60 Teedyuscung apologized and agreed to send 
two men to Tioga in his place, implying that he was comfortable where he was. When the 
men returned, he would then "make all Dispatch" in bringing the talks to a successful 
conclusion.61 Morris was surprised that Teedyuscung kept "loitering at a fort in so 
shameful a manner when he knows the necessity there is of his speedy Return to his 
People." He sent Parsons a string ofwampum to give to the chiefto urge him on his way. 
"Remind him how much he has to do and how little a time it is before the Winter will set 
in," Morris prodded Parsons.62 But trouble was brewing at Fort Allen. When Morris 
referred to Teedyuscung's "shameful" manner, Parsons thought he was referring to the 
chiefs lack of dispatch. He would soon fmd that the matter was more complicated. 
A few days later, Parsons wrote to the governor with a partial explanation for 
Teedyuscung's "loitering." When he asked Teedyuscung's interpreter and aide, Ben, why 
the chieftarried so long at Fort Allen, Ben revealed that it was on account of liquor, and 
the fort's temporary commander, Lt. Miller. The interpreter said that the fort's 
commander, Capt. Reynolds, had left for Philadelphia (apparently not an uncommon 
occurrence), leaving the "villainous" lieutenant in command and in position to sell liquor 
to Indians and white men alike. "As long as the Indians had money," Ben told Parsons, 
''the Lieutenant sold them Rum, so that they were almost always drunk." Furthermore, 
according to Ben, Miller also cheated Teedyuscung, ''teezing him and plying him with 
Rum till the old Man was off his Guard." Teedyuscung had brought sixteen deerskins 
with him as a present for Morris, so that the governor could make himself a "pair of 
60Peters to Parsons, Aug. 11, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
61Horsfield to Teedyuscung, Aug. 12, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
62Morris to Horsfield, Aug. 13, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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gloves." Miller teased Teedyuscung that gloves did not require so much leather, and that 
the chief should sell him some of the skins. Ben suggested that this was a 
misunderstanding of the way Indians talked about gifts and insisted that the chief had no 
intention of selling his present for the governor. But after Teedyuscung had drunk 
enough, Miller was able to take all of the skins for only £3.63 The prospect of a provincial 
officer cheating and delaying an important Indian delegate at such a critical point in 
peace negotiations was bad enough, but by then, Parsons already knew that the context of 
Teedyuscung's loitering was even more troubling. 
When Reynolds returned to Fort Allen, he acknowledged having trouble with the 
visiting Indians. He wrote Parsons to tell him that he was building a "shade" for the 
Indians a good distance from the fort. " I am resolved to let no more of them into ye fort 
for ye are So unruly that there is no Liveing with them," he reported. He added that while 
he was away in Philadelphia, some men "got a little mery with the Liquor."64 Reynolds 
was gifted at understatement. That merriness was actually a full-fledged mutiny, 
prompted by a corporal, Christian Weyrick, and uncontrolled liquor availability.65 
On August 5, Teedyuscung brought three women into the fort. While he "kept one 
as his own," according to Reynolds, the other two joked and cavorted with Lieutenant 
Miller and his sergeants. Jealous of the officers, a drunken Weyrick tried to have the 
women ejected from the fort. When Miller refused, Weyrick attacked him. Weyrick and 
63Parsons to Morris, Aug. 8, 1756, PA, 2:745-46. 
64Reynolds to Parsons, Aug. 12, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
65Discipline was a major problem among provincial forces during the Seven 
Years' War for a variety ofreasons, including a lack of capable officers, inability of 
officers to inflict the full brunt of military punishment, and the backgrounds of the troops 
themselves. This was especially true in Pennsylvania, where most troops were day 
laborers or artisans, and were unused to harsh discipline and unwilling to easily change 
their ways. Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 107-21. 
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two other men proceeded to behave "very undecently" with the women, washing their 
genitals with rum afterwards to prevent "Getting Sum Distemper ofye Squas." The 
mutineers then went on an alcohol-fueled rampage, firing guns into the fort's walls and 
encouraging their comrades to take over the post and kill several Reading militiamen who 
had sided with Miller.66 After hearing about the uprising, Parsons sent Capt. Jacob 
Wetterhold to Fort Allen to arrest Weyrick for inciting the mutiny and Miller for not 
suppressing the uprising. 67 Wetterhold reported that the fort's ensign, who had also been 
absent, returned and brought the situation under control on August 6. Wetterhold also 
identified liquor as the probable engine ofthe dispute.68 Available liquor seemed to be 
the common thread linking Teedyuscung's delay and the fort's mutiny.69 
Teedyuscung finally left Fort Allen on August 15, after being embarrassed and 
angered by what he probably interpreted as a breach of hospitality. When he first heard 
about the mutiny, Parsons ordered the fort's commander to restrict the Indians' rum 
allowance to one-quarter of a pint per day. When Teedyuscung heard about the 
restriction, he felt ashamed and unwelcome and vacated the fort. This validated Parsons's 
suspicion that available liquor caused the ruckus and he immediately ordered Reynolds to 
build the Indians their shelter outside of the fort. He would have to make up the affront to 
66Reynolds to Weiser, Aug. 11, 1756, in Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier, 241. 
67Parsons to Wetterhold, Aug. 12, 1756, PA, 2:741. 
68Wetterhold to Parsons, Aug. 12, 1756, PA, 2:754-55. 
69See Wallace, King of the Delawares, 116-18, for a description of the mutiny and 
its causes. Wallace claims that Teedyuscung "struck the match" that sparked the mutiny 
by bringing women into the fort, but that seems an unfair burden to place upon 
Teedyuscung, and especially upon the women, who were possibly raped by drunken 
soldiers. 
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Teedyuscung later. In the meantime, he had touched the bottom of Fort Allen's swamp of 
troubles and needed to bring order to the post. 
Personnel at Fort Allen had gone from supplying rum as a present and occasional 
trade item to selling it as a commodity. "I must acquaint your Honour," Parsons wrote to 
Morris, "That from some Hints I have so received this Day or two, I have reason to thlnk 
they have turn'd ye Fort to a Dram Shop."70 Horsfield's own investigation confirmed 
Parsons' suspicions that Reynolds's liquor policies caused the "Strange doings" at Fort 
Allen. "I've been told that Capt. Reynolds has had one hogshed of rum after another and 
sold it to his Men and Doubly to ye Indians and Every one that would give Money for it," 
he told Parsons, fearing that one of the most crucial forts in the defensive chain had 
succumbed to corruption and ineptitude. 71 
Only one day after reporting the "dram shop" allegation to the governor, Parsons 
wrote to report that Reynolds was again away from his post and Teedyuscung had 
returned. 72 This came amidst new rumors that Indians leaving the Easton treaty had 
stopped between Fort Allen and Wyoming, renounced their promises of peace, and 
burned the presents they had received. Indians were rumored to be massing north of the 
Blue Mountains to attack white settlements; even Teedyuscung had told friendly Indians 
to leave the area or be killed along with the ,whites. "I truly think we are in more Danger 
now than We have been," Horsfield wrote to Parson, adding that if the distractions could 
70Parsons to Richard Peters, Aug. 15, 1756, PA 2:747; Parsons to Morris, Aug. 15, 
1756, Horsfield Papers. 
71Horsfield to Parsons, Aug. 15, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
72Parsons to Morris, PA, 2:749. 
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not be straightened out at Fort Allen, the outpost would be "Surprised and taken by ye 
Indians."73 
From Teedyuscung's cultural perspective, the situation at the fort must h~ve been 
confusing. After the Easton conference, where provincial representatives had treated him 
with great respect and deference, a short sabbatical at Fort Allen probably seemed a 
reasonable extension of diplomatic customs. Expecting reciprocation for his efforts to 
obtain peace and to work for the good of the province, Teedyuscung was instead cheated 
by the acting commander of the fort. Present at the scene of a subsequent drunken 
mutiny, he found his people expelled from the fort and restricted in their liquor 
allowance, as if the uprising had been their fault. Teedyuscung's role in the episode 
should not be idealized. He had "loitered" at the fort because liquor could be had there, 
apparently at affordable prices and in good supply. But he considered himself to be on 
official provincial business and expected politeness and hospitality from the fort's 
commandant. Horsfield knew that Teedyuscung must be hurried upon his way, but he 
also understood that the situation required tact and understanding of the Delaware 
headman's point of view. Teedyuscung needed no correction; rather, the fort and its 
garrison had failed in their mission to guard the province and support its diplomatic 
efforts. 
Unrest at Fort Allen threatened to upset the province's peace plans. The Assembly 
acted quickly. The Provincial Council recommended that Weiser and Parsons be sent to 
Fort Allen to punish Lt. Miller, reestablish order, and urge Teedyuscung on his way. 
Morris, no longer governor but still in attendance at the Council (he had been replaced by 
73Horsfield to Parsons, Aug. 19, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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William Denny in the interim), suggested that Newcastle be sent to the Six Nations to ask 
what their leaders thought ofTeedyuscung's loitering and spreading dissent.74 Denny 
immediately ordered Weiser to look into the affair, and to make any inquiries and arrests 
he deemed necessary.75 After spending over £60,000 on frontier defenses, Pennsylvania's 
government could not allow one of its forts to endanger the peace of the region it had 
been charged to protect. 
As the governor and council tried to minimize the damage caused by the mutiny, 
Horsfield arrived at Fort Allen and discovered that an ill-tempered Teedyuscung had 
already left. Hurrying up the trail, Horsfield caught up with him a few miles away. 
Teedyuscung claimed to be especially upset about being cheated out of his skins, as he 
has hoped to make Morris a great show ofhis generosity. Horsfield promised to retrieve 
the skins from Miller and to forward them to Morris. This satisfied Teedyuscung, who 
agreed to leave for Wyoming as soon as possible. 
When Horsfield and Teedyuscung returned to Fort Allen, they found that 
Reynolds and his ensign had abandoned the fort and that the post was under the 
temporary command ofthe "sober and prudent" Lieutenant Geiger ofWetterhold's 
company. Horsfield confirmed Parsons's reports that Reynolds had "made a Tippeling 
House of the Fort" and discovered that "Several of the Men after a Deduction of all their 
pay remain 14 or 15 [pounds] indebted to their Capt. for Liquor." Horsfield promised to 
restrict all rum and punch sales indefinitely, hoping that this would take care of the lack 
74Pennsylvania Council, Aug. 21, 1756, CRP, 7:222-23; Denny to Sir Charles 
Hardy, Aug. 21, 1756, CRP, 7:223-25. 
75Denny to Weiser, Aug. 21, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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of discipline. 76 Weiser and Parsons decided that the officers' malfeasance had sunk too 
deeply into the garrison's structure and determined that Fort Allen's entire complement 
of troops must be removed to alleviate the stain of corruption.77 Reynolds and his whole 
garrison ended up at nearby Fort Norris, and that fort's compliment, led by Captain Jacob 
Orndt, arrived at Fort Allen just in time to host Teedyuscung and his retinue one last time 
before the King's return to the north. 
Teedyuscung wasted little time in finishing his business at Tioga and Wyoming. 
On October 9, he sent word to Orndt and Reynolds that he was waiting at Wyoming and 
that he would soon deliver several white prisoners to comply with treaty obligations. But 
Teedyuscung had heard rumors that if he brought a large party to Fort Allen or Easton, 
the English would kill them all. He thought it prudent to send one Indian with one 
prisoner to Fort Allen to make sure his people would be safe. Orndt expected a large 
number of Delawares and Iroquois to pass by his fort on their way to the autumn Easton 
conference and wanted no repeat of the summer's events. He ordered a shelter built for 
Teedyuscung's band and awaited his arrivaC8 
Almost three weeks later there was still no sign ofTeedyuscung, but rumors 
circulated that a hundred Indian men had camped near Fort Allen. 79 The rumored band 
were supposedly Minisink Delawares, who had come seeking a separate treaty with the 
province. Denny was at a loss to know how to deal with them, since Sir William Johnson 
had just been appointed Indian Superintendent for the Northern District and the 
76Parsons to Morris, Aug. 21, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
77Jacob Orndt to Weiser, Aug. 24, 1756, Horsfield Papers. Reynolds and Miller 
defended themselves successfully and avoided a court martial. Reynolds to Weiser, Aug. 
26, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
780mdt and Reynolds to Parsons, Oct. 9, 1756, P A, 3:5-6. 
79Horsfield to Denny, Oct. 27, 1756, Horsfield Papers. 
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provincial government did not yet know the scope ofhis diplomatic authority. The 
Council advised Denny to offer them supplies, gifts, and friendship, but also to inform 
them that Pennsylvania could not make peace with Indians who might continue to attack 
neighboring colonies.80 News ofthe Minisinks' arrival came amidst new reports of 
violence in the region: several settlers had been attacked near Forts Lebanon and 
Northkill, farther south on the defensive line. Fort Lebanon's commander admitted that 
the outposts were ''too weak to be of any Service to the Frontier'' in the face of a large-
scale Indian attack or siege.81 A force of a hundred Minisinks could easily overcome Fort 
Allen and threaten to disrupt the Easton conference if they decided to pursue conflict 
instead of diplomacy. 
When Weiser, Horsfield, and Parsons tried to investigate the report about the 
large Minisink band, they found the situation even more troubling. Horsfield reported a 
rumor that 140 Indians, in two camps near Fort Allen, had originally intended to attack 
the Easton conference while Denny and Teedyuscung's party were in attendance. Later, 
they decided to wait until the conference concluded and then attack Bethlehem instead, 
making them "Masters of the whole Country." Weiser was skeptical; when he checked 
out the rumor with two Indians who had just come from Fort Allen, they advised him to 
pay no heed to the story. The Indians reminded Weiser that he had told them not to listen 
to the rumors of "ugly birds." "We took your advice in good part," they reminded the 
colonel, "So we desire you will take ours."82 Weiser did. He decided to wait for 
Teedyuscung to arrive in Easton and then to send out official messengers to ascertain the 
8
°Council to Denny, Oct. 29, 1756, Franklin Papers, 7:6-7. 
81Jacob Morgan to Denny, Nov. 4, 1756, PA, 3:30-31. 
82
"Extract ofConrad Weiser's Journal," Nov. 5, 1756, PA, 3:32-33. 
115 
Minisinks' purposes. He was also curious to find out why they preferred camping near 
Fort Allen to the amenities ofEaston. 
Fear and promises ofhospitality caused the Minisinks to wait out the conference 
near Fort Allen. By November 6, tensions were high at Easton; Denny had not yet arrived 
and the Indians there feared that either the English or the Minisinks intended to fall upon 
them.83 When Denny arrived two days later, he and Teedyuscung quickly sent out a 
messenger, Delaware chief Tatamy, to meet with the Minisink bands and invite them to 
the conference. The Minisinks politely refused, saying they preferred the area around Fort 
Allen and had already arranged with Teedyuscung that they should remain there. As for 
the treaty talks, they assured Tatamy that they would agree to any terms that 
Teedyuscung could secure. Back at the conference, Teedyuscung confirmed that the 
Minisinks had agreed to travel "no further than a certain Place" and to allow 
Teedyuscung to negotiate in their stead.84 At first glance, the strategy seemed to be an 
effort for Teedyuscung and others to apply pressure on the negotiations. With 140 Indians 
ready to attack the most vital fort on the frontier line, and with Easton filled to capacity 
with Delaware and Iroquois delegates, Denny might be obliged to look favorably on the 
Indians' demands. However, Weiser soon began to wonder if the Minisinks' choice of 
Fort Allen was not based more on their preference for that location. 
By this time, Fort Allen had become a principal gateway through the Blue 
Mountains and into Northhampton County for the Susquehanna Delawares. Rum 
remained available near the fort, despite orders to limit its sale during the conference. 
Weiser and his troops spent most of their time escorting Indians back and forth between 
83Weiser and Parsons to Denny, Nov. 6, 1756, PA, 3:35. 
84
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Fort Allen and Easton. With the troops away from the fort, Weiser worried about the 
Minisinks' conduct. One of the Indians under his protection, Deedjoskan, agreed to act as 
an emissary to the Minisinks. In actuality, he spent most of his time trying to acquire rum 
so that he might "have a Frolick with his Company" at the fort. Weiser offered rum to 
Deedjoskan's party on the condition that they consume it only in the Indian camp outside 
the fort, and he warned that if any Indians tried to enter the fort, "they must take what 
follows." One ofDeedjoskan's men tried to climb the palisade at night after having too 
much rum, and cried, "Damn you all I value you not!" after Weiser made him jump 
down.85 Fort Allen's garrison spent a few anxious weeks surrounded by Indians, many of 
whom spent their time enjoying the availability of liquor in the fort's neighborhood. 
The Easton conference ended without any serious trouble near Fort Allen: By 
December, most of the attendees had been escorted back across the Blue Mountains and 
into the Susquehanna country. The province had much work to do: Teedyuscung and 
other delegates had blamed colonial land acquisition as the basis for their war with 
Pennsylvania, and demanded that the province assuage the Delaware chiefs on that matter 
before they would agree to a fmal treaty.86 Events of 1756 had been instructive to visiting 
85
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Delawares. From a purely social perspective, they had found that the province would 
protect them while in Easton and other towns, and that Fort Allen offered them little in 
the way of intimidation. Indeed, the small fort tucked on the north side of the Blue 
Mountains was quickly becoming a favorite Indian place. 
Ongoing treaty deliberations throughout 1757 made Fort Allen a desirable 
stopping point for Delaware and Iroquois delegates and their retinues. Located just across 
the Blue Mountains from the busy towns of Easton, Bethlehem, and Reading, the fort 
offered Indians the favors of British diplomatic hospitality while maintaining the 
contingency of a quick retreat into Susquehanna country. Before the winter had passed, 
more ofTeedyuscung's people began to filter into Fort Allen's neighborhood. First came 
seven women and three children from Tioga, who arrived at the fort in mid-February in 
advance ofTeedyuscung's main company. While Omdt was happy to provision the small 
party, Parsons suggested that they then be sent on to the Moravian brethren's care in 
Bethlehem, thinking that it might be "very inconvenient" for the women and children to 
stay at the fort or in Easton to await the delegation.87 This comparison of Fort Allen with 
Easton implies that anti-Indian intolerance might have rendered the fort an inhospitable 
place for women and children. More likely, Omdt and Parsons wished to avoid a replay 
of the 1756 mutiny and felt that seven unaccompanied Delaware women might provoke 
too many distractions among the fort's anxious garrison. Parsons also felt that the women 
and children might be more comfortable with other Indians until their own party arrived, 
and Bethlehem still seethed with Indian refugees. With a much larger party scheduled to 
870rndt to Parsons, Feb. 18, 1757, CRP, 7:429; Parsons to Horsfield, Feb. 20, 
17 57, Horsfield Papers. 
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arrive the following month, the province could ill-afford any unpleasantness to befall 
Teedyuscung's people. 
Teedyuscung's main party arrived at Fort Allen at the end of March, though 
without Teedyuscung himself. The fifty men, women, and children, led by 
Teedyuscung's two sons and his brother, Captain Harris, proceeded to make themselves 
at home. "They behave very civil here," reported a relieved Captain Omdt, "They have 
made Cabbins about 60 perches from the Fort, where they live, and int~nd to tarry here 
till the King comes."88 Despite the visitors' civility, Parsons remained as anxious about 
Indians encamped around the fort as he had been about the smaller group of women and 
children; he requested that the group be sent on to Philadelphia immediately. 89 Even 
though the visiting Indians maintained their own shelters, Orndt still had trouble 
preventing rum-induced problems. His orders forbad liquor sales at the fort, but Indians 
still found ways to procure it, especially when visiting Easton on official business. On 
one occasion, when Omdt sent Indian emissaries to Easton with a military escort, the 
emissaries found so much rum that some of them "stay'd all Night in the Woods, and the 
remainder went ... to Bethlehem," where Omdt feared ''there might easily happen any 
Misbehaviour."90 As long as Indians remained about the fort, anything was possible, 
including a replay of the previous year's mutiny or an Indian attack. 
Denny shared Parsons's apprehensions about the large Indian band at Fort Allen. 
He ordered Orndt to send the party to Philadelphia immediately upon Teedyuscung's 
arrival, by way of Bethlehem, where the Moravians would provision them. He 
880rndt to Parsons, Mar. 31, 1757, CRP, 7:474. 
89Parsons to Richard Peters, Apr. 3, 1757, PA, 3:104. 
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specifically warned Orndt to prevent Indian loitering, "least any Mischief shou' d 
happen.'m But by the middle of April, Teedyuscung had not yet left the Susquehanna. He 
needed provisions for the journey and asked Parsons that they be sent to Fort Allen by 
wagon, where Indians could carry them on to Tioga on horseback.92 Fort Allen had 
become more than a comfortable place for Indian wayfarers. Teedyuscung viewed it as a 
temporary way-station between his country and the English settlements, and keeping an 
Indian presence there cemented the fort's position as an Indian-English outpost of 
importance. Denny could not tum him down easily. If the Indians refused to travel to 
Philadelphia and insisted upon staying on the frontier to await Teedyuscung, it was better 
they wait at Fort Allen than at Easton, where Denny knew they were "always in the Way 
of strong Liquor & in Danger" from intolerant residents.93 
Fort Allen's position had become complicated: In order to protect the Indians with 
whom the province must make peace, the fort must endure the presence of large groups 
of them before peace had been achieved. Even as he advised his representatives to keep 
Indians near Fort Allen, Denny also warned Parsons and Horsfield to reinforce the fort 
for a possible attack. Pressure could only be relieved by Teedyuscung's arrival, but by the 
end of April he had not yet come to the fort. Parsons told Horsfield to be ready for his 
arrival and to have dozens of wagons ready to take the "King" and his baggage to 
Philadelphia.94 A few days later the problem took care of itself. The large band encamped 
near the fort grew tired of waiting for Teedyuscung and left their temporary lodgings, 
91Denny to Parsons, CRP, 7:476-77. 
92Teedyuscung to Parsons, Apr. 13, 1757, CRP, 7:477-78. 
93Denny to Horsfield, Apr. 26, 1757, and Denny to [unknown], Apr. 26, 1757, 
Horsfield Papers. 
94Parsons to Horsfield, Apr. 28, 1757, Horsfield Papers. 
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possibly to return home in time to plant com.95 During the first half of 1757, Fort Allen 
had become an outpost of anxious hospitality, forced by circumstance to keep its enemies 
close at hand. 
In early July, Teedyuscung arrived at Fort Allen. His large band of delegates and 
followers strained the provisions of the entire region. Teedyuscung brought along 200 
men, women, and children, and expected to stay at the fort for six to seven days. During 
that time he expected to meet 100 Senecas at Fort Allen, and then the whole mass of 
people would have to be shuttled to Easton, where Denny had agreed to meet with them 
once again.96 Throughout the month, Omdt and his soldiers transferred Indians back and 
forth between Fort Allen and Easton, a job made less easy by apprehensive settlers and 
wacy Indian emissaries.97 During the July conference, 285 Indians came to Easton by way 
ofFort Allen (112 men, 67 women, and 106 children), though Indians constantly shuttled 
back and forth between Easton and the fort, and there were always Indians encamped 
near Fort Allen.98 Satisfied by an interim peace arrangement with Denny, Teedyuscung 
and his party arrived back at Fort Allen on August 13. He and his band took advantage of 
95William Trent to Denny, May 2, 1757, PA, 3:149-50. Some Indians also told 
Trent that they had heard of white people being killed by Indians and feared English 
reprisals. 
960mdt to Weiser, July 5, 1757, PA, 3:207. 
97The worst threat to peace came when a fifteen-year-old "foolish white boy" shot 
and wounded William Dattamy, an unaccompanied Indian on his way to Bethlehem. 
Omdt was forced to remain in Easton with some of his men to prevent Indian-white 
animosities from flaring, despite the fact that fifty or more Indians remained encamped 
around Fort Allen. Omdt to Denny, July 8, 1757, PA, 3:209-10. 
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the fort's hospitality for several more days before departing, "very glad and joyful," on 
August 17. Several "sick" families stayed on at Fort Allen.99 
An unforeseen result of the series of conferences in 1756 and 1757 was to 
establish the Fort Allen-Bethlehem corridor as a familiar, friendly place for Susquehanna 
Indians. September found Teedyuscung still in the region, languishing in overcrowded 
Bethlehem, awaiting his son's return from a diplomatic trip to Ohio. Denny approved the 
headman's presence there and promised that the province would defray the cost to the 
Moravian brethren for any expenses Indians might incur. He also authorized Bethlehem's 
gunsmiths to repair the Indians' arms upon request. Eager to avoid doing anything that 
"would give Disgust" to the Delawares in the aftermath of their successful peace 
arrangements, Denny tacitly allowed a constant Delaware presence on the Blue Mountain 
frontier. 10° Fort Allen's mission had changed, at least temporarily, from protecting the 
Pennsylvania frontier against Indian incursions to protecting and entertaining those same 
Indians while visiting the region. 
During this period, Pennsylvania's settlers encouraged this policy of fretful 
hospitality, though many of them did so in spite of their anti-Indian sentiments. Settlers in 
Northhampton and Berks Counties petitioned Denny in May 1757 to protect them from 
reported incursions of Ohio Indians. With peace efforts ongoing, settlers feared that the 
sparsely garrisoned forts and blockhouses would be abandoned entirely. Fort Franklin 
had never been tenable and was abandoned in November 1756. Forts Norris and 
Hamilton were still garrisoned, but would not remain so for long. Petitioners asked that 
990mdt to Denny, Aug. 19, 1757, CRP, 7:723-24. 
10~enny to Horsfield, Sep. 5, 1757, Horsfield Papers. 
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more men be sent to the frontiers and that Fort Allen and other forts be maintained.101 
This was understandable given the continuing violence in frontier Pennsylvania. In July 
1757 several Indians killed and scalped settlers in Lynn Township, the source of one of 
the petitions. Wetterhold, in Lynn awaiting orders, pursued but could not catch the 
attackers. He complained that their lack of provisions and ammunition prevented them 
from acting as a sufficient defense against Indian incursions.102 With Indian attacks 
continuing, settlers demanded forts and soldiers in their neighborhoods, either not 
knowing or not caring that this could encourage a persisting Indian presence in the 
region. In September, Benjamin Franklin defended the expense of maintaining several 
forts and blockhouses and over 1,100 men on the frontier, claimingthat this policy kept 
settlers from abandoning their homes altogether.103 But if peace could be finalized 
between the province and belligerent Delawares, any forts that remained in the 
Pennsylvania backcountry would serve mainly to meet Indian needs rather than to allay 
settlers' fears. 
101Horsfield to Parsons, Apr. 27, 1757, PA, 3:142-43; "Petition from 
Northhampton County," PA, 3:151-52; "Petition from the Frontiers," PA, 3:153-54. 
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PA, 3:66-68. Morale continued to be a problem at the outposts. In Mar. 1757 another 
near-mutiny took place when a soldier, Hieronymous Faxtor, was discharged for 
insubordination. He fired his gun at the fort upon leaving and then attacked a passing 
settler, making it even more curious that the local inhabitants would want a military 
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Fort Allen became more of a diplomatic way-station than a defensive outpost in 
1758 and as such merited a reduced military complement. In February, Jacob Omdt's 
garrison consisted of 78 men, though later in the year as few as 50 men occupied the 
fort. 104 Even the complement of78 was small compared with that ofFort Augusta (362 
men) and smaller forts Henry (105) and Littleton (110).105 James Burd, Fort Augusta's 
commander, visited Fort Allen in February 1758 and approved ofthe fort's garrison and 
stores, but did not think much of the fort itself. "This is a very poor Stockade, surrounded 
with Hills, situated on a barren plain," he noted in his journal, and wondered how the fort 
could hold more than forty men.106 The location had not been chosen for its strategic 
value and Franklin's men had worked under pressure, so it should not have surprised 
Burd that the fort possessed defensive and structural shortcomings. 
Because of its diminished military role and poor condition, Fort Allen was in 
constant danger of being closed throughout 1758. This prompted Northhampton County 
settlers to issue another petition in March, asking that the fort be maintained to guard the 
Blue Mountain pass.107 The settlers need not have worried. Despite the fort's disheveled 
state and small garrison, Fort Allen would remain necessary as an Indian way station as 
long as Indians continued to travel through the Blue Mountains on diplomatic missions. 
Omdt and his men entertained at least two such embassies in March 1758, and the Indian 
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visitors kept the small garrison busy as escorts between the fort and Philadelphia.108 As 
early as April 1758, Fort Allen had achieved the status of an official diplomatic 
checkpoint, "the Place where the Susquehannah Indians are by Treaty obliged first to 
come to, when they arrive on Our Frontiers," according to Denny.109 With its small 
garrison and ramshackle construction, Fort Allen remained an important stopover for 
Indians, even as the dangers of Delaware hostilities began to subside. 
Indians visiting Fort Allen and living nearby often assisted English authorities in 
keeping the peace. In doing so, they helped maintain the fort's status as a welcome haven 
for traveling Delawares. In April 1758, Indians attacked and killed a group of settlers in 
Lancaster County. Denny ordered Fort Allen's garrison to escort friendly Indians from. 
the area and to range the woods for the attackers. Eager to prove his friendship, 
Teedyuscung sent men to augment Orndt's garrison. 110 Omdt had always employed 
Indians, usually Christian converts from Bethlehem, to range the countryside around the 
fort. But by April 1758, it had become more difficult for him to find reliable Indian 
rangers, mainly because of the regional culture of hospitality and consumerism. Despite 
his orders to limit liquor sales at the fort, Omdt complained that the Indian rangers were 
"continually drunk," having bought "whole Casks ofRum" in Easton.111 Iflndians could 
not obtain liquor at the fort, they still expected provisions, knowing full well that with the 
Seven Years' War raging on, the English would be bound to supply Indian allies. "There 
is dayly Indians Passing and Repassing, and they want Suplys from us," reported John. 
3:367. 
108Burd to Orndt, Mar. 7, 1758, PA, 3:351; Omdt to Burd, Mar. 29, 1758, PA, 
109Denny to James Abercrombie, Apr. 7, 1758, WJP, 2:814. 
110Robert Strettell to Horsfield, Apr. 14, 1758, Horsfield Papers. 
111John Edwin to [unknown], Apr. 23, 1758, CRP, 8:98-99. 
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Bull, Omdt's successor as Fort Allen's commander.112 Bull supplied his Indian visitors, 
but seemed confused as to how and whether the policy should be continued.113 However, 
Fort Allen's position as a diplomatic station made such provisioning a necessity, at least 
for the moment. Continuing dangers in the region mandated friendly relations with Indian 
visitors. 
Ironically, maintaining Fort Allen as a friendly outpost to conduct diplomacy 
helped grow a regional consumer culture that actually hindered diplomatic efforts. 
Quaker interpreter Charles Thomson and Moravian missionary Christian Frederick Post 
encountered this problem during a diplomatic trip to meet with Teedyuscung in Wyoming 
in June 1758. As the diplomats left Fort Allen, a small party oflndians warned them that 
the path to Wyoming was too dangerous and that they should tum back. A bit farther 
along the trail, the diplomats met Teedyuscung himself, who repeated the warnings and 
convinced them to return with him to Fort Allen. On the way back they met Gabriel 
Loquus, a Delaware whom Post and Thomson had last seen at the fort. When 
Teedyuscung found out that Loquus had brought some rum along, the Indians 
disappeared for an all-night drinking session. Post and Thomson were disappointed at this 
unexpected delay in their mission, and the next day they enquired at the fort to find out 
where Loquus had purchased his liquor. Hans Bowman, a trader who operated five miles 
from the fort, had "given" Loquus five gallons of whiskey a few days earlier. Outraged, 
Bull sent a few soldiers to remind Bowman that selling liquor to the Indians was 
prohibited and could cause civil unrest and violence. The trader replied that the liquor 
1120rndt had been promoted to Major and given command of the region around 
Fort Allen. 
113Bull to Peters, June 14, 1758, PA, 3:423. 
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was a present for Loquus, that he would give gifts to whomever he pleased, and that not 
even the troops could stop him. Bull's inability to enforce his liquor regulations was 
annoying enough, but the incident also interfered with provincial diplomacy. Post and 
Thomson hoped to obtain Teedyuscung's help in punishing French-allied Minisinks. 
Loitering and drinking at Fort Allen would cost the province unexpected and costly 
delays.114 
Throughout the summer of 1758, hundreds of Indians moved through the Blue 
Mountains, many enjoying lengthy stays at the fort. On June 29, Teedyuscung and fifty 
Delawares and Iroquois arrived at Fort Allen, hoping to meet with Denny at Germantown 
a few days later.115 Bull sent the entire party on to Bethlehem under escort, ordering his 
men to hand them over to Horsfield and return. With Indians lingering around the fort in 
search of trade and alcohol, Bull could hardly afford to weaken his force by giving up 
men for escort duty! 16 Omdt had already lost a detachment of men to Forbes's 
expedition against Fort Duquesne, and Bull's garrison at Fort Allen had been reduced to 
only thirty men! 17 Pennsylvania had begun to devalue what was left of the defensive 
chain of forts in favor of more proactive measures against the French and their Indian 
allies. From then on, Fort Allen would host more Indians than Pennsylvanians. 
After a short conference in Philadelphia, Teedyuscung and his party returned to 
Fort Allen in mid-July. He again met Christian Frederick Post, passing through on his 
way to elicit Indian help at Fort Alleghany. Teedyuscung tried to keep Post at the fort, 
claiming that the French would surely capture him if he made the trip. Besides, the 
ll4"Report of Charles Thomson and F. Post, of a Journey in 1758", PA, 3:412-22. 
ll 5Lieutenant Samuel Price to Denny, June 29, 1758, PA, 3:429. 
116Horsfield to Denny, July 4, 17 58, P A, 3:436. 
117Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 252-53. 
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chiefs son Han Jacob would soon return from Alleghany, making Post's diplomatic trip 
there unnecessary .118 Teedyuscung had positioned himself at Fort Allen and hoped to use 
the location as a base to influence diplomatic and military initiatives. When Han Jacob 
arrived, Teedyuscung forwarded his findings to Jacob Orndt. According to Han Jacob, 
the French were warning western Indians about British duplicity. "The English Does give 
you no Knives or Swords, or Guns, neither Powder nor Lead," the French had told 
Indians near Allegheny. According to French emissaries, what the French gave as 
presents, the English sold as trade goods. French agents always tried to drive wedges 
between the British and their Indian allies, but in relaying this message to Denny, 
Teedyuscung was thinking more about Fort Allen than about Fort Allegheny or any other 
outpost. Specifically, he wished to use the French threat to elicit the use ofFort Allen as 
an arms depot for Indians. Of course, Teedyuscung promised to stand by the English, but 
he made it clear that he would be helped in these efforts if the province would send more 
powder and lead to Fort Allen to supply any Indians he sent there.119 Many could be 
expected, especially with more treaty talks scheduled at Easton for late 1758. On 
September 12, Omdt informed Denny that 128 Indians had arrived at Fort Allen "and 
intended to stay there."120 
With the date of the new treaty conference fast approaching, Denny moved to 
limit the hospitable drinking culture near the fort and, even more importantly, at the 
conference locations. Soon after Post and Thomson complained about liquor sales near 
Fort Allen, Denny posted another prohibition threatening imprisonment for anyone who 
118
"Joumal ofFrederick Post, 1758," PA, 3:521. 
1190rndt to Denny, July 24, 1758, PA, 3:490-91. 
1200rndt to Denny, Sep. 12, 1758, CRP, 8:167. 
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sold liquor to Teedyuscung and his party during their summer visits.121 But as more 
Indians poured into Northhampton County in August and September, individual traders 
and tavern keepers continued to supply Indians with liquor, using their non-official status 
as "private persons" to skirt regulations. Denny knew perfectly well that profit was not 
always the motive, and that some native and Pennsylvanian parties could gain much by 
the "Prejudice and Hindrance of the Business" at important treaty conferences. To 
prevent such disruptions at Easton, Denny forbade liquor gifts and sales entirely, "upon 
any Pretence whatsoever," except by authorized Indian agents.122 Many Indians came to 
the conferences for amusement and the promise of liquor and gifts, and Denny could not 
hope to prohibit them entirely. The province could, however, begin to change the role of 
Fort Allen from a purely defensive outpost and diplomatic transfer point into a place that 
took better advantage of a steady supply oflndian consumers. 
During the Easton Conference of October 1758, Denny surprised the several 
Indians present by announcing that Fort Allen would soon become a trading post. In 
April1758, the province passed an act enabling a board oflndian Commissioners to 
establish trading posts where they thought most fit. Placed at or near manned forts and 
overseen by Indian agents, they would prevent "Abuses in the Indian Trade" and supply 
"Indians, Friends and Allies of Great Britain" with "Goods at more easy Rates." 
Hopefully, this would help cement the favorable Indian-white relations established at 
Easton.123 Fort Augusta at Shamokin had opened a trading post in May 1758, and in 
October Denny announced to Teedyuscung and many conference attendees that 
121
"Advertisement Against Selling Rum to Indians," PA, 3:437. 
122
"Proclamation Against Selling Rum to the Indians," PA, 3:519. 
123Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 254-55. 
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Shamokin was open for business. "The Indians may be Supplied at the most reasonable 
Rates with any goods they may want," he announced, "And the best Prices will be given 
to you for such Skins, Furs, and Peltry as you shall bring them." Another trading post 
would soon be opened at Fort Allen, where Indian consumers could "depend upon it" that 
Indian agents would ensure the "Strictest Justice" in all dealings there.124 Robert 
Tuclmess became Fort Allen's first Indian agent on December 11; by December 21 
"Quantities of Indian Goods" had been shipped to the post, which Denny hoped would 
please the Susquehanna people and attach them firmly to Britain's interests.125 It was also 
hoped that an authorized post at Fort Allen would reduce the influence of unscrupulous 
traders in the region and transform Indian traffic at the post from a financial drain into a 
profitable coexistence. Far from its original purpose of providing safety for Blue 
Mountain settlers, Fort Allen became dependent on a regular Indian presence. 
During its short tenure as a trading post, Fort Allen enjoyed a relatively robust 
business. From December 1758 through May 1760, the Pennsylvania Commissioners for 
Indian Affairs recorded sales amounting to just over £2,333.126 According to entries in 
the Fort Allen Daybook for the period ofOctober 1759 through April1760, the trading 
124
"Conference with the Indians Held at Easton," Pennsylvania Treaties, 451. 
125Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 255; Denny to Assembly, Dec. 21, 
1758, CRP, 8:238 . 
. 
126This amount barely exceeded the £2,313 brought in at Fort Augusta for the 
same period, though both of the smaller forts paled in comparison with the center of 
western Pennsylvania trade, the new post at Fort Pitt. From December 1758 through May 
1760, Fort Pitt recorded returns of over £10,166. "Indian Trade at Fort Augusta, Pitsberg, 
and Fort Allen," Cash Book, Commissioners for Indian Affairs, Apr. 28, 1758- Apr. 19, 
1763, Simon Gratz Collection, Historical Society ofPennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
130 
post offered a wide variety of goods for settlers and Indians alike.127 But economics 
dictated that the post's tenure was likely to be short. However much the posts might have 
contributed to easing tensions between the province and Pennsylvania's Indians and in 
meeting visiting natives' material needs, the returns never overcame the costs of goods, 
shipping, and maintaining enough soldiers in the field to protect the trade.128 Also during 
this period, Fort Allen's diplomatic role diminished in favor of its new economic 
pursuits. Sir William Johnson's Indian Department had taken over most Indian diplomacy 
by 1758, and Easton would host only one more major Indian conference in 1761. By 
January 1760, the province had further reduced Fort Allen's complement to 2 officers, 2 
sergeants, and 21 privates. Fort Allen even proved unable to serve as an effective outpost 
for equipping Indian diplomatic expeditions. By the summer of 1760, inexperienced 
leaders, desertions, and mismanagement of stores had made Fort Allen nearly 
. bl 129 unsustama e. 
By late 1760, the province began to consider closing Fort Allen. There was 
certainly no shortage of Indians near the fort; in fact, a hundred Indians arrived there on 
August 6, on their way to Philadelphia. The fort's commander, Lt. Andrew Wackerberg, 
127Items sold at Fort Allen were typical of trading posts throughout the Northeast, 
and show the depth to which European trade had infiltrated native material culture. 
European clothing and textiles are well represented in the Daybook accounts, both 
utilitarian (shirts and strouds) and fancy ("nonesopretties"). Tools, construction materials, 
cooking implements, guns, ammunition, decorations, animal tack, locks, and even mouse 
traps were all traded and sold at the post. In return, the traders took cash and every kind 
of peltry available, mainly deer and beaver, but also mink, martin, and panther. Fort 
Allen Daybook, Indian Affairs, Simon Gratz Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania. 
128Merritt, At the Crossroads, 241-42. 
129Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 255-56. 
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kept native travelers supplied with provisions and rum, despite orders to the contrary .130 
But Fort Allen had outlived its usefulness and the Assembly refused to fund it beyond 
January 1761.131 Peters ordered Horsfield to pay off and discharge Fort Allen's garrison 
and take custody of the arms, ammunition, and stores left at the post.132 On April27, 
Horsfield declared the fort closed and returned the land to the Moravian brethren.133 In a 
final ignominy, Indians attending the Easton conference in August 1761 raided Fort 
Allen, hoping to loot its remaining stores, but they found nothing there but a few 
squatters, one ofwhom was Lt. Wackerberg. 134 
Unlike Forts Michilimackinac, Niagara, Loudoun, and Chartres, Fort Allen has 
not been restored or recreated for present-day visitors. Only the fort's well remains to 
mark the spot, in modem Weissport. A historical marker also testifies to the fort's 
location; until fairly recently, the site faced a longstanding inn called the Fort Allen 
Hotel. This could not have been a more fitting tribute to the strange history of the small 
Blue Mountain outpost. The fort was designed to stage an Indian invasion, but instead 
became as much an Indian place as a British one. Hospitality defined the fort's ultimate 
role in Indian-white relations and infused its mission with anxiety and confusion. Fort 
Allen never suffered an attack, except by some of its own garrison. It never served as the 
130Ibid., 257. 
131CRP, 8:514; Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser., 6:586-87. 
132Peters to Horsfield, Jan. 17, 1761, Horsfield Papers. Not much was left to 
salvage from Fort Allen after the garrison had plundered the stores in 1760. Some of the 
few remaining guns were broken as were several of the tools. Horsfield sold the 
utilitarian goods for just over £9 and sent the guns and ammunition to Philadelphia. 
"Account of Ammunition Stores &cain Fort Allen, Taken the 21st Sept. 1761," Horsfield 
Papers. 
133Joseph Mortimer Levering, History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 1742-1892 
(Bethlehem: Times Publishing Co., 1903), 370. 
134Horsfield to James Hamilton, Sep. 3, 1761, Horsfield Papers. 
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base for Indian punitive expeditions. Missionaries, not military planners, determined its 
location. For a brief period, Fort Allen even served as an illegal tavern, of sorts. But its 
use by Indian visitors made it a link in the chain of Indian reciprocal relations. Instead of 
a military post for keeping Indians and Europeans apart, it became a diplomatic post that 
brought them together. In this respect, Fort Allen was not alone. Throughout North 
America; outposts that were meant to introduce European culture and resolve into Indian 
country had their identities reshaped by the complexities of intercultural contact. Fort 
Allen became an example of the transformational nature oflndian-European contact and 
coexistence in the North American backcountcy. 
In Franklin's autobiography, the great man seemed embarrassed by the rough 
little fort he and his men built during the Delaware War. But, of course, he never enjoyed 
the post's hospitality. Had Teedyuscung left a memoir, his description of Fort Allen 
might have been more agreeable. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE GREATEST MART: 
Food, Drink and Interdependence at Michilimackinac, 1761-1796 
By the end ofthe British occupation ofthe Straits ofMackinac, observers who 
had lived in the region long enough might have been surprised to hear Kegeweskam, a 
powerful and influential Ottawa chief, complain that his peoples' lives there were nearly 
over. He described his settlement ofL'Arbre Croche, once a bountiful agricultural center, 
as a dead place, a sad remnant to be pitied. He professed hope that the subsistence gained 
from their exhausted cornfields and whatever fish they could catch would be enough to 
save his people, but he feared that the tide had turned. Once, the French and British 
occupants of the Straits depended on Indian knowledge and food to survive. Now 
Kegeweskam claimed that his people would need help from the Europeans or die starving 
in their own land. 1 
Kegeweskam's complaints were probably overstated. L'Arbre Croche remained a 
prominent corn producing post until well into the nineteenth century. But the chiefs 
descriptions leave the reader with an unmistakable impression of loss. It would be easy to 
mistake this turn of fortune as the result of an inevitable process of invasion, dislocation, 
and oppression. The arrival of the European fur trade and its supplies of manufactured 
trade goods, unfamiliar to Indians but quickly adopted and appreciated, changed the 
1 Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, Collections and Researches (Lansing, 
MI: The Society, 1877-1929), 493-94 (hereafter cited as MPHC). 
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logistics of everyday life at the Straits. By the end of the seventeenth century, Indians of 
the Great Lakes basin had adapted their lifeways around the European trade. In a 
teleological view, from the point of view of the survivors, this European alteration of 
native lives in the Mackinac Straits can appear to have been an unstoppable, inevitable 
cultural juggernaut. But this was not the reality experienced by the Indians themselves; 
the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and others who knew and appreciated the natural gifts of the 
region centuries before the French and British ever saw the Great Lakes. 
Northern Great Lakes Indians were influenced negatively by European expansion 
in the region, but the story of the British occupation ofFort Michilimackinac is not only 
one oflndian loss. The fur trade did help bring about the partial dissolution oflndian 
traditions and power in the region, and the fort maintained by British troops for thirty-
five years protected that trade and its tradesmen and voyageurs. But Mackinac's forts 
were hardly engines of intimidation for the Indians at the Straits. Rather, the forts acted 
as markets, drawing Indians from hundreds of miles around to trade their furs, buy trade 
goods and provisions, and renew their reciprocal trade agreements with European 
authorities. Indians valued the trade for the advantages that European goods gave them, 
and demanded trading posts and traders in Indian country. Though most trading took 
place in the natives' villages, traders kept houses near the post. Fort commandants also 
gave gifts to Indian visitors to maintain friendship and reciprocity in the Great Lakes 
economic system. In the French period, visiting Indians probably made little distinction 
between the small French fort and native palisaded villages they had seen in their travels. 
During the British period, larger garrisons and more impressive edifices were meant to 
impress and awe Indians, especially during the wars ofthe late eighteenth century in 
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which Indians and Europeans allied with and fought against each other. Indian awe 
proved more difficult to elicit than many Europeans expected. Throughout the entire 
British period at Michilimackinac, Indians always outnumbered Europeans, reminding 
the newcomers constantly of their importance in the region. 
Efforts to procure food at remote outposts like Michilimackinac displayed this 
localized Indian-European social and economic parity. European military and diplomatic 
efforts to manage trade and gain advantages over Indians in the Great Lakes basin 
certainly loomed large in deciding the outcome of the contest for cultural supremacy in 
North America. However, local, everyday concerns like provisioning complicate the 
picture. Large-scale naval freighting on the lakes became viable during the British 
occupation ofMichilimackinac, making outside provisioning much more efficient than 
during the earlier French tenure at the straits. But, despite the best efforts of British 
quartermasters to provision the lake posts, outside supplies could not fulfill all the dietary 
needs of Michilimackinac. The British post at the straits contained over one hundred 
soldiers, was almost four hundred miles from Detroit, and greeted many thousands of 
native visitors every summer. Throughout the British occupation Europeans depended in 
part on Indian foodways and native food suppliers. At the same time, the fur trade 
changed native material culture significantly. This was especially true with the 
introduction of alcohol, a trade good that only Europeans could supply, and one Indians 
increasingly demanded on their trips to the post. Food and drink defmed an 
interdependent relationship between British newcomers and natives at Michilimackinac 
that complicates later arguments for economic determinism and inevitable Indian 
d . 2 em1se. 
Many of the groups that would eventually call the Mackinac region home were 
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Algonquian-speaking peoples displaced by the great Iroquois expansion west and north 
during the mid-seventeenth century. Iroquois warfare nearly destroyed Huron culture, and 
scattered other Iroquoian and Algonquian groups into the Great Lakes basin and further 
west. In some cases, lifeways and traditions merged in multiethnic refugee villages, 
creating the ethnic, linguistic, and political divisions later identified and redefined by the 
earliest European observers. In other cases, Great Lakes Indians maintained traditional 
lands and kinship networks in the. face ofthese demographic changes. This dramatic 
profusion of cultures in the mid-seventeenth century makes describing traditional 
foodways in the region problematic. All descriptions of the ways Ottawas, Ojibwas, 
Potawatomis, Nippisings, and other native peoples of the Great Lakes region found, 
traded, created, and prepared food are based upon the accounts and observations of early 
French missionaries, traders, and adventurers. 3 But generalizations can still be made 
about pre-contact Indian foodways from the common practices that survived to the 
contact period. To one degree or another, almost all Indians hunted, fished, and cultivated 
2For a concise overview of the diets and foodways of soldiers manning forts 
throughout the trans-Appalachian west, including the problems encountered in 
transporting, storing, and procuring provisions, see McConnell, Army and Empire, 101-
13. 
30n Indian refugees in the seventeenth century, see White, The Middle Ground, 1-
49. White's description ofpost-1650 Great Lakes Indian societies as fragmented refugee 
groups has been challenged effectively by Heidi Bohaker. She argues that Anishinaabe 
expressive symbols imply kinship networks and traditions that predate. and postdate 1650, 
revealing a much more stable native social landscape in the region than proposed by 
White. '"Nindoodemag': The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the 
Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701," WMQ, 3rd ser. 63:1 (Jan. 2006): 23-52. 
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plants for sustenance. In the ecologically fragile world of the upper Great Lakes, with its 
six-to-eight months of freezing temperatures and snowfall measured in meters, Indians 
worked both with and against nature to provide sustenance, using methods honed and 
tested over many centuries. 
Anthropologists identify prehistoric Indians as horticulturists, agriculturists, or 
gatherers to describe how they obtained their vegetable food. However, any implications 
of agricultural lethargy or primitivism are misplaced in describing people who had 
cultivated plants for thousands of years, nearly as long as Europeans. Archaeologists have 
shown that people of the Early Woodland Adena culture cultivated squash well over two 
thousand years ago. Squash was one ofthe nutritional ''three sisters" crucial to later 
Eastern Woodland foodways. After about 100 B.C.E., their Hopewell successors carried 
on and expanded horticulture, planting larger garden plots and living in sedentary 
villages. Mississippian groups expanded even further into the cultivation of large fields of 
beans and corn, the remaining two "sisters" of the trio.4 
Maize seemed especially important to contact-era Indians, according to the 
reports of early European observers. It could be planted easily and required little 
maintenance. Clear-burning fields provided easy fertilization, and as seed the maize 
kernel was highly reproductive; one kernel could provide up to two hundred kernels for 
consumption. Combined with squash and beans, maize provided a combination of 
essential nutrients unsurpassed in any culture or continent.5 Even so, Indian agriculture 
4R. Douglas Hurt, Indian Agriculture in America: Prehistory to Present 
(Lawrence, KS: University ofKansas Press, 1987), 11-15. 
5 Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 54-56; William Cronon, Changes in 
the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1983), 41-46. 
was not completely reliable or assuredly bountiful. Untimely frosts, insect infestation, 
and drought could all affect crop productivity. Early European visitors may have 
overstated bountiful native crop yields in their exuberant relations to the Old World.6 
Still, maize, beans arid squash proved to be hardy and dependable crops in supporting 
both sedentary and mobile lifeways in the rugged countty north and east of the Great 
Lakes, and in most other parts of eastern North America. 
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Indians augmented their vegetable crops with wild game and fish. Especially in 
winter, this provided the only available source of animal protein because Indians did not 
domesticate food animals.7 Animals with thick, warm hides like bear, beaver, and deer 
were most sought after because they provided warmth as well as nourishment. This 
would change when the introduction of the European fur trade altered hunting patterns, 
turning a practical necessity into an economic priority. Indians used assigned hunting 
grounds to avoid confrontations with other native groups and to keep from over-hunting 
animal populations. Native hunters employed shooting, spearing and trapping, and the 
prodigious skills involved made expert hunters highly valued in their societies.8 Fishing 
was no less important, and sedentary villages sprang up near especially bountiful rivers 
and lakes. This was especially true in the fresh waters of the Great Lakes basin, where 
fish populations had grown and evolved over millennia, providing a diverse source of 
nutrition. Relatively low Indian populations prevented excessive fishing and hunting, and 
6Sissel Schroeder, "Maize Productivity in the Eastern Woodlands and Great 
Plains of North America," American Antiquity 64:2 (1999): 502. 
7Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 57. 
8W. Vernon Kinietz, The Indians ofthe Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965), 236-39; 322. 
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barring natural factors such as storms and droughts, Indian hunting and fishing worked as 
part of a well-balanced ecosystem. 
In Great Lakes Indian societies, food production and processing was usually the 
domain of native women. Women grew vegetables and processed meat and fish for local 
consumption and for sale to travelers and traders. They also produced craft items and 
processed skins for the fur trade, making them indispensable to the wide-ranging Indian 
trade networks that developed long before the arrival of Europeans. This important role in 
trade and local economics gave women exceptional influence in their societies. After the 
arrival ofEuropeans, Great Lakes native women sold provisions to traders, travelers, and 
soldiers, and were important consumers in the emergent European trade.9 
The weather in the region surrounding the Upper Great Lakes challenged even the 
hardiest Indians and Europeans. Snowstorms buried paths and villages, and driving winds 
made travel difficult or impossible. Winter travel was always dangerous, especially over 
frozen lakes and rivers that could break open without warning. In the Michilimackinac 
region, winter can come as early as late September, and snow in April is not uncommon. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during the period some call the Little Ice 
Age, average temperatures were possibly even lower than at present, and winters may 
9Lucy Eldersveld Murphy, A Gathering of Rivers: Indians, Metis, and Mining in 
the Western Great Lakes, 1737-1832 (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1980), 29-
30. 
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have lasted longer.10 The soil was, and still is, sandy and rocky near the lakeshores, 
though the great forests of the interior portions of the two Michigan peninsulas provided 
fertile ground for planting. 
Rivers in the Great Lakes basin, especially the Ottawa and the St. Lawrence, were 
major highways that made journeys of many hundreds of miles feasible during the 
wanner months. Before European contact, Indians in the area seemed to coalesce in small 
villages near lakes and rivers; archaeologists have studied several prehistoric and 
protohistoric fishing villages on the shores of Lakes Superior, Michigan, and Huron, 
attesting to the importance ofthe big lakes as a source of sustenance. More tantalizing is 
evidence that on the eve ofEuropean contact in the region, large parts of the Upper Great 
Lakes region were empty of people, following the dissolution ofthe advanced 
Mississippian culture that dominated ~entral North America for centuries.11 This was the 
world that French explorers found when they entered the region in the early seventeenth 
century, and unbeknownst to European or Indian, it was a world on the verge of 
exceptional demographic change. 
1
°For an overview of this period of global climate change and its relationship to 
historical events in Europe, see Brian M. Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate made 
History, 1300-1850 (Boulder, CO: Basic Books, 2000), esp. 129-47 for the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. For the problems of determining historical climate change and 
conditions, see Reid A. Bryson and Christine Padoch, "On the Climates ofHistory," 
Joumal of Interdisciplinary History 10:4 (Spring 1980): 583-97. In the absence of 
documentation, historical climate change can be determined through archaeological 
means, especially through the analysis of tree rings, forest fire ash stratigraphy, pollen 
and lichen analysis, ice cores, etc. For a Great Lakes region example, see James S. Clark, 
"Fire and Climate Change During the Last 750 Years in Northwestern Minnesota," 
Ecological Monographs 60:2 (1990): 135-59. 
11David S. Brose, "Late Prehistory of the Upper Great Lakes Area," in Handbook 
of North American Indians, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant, vol. 15: Northeast, ed. Bruce 
G. Trigger (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 577-79. 
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French explorers and missionaries entered the Great Lakes region almost 
simultaneously. Recollect missionary Joseph Le Caron attempted to start a mission near 
Thunder Bay in 1615, and explorer Etienne Brule, an associate of fur entrepreneur 
Samuel de Champlain, reached Sault Sainte Marie by 1620. They were the first of a 
stream of French adventurers, priests, and fur traders that would change dramatically the 
way Indians of the upper Great Lakes lived their daily lives. French visitors quickly 
recognized the strategic importance ofMichilimackinac, as Jesuit missionary Claude 
Dablon explained in 1670: "It is situated exactly in the strait connecting the Lake of the 
Hurons and that of the Illinois, and forms the key and the door, so to speak, for all the 
peoples of the South, as does the Sault for those of the North; for in these regions there 
are only those two passages by water for very many Nations."12 
But Dablon also noted that the Indians' fascination with Michilimackinac had 
more to do with food procurement than with transportation, and described the many 
different varieties offish that the Indians found there. This included three kinds of trout, 
the largest of which was so "monstrous" that native residents had trouble eating them. An 
Indian could spear 40 or 50 fish in a few hours, which may have been why the local 
Ottawas, Ojibwas and Hurons thought that Michilimackinac was the "native country" of 
all fish. 13 In addition to fish, Jesuits iii the New France missions noted the wondrous 
availability of com; in 1639 missionary Franyois du Peron described Hurons bringing the 
priests gifts of squash, bread, and "more com than if we had broad lands."14 Indeed, since 





proclivity of com agriculture among many Indian groups.15 Jesuit priests did not write 
much about agriculture in the Michilimackinac area in the seventeenth century, although 
by 1710 Jesuit missionary Antoine Silvy reported that "maize grows very well" on the 
south shore of the straits, and that the Potawatomis ofthe Lake Michigan islands "sow 
com and supply the needs ofMichilimackinac."16 However, by then a fort and a mission 
had already come and gone at the Straits, and the fur trade increasingly determined the 
nature of both European and Indian existence there. 
Excellent fishing, arable land for growing com, and lake geography was reason 
enough for Indians to gather at Michilimackinac, but the fur trade and Christian missions 
were additional inducements. 17 When Jacques Marquette founded the mission of St. 
Ignace on the north shore ofthe Straits in 1669, he brought his Huron followers with him 
from Sault Sainte Marie, with the full knowledge that other potential converts would 
come to Michilimackinac for their own reasons. Dablon knew that "the abundance of 
fish, and the excellence of the soil for raising Indian com, have ever proved a very 
powerful attraction for the tribes of these regions" and Indians would soon be "turning 
their eyes toward so advantageous a location as this," making Michilimackinac a ripe 
target for both traders and proselytizers. 18 Establishment of the mission at St. Ignace and 
ofFrench Fort de Baude, built there in 1690, was determined by the availability of food 
in the region and the Indian refugees who would soon migrate there.19 
15Hurt, Indian Agriculture, 33. 
16 Antoine Silvy, Letters from North America, trans. Ivy Alice Dickson (Belleville, 
Ont.: Mika Publishing Co., 1980), 161-63. 
17White, Middle Ground, 23. 
18JR, 55:159-61. 
19White, Middle Ground, 42-49. 
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Fort de Baude, the first fort at the Mackinac straits, was primarily an attempt to 
hold the area for France as a fur entrepot before the British tried the same thing. English 
companies had already established a competitive post on James Bay to handle the 
northern fur trade, and wished to steer as many beaver skins as possible through the Great 
Lakes and friendly Iroquois country to Albany. By 1694, when Aritoine de Ia Mothe 
Cadillac took over as commandant of Fort de Baude, he commanded 200 soldiers, the 
largest French garrison ever at Michilimackinac. This might have intimidated rival 
. British traders, but probably did not trouble the hundreds of Ottawas, Ojibwas, and 
Potawatomis who lived nearby, or the thousands of other Indians who came to the straits 
to trade their beaver pelts for European goods and provisions annually. Indeed, Cadillac 
never felt safe there because of the remoteness of the post and the clear superiority of the 
Indians in numbers and practical advantages. "With a little Indian com," he argued in 
1700, "These people have no difficulty in traversing two hundred leagues to come and 
take some one's life by stealth, and when we want to get their lands, we are obliged to 
provide ourselves with stores of all kinds and to make great preparations."2° Cadillac 
applied for and received permission to move the post to Detroit, taking as many of his 
Indian suppliers/customers with him as would consent to go, but the natural advantages 
of the Mackinac Straits in geography and the availability of food kept voyageurs, traders, 
and Indians flocking to the region. 
Indians resorting to Michilimackinac for food attracted French traders and 
soldiers there because of the fur trade, the defining economic concern in Canada since the 
sixteenth century. Fur trading had moved far into the St. Lawrence Valley by the early 
20MPHC, 33:97. 
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seventeenth century. It introduced new kinds oftextiles, tools, weapons, and sundry items 
into native material culture, and drew Indians into an intercontinental trade system as 
spenders and consumers. Indians were not necessarily dependent upon the new trade, 
however much they seemed attached to it. European trade goods replaced similar native 
items, and the tradeitselfreinforced Indian notions of social reciprocity and mutual 
obligations. In fact, the European trade, often configured as a gift exchange from the 
Indians' points of view, and the actual diplomatic gift giving that went with it, defined 
the give-and-take nature ofboth Indian and European alliances in the seventeenth 
century.21 
21Recent studies have shown that the fur trade was important to native lives before 
European contact, and after the coming of Europeans it provided arenas for cultural 
conflict and accommodation into the nineteenth century and beyond. Gender roles, 
spirituality, demographic change, and consumerism flowed together to create vital new 
cultural forms and to affect existing kinship, social, and political relationships. Women's 
history has especially transformed our understanding of the social nature of fur trade 
relationships, revealing the fundamental domestic and public roles played by women. The 
groundbreaking works in this new understanding of the trade are Jennifer S. H. Brown, 
Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country, (1980; new ed. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), and Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties: 
Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870 (Norman: University ofOklahoma Press, 1983). 
For recent studies see Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking 
Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 200 I), and Bruce M. White, "The Woman Who Married a Beaver: Trade Patterns 
and Gender Roles in the Ojibwa Fur Trade," Ethnohistory 46:1 (Winter 1999): 109-47. 
Bruce White has argued for a nuanced view of trade that emphasizes native spiritual 
views about goods. He shows that western Great Lakes Indians thought French trade 
goods, especially metal goods and guns, were imbued with powerful spirits and possessed 
greater-than-human powers. Ojibwas desired goods for both ritual and practical reasons, 
and made little distinction between those values. "Encounters With Spirits: Ojibwa and 
Dakota Theories about the French and Their Merchandise," Ethnohistory 41 :3 (Summer 
1994): 369-405. For classic studies ofthe fur trade, see Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur 
Trade: Their Role as Hunters, Trappers, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of 
Hudson's Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1974), and Harold 
Adams Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History, 
new ed. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1999). 
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Michilimackinac created natural opportunities for the northern fur trade and its 
Montreal-based traders because it prevented furs from north of Lake Superior being 
transported further south in the Great Lakes. There they might have ended up being sold 
at rival French forts Niagara or Frontenac on Lake Ontario or, even worse from the 
French perspective, sold illicitly to British traders.22 The fur trade also brought new 
Indian groups to the Straits region; Marquette's Huron converts moved away from St. 
Ignace after 170 I, but other groups had moved into the region after 1650, including 
Ottawas, Nipissings, and Potawatomis who worked as middlemen in the transportation of 
furs. 23 The French fur trade may have dominated the Canadian economy during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it was always a shaky endeavor offering large net 
receipts but somewhat meager profits. This may explain why French authorities were 
slow to reestablish a fort at the Straits until1715, and hesitant to garrison the post with 
more than a token company throughout the eighteenth centwy.24 But from Indians' 
perspective, the trade changed their material lives in many ways, and introduced them to 
alcohol, a new and troubling consumable commodity. 
French residents of the New World enjoyed brandy mainly as a pleasant 
accompaniment to food and as a brace against fatigue and cold, damp weather. Indians 
preferred liquor for its qualities as an intoxicant for recreation, in spiritual and mourning 
rituals and practices, and to escape the pressures and boredom of life.25 Indian 
22W. J. Eccles, France in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 86. 
23White, Middle Ground, 105-06. 
24After expenses and percentages for middlemen, the profit of the French fur trade 
may have been only a few hundred thousand livres a year, to be divided amongst many 
investors. Eccles, France in America, 126. 
25Peter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine, 63-84; James Axtell, The Invasion Within, 
64-67. 
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drunkenness often disrupted village life and backwoods social interactions, and violence 
and lawlessness commonly ensued. French missionaries deplored the introduction of 
liquor into native lifeways and always argued for brandy's restriction among Indians, but 
once it was in place there was little they could do about it. "How deprive them of it 
entirely?" wondered French captain Pierre Noyan in 1730, "It has become the basis of 
their religion! These superstitious men can no longer recover from their diseases, unless 
they make festivals with brandy ... they must have it, at whatever cost. "26 
Intoxication also served as a valid excuse for violence and thievery among some 
Indian groups, who believed that intoxicants transported them to other worlds or places 
where the normal restrictions of reciprocity and responsibility did not hold. "When our 
Savages have received an injury from any one," explained Jesuit priest Jacques Bruyan in 
1669, "They get half drunk and do with impunity all that passion suggests to them. All 
the satisfaction one receives from them is embraced in two words: 'He was drunk; he had 
lost his reason. "'27 Indians so desired brandy and other spirituous liquors that its value as 
a trade commodity made it irresistible to traders both honest and illicit; indeed, in some 
cases Indians would trade almost anything for it, and intoxicated men were easily 
cheated.28 
But some felt that the missionaries overstated their complaints against the liquor 
trade. Cadillac, whose conflicts with the Jesuits were many, argued that if all the priests' 
complaints were compiled into a single volume, "a man's life would not suffice to get 
through the reading of it." He charged Jesuit missionaries with using .the liquor trade as 
26MPHC, 34:75. 
27JR, 53:257. 
28Eccles, France in America, 55-56. 
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an excuse for their own conversion failures. 29 But Indians cared little about the squabbles 
of French missionaries and soldiers. From the natives' point ofview, alcohol was an 
important new ingestible trade good that served many of their needs despite its attendant 
social problems, and they had as much right to purchase and consume it as anyone else. 
Indians could buy their liquor from traders in their villages, but also expected to find it at 
the trading posts along with other goods. Because of the fur trade, Michilimackinac 
became a place for native consumers to acquire strong drink as well as provisions and 
useful European goods.30 
After the conclusion of the very expensive Queen Anne's War, the potential 
profits of the fur trade seemed a sufficient inducement to reestablish a post at 
Michilimackinac. This time the fort was built on the south shore of the Straits, opposite 
the decaying ruins ofFort de Baude at St. Ignace, probably in 1715. Fort 
Michilimackinac enjoyed four decades of relative peace, despite supplying French and 
Indian attackers during the Fox War of 1716 and King George's War in the 1740s. Only a 
small garrison served the post, never more than twenty or thirty soldiers and officers, and 
29MPHC, 33:142-43. 
30ouring the French regime at Michilimackinac, alcohol ranked fifth among trade 
goods kept in inventory when catalogued by use type. Clothing was the premier trade 
good, commanding 72% of trade expenditures at the post. Hunting implements (including 
guns, flints, and ammunition) ranked second, adornments ranked third, and cooking and 
eating implements ranked fourth. Brandy and wine accounted for 3.07% of expenditures 
for the period 1715-1760. These ratios were typical of Great Lakes area posts. Dean L. 
Anderson, "The Flow of European Trade Goods into the Western Great Lakes Region, 
1715-1760," in The Fur Trade Revisited: Selected Papers of the Sixth North American 
Fur Trade Conference, Mackinac Island, Michigan, 1991, eds., Jennifer S. H. Brown, W. 
J. Eccles, and Donald P. Heldman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 
107. 
148 
the fort itself was a small, lightly stockaded complex built much like an Indian fort.31 
Fort Michilimackinac's neighbors were the native groups that had been settling in 
the area since the 1650s. Ottawas had lived at the Straits since at least 1650, but were 
then scattered by Iroquois incursions to points west (Green Bay, the Mississippi) and 
north (Chaquamegon Bay, Sault Ste. Marie), returning to St. Ignace by the 1670s. Some 
Ottawas followed Cadillac to Detroit in 1701, but many stayed in Michilimackinac and 
the islands of northern Lakes Michigan and Huron. As many as 1,500 Ottawas lived near 
Michilimackinac in 1720, and about 750 more lived farther south near Detroit and 
S . B 32 agmaw ay. 
Ottawas at Mackinac sought better planting grounds after they overstressed their 
cornfields, and founded the village ofL'Arbre Croche thirty miles down the Lake 
Michigan coast in 1742, which became a major com supplier.33 At St. Mary's River, 
small Ojibwa groups that the French called Saulteurs or Saulteaux had long maintained 
fishing villages. Primarily hunters and fishers from the country north of Lake Superior, 
Ojibwas moved into the Upper Great Lakes area after 1650 and moved south and east 
during the early eighteenth centmy, living alongside Ottawas at Saginaw, L' Arbre 
Croche, and Detroit by the 1740s.34 By the end ofthe French occupation ofthe Straits, 
31Lyle M. Stone, Fort Michilimackinac, 1715-1781: An Archaeological 
Perspective on the Revolutionary Frontier (East Lansing: The Museum, Michigan State 
University, 1974), 8. 
32Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 228-32; Johanna E. Feest and 
Christian Feest, "Ottawa," in Trigger, Handbook, 774. 
33Ibid., 772-73. 
34E. S. Rogers, "Southeastern Ojibwa," in Trigger, Handbook, 760-62. 
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they also maintained a village of 100 men on Mackinac Island.35 Potawatomis, 
Nipissings, and many other groups visited the narrow strait to trade and fish. Exact 
censuses of Indians near Michilimackinac during the French regime are difficult to 
assess, not only because of the lack of dependable records but also because most Indians 
resorting there did not make the Straits a permanent or even semi-permanent home. By 
the end of the French period of occupation, about 250 Ottawa and 400 Ojibwa men lived 
near Michilimackinac; adding in women and children probably would bring this total to 
more than two thousand overall. Of course, this figure does not take into account the 
many French traders and their Metis and Indian wives who visited and worked near the 
post. Working within the structure of this dynamic cultural mix challenged fort 
commandants during both French and British regimes at Michilimackinac.36 
Michilimackinac saw no fighting during the Seven Years' War, but local Indians 
supported French interests in many campaigns during the conflict. Mackinac Indians 
definitely accompanied Michilimackinac commandant Charles de Langlade and the 
French forces who defeated Edward Braddock's advance into the Pennsylvania frontier in 
1754, and Ottawas ofL 'Arbre Croche, led by their hereditary chief La Fourche, aided 
Langlade and the Marquis de Montcalm in the 1757 reduction ofFort William Henry in 
35Descriptions of native populations often included only men, or "warriors" as 
they were usually called. In sedentary villages it is assumed that women and children 
were present, and those population estimates can be increased conservatively by a factor 
of four, bringing the population of Mackinac Island to at least 400 if the original report 
can be believed. Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures in Canada in the Years 1760-
1776 (1809; repr., Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1921), 37-38. 
36
"A List of the Indian Nations," WJP, 10:544-46. Negotiating the kinship-based 
networks that dominated the fur trade and neighboring villages was vital for French 
success during their tenure at the Straits. British regimes would have less success with 
these relationships at posts throughout the Great Lakes region. Sleeper-Smith, Indian 
Women and French Men, 54-72. 
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New York. 37 Throughout the region, Indians maintained their loyalties to their French 
trading partners, though fighting in faraway battles might have broadened some Indians' 
outlooks enough to prepare them for the upcoming regime change. For example, a 
"chief' living fifteen miles south of the fort who had been taken prisoner by Sir William 
Johnson at the battle ofNiagara had been treated so well that he flew the British colors 
(given to him as a present on his release) over his lodge, which did little to endear him to 
the largely pro-French Indians living nearby.38 
Despite the support of such local Anglophiles, the transition to a British regime at 
the Straits after French capitulation in 1761 was destined to be a rough one. William 
Johnson warned that Indians in the Great Lakes region might not welcome an expanded 
military presence. Indians had not necessarily minded the French garrisons and forts, but 
they viewed any augmentation of the fort system as a "great cause of Suspicion," and 
tolerated them only because they brought traders and their goods into Indian countcy.39 
To further complicate the situation, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, the British commander-in-chief 
in North America, planned to institute a policy that would replace the French system with 
one Indians were unlikely to find any better. 
Great Britain spent itself into near-bankruptcy winning North America away from 
France in the Seven Years' War, and Amherst had no desire to continue the expensive 
French policy of buying Indian allegiances with gifts. Under the British regime, Indians 
would be treated like other British subjects in America and would pull their weight in the 
fur trade without additional inducements to friendship, a decision that would have 
37David A. Armour, "Who Remembers La Fourche?" Chronicle: Historical 
Society o[ Michigan Newsletter 16:2 (Summer 1980): 13. 
3 Henry, Travels and Adventures, 57-58. 
39
''Niagara and Detroit Proceedings, July-Sep. 1761," WJP, 3:502. 
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profound implications.40 In addition to the wide scale diplomatic impact on Indian-British 
relations caused by this diminution of gift-giving, the new policy threatened individual 
Indians with serious economic consequences. Many Indians had come to expect presents 
and provisions as a condition of their alliances. They depended on these gifts of food, 
clothing, powder and ammunition for survival, especially when traders encouraged 
Indians to trade furs for rum instead of other necessities. Reducing Indian presents 
resulted in greater Indian poverty. 
When Amherst sent a detachment under the command of Capt. Henry Balfour to 
take command of Michilimackinac and the other French posts in the upper lakes, Balfour 
wasted no time in announcing that the new regime would not coddle the local Indians or 
dole out gifts as lavishly as the French had done. At a Michilimackinac Indian conference 
in September 1761, in which a Saulteur speaker asked for powder, lead, and other goods 
for the winter hunting season to save his people from starvation, Balfour upbraided them 
for wasting their pelts by purchasing rum in Niagara. "I know well it is not by misfortune 
you have become miserable," Balfour scolded. "You sold your pelletry for Rum, without 
even buying powder, Lead, or any other Things; you are continually drunk, and then you 
behave yourselves not as Men, but as Beasts." He gave them enough goods to hold them 
over, but exhorted the Saulteurs to "become Wiser for the time to come.',41 
As low as was Amherst's opinion oflndians, his view of unscrupulous traders 
might have been even lower. He charged them with luring Indians to the posts with 
messages ofwampum (Amherst was very upset at such unauthorized communications) 
and then taking all their furs in exchange for rum, leaving the Indians "Naked and 
40White, Middle Ground, 256-268; Dowd, War Under Heaven, 73-75. 
41
"Henry Balfour's Conference with the Indians," WJP, 3:544. 
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Destitute ofEverything."42 But unscrupulous as the traders may have been, the Indians 
wanted them. Traders spoke the Indians' languages, supplied their needs, and lived with 
them in winter. Amherst's attempts to restrict traders' activities could only be interpreted 
by Indians as an unfriendly policy. The message could not have been clearer to 
Michilimackinac's Indians: The new regime would be less paternalistic than the French, 
and the trade in goods and provisions would be affected. At least one British trader had 
already found this out. 
Alexander Heruy was one of the first English licensees to trade at 
Michilimackinac, and his reception there was not warm. On his journey to the straits he 
had to disguise himself as a French voyageur because of frequent reports that Indians 
would kill any Englishman they found. 43 Upon his arrival and the discovery of his true 
identity, Minavavana, also known as "LeGrand Sauteur," a leader ofthe Ojibwas living 
on Mackinac Island, warned Heruy that hostilities would continue unless the new regime 
met their expectations. Because many of his people had been killed in service to the 
French, those who killed them must make amends, either with their own deaths, or by 
"covering the bodies of the dead, and thus allaying the resentment of their relations." 
According to Minavavana, this could only be accomplished "by making presents." Until 
the English king made such arrangements, the Ojibwas would consider them enemies.44 
Minavavana gave credit to Heruy' s respect and bravery and allowed him to stay, 
42Amherst to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1762, WJP, 3:941-43. 
43Heruy, Travels and Adventures, 34-38. 
44Ibid., 42-45. 
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on condition that Henry would allow him a taste of"English milk," or rum.45 Henry 
hesitated to supply rum to the Ojibwa band, but outnumbered and in hostile country, he 
had little choice but to comply. Soon after, two hundred Ottawas from L'Arbre Croche 
descended upon the fort and "asked" that all the men of their village be given fifty beaver 
skins' worth of goods on credit until the next year.46 Refusal would have meant death for 
Henry and his associates, and the only alternative was the loss of all of his trade goods 
destined for the western fur country. The arrival ofBalfour's 300 British troops saved 
Henry's life and livelihood, but the local Ottawa and Ojibwa men had made their points 
and asserted their importance in the region. Most of Balfour's men would soon move on 
to other posts on the Great Lakes, leaving Fort Michilimackinac to continue to rely in part 
upon the hundreds of native inhabitants and their control of food and warfare in the 
region. 
Henry soon discovered that there was no living in the upper Great Lakes without 
adopting native foodways to at least some degree. Com was the nutritional lifeline in the 
region, especially for canoe voyages, and that made the great com post ofL'Arbre Croche 
essential. Com was boiled, mashed, and mixed with animal fat for consumption by 
voyageurs; on a voyage, "a bushel with two pounds of prepared fat" could nourish a man 
for a month of hard labor. This method was the only way to provision canoes for the long 
45Minavavana used this term to denote a gift of rum as a mark of friendship and 
understanding. Native requests for "milk" referred to the reciprocal sustenance provided 
by gifts of alcohol. The metaphor allowed Indians to transfer their metaphor of kinship to 
the trade relationship, with the natives as children receiving milk from their parents. This 
also allowed Indians to impose a familiarity from their own lives onto an important 
foreign product. In this way, Ojibwas bridged cultural gaps in trading and were able to 
come to reciprocal agreements with British newcomers. Without this reciprocity, friendly 




voyages into the Canadian wilderness, because any other type of food would take up too 
much space. All of this food was prepared by women, whose skills made fur-trading 
voyages possible.47 Both Indians and Canadians preferred whitefish and trout, which 
were easily caught in both winter and summer, but when fishing failed and no beef or 
pork could be had, inhabitants of Michilimackinac were forced to purchase com at 
exorbitant prices; Henry paid forty livres worth of pelts per bushel for com, and had he 
paid in cash the price would have doubled. 48 
Luckily for Henry, whitefish were plentiful at Sault Sainte Marie, ninety miles 
away by canoe, which he visited in 1762. A fire at the Sault post in December left Henry, 
the commander/clerk Lt. John Jamet, and translator Jean Baptiste Cadotte and his Ojibwa 
wife living in a small shack, "subsisting only by hunting and fishing" which kept them 
alive for two freezing winter months.49 After returning to Michilimackinac briefly in 
February 1763, Henry went back to the Sault and learned the Ojibwa method oftapping 
maple trees and making sugar, which was their main sustenance through April. "I have 
known Indians to live wholly upon the same and become fat," observed Henry, who 
47Ibid., 54. Production of this com porridge, known as sagamite, was done by 
Indian and Metis women, and was only one of many womens' tasks in the fur trade. 
Among their many important jobs, women processed hides, made shoes, clothing, and 
canoes, and grew and processed all kinds of food, including pemmican, maple sugar, and 
dried berries. If com was a lifeline in northern fur trade societies, then Indian and Metis 
women were the anchors. Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties, 53-73. 
48Ibid., 54-62. 
49Ibid., 65. Cadotte became Henry's trading partner, and his family was among 
the most important in the Great Lakes fur trade. Theresa Schenk, "The Cadottes: Five 
Generations of Fur Traders on Lake Superior," in Brown, Eccles, and Heldman, The Fur 
Trade Revisited, 189-98. 
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seems to have spent his entire first two years at Michilimackinac living on locally 
produced food. 50 
Henry's most famous contribution to the literature ofMichilimackinac is his 
eyewitness account of the "massacre" and reduction ofthe fort by local Ojibwas on June 
2, 1763, which was inspired in part by messages encouraging a pan-Indian uprising 
throughout the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. Using the pretence of a ball game outside 
the fort, Ojibwa men launched the ball toward the post's gate and raced after it and, 
retrieving weapons from Ojibwa women pretending to watch the game, ran into the fort 
and quickly killed sixteen soldiers, taking the rest of the English occupants prisoner. 51 
Most of the garrison and traders were later rescued and taken to Montreal by L 'Arbre 
Croche Ottawas, who were angry at the Ojibwa for attacking the fort without seeking 
their permission (or perhaps, without requesting their participation). A captive ofthe 
Ojibwa victors, Henry was first taken on a boat bound for Beaver Island, where he might 
have ended up part ofthe Ojibwa food chain himselfhad not the Ottawas rescued him. 52 
But they soon returned Henry into Ojibwa hands, where the trader and his fellow 
prisoners were offered bread cut with a knife still covered with the blood ofBritish 
soldiers as their only sustenance, and were told to "eat the blood of their countrymen."53 
50Ibid., 69-70. 
51Dowd, War Under Heaven, 126; Henry, Travels and Adventures, 78-85. The· 
Ojibwas' attack on Michilimackinac was not prompted only by their pro-French political 
leanings. Bruce M. White has argued that the attack was an example of a trade "pillage," 
which resulted from the Britons' lack of establishing proper trade and friendship 
protocols, especially through gift-giving. Threats of pillaging (imagined or real) were an 
important tactic used by Indians in enforcing reciprocity in the Great Lakes trade. "The 
Fear of Pillaging: Folktales of the Great Lakes Fur Trade," in Brown, Eccles, and 




This vivid episode showed gruesomely what should have been evident to all: Indians 
influenced the backwoods through control offoodways and, if necessary, violence. Local 
Indians occupied Fort Michilimackinac until British troops arrived the following year. In 
the meantime, British authorities worked to rebuild Indian-British relations throughout 
the Great Lakes region, which had deteriorated during the destructive war named for the 
Ottawa leader and besieger of Detroit, Pontiac. 
Sir William Johnson knew that the trade must be continued, but he had his doubts 
about posts situated deep in Indian country like Michilimackinac. In January 1764, Lt. 
Col. William Eyre of the King's Engineers encouraged Johnson not to reoccupy the 
outposts because there was no way to make such posts defensible against Indians. 54 This 
was the basic problem for Johnson and the new commander-in-chief, Gen. Thomas Gage, 
who needed to continue the trade and resume amicable Indian relations. Johnson 
recommended that trade be confined to the large forts at Detroit, Niagara, and Oswego, 
because even enhanced garrisons could not protect smaller posts, except by the "French 
Maxim" ofbuying the Indians' protection with presents. Limiting trade to a few posts 
would likely enrage traders, who eschewed caution and would "run any Risque" in 
pursuing their occupation, but to Johnson it seemed worth the trouble. 55 
Meanwhile, Gage had already begun the retaking of the straits by ordering Col. 
John Bradstreet to send a detachment of one hundred men to Michilimackinac with 
provisions for fifteen-to-eighteen months. With local Indians still resistant to British 
occupation of Michilimackinac, hopes of procuring food locally would be slim. Gage also 
instructed Bradstreet to be wary of Indian remonstrances, especially from L 'Arbre 
54William Eyre to Johnson, Jan. 7, 1764, WJP, 11:20-23. 
55Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, June 9, 1764, WJP, 4:442-44. 
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Croche and their leader La Fourche, who were likely to demand recompense because of 
their service in rescuing the Michilimackinac garrison. From ''their Cunning Old Speaker, 
who is a very great Rascal," warned Gage, "You will hear of nothing but Poverty and 
Distress & the Great Services they did Us: they are however the Richest tribe in that 
whole Country ."56 But such protestations were a commonly used attempt to manage 
British-Indian relations on Indians' terms. Often the claims of poverty and nakedness 
were based on reality. The Indian uprising restricted trade throughout the Great Lakes 
region and stressed the native inhabitants economically. But claims of hardship and pleas 
for pity were also a tactic for obtaining provisions and goods, and were used alongside 
threats of violence and promises of aid to pressure British authorities into rewarding 
Indians as the French had done earlier. 57 These seemingly conflicting tactics merged 
comfortably in the Indians' ways ofthinking. In July 1764, for example, hungry 
Michilimackinac Ojibwas shot a French habitant for "defending his Hogg," and then 
appeared at the fort and demanded an end to war. 58 Mackinac Indians wished for a 
resumption of trade and an end to violence, but they would address hunger and other 
necessities at the same time. 
Throughout 1764, Bradstreet and his successor as commandant ofDetroit, John 
Campbell, made arrangements to send the requested detachment to Michilimackinac. The 
attempt was fraught with problems, mostly dealing with provisions. Captain William 
56Gage to Bradstreet, Apr. 2, 1764, Gage Papers AS, vol. 16. 
57For the complex metaphorical meanings oflndian pleas for pity, see Bruce M. 
White, "'Give Us a Little Milk,"' 187-88. At the 1764 summer conference at Niagara 
held to negotiate an end to the Indian uprising, Johnson heard many such protestations of 
hardship, usually from friendly Indians who had no part in the hostilities and had come to 
the congress to trade or receive British gifts. For examples see WJP, 4:466-83, 11:262-
76. See Chapter 4, 214-22, for more information on the Niagara conference of 1764. 
58 Gage to Johnson, July 7, 1764, WJP, 4:481-84. 
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Howard and his two companies reached Michilimackinac on September 22, 1764, late in 
the year for any local provisioning even if food was available. Campbell had his doubts 
about the enterprise, reporting to Gage that if the schooner carrying supplies did not 
arrive by October 20, Howard and his men may have to return to Detroit "for want of 
Provision."59 No supplies arrived, and Howard meant to depart when the local priest and 
inhabitants offered to lend him all the com they had ifhe would consent to stay through 
the winter. With the provisions they had brought with them, Howard reckoned that his 
men could stay until spring. He wrote to Bradstreet, "I found that I could support 60 Men 
till the 15 ofMay every body Included, at 8 Ounces ofPork, haifa Pound ofBread and a 
Pint of Com (per) Day." However, if no supplies arrived by May 20 he would have to 
leave, and the inhabitants would starve ifhe could not replace the borrowed com. He had 
already sent some men back to Detroit after he discovered that some of his barrels of 
flour and pork had not been completely filled.60 
Food worries only continued for Howard at the Straits. All of their flour went bad, 
and in May he reported that his garrison had been living on rotten pork; luckily, because 
ofthe availability offish "very little Pork serves them.'.61 When provisions did arrive by 
schooner, Howard found that all ofthe food had spoiled, especially the barrels of pork, 
and were deemed "unfit to be issued to the Troops." Campbell sent an emergency relief 
convoy of an officer and twenty-five voyageurs in canoes to relieve the post (a dangerous 
gambit in late October), because Howard claimed the garrison would run out of 
59Campbell to Gage, Oct. 3, 1764, Gage Papers AS, vol. 25. 
6
°Campbell to Bradstreet, Dec. 7, 1764, Gage Papers AS, vol. 29. 
61Howard to Bradstreet, Jan. 6, 1765, Gage Papers AS, vol. 29; Campbell to Gage, 
May 31, 1765, Gage Papers AS, vol. 37. 
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provisions by mid-January otherwise.62 By November 1765, Howard had reached his 
physical limits. Disease, bad food and other "bodily infirmities contracted in the Service" 
caused him to request retirement after thirty-two years of service. But the aging officer 
stayed on at Michilimackinac until relieved in August 1766 by Robert Rogers.63 With 
local food supplies strained after the Indian uprising, and the necessity of keeping a large 
garrison to protect the fur trade, Britain would have a hard time maintaining their post at 
the Straits. 
The British Michilimackinac of 1766 was quite a different operation compared 
with the earlier French endeavor. While the French seldom maintained a garrison of more 
than twenty soldiers, the British garrison was at least five times larger. Explorer Jonathan 
Carver described the fort in 1766 as having a "strong stockade" and about thirty houses 
for its garrison of one hundred men and resident traders. 64 Evidence of native material 
culture has been found in the fort, though the greater abundance of this has been isolated 
to the French period and the early British occupation. Indian slaves or servants may have 
worked in the fort, or soldiers and traders may have used native manufactures.65 The 
British post was more military in character than its French predecessor, and while the fur 
62Campbell to Gage, Oct. 31, 1765, Gage Papers AS, vol. 45. 
63Campbell to Gage, Nov. 1, 1765, Gage Papers AS, vol. 45. 
64Jonathan Carver, Travels Through the Interior Parts of North America, in the 
Years 1766, 1767, and 1768 (1781; repr., Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, 1956), 18. 
65John Martin Francis Whitaker, The Functions of Four Colonial Yards of the 
Southeast Row House, Fort Michi/imackinac, Michigan, Archaeological Completion 
Report Series, no. 16 (Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac Island State Park Commission, 
1998), 117-19. . 
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trade was still the primary reason for maintaining the post, the army and the Indian 
Department oversaw all operations.66 
Archaeology reveals another difference between the French and British 
occupations. Animal remains in sample refuse pits from both the French and British 
occupations of the fort show that the French used locally available sources of food much 
more than did the British, who tried to rely more on outside provisioning. Canoe travel 
defined the French supply system, and their posts were isolated and largely self-
sufficient, based on foraging, hunting, fishing, and corn purchased from L 'Arbre Croche 
and other Indian corn posts. With sloops and schooners at their disposal, the British were 
able to transport provisions for many months, including cows and swine. The highly 
differentiated military social order under the British regime is displayed in the faunal 
remains as well, with officers, enlisted men, and traders eating different kinds and 
qualities of meat. In at least one ofthe soldiers' houses the diet seems to have been very 
close to that of the earlier French period, with local game, fish, fowl, and Indian corn 
66Archaeologists have confirmed the differences in vocational use ofFort 
Michilimackinac and its adjacent village. However, despite the increased emphasis on 
military activity by the British, trading still dominated as the post's primary economic 
endeavor. Donald P. Heldman and Roger T. Grange, Excavations at Fort 
Michi/imackinac, 1978-1979: The Rue de Ia Babillarde, Archaeological Completion 
Report Series, no. 3 (Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac Island State Park Commission, 
1981), 202. 
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I . h f h . . 67 supp ymg muc o t e nutntiOn. 
Even though the British may have depended more on provisioning from outside 
sources, Howard's experiences show that the supply chain was hazardous and prone to 
failure. Supplies could be packed poorly at shipping or contaminated enroute. 
Unscrupulous traders could skim food from the crates and barrels at many points, and 
shipments often arrived deficient. Outside supplying worked better for posts farther down 
the Great Lakes such as Detroit and Niagara, though local French and British farming 
also provided much-needed food at those locations. At Michilimackinac the local farmers 
were Ottawa women, and despite the best efforts of British quartermasters, Indians and 
Indian corn were very important to British occupiers of the post. 
If the British occupiers of the Mackinac Straits were beginning to show their 
dependence on Indian maize, the Indians still desired English rum and manufactured 
goods and depended on the traders who supplied it. This worried Gage, who thought the 
67Charles E. Cleland, "Comparison ofthe Faunal Remains from French and 
British Refuse Pits at Fort Michilimackinac: A Study in Changing Subsistence Patterns," 
Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History 3 (1970): 7-23. 
Elizabeth Scott's study of subsistence patterns under the French regime show much 
differentiation based on profession (clergy and traders) and socioeconomic class. She also 
bases her arguments on analysis of refuse pits and patterns of dispersal. French 
Subsistence at Fort Michilimackinac, 1715-1781: The Clergy and the Traders, 
Archaeological Completion Report Series, no. 9 (Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac Island 
State Park Commission, 1985). Lyle M. Stone makes the same argument for greater 
differentiation in material culture under the British regime compared with the French 
occupation ofFort Michilimackinac, but bases his argument on artifact analysis rather 
than zooarchaeology. Fort Michilimackinac, 348-56. For a concise description of the 
outside provisioning system at the fort, see Brian Leigh Dunnigan, The Necessity of 
Regularity in Quartering Soldiers: The Organization, Material Culture and Quartering 
of the British Soldier at Michi/imackinac (Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac State Historic 
Parks, 1999), 17-21. For evidence of soldiers eating more wild and local food than 
offlcers or wealthier townspeople, see Lynn M. Evans, House D of the Southeast Row 
House: Excavations at Fort Michi/imackinac, 1989-1997, Archaeological Completion 
Report Series, no. 17 (Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac State Historic Parks, 2001 ), 60-73. 
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"Canada-Traders," to be "A terrible Set of People," who would "stick to Nothing true or 
false.'.68 Meanwhile, hundreds and perhaps thousands oflndians had visited 
Michilimackinac in 1765, seeking trade and encouraging the resumption oflicensed 
traders wintering with the Indians in their hunting grounds.69 Johnson apologized to 
Michilimackinac traders for the delay in resuming the trade, but he worried that storing 
goods at the fort would prove too tempting to the Indians who controlled the region, and 
renewed licensing of French traders to winter with Indians would give them too much 
influence and control in the Canadian wild. 7° French traders had much to gain by 
wintering with the Indians. They were more accustomed to it than British traders, who 
would often sell their goods to the French rather than risk wintering with unknown 
Indians. French traders could then tum around and resell those goods at higher prices. 
Gage rejected traders' claims that the Indians would starve if the traders did not go 
among them, and thought that simply restricting trade to the larger posts would be 
preferable to licensing French traders or sending English traders into an environment 
where they would be at a clear disadvantage. 71 
Gage finally ordered that, under a plan formulated in 1764, only the large trading 
posts of Michilimackinac, Detroit, Niagara, Erie, Oswego, and Stanwix would remain 
open. A commissary from the Indian Department would regulate each post, and all 
Indians who wished to trade must travel to the posts themselves. Gage thought this would 
68Gage to Johnson, Nov. 24, 1765, WJP, 4:878-79. 
69Daniel Claus to Johnson, July 11, 1765, WJP, 4:789-91; John Porteous, 
Schenectady to Michilimackinac, 1765 and 1766: Journal of John Porteous (Toronto: 
Ontario Historical Society, 193 9), 91. 
70Johnson to the Traders at Michilimackinac, July 1, 1765, WJP, 4:810; Johnson 
to Gage, Aug. 28, 1765, WJP, 4:833-34. 
71Gage to Johnson, WJP, 11:915-17. 
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satisfy the Indians, who were used to traveling long distances in their hunts, and it would 
allow British authorities to maintain a close watch on the frontiers. But Gage's plan 
would only put more pressure on the delicate food chain in the Great Lakes, because 
Indians would have to provision themselves even more for the longer journeys to the 
posts, and then consume more food while waiting for trade goods to arrive. Still, Gage 
was sure that resumption of the trade would placate the Indians, and draw them closer to 
B .. h. t 72 ntis mteres s. 
Gage was less sure of the man who was to replace William Howard as 
commandant ofMichilimackinac, Major Robert Rogers. A hero of the Seven Years' War, 
Rogers had purchased his Michilimackinac appointment while in England. Gage worried 
that the young officer would be interested only in enriching himself and his friends at 
Michilimackinac, which the general called "the greatest Mart ofTrade" in the Great 
Lakes. 73 Gage's biggest fear was the rum trade. He ordered commandants of all the posts 
not to allow liquor to be sold at the forts themselves, but instead to secure the rum in 
storage and have the traders deliver it to their Indian buyers at least two leagues from the 
forts.74 As far as Michilimackinac was concerned, Gage and Johnson agreed that the 
72Gage to Johnson, W JP, 5 :3 0-31. Gage's plan was never enforced effectively at 
Michilimackinac, where both French and British traders continued to trade in Indian 
villages throughout the 1760s, despite the presence of an Indian Department commissary. 
Gage and Johnson did not count on the kinship-based structure of the fur trade, and the 
inability ofBritish post commandants and commissaries to restrict French traders and 
their native wives from trading in Indians' winter villages. The plan was a failure for 
Johnson and Gage, and officially ended in 1768. Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and 
French Men, 62-63. 
73Gage to Johnson, Mar. 23, 1766, WJP, 5:94; Johnson to Gage, Jan. 25, 1766, 
WJP, 12:8-10. 
74Gage to Post Commanders, Jan. 16, 1766, Gage Papers Supplementary Account, 
Box 47, transcription in Peterson Center Library, Mackinac State Historic Parks, 
Mackinaw City, Mich. 
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Indian Department commissary, Benjamin Roberts, would have ultimate authority over 
the trade there and should be able to keep Rogers under control. 
That hope would be short-lived. Almost as soon as he arrived, Roberts was 
shocked at the amount of rum sold at the post. He worried that the hundreds of idle 
Indians waiting for trade goods to arrive might trade all their furs for rum, and the 
ensuing drunkenness would fuel native frustrations with the new trade system and lead to 
depredations against traders and settlers?5 Subsequent letters to Johnson and other Indian 
agents reveal Roberts's fears that rum was being sold out ofhis sight and against Gage's 
orders. He found the proofhe needed when he discovered a cache of"40 Kags" of rum 
stored on an island in Lake Michigan. Roberts seized the rum, whereupon Rogers 
demanded it back. Roberts accused Rogers of treason, and over the ensuing months 
engaged in a struggle for control ofMichilimackinac that eventually saw Rogers carried 
in irons to Niagara to await trial for disobedience and insubordination.76 
Personalities of the individuals involved in this drama certainly played a role in 
the Rogers-Roberts dispute. But at the center lay the question of the rum trade, which 
would continue to constitute a controversial question in Indian-British relations because 
.furs spent on alcohol could not be traded for guns, ammunition, manufactured goods, and 
provisions. In a region increasingly defmed by British military concerns, where Indians 
sometimes found it necessary to travel hundreds of miles to conduct trade and treat with 
British trade authorities, the availability of critical goods was more important than ever. 
75Roberts to Daniel Claus, July 23, 1767 WJP, 12:342. 
76For a thorough treatment of the Roberts-Rogers conflict, see Peter Marshall, 
"The Michilimackinac Misfortunes of Commissary Roberts," in Brown, Eccles, and 
Heldman, The Fur Trade Revisited, 285-98. 
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Talk of rum haunted the communications from Michilimackinac in the years 
before the American Revolution, which was not surprising given the great amount of 
liquor sold on the lakes. A report oftrade covering April to November 1768 shows that 
68,312 gallons of rum passed down the St. Lawrence for the Indian trade at the Great 
Lakes posts. 77 Roberts complained to Johnson that there was little he could do to control 
it. "The Indians will Visit me, beg so hard in your name for rum, & wheedle so much 
they have already 10 Eight Gallen Kegs of me," he wrote to Johnson. Indians knew that 
they could buy all the rum that Roberts would allow to be sold, and could still ask for 
presents of liquor in Johnson's name to acquire even more. This increased costs to the 
crown, and sapped the profitability ofthe Mackinac mart. "I am at a loss what way of life 
to try," sulked Roberts, near the end of his tenure as commissary, and frustrated at his 
inability to advance British interests at the Straits. 78 Even local Indian leaders were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to control liquor usage and its attendant social problems. 
Johnson knew the power liquor held as a trade good and a new fixture oflndian life, and 
had little confidence in native efforts to control the sale of rum. "The Temptation is too 
great for them," Johnson despaired to Gage, "And altho' at a public Congress the Chiefs, 
Sensible of it fatal Effects make heavy Complaints against it, I believe very few of them 
have virtue enough to resist what they Condemn."79 
Luckily for Michilimackinac, the Ottawas at L 'Arbre Croche and their most 
powerful chief, La Fourche, were proving to be good friends to the British operation as 
long as the presents kept coming. "As long as you remain here you and your Garrison 
77
"Report oflndian Trade," Nov. 16, 1768, WJP, 12:650. 
78Roberts to Johnson, Aug. 29, 1769, WJP, 7:146-47. 
·
79Johnson to Gage, Dec. 31, 1770, WJP, 7:1053-54. 
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Shall always Sleep in Safety," La Fourche promised the post's new commandant, 
Beamsley Glasier. La Fourche made it clear, though, that as the English king's "Obedient 
Children," when the Ottawas visited "Out of pure Affection to See our father," they 
"must not go away dry." For the cost of annual presents of rum, food, tobacco, and 
ammunition, the allegiance of the important L 'Arbre Croche band was a good bargain for 
the British command. 80 
Glasier liked and respected La Fourche and the other Ottawas, and recounted to 
Johnson that despite the ample presence of liquor during their visit to Michilimackinac in 
August 1768, "there was not one of them drunk."81 Traveler Peter Pond agreed in 1773, 
calling the L 'Arbre Croche Ottawas ''the most Sivilised in these Parts," except when they 
"Drink to Exses."82 As troubling as the rum trade was for British interests in the Great 
Lakes country, liquor had come to be expected by Indians either as a consumer good or 
as a gift, and the best that the Michilimackinac commanders could hope for was that it be 
used responsibly if near the fort, or consumed far enough away that it would not matter. 
The American Revolution further stressed the supply lines on the Great Lakes, 
though little actual fighting took place in the region. As the "greatest mart of trade" in the 
lakes Michilimackinac seemed an obvious target, but its remoteness proved to be its 
salvation. American rebels, most auspiciously those led by George Rogers Clark, moved 
into more accessible backcountry regions further south in the Illinois country where 
thousands of anti-British Indians and French habitants could be found. During the early 
80
"Speech ofLa Force and Other Ottawas," Aug. 30, 1768, WJP, 6:348-49. 
81Ibid., 349. 
82
"Journal ofPeter Pond," in Wisconsin State Historical Society, Collections of 
the State Historical Society ofWisconsin (Madison, WI: The Society, 1854-1931), 
18:314-54 at 328-29 (hereafter cited as WHC). 
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years of the Revolution, Michilimackinac's role was to organize and supply Indian forces 
from the immediate vicinity of the Straits and points north and west for major 
engagements in the eastern theaters. For example, Michilimackinac Ojibwas, Ottawas, 
and Menominees from across Lake Michigan followed Charles de Langlade, now a 
translator in the British Indian Department, in joining General John Burgoyne's failed 
1777 offensive in New York. Outfitting and pro\fisioning such large expeditions put 
increased pressure on the Mackinac food system. 
Throughout the war, Michilimackinac's main military role would be as a staging 
area for engagements elsewhere. Aside from that ancillary wartime role, the post 
commandant's job was to maintain Indian allegiances and to protect the fur trade, which 
Ill 
managed to hum along solidly if not spectacularly during the war years. Arent Schuyler 
de Peyster, commandant of the post after July 1774, spent much ofhis tenure arranging 
Indian assaults into the Illinois and Wabash regions and fortifying the crumbling ramparts 
of the fort against the seemingly inevitable rebel assault from the south that would never 
come. Rising war costs, which included increases in allowances for Indian gifts, 
stagnation of fur trade revenues, and disruption of supply lines all contributed to tense 
and troubling times at Michilimackinac. 83 
De Peyster tried his best to provision the garrison and the hundreds of Indians 
moving through the fort headed for distant battles, while still maintaining the trade. Rum 
83The most exhaustive treatment of the American Revolution at Michilimackinac 
is David A. Armour and Keith R. Widder, At the Crossroads: Michilimackinac During 
the American Revolution (Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac Island State Park Commission, 
1978). For a brief treatment, see Keith R. Widder, "Effects of the American Revolution 
on Fur-Trade Society at Michilimackinac," in Brown, Eccles, and Heldman, Fur Trade 
Revisited, 299-316. For the effects ofthe Revolution on Great Lakes Indian social 
interactions with whites and each other, see White, Middle Ground, 366-412. 
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availability was a problem, forcing De Peyster to purchase liquor for Indian gifts from 
traders, as well as dipping into his "private stock."84 Outside provisioning, though greatly 
incre.ased during the war, proved insufficient to feed the increased number of men 
moving through the fort, and much of the food arrived spoiled; provisions of poorer 
quality were given to Indians. More troubling were reports that local meat supplies were 
becoming strained, either through pressures brought by the war or simply through 
population changes or environmental stress. "There are not five carcases of any kind 
brought to this Post in the course of a year," De Peyster complained, "There are fewer 
animals, and Indians since the beginning of the War are become very idle, even in the 
hunting Season. I am obliged to help maintain all who live within fifty or sixty miles of 
this place, were it not for the sugar in the spring many would starve. "85 This meant 
trouble for De Peyster, because new British commander-in-chief Frederick Haldimand 
had been encouraging him to reduce supply costs by moving toward local provisioning 
sources, especially dried deer meat and fish, using "all such means as the Indians use."86 
De Peyster had other concerns by 1779, with George Rogers Clark topping the 
list. Clark had successfully defeated Detroit governor William Hamilton at Vincennes in 
February 1779 and won temporary control of the Illinois country, and De Peyster was 
certain that Clark's Kentuckians would soon make their way up the lakes. Of course, De 
Peyster had confidence in his Indian diplomatic efforts and the loyalty of the Lake 
Michigan groups. "I don't care how soon Mr. Clarke appears provided he come by Lake 
84De Peyster to Carleton, May 30, 1778, MPHC, 9:365-66. 
85De Peyster to Haldirnand, June 14, 1779, MPHC, 9:385. 
86Haldimand to De Peyster, Dec. 25, 1778, MPHC, 9:355-56. 
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Michigan & the Indians prove staunch," he bragged to Haldimand.87 Preparedness was 
one of De Peyster's virtues, and he made sure to reinforce the fort. This would not help 
against Clark's rebels, who would probably bring artillery and blow the log stockade to 
pieces, but it might help stave off Indian attacks, which De Peyster believed were more 
likely than a Kentuckian assault. 88 In fact, a strong fort was not enough. De Peyster 
wanted an armed sloop, which he thought would "awe" the Indians more than the fort's 
guns. 89 De Peyster found himself in a difficult and doubly ironic position: His 
commanding officer wanted him to use more Indian-supplied provisions at a time when 
local food was running out, and he depended on Lake Michigan Indians as his main 
source of protection at a time when Indians were his most likely enemies. De Peyster 
reminded Haldimand that British strength at the straits was invested in ''the good 
understanding kept up with the Indians," who could change allegiances with little or no 
notice.90 Local Indians were DePeyster's biggest fear and his best source of protection. 
The situation did not change under De Peyster's successor, Patrick Sinclair, who 
took command in October 1779. Almost immediately he notified Haldirnand that the 
fort's situation was untenable. For one thing, the arable soil and lake conditions around 
the fort would not serve Haldimand's "scheme" of using local provisions produced either 
through agriculture or fishing. Decades of increased com production had stressed the 
area's soil, and fishing on the lakes in fall and winter was so dangerous that three soldiers 
had almost drowned the previous year (one later died) because of high lake winds. 
Sinclair recommended that the fort be moved to Mackinac Island, where the soil was 
87De Peyster to Haldimand, May 13, 1779, MPHC, 9:381. 
88De Peyster to Brehm, June 20, 1779, MPHC, 9:386-87. 
89De Peyster to Carleton, May 30, 1778, MPHC, 9:366. 
90De Peyster to Haldimand, Oct. 7, 1778, MPHC, 9:373. 
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much better for agriculture and a small sheltered bay would provide safer fishing and lake 
travel. On the island farmers and fishermen could supply the garrison and greatly reduce 
the crown's expenses. Also, the fort could be built upon elevated ground, overseeing the 
harbor and land for miles around.91 The post would be much better protected on the 
island against any rebel attack by way of Lake Michigan, unlike the "defenceless" old 
fort where the garrison depended on the availability of fish, Indian-supplied com, and the 
scant protection oflog pickets. Maintaining De Peyster's Indian fears, Sinclair may have 
been even more afraid ofthe local native population than he was of Clark's small army 
far away in the Illinois country, and he was sure that "the Influence it would retain & 
command with the Indians of this Extended country" would justify construction of a 
strong new fort on the small island in the Straits.92 
As concerned as Sinclair may have been about George Rogers Clark and local 
Indians, he was just as worried about provisioning the post sufficient to keep it on a war 
footing. In October 1779, Sinclair ordered Samuel Robertson to take the armed sloop 
Felicity on a loop around Lake Michigan to gather intelligenc~ and look for com. Sailing 
the lakes in late autumn was always risky, but com was the fort's lifeline. With winter 
approaching, Sinclair felt he must have control of all the provisions he and his men could 
muster. The mission was both diplomatic and practical. Sinclair told Haldimand's aide de 
camp Dederick Brehm that he found the "Dispositions of the Indians in Lake Michigan 
very wavering" to the British cause, but also that "several Depots of Com in the rivers 
there" might be captured by the sloop. Two Canadian guides and interpreter Charles 
Gautier accompanied Robertson with gifts for the Lake Michigan Indians, exhorting them 
91Sinclair to Brehm, Oct. 7, 1779, MPHC, 9:524-25. 
92Ibid., 528. 
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to "good behaviour during the winter" and recruiting men for a planned attack on St. 
Louis, to be led by local chiefs Minable and Matchekewis. But as for the corn, Robertson 
was to take no chances; he was ordered to purchase "all the grain Grease & Provisions in 
that Country on the credit of the Merchants and Traders here & to use that of the 
Government if necessary." If any "refractory disaffected persons" were found, Robertson 
was to seize as much of their corn as the Felicity could hold, give them a receipt, and 
"destroy the rest" of the food to keep it out of enemy hands."93 
Robertson and his crew reached the Muskegon River by October 31. There, "a 
negro & 3 indeans," one of them a chief of the L 'Arbre Croche Ottawas, informed them 
that as much as 200 bags of corn had been cached away on the Grand River. But despite 
Robertson's best efforts, the approach ofwinter frustrated his subsequent attempts to find 
them.94 On November 3, the Felicity weighed anchor in Milwaukee Bay, but negotiations 
with Indians and two French traders there produced no corn. The crop at Milwaukee had 
been poor, and since no traders had been allowed in the area, the Indians saved their corn 
for trading the following spring. 95 Throughout the trip, Robertson was also frustrated in 
seeking intelligence about Rebel movements on the lakes. All of the Indians he met 
received Sinclair's warnings to "behave" agreeably, but without capturing any 
93Sinc1air to Brehm, Oct. 29, 1779, AfPHC, 9:530. Large supplies of corn in the 
Indian villages of southern Lake Michigan were not unusual. Native women maintained 
large agricultural operations in the area and produced substantial surpluses of corn and 
other crops for sale in the ~trade. For an example of southern Michigan natives' 
agricultural potential, see Susan Sleeper-Smith's study ofPotawatomi women who traded 
food at Fort St. Joseph in Indian Women and French Men, 73-85. 
94
"A Voyage on Lake Michigan, 1779," WHC, 11:207-08. 
95Ibid., 210-12. 
intelligence or provisions, the Felicity's trip around the lake would do little to help 
Michilimackinac through the winter.96 
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Sinclair received Haldimand's permission to negotiate with the Ojibwas living on 
Mackinac Island for its purchase, and this activity occupied most of 1780. In February, 
Sinclair hired local Indians to begin cutting planks for the new post, and by the middle of 
the month they had produced 16,000 feet of lumber.97 Haldimand, a botany enthusiast, 
seemed delighted with Sinclair's reports of good farmland on the island, and offered to 
send various kinds of seeds with which to carry out his "favorite scheme" of agricultural 
experimentation.98 By July, Sinclair had gained the Ojibwas' surrender ofthe island 
''without any Present," and the Indians had begun moving to the mainland. "I have 
explained His Excellency's intentions to them, to make Com Fields of the whole Island-
no more of their Country is required for that purpose," reported Sinclair, revealing one of 
his inducements for gaining the Indians' favor. He added, "The Fort will be on the upper 
ground where no Indians will be allowed to enter. "99 Mackinac Island was to be a 
segregated settlement, with rigid divisions between the military regime in the fort and the 
economic activities in the traders' town below. Sinclair finalized the official deed 
delivering Mackinac Island to Great Britain on May 12, 1781. Four Ojibwa chiefs 
received five thousand pounds New York currency and gave up all future claims to the 
island.100 Despite the hardship that the move to Mackinac Island imposed on traders, who 
were forced to transport their houses to the island at their own expense, Sinclair's move 
96Ibid., 203-12. 
97Sinclair to Brehm, Feb. 15, 1780, MPHC, 9:538. 
98Brehm to Sinclair, Apr. 17, 1780, MPHC, 9:537. 
99Sinclair to Brehm, July 8, 1780, MPHC, 9:579. 
100
"Indian Deed for the Island ofMackinac," MPHC, 19:633-34. 
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was a bold step toward British self-sufficiency at a point in time when the availability of 
local provisions seemed to be diminishing.101 
Sinclair had ambitious plans for producing food in the short term, and even to 
offer provisions to other posts later on. "I have a Sergeant and six men employed in 
fishing & perhaps I may be able over & above Indian consumption, to send some 
thousand weight of fme trout to Niagara for the use of our brown allies there," he 
promised Brehm. Sinclair also hired three professional Canadian fishermen to supply all 
the Indian provisions needed at the Straits.102 But Sinclair's food woes continued. Captain 
John Mompesson, the new garrison commander, reported in September that com supplies 
were becoming harder to find because Lake Michigan Indians were too hostile to trade 
with, though he hoped to buy some at L'Arbre Croche and Saginaw.103 
In July Sinclair noted the arrival oflndians in "greater numbers than usual" 
looking for provisions. He optimistically reported satisfying them with "the supply of 
Indian Com which the last favourable season furnished us with." But a few weeks later, 
he complained that "the Indians are more expensive when inactive," staying closer to the 
fort and consuming more and more food. 104 By September 1781, Sinclair's reports 
1010ther operations aimed at British self~sufficiency had also been tried during the 
Revolutionary War. By 1774, trader John Askin operated small farms in L'Arbre Croche 
and at French Farm Lake, about 3 miles southeast of the fort. Askin continued to produce 
vegetables there for the garrison, traders, and merchants of the post unti11780, when he 
moved to Detroit and the post moved to Mackinac Island. The farms undoubtedly 
supplied much necessary food for the post, and were an important part of the local food 
chain. Donald P. Heldman, Archaeological Investigations at French Farm Lake in 
Northern Michigan, 1981-1982, Archaeological Completion Report Series no. 6 
(Mackinac Island, MI: Mackinac Island State Park Commission, 1983), 7-15, 69. 
102Sinclair to Brehm, Feb. 15, 1780, MPHC, 9:540-41. 
103Mompesson to De Peyster, Sep. 20, 1780, MPHC, 19:575. 
104Sinclairto [unknown], July 8, 1781,MPHC, 10:495; Sinclairto [unknown], 
July 31, 1781, MPHC, 10:504. 
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showed increasing levels of frustration, especially after Haldimand began complaining 
about the enormous expenses of building the new fort, provisioning the men involved, 
and supplying Indians with presents. The idleness of Indians waiting at the post to be sent 
out against the Rebels or waiting to trade for goods, food, and rum was the reason. "The 
Indians cannot be deprived of their usual quantity of Rum, however destructive it is, 
without creating much discontent, nor can they be detained at the Post to await the arrival 
of Presents without dissatisfaction, and a waste of Provisions greater in value than the 
presents they Receive," Sinclair argued. The situation only became worse after hostilities 
ended in 1781 and Haldimand ordered Sinclair and other post commanders to reduce the 
number of Indian gifts and discourage native visitors. Sinclair was troubled that "Five 
Hundred families naked & without provisions after coming a great distance" could not 
enter a post in which they had been welcomed as allies during the war. He argued that to 
"deprive them of Provisions or Presents necessary for their subsistence would be the 
same thing as to destroy them."105 Sinclair was almost surely exaggerating, but he was 
faced with maintaining Indian friendship and reciprocal relations. As hard as it had been 
to encourage Indians to fight during the Revolution, Sinclair warned, it might be just as 
difficult to keep them quiet during peacetime. Haldimand was not convinced, and was 
determined to forbid excessive Indian presents and to prevent western Indians from 
resorting to the post. By September 1782 Sinclair had been relieved of his command, 
following accusations of excessive spending on presents and maintaining an improper 
and inefficient method of provisioning Indians. 106 
105Sinclair to Haldimand, July 5, 1782, MPHC, 10:596-97. 
106Armour and Widder, At the Crossroads, 180. 
175 
After the war the business of the fort turned again to furs and food, and locally 
obtained com increasingly proved to be a Michilimackinac staple .. Monthly returns over 
the following year showed the amount of com issued out of the king's stores to support 
Canadian employees, Indians, and the post's cattle: 180 bushels in September; 192 in 
October, 191 in November, 201 in December, 247 in January 1783,241 in February, and 
so on.107 As the demand for provisions remained steady, the old problems associated with 
outside provisioning still troubled the supply chain on the Great Lakes. The new 
commandant, Capt. Daniel Robertson, surveyed the post's provisions in December 1782 
and found that 1,112 pounds of flour, 506 pounds of oatmeal, and 200 gallons of peas 
were "unfit for human use." Also, 512 pounds of pork were spoiled, and while they were 
"unfit for the use ofHis Majesty's Troops," he thought they "may be apply'd to the use 
of Savages." Robertson also found that seven barrels of pork had been packed short.108 
Such problems were common sources of complaints throughout the Lakes, but they hurt 
most at remote outposts like Michilimackinac.109 · 
To add to the post's food troubles, fur trader George McBeath warned Robertson 
that the com crop had failed around Detroit. This forced the post to rely on Saginaw, "the 
greatest Com Post in this Country," where the Indians would certainly raise their prices 
to meet the increased demand.110 Robertson had already ordered a post buyer to go to 
L 'Arbre Croche to buy two thousand bags of com for the King's stores before the traders 
107
"Returns of Com," Sep. 24, 1781-Mar. 24, 1782, MPHC, 10:666; 11:325, 
331,339, 346, 352. 
108
"Surveys of Provisions," Dec. 28, 1782, MPHC, 11:332. 
109Heruy Hope to Haldimand, Oct. 19, 1782, MPHC, 10:656-59. 
110McBeath to Robertson, Dec. 29, 1782, MPHC, 11:333. 
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were allowed to purchase any and, subsequently, to inflate the price.111 After finalizing 
peace terms with the Americans, British policy turned to reducing the demand for food 
and presents at Michilimackinac by sending deputations to discourage Sioux and other 
groups of Western Indians from traveling to the posts. One such mission prevented one 
thousand Indians from traveling to the post, saving the cost of"two Bushels Com with 
some Grease, a little Bread & Pork ... with Rum and other Presents," for each man 
provisioned, according to Robertson.112 Such large-scale provisioning was simply no 
longer feasible at Michilimackinac. Game animal populations had decreased, corn 
availability had become more prone to failure through soil exhaustion, and demand was 
up with the peacetime expansion of the fur trade. If local Indians could not supply the 
post with needed provisions, and if they were not needed for protection, then they were 
more hindrance than help to British interests. As British-American negotiations wore on 
into the 1780s for the transferal of Great Lakes posts to the new United States, the slowly 
declining status of local Indian groups as food providers would stress the interdependent 
trade relationship at the Straits. 
Talk oflndian discontent pervaded the upper Great Lakes during the postwar 
period as the British garrison focused on the fur business, not knowing when treaty 
negotiations would force them to give up their new fort on Mackinac Island to the 
Americans. Indian agent Alexander McKee credited the rumblings to people "disaffected 
to us," meaning Canadians and American rebels. 113 But changing British policies 
restricting Indian presents and increased stress on the local food system helped fan the 
111Hope et al. to Robertson, Sep. 20, 1782, MPHC, 10:638-40. 
112Robertson to Robert Mathews, Aug. 9, 1783, WHC, 11: 173-7 4. 
113McKee to John Johnson, June 2, 1784, MPHC, 20:229. 
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flames of Indian animosities. Through 1784 Robertson kept the fort on alert amidst 
rumors that Ottawas would soon attack the post. Despite being poorly provisioned, he 
promised Haldimand ''they must give me a hearty Beating before they succeed."114 But 
this was mostly bravado on Robertson's part, and he later admitted that his small garrison 
was "by no means adequate to a Post in those Parts," especially with the fur trade in full 
swing and local traders with "not less than four Thousand Packs" of furs and goods on 
hand and ready to be stolen.115 
Robertson's frustrations must have reached a peak during a confrontation with a 
local Indian legend. Matchekewis, a respected local Ojibwa war chief who had 
I 
participated in and probably helped plan the 1763 assault on Fort Michilimackinac, had 
been a British ally ever since, and even had a house near the old mainland fort. In 
September 1784 he confronted Robertson, and "altho' sober," accused the British of 
being "all Lyers, Impostures, &c." for talking Matchekewis's people into fighting and 
dying during the American Revolution, only to "now despise them, and let them starve." 
Matchekewis suggested angrily, "The Indians ought to chasse [the British] and [their] 
connections out of the country," and promised to go to Quebec and make a more formal 
complaint.116 The Ojibwa chief, who claimed to have fought with Burgoyne at Saratoga 
and expected consideration for it, was clearly upset with Haldimand's limits on Indian 
gifts. But his berating of Robertson might have been inspired by a general degradation of 
local Indian-white relations, in which Indians held less control of the practical necessities 
of life in the region. 
114Robertson to Mathews, May 6, 1784, MPHC, 11:414. 
115Robertson to Haldimand, Aug. 5, 1784, MPHC, 11 :442. 
116Robertson to Mathews, Sep. 7, 1784, MPHC, 11:453. 
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A vivid depiction of changes in Ottawa lifeways by 1787 is suggested by an 
account of an Indian council held that year. John Dease, the Indian agent at Mackinac 
Island, answered an urgent request from Ottawa leaders for a council at L 'Arbre Croche. 
Since the end ofthe Seven Years' War, the Michilimackinac post had depended on the 
L 'Arbre Croche Ottawa band as important allies in both war and peace, and especially 
needed the thousands of bushels of com produced there annually. Unfortunately for the 
British, and even more so for the Ottawas, things had not gone well at L 'Arbre Croche 
since the end of the Revolution. Four years earlier the entire com crop failed, leaving 
both Indians and English scurrying to fmd a replacement for the lost bushels and 
depriving the Ottawas of seed com for the following year. With no com to be had at any 
price in the area, Robertson requested 400 bushels from Detroit to supply the Indians 
with seed, but it is unclear if he ever received them.117 Apparently the intervening years 
had provided little sustenance to L 'Arbre Croche. 
At the council on August 3, 1787, Kegeweskam, the L' Arbre Croche headman 
whom De Peyster later described as "the most subtile of all the chiefs," spoke with 
striking transparency about the conditions in his village, which he described as "no more 
than a Village of dead people."118 Kegeweskam mourned, "Our lands are exhausted, our 
hunts are ruined, no more Animals remain to call us out to the Woods, the only resource 
left to us is the cultivation of these sandy plains, and what we can procure from the 
water." Kegeweskam's speech was clearly an attempt to adjust perceived inequalities 
emerging in the Ottawa-British mutual economic relationship. Still, Kegeweskam's 
complaints contained an untypical note of desperation, though he upheld his reputation 
117Robertson to Mathews, Oct. 29, 1783, NOJHC, 11:395-96. 
118WHC, 18:389; NOJHC, 11:494. 
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for subtlety by reminding Dease that his village was "not lately the most peaceably 
inclined among the nations," and that it had taken some effort on his part to prevent his 
young men from participating in revenge wars in the West. Kegeweskam also 
complained that with all trade goods in the region confined to a single Indian general 
store at Michilimackinac, which was frequently closed and inadequately stocked when 
open, his people often returned from visits to the post empty-handed. Dease promised 
that the trade situation would change soon and he gave the Ottawas gifts to hold them 
over, but Kegeweskam's speech made clear the environmental pressures that were 
. ld . . b k d h . 119 causmg o amities to rea own at t e straits. 
By 1 790, British interest in Michilimackinac was clearly waning, despite their 
continued occupation ofthe Lake posts well after the conclusion of peace in 1783. 
Sinclair's grand plans for a mighty fort on Mackinac Island surrounded by a prosperous 
trading town and unlimited supplies of com had not materialized. The trade had 
prospered, but the unfinished fort was already falling into ruin. In 1790, British 
commander in chief Lord Dorchester was losing interest in the p()st, reporting that 
"Michilimackinac can keep out only Indians," unlike more substantial lake forts such as 
Niagara.120 He might have been worried about defense against Americans, and sent 
Gother Mann of the Royal Engineers to survey the post. Mann observed that the fort was 
overbuilt as a defense against Indians or small arms, but insufficient to defend against 
artillery. 121 The situation worsened three years later when Captain William Doyle, one of 
a long line of commandants in the 1790s, reported that heavy rains had made a "38-foot 
119MPHC, 11: 490-96 at 494. 
120Dorchester toW. W. Grenville, Mar. 8, 1790, MPHC, 12:22-23. 
121
"Report on the State ofFort Lemoult, Michilimackinac, &c.," Mar. 3, 1790, 
MPHC, 12:30-37. 
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breach in the wall" and the barracks were in "a ruinous state."122 With Indians busy 
fighting Americans farther south in the mid-1790s, and Americans eager to take control 
of the Great Lakes posts, British authorities began to look for other places to administer 
their operations in the upper lakes. 
Conditions were certainly unpleasant for residents of the island fort during the last 
British year at Michilimackinac. Keeper of the Indian store Thomas Duggan did not even 
have a house to live in for the entire year, and was unsuccessful in arguing with his 
superiors in the Indian Department for a bigger allotment of firewood and a rum 
allowance; in fact, he was living mostly on whitefish.123 After the Treaty of Greenville in 
1795, the first major land cession by Indians to the new American government in the Old 
Northwest, the British Indian Department worried that natives were being drawn to 
Detroit from all over by offers from "land jobbers" who had been buying up Indian lands; 
according to assistant Indian superintendent Joseph Chew, "some Millions of acres have 
been sold to them for little more than a Keg of Rum. "124 
Indians near the Mackinac Straits had lost some of their old grip on the food 
supply, but still engaged in provisioning. Ottawas and Ojibwas brought in com and sugar 
for the use of the garrison and their contributions were noted in official certificates signed 
by the post commandant. For example, on May 26, 1796, the Ottawas of L 'Arbre Croche 
supplied forty mococks125 of maple sugar. Other local Indians made similar contributions 
of sugar and com, all officially noted in post certificates, but whether these were food 
122Doyle toR. J. England, May 16, 1793, MPHC, 12:48-49. 
123Duggan to Prideaux Selby, Jan. 10, 1796, MPHC, 12:192-93. 
124Selby to Chew, Apr. 19, 1796, MPHC, 12:200-01. 
125Birch bags holding up to fifty pounds each. 
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sales or gifts is unclear.126 Only small issues of provisions left the post. Between January 
25 and May 24 only thirty-one bags of com were issued as presents out ofthe Indian 
store. 127 British authorities planned to build a new post on St. Joseph Island, a remote but 
strategic location at the mouth of the St. Mary's River, and any Indians who wished to 
retain their old allegiance with the crown were encouraged to move there. With the 
removal of the British garrison on September 1, 1 796, Indians who chose to stay at 
Michilimackinac prepared for the changes and challenges of life under the American 
regime. 
During the American era, Ottawas and Ojibwas in the northern Great Lakes 
continued to operate in an economy that was familiar to them, but without as much 
influence. Through their roles as trading partners and consumers in the fur trade and as 
warriors in the various European disputes that occasionally roiled British North America, 
Great Lakes Indians had managed to maintain power and influence in the cultural and 
political contests of the eighteenth century. But their importance as suppliers of food and 
provisions is often overlooked. Throughout the British period of occupation at the Straits 
of Mackinac and during the French regime that preceded it, Europeans in the backwoods 
depended on local Indians who taught them centuries-old methods of growing, catching, 
and killing food, and regularly provided it to the newcomers for a price. In return, Indians 
received trade goods and alcohol, which had become valued necessities of life. The 
relationship between the British garrisons, Canadian and British traders, and native men 
and women at the forts ofMichilimackinac was one of interdependence, but Indians' 
126
"Certification of Indian Supplies of Sugar," Mar. 26-June 14, 1796, MP HC, 12: 
208, 215-16,240. 
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"Com and Sugar Issued as Indian Presents," July 12, 1796, MPHC, 12:207. 
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roles as food providers decreased when enough settlers and ships could ply the Lakes and 
supply provisions. When fanners and loggers arrived to strip away Lower Michigan's 
forests and plow the land, Indians who had spent generations as masters of the local food 
chain saw their economic importance and cultural influence increasingly challenged 
amidst the realities of nineteenth-century America. 
In 1835 Father Francis Pierz, a Leopoldine missionary, began his work among the 
Michigan Indians. His assignment was the new L 'Arbre Croche mission, built at Harbor 
Springs about twenty miles from Cross Village, the site of the old Ottawa village of 
L 'Arbre Croche. In 184 7 Pierz described the Ottawas of Cross Village and his mission: 
There are among them good carpenters, joiners and coopers - they build neat and 
substantial houses. They are assiduous in cultivating their farms, which they 
bought from the government and sell much fruit and vegetables. The women are 
also very industrious and have great proficiency in household economy, making 
all the clothes for their families, and mats, baskets and other fancy work with 
porcupine quills, which display great taste and skill. In fine, I can truly assert, of 
the Indians of these missions, that they make such progress in their schools and in 
civilization as fully to satisfy their superiors; that they have gained the esteem of 
the whites, and deserve all the favor of our government.128 
Father Pierz missed the point. The Ottawas ofL' Arbre Croche never went away 
and never lost their abilities to produce food and crafts. Their society remained as 
dynamic as it had ever been, as was true of native peoples throughout the upper Great 
Lakes well into the nineteenth century and beyond. They are still there today, as any 
casual visitor to modern-day Cross Village can attest. Descriptions such as Pierz's belie 
the ongoing influence that Mackinac area natives held in the region; indeed, his list of 
Ottawa attributes unintentionally shows how much continuity of tradition they had 
maintained. But such paternalism was just part ofthe price that the old provisioners of 
128Mary Belle Shurtleff. Old Arbre Croche (n.p., 1945), 25. 
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Fort Michilimackinac paid for their lives in the new republic. Left to themselves in the 
rugged environment and economy of northern Michigan and unwilling to leave their 
homeland, the L 'Arbre Croche Ottawas used their valuable skills to adapt to changing 
circumstances and assimilate themselves into American society. Subsequent generations 
of whites measured them not by their long tradition of agricultural effectiveness or their 
skillful adaptations, but by the apparent success of their assimilation to Euro-American 
ways. In a supreme and unfair irony, L' Arbre Croche's twentieth-century ethnographer 




Seneca-British Coexistence Strategies, 1763-1764 
In early September 1763 the garrison ofFort Niagara felt lucky. They had been 
spared the fates of Fort Michilimackinac and many smaller western forts, which had been 
taken or destroyed in the Indian rebellion that would soon be named after the Ottawa 
leader Pontiac. Niagara lay within the nominal territory of the Seneca Nation, and some 
of them had become disaffected with the British regime. Some of the western group of 
Senecas from the Genesee River area had joined in the rebellion, and may have played a 
role in fomenting the uprising in the first place. They had long been friendlier to the old 
French regime in Canada than most of their English-allied Iroquois kin, and they saw the 
Indian war as a way to assert their primacy in the affairs of the region. However, except 
for a few small skirmishes, the belligerent Genesees had not yet exposed the Niagara 
corridor to the kind of violence that had roiled through the Great Lakes region earlier that 
summer. 
This was vital to British hopes because Niagara was the main supply point for all 
the western posts, and any chance of relieving besieged Fort Detroit and quelling the 
rebellion would begin there. In the meantime British authorities continued to parley with 
western Indian groups, and to that end the sloop Michigan had sailed into Lake Erie on 
August 26 carrying provisions for Fort Detroit and an Iroquois delegation to meet with 
Pontiac's besieging Indians. The small delegation included a Mohawk friend of Sir 
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William Johnson, and their mission was a routine peace negotiation. But soon after the 
ship entered Lake Erie it was cast ashore, and an effort to reclaim its wreckage from the 
lakefront started a chain of events that brought the full force of the Indian uprising to the 
Niagara Strait. 
Niagara's role in the Indian uprising of 1763 has often been afforded less 
prominence in studies of the rebellion than more familiar events at Detroit, 
Michilimackinac, and Pittsburgh. 1 Pontiac and his Ottawa, Chippewa, and Shawnee allies 
have usually garnered more attention than the western Seneca group, despite the Genesee 
Senecas' roles as early instigators and supporters of the rebellion and their success in 
overthrowing Forts Venango, LeBoeuf, and Presque Isle. The Seneca attack at Devil's 
Hole on the Niagara portage is usually noted as an important British defeat, but not as 
prominent as other events such as the Battle of Bushy Run near Fort Pitt or the ambush of 
Dalyell's men near Detroit. Johnson's Indian peace conference in 1764 is usually 
depicted as a foregone British diplomatic success because it resulted in the supposedly 
1Studies ofthe uprising typically devote only a few pages to events in New York, 
preferring instead to concentrate on the western center of the rebellion. See Francis 
Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada 
(Lincoln, NE: University ofNebraska Press, 1994); Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and 
the Indian Uprising (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994); William R. Nester, 
"Haughty Conquerors": Amherst and the Great Indian Uprising of 1763 (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2000); Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations 
and the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); David Dixon, 
Never Come To Peace Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in 
North America (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005). 
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desperate Senecas ceding control of the Niagara corridor.2 From the British point of view 
and with the benefit of hindsight, these interpretations seem appropriate. However, 
studying these events from the Seneca perspective complicates the picture. Their attack at 
Devil's Hole made perfect sense given the portage's strategic importance and the ever-
increasing British presence at the vital Niagara strait. Their capitulation and cession of 
the strip to the British in 1764 continued a diplomatic strategy employed by the Iroquois 
twice before in the eighteenth century, and the Genesee Senecas had no reason to think 
that the cession would mean their eventual exclusion from managing Niagara's affairs. 
From the summer of 1763 to the summer of 1764, Senecas near Niagara used the best 
methods available to them, both violent and diplomatic, to maintain as much of their land 
and culture as possible in the face of British economic and military expansion. 
For centuries Indian groups traveled through the Niagara straits, following a well-
defined portage route around Niagara Falls. Archaeologists studying the Lower Landing 
site near present-day Lewiston, New York have found evidence of use from the 
2In their lengthy studies of the uprising, Nester, Dowd and Dixon devote only a 
paragraph each to the Niagara peace conference. Nester is especially complimentary of 
Johnson's diplomatic efforts in forcing Seneca submission. He asserts unconvincingly 
that in gaining the Iroquois' cooperation in fighting rebel Indians ''the Iroquois had little 
choice but to accept Johnson's demands. The Six Nations were now surrounded by Union 
Jacks floating above frontier forts." According to Nester, the Senecas "begged for mercy" 
at Johnson Hall in March 1764, and at the Niagara conference in August Johnson "was 
generous with British friends and tough toward foes," which glosses over the 
overabundance of "friends" and virtual absence of any "foes" there, except for the 
Senecas and a small band ofHurons. Haughty Conquerors, 191, 193,208. Dixon gives 
only a brief paragraph about the submission of the "meek" Senecas at Niagara. Never 
Come To Peace Again, 228. 
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prehistoric period through the French and British occupations of the region.3 The Portage 
Site, located at the top of the Niagara escarpment where the portage path begins the steep 
decline to the Lower Landing, produced artifacts revealing portaging at the site as early 
as 1000 C. E. and continuing into the historical period.4 Heavy Indian use of the Niagara 
River and the portage around Niagara Falls is not surprising, considering the passage's 
strategic and practical importance. As French authorities realized by the 1670s, the 
portage around the falls was the only land carriage in a continuous waterway stretching 
between Lake Ontario and the Gulf of Mexico, arid therefore represented an important 
key to the western fur trade. 5 
Early French visitors to the region reported Senecas present near the Niagara 
River throughout the late seventeenth century, following their expansion into the area in 
the 1650s. 6 In 1678 Jesuit missionary Louis Hennepin described a "very fine road" 
3Stuart D. Scott, An Archaeological Survey of Artpark and the Lower Landing, 
Lewiston, New York (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 7-17. Archaeological 
work carried out at the Lower Landing Site, or Joncaire Site, was a salvage operation 
conducted by amateur archaeologists, and while they preserved many telling artifacts, 
many more were deemed unimportant and discarded. The surviving material definitely 
shows long-term Indian occupation and use of the site, but more specific information that 
may have been available through analysis of artifact placement is not available. Though 
many of the same team later excavated the Portage Site at the top of the cliff, more 
careful methods and analysis produced richer results. 
4 Marian E. White, "Late Woodland Archaeology in the Niagara Frontier ofNew 
York and Ontario," in The Late Prehistory of the Lake Erie Drainage Basin: A 1972 
Symposium Revised, ed. David S. Brose (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Museum ofNatural 
History, 1976), 115-16. 
5Frontenac to Colbert, Nov. 14, 1674, NYCD, 9:116-21. 
6 Marian E. White, Iroquois Culture History in the Niagara Frontier Area of New 
York State (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1961 ), 50. 
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already existing on both sides of the river.7 But Indians used the straits as a highway and 
a place for hunting and fishing, and without permanent native settlements the area 
became irresistible to French expansionists. In a 1676 memoir, French merchant Charles 
Aubert de Ia Chesnaye did not mention Indians or permanent settlements, and he hoped 
that the important passage might be secured by settling French families along the route.8 
By the 1670s it must have become clear to Indians in the Niagara region that the strait 
interested Europeans, and that the well-traveled portage routes around the falls would 
become zones of friction and negotiation between natives and newcomers. 
Instead of French settlers, the Senecas would soon receive much more troubling 
visitors when over two thousand troops under the command of the Marquis de Denonville 
invaded the Niagara region in 1687. Denonville's invasion was short-lived, but he built a 
small fort at the outlet of the Niagara River, believing that the outpost would keep the 
Senecas "in check and in fear" if properly garrisoned. Denonville hoped his fort, along 
with Fort Cataraqui (later called Fort Frontenac) at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, 
would help establish French dominance over the lake and its trade.9 Denonville knew that 
the Senecas would not approve his attempt to seize control of the Niagara passage, and 
this expectation was soon realized. The Five Nations had already met the year before 
with New York's governor Thomas Dongan and agreed to tear down any forts the French 
might build south of Lake Ontario, and Dongan agreed to help the Iroquois against 
7Frank H. Severance, Studies of the Niagara Frontier (Buffalo, NY: Buffalo 
Historical Society, 1911), 315. Hennepin's account ofthe region contains fanciful 
descriptions of the falls that greatly overstate their height, so some skepticism is in order. 
Still, his description of the portage trails seems reasonable, though one might question the 
"fineness" ofthe roads. 
8Frank H. Severance, An Old Frontier of France: The Niagara Region and 
Adjacent Lakes under French Control (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1917), 1:35. 
9Denonville to Seignelay, May 8, 1686, NYCD, 9:287-92. 
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French threats.10 Dongan gave no credence to the French general's argument that the area 
was claimed for France because Robert de Ia Salle had built a small house at the fort's 
location in 1676, and he demanded that Denonville abandon the fort and remove the four-
hundred-man garrison there.11 Denonville relented in 1688, citing "the bad air, and the 
difficulty of revictualling that post" and noted that he had always meant the fort as a 
place of refuge for threatened Indians, though none had used it for that purpose.12 But 
Denonville's abandonment ofNiagara represented only a temporary pause in French 
plans to fortify the strait, and violence between the Iroquois and French-allied Indians in 
Canada continued through the following decade. 
By the end ofthe seventeenth century, warfare and disease had depleted Iroquois 
ranks and they began looking for a way out of constant war. In 1700 Iroquois groups sent 
delegations to both Montreal and Albany to conduct peace negotiations that would 
establish the Five Nations as neutral middlemen in the economic and political struggles 
between the New France and New Y ork. 13 Indian leaders knew that the French retained 
their designs to fortify the Niagara Strait and had already begun establishing a post at 
Detroit, in what most Iroquois considered part of their conquered territory. To counter 
French expansion, twenty Iroquois headmen granted the king of England a deed to their 
1
'1.awrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records (Gettysburg, P A: 
Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1956), 101. 
ll"Estab1ishment of the French at Niagara," NYCD, 9:335-36; "Examination of 
Adandidaghko," NYCD, 9:435; Dongan to Palmer, NYCD, 9:476; "Dongan's First 
Demand ofFrench Agents," NYCD, 9:520-21. 
12
"Joumal ofDenonville and Champigny," NYCD, 9:393-98. 
13Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 206-13; J. A. Brandao and William A. Starna, 
''The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy," Ethnohistory 43:2 (Spring 
1996): 209-44. Richter argues that desperation led the Iroquois to seek neutrality, while 
Brandao and Starna insist that the 1701 treaties were advantageous to all parties concerned 
and represented a diplomatic victory for the Iroquois. 
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beaver hunting grounds, which encompassed most of Michigan and Upper Canada 
between Lakes Michigan and Erie. The land cession included "the great falls 
Oakinagaro," or Niagara, and gave the British "power to erect Forts and castles" in any 
part of the ceded territory. In return, the British were required to protect Iroquois rights to 
hunt in the region forever, "free of all disturbances expecting to be protected therein by 
the Crown ofEngland."14 
Of course, this "deed" was not a genuine land cession in either a legal or practical 
sense. Western Indians, many ofthem allied to the French, dominated the ceded 
territories, and the French did not recognize the deed at all. Any British forts built in the 
ceded territory would certainly cause conflict between the two European superpowers 
with or without Iroquois permission. The 1701 deed, which was quickly forgotten in 
French-Anglo diplomacy, shows that the Iroquois desired and needed their British allies' 
protection, which they hoped would give them some leverage to use in their dealings with 
Montreal and Paris.15 As for the Niagara Strait, the Iroquois never intended to transfer 
actual ownership ofthe vital passage to Europeans either in or after 1701. 
Over the next twenty years, hundreds of French traders, settlers, and soldiers 
traveled over the Niagara portage, and paid Indian carriers helped move the baggage. 
Exactly when Senecas and other native groups began to work for wages on the portage is 
unknown. In 1707 Senecas had established a fortified post on the river, encouraged by 
Chabert de Joncaire the Elder, a French interpreter and adopted Seneca whose family 
would later establish a permanent trading post at the Lower Landing. By 1715 Senecas 
14
"Deed from the Five Nations to the King of their Beaver Hunting Ground," 
NYCD, 4:908-11. 
15Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 212. 
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definitely worked with Joncaire as porters on the passage, and may have done so much 
earlier.16 A memoir by an unknown writer includes a description: "Above the first hi1117 
there is a Seneca village of about ten cabins, where Indian com, beans, peas, water-
melons, and pumpkins are raised, all of which are very fine. These Senecas are employed 
by the French, from whom they earn money by carrying the goods of those who are going 
to the Upper Country." Seneca porters used their pay to buy "mitasses" (leggings), shirts, 
and ammunition. Some would "pilfer" to augment their pay. When the French traders 
returned from trapping, the Senecas would accept peltry in lieu of currency for carrying 
the huge packs of furs around the falls. 18 
Not all Indians present at the portage were workers. Indian wage laborers were 
also consumers, and at Niagara they had access to French goods not available in most 
parts oflroquoia, including liquor. French officials reasonably expected that native 
supervisors would keep laborers out oftrouble. In 1744 New France's governor-general 
Charles de Beauhamois reported that the Senecas kept a chief and others at the Niagara 
portage "to settle any differences that liquor might occasion among the Indians in the 
work that they had to do at the Carrying Place."19 Permanent Indian wage labor at 
Niagara demonstrates the extent to which Iroquois groups had become dependent on 
European trade goods and business, but it also shows how Indians living near Europeans 
16Severance, An Old Frontier of France, 1: 163; NYCD, 9:805-08. 
17The writer mentions four hills, counting the steep cliff above the Lower Landing 
as the first. Later observers mention only three large hills on the portage. 
18
"Memoir on the Indians Between Lake Erie and the Mississippi, 1718," NYCD, 
9:885. This Seneca village is mentioned again in a 1736 census oflndians in Canada. 
"Enumeration of the Indian Tribes Connected With the Government of Canada, 1736" 
NYCD, 9:1057. 
19Beauhamois to Maurapas, Nov. 7, 1744, NYCD, 9:1111-12. 
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found ways to coexist with the newcomers while retaining as much of their traditional 
cultures as possible?0 
Indian wage labor at the Niagara portage was only one example of larger 
economic changes occurring throughout Iroquoia. As early as 1704 a similar arrangement 
had sprung up at the Oneida portage, south of Lake Oneida and the only land carriage 
between Albany and Lake Ontario?1 In 1709 a report by Albany aldermen during Queen 
Anne's War noted that one significant expense of a proposed campaign against Canada 
would be the "200 Indians kept in Pay for Skouts & to hunt at ye Carrying Place" during 
the winter.22 Naturalist John Bartram described a small permanent settlement at the 
Oneida portage in 1743, with a population of"very nice" Onondagas who subsisted by 
"catching fish and assisting the Albany people to bawl their Bateaus and carry their 
goods around the falls. "23 
Despite Bartram's rosy depiction of the Oneida portage village, there were limits 
to the amount of"niceness" that British traders might expect on the road to Oswego. 
During a 1740 council in Albany, Onondaga sachems agreed to help keep the passage 
from Albany to Oswego open and safe, especially at the Oneida Carrying Place where 
traders were "generally in want of assistance" and the Indians promised to "help them 
there in carrying their smaller goods, but the large casks and Bales they may have rid 
over." The sachems knew the value of a constant Indian presence at the Oneida portage, 
and they remained skeptical about paternalistic British claims that posts and open trade 
20Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 262. 
21Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 214. 
22Ibid., 214. 
23John Bartram, Lewis Evans, and Conrad Weiser, A Journey from Pennsylvania 
to Onondaga in 1743 (Barre, MA: Imprint Society, 1973), 64-65. 
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routes worked mostly to the Indians' advantage. "We think Brother," one Onondaga 
representative told an Albany official, "That your people who trade there (Oswego) have 
the most advantage by it, and.that it is as good for them as a Silver mine."24 Iroquois 
groups understood their roles as players in the new European economic system, and 
realized that work in the fur trade offered them diplomatic and political opportunities as 
well as economic benefits. 
While Senecas and other Indians began migrating to portage locations to find 
wage labor in the early eighteenth century, France and England worked to position their 
trading posts for their best advantage in the increasingly important fur trade. French posts 
erected at Detroit (1701) and Michilimackinac (1715) helped capture a good deal of the 
Great Lakes business, but Canadian authorities never gave up on the idea of a post at the 
Niagara River to grab the Upper Canada trade before it could move into Lake Ontario 
and on to Albany.25 By 1720 Joncaire's diplomatic efforts among the Indians paid off 
when some of the Western Senecas allowed him to establish a small trading house at the 
Lower Landing site, about eight miles below the falls.26 Since 1701 the Iroquois had tried 
to establish themselves as neutral middlemen in the trade between western Great Lakes 
Indians and Albany traders, and barring French and British forts on Lake Ontario was 
24
"Conference Between Lieutenant-Governor Clarke and the Six Nations," NYCD, 
6:172-79. 
25
"Proposal to Take Possession ofNiagara in Canada, 1706," NYCD, 9:773-75. 
26 Journal of Schuyler and Livingston," NYCD, 5:542-45; "Journal of Lawrence 
Clawsen's Visit to Niagara," NYCD, 5:550-51; Robert Livingston to Peter Schuyler, Aug. 
23, 1723, NYCD, 5:559-60. 
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essential in keeping the trade passing through Iroquoia.27 Joncaire's new post represented 
a step backward in the Iroquois plan, and a British post built at Irondequoit in 1721 
eroded their policy further. 
The Senecas' position became even worse in 1726 when Joncaire went behind 
their backs, appealed to a group of Onondagas eager to prevent war between France and 
England, and received permission to build a trading house at the site ofDenonville's old 
fort. This fortified "house of peace," so called because the Iroquois League would brook 
no new "forts" in their territory, formed the center of French and British occupation of 
the Niagara River for the next seventy years. With Joncaire's trading house at the portage 
and the new fort at the outlet of the Niagara, the French now exercised considerable 
control over trade passing in and out of Lake Ontario. Albany traders would have to offer 
substantially better prices to induce Indians to make the overland trek through New 
York.28 
With this new French incursion at Niagara, Senecas and other Iroquois groups 
moved to minimize the damage. At an Albany council in September 1726, New York's 
governor William Burnet suggested to a small delegation of Onondaga, Cayuga, and 
Seneca sachems that they might reinforce the deed negotiated in 170 I, which had been 
largely forgotten in the interim. This suited the Iroquois representatives, who still hoped 
"His Majesty would be pleased to defend them from the Incroachments of the French."29 
27Cadwallader Colden, "Colden's Account of the Conference Between Governor 
Burnet and the Five Nations, 1721" in Collections ofthe New York Historical Society 
(New York: The Society, 1868-1975), 50:128-34; Burnet to Lords of Trade, June 25, 
1723, NYCD, 5:684-85. 
28For an overview ofthe French and British fort controversies of the 1720s, see 
Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 246-54. 
29
"A Conference Held at Albany," NYCD, 5:799. 
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This new deed of "Surrender and Submission," signed by seven Iroquois sachems from 
three nations, gave the English king mastery "all along the river ofOniagam." But as in 
the earlier deed, the British role would be that of protectors rather than landlords, 
defending the ceded territory for the Indians' perpetual use.30 
This new deed would have no greater impact than the 1701 cession on diplomatic 
efforts between Indians and Europeans. The French completed their fortified post at 
Niagara, and Albany went ahead with a new post at Oswego in 1727 to counter the 
French expansion and grab some ofthe Lake Ontario commerce. Furthermore, most 
Iroquois groups rejected the authority of the small negotiating team to deal away 
sovereignty over so much of their hunting land?1 But the deed exemplified the 
willingness of some Iroquois to play European diplomatic games for their own benefit. 
Indians could still use the lands as they always had, and their ability to do this would be 
protected by their increasingly powerful British allies. Transference oftitle was 
something that Indians understood to be important to the Europeans, and British 
negotiators might be able to use it to defend the territories against further French 
incursions. In ceding these lands the Iroquois representatives gave away nothing, and 
expected the protection they would need to negotiate their way through the complex 
economic and political problems of the eighteenth century. 
Even with Fort Niagara guarding the lower end of the stmit and a new fort, Little 
Niagam, commanding the portage's landing above the falls after 1751, France required 
the consent and coopemtion of the Iroquois League to maintain its control over a 
30
"Deed in Trust from Three of the Five Nations oflndians to the King," NYCD, 
5:800-01. 
31Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 252-53. 
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substantial part of the Lake Ontario trade. This was especially true regarding the western 
group of Senecas, who maintained their principal settlement on the Genesee River about 
sixty miles from Niagara. To keep the Genesee Senecas happy, French authorities at 
Niagara kept Seneca carriers employed on the waterfall portage and other land carriages 
in the region. By 1750 this had become quite an operation. Swedish traveler Peter Kalm 
reported seeing "above 200 Indians, most of them belonging to the Six Nations, busy in 
carrying packs of furs, chiefly of deer and bear, over the carrying-place" and noted that 
these Indians would receive 20 pence for each pack carried around the falls.32 
In 1757 French officer Louis-Antoine de Bougainville confirmed the size and 
importance oflndian involvement on portages at Niagara and Presque Isle, near modem-
day Erie, Pennsylvania, and encouraged greater use of native carriers. He reported that 
wagons were almost never usable on the portage roads anytime but summer, and that 
only Indians and packhorses could travel over the muddy trails. Furthermore, 
Bougainville asserted that French policy, "especially in time ofwar," demanded Indian 
employment on the portages. Indian porters would "hinder the tribes that might be badly 
intentioned" from attacking and help keep valuable trade and military goods moving. 
Bougainville noted that Indians at Presque Isle earned six francs per sack carried, twice 
the rate paid to French porters, but the Indians' superior abilities were worth the added 
expense. At Niagara, where 250 to 300 trips traversed the portage each year, Bougainville 
thought that Indian porters were even more important.33 
32Severance, Studies of the Niagara Frontier, 326. 
33Bougainville, Louis-Antoine, "Memoir ofBougainville" WHC, 18:314-354, at 
328-29. 
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Decades of commerce passing through the Niagara region brought French traders, 
soldiers, and missionaries into frequent contact and commerce with Indians using the 
passage and living nearby. The relationship was not always easy. Small French garrisons 
at Fort Niagara lived in frequent fear of rumored Indian assaults on the fort and its 
personnel.34 Genesee Senecas had never enjoyed having a French fort in their country, 
but those living near Niagara learned to make the best of the situation. Their main 
complaint with the French conduct ofthe portage was when increased use ofhorses and 
wagons threatened the carriers' wages. Onondaga chiefChinoniata complained for the 
Iroquois League about this threat to Indian livelihoods in a 1756 congress with New 
France's governor-general, the Marquis de Vaudreuil. "Formerly when we were coming 
from war we had the Niagara portage; twas promised us that we would always possess 
it," Chinoniata reminded Vaudreuil. But lately horses had been hauling more goods, and 
the Onondaga chief asked the French governor to preserve the carrying concession on the 
portage for Indian workers.35 Iroquois leaders may have been nervous about the expanded 
French military presence at Niagara since the outbreak of war in 1754. The fort's garrison 
increased from about thirty soldiers and officers in 1754 to a defensive force of over six 
hundred in 1756. The fort itselfwas badly in need of repair by then, and was renovated in 
1756 to include expanded earthen breastworks and several new buildings. Throughout 
this period, western Indians continued to throng to the fort, as many as 2,000 at a time 
34Severance, An Old Frontier of France, 1:292, 322-23, 355. 
35
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during the summer seasons. On the eve of British occupation, Fort Niagara and the 
Niagara portage had become major centers of cultural confluence. 
On July 6, 1759, the Niagara Senecas' lives changed. A few miles from Fort 
Niagara a British force of 1,500 Regulars and 1,000 Indians from all six Iroquois nations, 
including Genesee Senecas, landed on the Lake Ontario shore to begin the siege and 
eventual reduction ofthe fort. Within the fort 500 French troops and about 100 Indians, 
many of them local residents, lay in wait. The presence of so many hitherto neutral 
Iroquois warriors allied with the British created a dilemma for the Niagara Senecas. 
Working at the portage had helped them maintain friendly relations with the fort's 
garrison and its commander, Captain Pierre Pouchot, but this new military alliance 
between the British and the rest of the Six Nations Confederacy placed Niagara Senecas 
in the middle of a conflict between their French friends and their own Iroquois 
countrymen. Local Seneca leader Kaendae decided to try diplomacy to maneuver out of 
the dilemma, but his efforts over three days produced little to his people's advantage 
except a general Iroquois withdrawal from the siege, a dubious achievement since siege 
work was largely the domain of engineers and artillerymen. Kaendae had little choice but 
to turn to Pouchot and to negotiate an exit from the fort for his people?6 On July 26, after 
defeating a relief force of 1,500 French soldiers and Ohio-based Indians just south of the 
36M. (Pierre) Pouchot, Memoir Upon the Late War in North America Between the 
French and the English, 1755-60, ed. and trans. Franklin B. Hough (Roxbury, MA: W. 
Elliot Woodward, 1866), 1: 171-78. 
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fort at La Belle Famille, Sir William Johnson accepted Pouchot's surrender.37 Fort 
Niagara and the portage passed into British control, and local Indians would have to find 
ways to continue their European-Indian coexistence under a new regime. 
After the reduction of Fort Niagara, Indian superintendent Johnson was left with a 
problem concerning the local Senecas. Though their first allegiance was clearly with 
Pouchot and his garrison, they had remained neutral during the siege, and they could not 
be removed from their homes near the portage when they had not joined the French in 
anns against British forces. On August 2 Johnson told Hugh Farquhar, Fort Niagara's 
new commander, that local Senecas would be friendly "at least in appearance." Johnson 
advised Farquhar to "receive them with civility; give them provisions, and assure them 
that traders will soon arrive to buy their skins more to their advantage than ever the 
French did." But Johnson also ordered Farquhar not to admit more than twenty of the 
Senecas into the fort at a time, even if they arrived in large groups. 38 
Johnson meant also to speak with Genesee Senecas who had taken part in the 
siege, but they had speedily returned home after Fort Niagara's fall. To the other allied 
Iroquois nations Johnson sent three strings of wampum, along with his thanks for "the 
good salve" they had provided for his ''wounds," by which he meant his troubles in 
reducing Fort Niagara. To the Genesee Senecas he sent only one string, a rebuke for their 
37Johnson commanded the besieging army after the death of Brig. Gen. John 
Prideaux. The full story of the Fort Niagara siege from the French perspective is in 
Pouchot, Memoir, 1:165-206. Johnson's more utilitarian account ofthe siege is in "The 
Prideaux and Johnson Orderly Book," WJP, 3:48-105. See also Lawrence Henry Gipson, 
The Great War for the Empire: The Victorious Years, 1758-1760 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1949), 348-55, and Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and 
the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
. 2000), 331-39. 
38
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disrespect.39 On September 25 Johnson made his point clearer. He sent the Seneca Nation 
a black string and warned them to ensure the safety ofthe Niagara garrison, lest 
commander-in-chief Jeffrey Amherst "be obliged to take proper measures" to punish 
them. The initial returns of his diplomacy were not encouraging. Several Iroquois chiefs 
agreed to watch over Niagara but made no guarantees for the garrison's safety. They then 
made it clear they expected more smiths, traders, and goods at posts in their countries. 
The Iroquois League would help keep the Genesee Senecas in line, but not for free.40 
During the first year of British occupation the garrison of Fort Niagara helped 
prepare the portage for resumption of trade and, of more immediate importance, military 
traffic. In 1760 Amherst was preparing his attack on Montreal, and plans for rebuilding 
Fort Presque Isle on Lake Erie, which had been destroyed during the war, required a giant 
influx oftraffic rolling through the portage.41 Years ofwar and the siege had caused 
much damage at the strait. Fort Niagara required extensive rebuilding, Joncaire's trading 
post had been abandoned, and Fort Little Niagara had been burned down by a group of 
Indians from Johnson's detachment soon after the end of the siege.42 By the end of 1760 
Fort Niagara's garrison had restored Little Niagara and improved the portage road 
enough to allow wagons, oxen, and carts to transport goods that had been carried 
previously by Indian porters. Whether local Senecas approved or disapproved of this 
increased use of wagons and draft animals is unknown. Neither Johnson nor Amherst 
mentioned any controversy involving lost portage jobs. It is also possible that with the 
39
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increased militarization ofthe Niagara straits after 1756, carts and draft animals may 
have begun replacing Indians even during the French regime. But Genesee Senecas still 
recognized the Niagara region as part of their country and hunting grounds, with or 
without Indians working at the portage.43 
Jeffrey Amherst felt that the best way to secure the portage would be to populate 
the area with British traders and families, which would ensure friendly control ofthe 
portage and reduce the presence oflndians in the region. In May 1761 he licensed a 
group of former army officers to monopolize trade at Fort Little Niagara and to operate 
on the portage. The traders began building a settlement and raising com, which Johnson 
feared would confirm the Genesee Senecas's long-held suspicion that the British planned 
"rooting them out oftheir Countcy."44 Johnson warned Amherst that these settlements 
would violate the 1726 agreement with the Iroquois, which restricted European 
settlement and reserved the Niagara portage area for the crown.45 The commander-in-
chief refused to remove the traders, despite Johnson's urgent pleas that the settlement 
would upset the Senecas. "It was never my design to take an inch from them," Amherst 
insisted, and he assured Johnson that the settlements were military necessities and not 
46 permanent. 
Unhappy Senecas was not the only problem caused by Amherst's trading grant. 
Albany merchants based at Fort Niagara began to complain about the Little Niagara 
43During the two years following the British takeover ofNiagara, portaging was 
the domain ofthe army, and they used many methods to carry goods along the portage 
road, including horses, soldiers, and finally oxen. For a description of portaging during 
the early British tenure at Niagara, see McConnell, Army and Empire, 16-17. 
44Johnson to Daniel Claus, May 20, 1761, WJP, 10:270. 
45Johnson to Amherst, July 29, 1761, WJP, 10:322. 
46Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 9, 1761, WJP, 3:515. 
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monopoly and requested the right to trade above the falls as well.47 Amherst assured the 
Albany men that they were free to trade at Little Niagara as long they followed 
regulations.48 But the complaints did not stop, and by the middle of 1762 he realized that 
his settlement plan would not work. In October Amherst withdrew his original permit for 
the Little Niagara consortium, though he still thought that "peopling of the Tracts of 
Land, situated near our Forts and particularly such a spot as the Carrying Place of 
Niagara" was the best way to secure the area for British use.49 Almost everyone else in 
the region disagreed. With news oflndian unrest in the West, Amherst's attempt to settle 
the portage could not have come at a worse time. 
When news of the Niagara settlement controversy first reached Johnson, he was 
involved in planning a major conference with western Indians at Detroit and did not need 
any additional irritation. On his way to Detroit he stopped at Fort Niagara on July 24, 
1761 and learned that Genesee Senecas disapproved ofBritish efforts to garrison former 
French posts in the West. They saw Johnson's Detroit conference as an attempt to "hem 
them in" and deprive them of their lands and livelihoods. 50 Two Genesee agents had 
already traveled to Detroit to build enthusiasm for a general uprising against the British, 
and Senecas had been stealing horses near Fort Pitt. Johnson needed to discover the depth 
of their disaffection and had summoned a Genesee delegation to meet him at Fort 
Niagara. 51 On August 4 Seneca chiefSonoj6ana arrived at Niagara with bad news for 
47
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Johnson. The full Seneca delegation had turned back to Genesee because one of the 
members had become ill, but they still wanted Johnson to give his messages to the few 
Senecas in attendance. This disappointed Johnson, and he was further dismayed when the 
Senecas denied sending agents to Detroit and blamed the stolen horses on their 
"impudent young men." Johnson rejected what he characterized as their "Feigned 
Declarations of ignorance" and suggested that the Genesee Senecas should send chiefs to 
Detroit, where they might deny fomenting rebellion before all the assembled western 
nations. 52 Iroquois representatives accompanying Johnson were clearly nervous about the 
purported Seneca schemes. Mohawk sachem Nickas warned the Genesees that unless 
they gave up "Thieving, Drunkenness & Quarrels" and found a way to coexist with the 
British, other Iroquois nations would oppose them. 53 Seneca disaffection at Niagara had 
begun to complicate British relations both with the western Indians and with their long-
time Iroquois allies. 
Alcohol sold at Niagara also complicated British efforts to make peace with 
Indians locally and in the West. Donald Campbell, commander of Fort Detroit, 
complained about this to Johnson in August 1761. Though he forbade the sale ofliquor at 
Detroit, local Indians would buy it at Niagara and bring it home, making them 
"troublesome & ill to manage," according to Campbell. Furthermore, the sale ofrum at 
Niagara was so profitable that many traders brought little else to sell, depriving the posts 
at Detroit and Michilimackinac of provisions. 54 Col. Henry Bouquet was having the same 
problem at Fort Pitt. "The Traders engaged in that Illicite Trade, know the Country, avoid 
52
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the Posts and assisted by the Indians cannot be easily discovered," Bouquet complained, 
and he advised Amherst to forbid liquor sales at all the posts, especially Niagara, which 
he claimed was ''the greatest Inlett" for liquor brought into the backcountry.55 
Throughout the winter and spring of 1762, Amherst dispatched orders to all posts 
forbidding the sale of alcohol to Indians under any circumstances, creating immediate 
problems at Niagara. 56 Fort Niagara's new commander, William Walters, reported that 
Indians visiting the fort complained about the restrictions, and continued to ask for rum 
"for their Refreshment." Walters tried to convince them that refraining from drinking 
would promote health and economy, allowing them to "purchase every necessary ofLife 
they wanted for their familys," but the Indians expected rum to be sold at trading posts 
and persisted in their requests. Walters despaired that he would have trouble convincing 
Indians not to pester him for rum during the busy summer season. 57 Amherst's 
restrictions on alcohol sales and gift giving in general helped further degrade British-
Indian relations at Niagara. 
A request for rum signaled a coming storm for the garrison ofNiagara, already on 
alert in June 1763 after Pontiac and other western Indians began their uprising throughout 
the Great Lakes region. Local Seneca chief Wapackcamigat had come to the fort in 
search of rum. Niagara's interpreter, Jean Baptiste de Couagne, refused him, and was 
dismayed when Wapackcamigat warned that if rum and gift restrictions continued, the 
British "must take Care of the consequence," and that they should expect to hear some 
55Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 7, 1762, MPHC, 19:131. 
56 Amherst to Johnson, Jan. 16, 1762, WJP, 10:354; Amherst to Johnson, Feb. 14, 
1762, WJP, 10:382-83; "Journal oflndianAffairs," WJP, 10:386-88. 
57William Walters to Johnson, Apr. 27, 1762, WJP, 3:721-23; Walters to Johnson, 
Apr. 5, 1762, WJP, 10:426-28. 
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"bad news" soon. The next day another Iroquois chief arrived and requested rum. 
Couagne delayed him, but was made uneasy by these incessant friendship tests and news 
of fresh attacks on the frontier. 58 The situation worsened when Amherst and Johnson 
became convinced of Seneca involvement in the Indian attacks on Forts Venango, Le 
Boeuf, and Presque Isle, a chain of forts between Lake Erie and Fort Pitt. 
Senecas seemed to care more about protecting their lands and preserving fair trade 
than about Pontiac and his message of cultural renewal. For example, Fort Venango's 
attackers cited as reasons for their uprising the recent inflated expense of powder and 
goods at the posts, the lack of any means of redress of unfair trade practices, and the 
establishment and maintenance of new British posts, which convinced them that the 
British intended ''to possess all their Country."59 Johnson blamed the Senecas' 
disaffection on their proximity to Niagara, where they were ''seated in the midst of 
assiduous Missionaries, and zealous Partizans, which (together with their vicinity to 
Niagara where they were continually receiving presents, provisions, &c.) contributed to 
establish their regard for the French."60 By late July small attacks around the Niagara 
portage threatened the safety of that vital lifeline, and Johnson feared for Detroit and the 
other upcountry posts if provisions could not be brought over the carrying place. 61 
Fort Niagara did not fall during the Indian uprising because an easier and more 
valuable target lay only six miles to the south. The fortress at the outlet of the Niagara 
River had proven a poor guard over commerce traveling between Lakes Erie and Ontario 
58Couagne to Johnson, June 5, 1763, WJP, 4:134-35. 
59The Seneca attackers forced the fort's commander write out their reasons before 
executinf, him. Johnson to Amherst, July 11, 1763, NYCD, 7:533. 
6 Johnson to Lords ofTrade, July 1, 1763, NYCD, 7:525-27. 
61Johnson to Lords ofTrade, July 26, 1763, NYCD, 7:559-62. 
206 
because Indians could easily bypass the fort by land or water at night, trading their goods 
at Fort Little Niagara or other posts on the lakes. Fort Niagara served best as a place of 
defense and refuge for soldiers and local Indians still friendly to the British. It was 
Niagara's portage that was the crux of the region's defense. Most European goods 
traveling into America's interior passed over the six·mile land carriage, and though the 
strategic importance ofthe portage had been known for decades, the British conquerors 
ofNiagara had never fortified the portage path. Only Fort Little Niagara, which had been 
strengthened in June 1763 and renamed Fort Schlosser, and the small post at the Lower 
Landing protected the carrying place. With Genesee Senecas now in open rebellion in 
Pennsylvania, traversing the Niagara portage through the Genesees' own territory must 
have been terrifYing for teamsters and their military escorts. But only small skirmishes 
troubled the land carriage until August 1763, when the loss ofthe Michigan started a 
chain of events that brought the uprising to Niagara. 
Two days after the Michigan left Buffalo Creek, New York, leaks and bad 
weather cast the ship onto the south shore of Lake Erie about fourteen miles from the 
Niagara River. 62 In addition to vital supplies for the beleaguered Detroit garrison, the 
sloop carried an Indian peace delegation that included Daniel Oughnour, a Mohawk 
friend of Johnson's. With the help of army engineer John Montresor, a passenger on the 
Michigan, the shipwrecked crew erected a small defensive log breastwork and waited for 
help. Two companies from Fort Niagara arrived on September 2 to protect the small post. 
The peace delegation's presence there proved helpful when a small Indian band attacked 
the following day. Three men lay dead before Daniel had a chance to talk to the attackers. 
62Near present-day Highland-on-the-Lake, New York. 
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Though they would give him no information, he identified them as Senecas.63 The 
presence of a prominent Mohawk delegation may have prevented further attacks, and this 
gave Major John Wilkins and his regiment encamped at Fort Niagara time to organize a 
salvage operation. This was done with some trepidation, because on September 7 Henry 
Bouquet sent word from Fort Pitt that a force of eight hundred Ohio Indians was headed 
to Niagara to attack the portage.64 For days wagons and oxen rolled back and forth across 
the portage with no sign of trouble. Couagne wrote that from the time of the attack on the 
wreck until September 13, Indians allowed the wagon trains to "pass, and repass under an 
escort of 20, or 30 at most, with an Officer." But the unseen Indians around the portage 
were actually waiting for the best opportunity to attack, and with British forces busy 
salvaging the wreck, they struck. "Melancholy was their fate," reported Couagne, "For 
they were so massacred that 64 were buried yesterday.'.65 Couagne's report was one of 
the first accounts of the Devil' s Hole attack, and unfortunately for the victims, the death 
toll he reported was low. 
On September 14, 1763, a wagon train with a twenty-five-man military escort 
hurried northward across the portage toward the Lower Landing, having just unloaded 
provisions at Fort Schlosser. About three miles from their destination a large body of 
Indians attacked without warning, making enough noise to attract the attention of a 
63J. C. Webster, "Life of John Montresor" Transactions of the Royal Society of 
Canada, 3rd ser. 22 (May 1928): 14-18; Couagne to Johnson, Sept. 8, 1763, WJP, 10:812; 
Collin Andrews to Johnson, Sept. 9, 1763, WJP, 10:812-13. 
64Bouquet to Amherst, Sept. 7, 1763, MPHC, 19:230-31. 
65John Stoughton to Johnson, Sep. 16, 1763, WJP, 10:814; Couagne to Johnson, 
Sep. 16, 1763, WJP, 10:815. 
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military force in transit waiting at the Lower Landing fort.66 There, Lts. William Fraser 
and George Campbell sent to Fort Niagara for help and hurried their two companies up 
the escarpment to aid the wagon train. At Niagara Major Wilkins quickly readied his 
regiment and hurried them to the Lower Landing post. But when they arrived, they 
learned that the worst had already happened: Campbell and Fraser had moved their 
companies into a trap. As the soldiers advanced toward the site of the attack on the 
portage path, they heard yelping behind them. Thinking that they had been outflanked, 
they retreated toward the edge of the steep bluff where the actual main force lay.hidden. 
The attacking Indians had chosen the location well. 
Directly above the whirlpool known as Devil' s Hole, where a wooden bridge 
· crossed a small creek emptying into the Niagara, the retreating companies had nowhere to 
run. Several soldiers plunged over the precipice, and many more were killed and scalped 
on the portage path. Wilkins waited with his men at the Lower Landing for 
reinforcements, but nightfall forced the regiment back to Fort Niagara. Next morning 
they returned to find most of the soldiers dead on the path. Eighty men died without 
inflicting a single casualty upon the attackers, making the Devil's Hole attack the worst 
British military loss in the Indian uprising.67 And to make matters worse, the Indians had 
killed or stolen all the draft animals and hurled wagons and harnesses into the swirling 
66The size of the attacking force was disputed. Early reports put the Indian party 
at 400-500 men, but later a Seneca chief told Johnson that the attackers numbered 309. 
67Later reports asserted that one Indian attacker was wounded. 
rapids. Without the draft teams and wagons, the portage was cut off, as were all of the 
posts on the Great Lakes, including besieged Fort Detroit.68 
Amherst and Johnson immediately set about repairing the damage and placing 
blame for the attack, and both found the latter easier than the former. Initially they 
supposed that the attacking force was the same one Bouquet had reported the previous 
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month, meaning that some of the Indians had come from western groups. But all reports 
of the ambush identified Senecas among the attackers, and this was borne out by the 
discovery of tracks leading toward the Genesee castle. With the knowledge that Senecas 
had begun attacking the portage, fear set in at Niagara and throughout the West. Amherst 
warned Bouquet to watch out for deception, because the attackers stole dead soldiers' 
uniforms. 69 Wilkins's relief expedition bound for Detroit was delayed for the year by 
devastating storms on Lake Erie. Provisions for their winter camp at Fort Erie had to be 
brought across the portage on men's backs until fresh oxen and wagons arrived on 
September 25.70 Johnson warned ofworse tidings to come. He knew that the Genesees 
were involved, and feared that "The Success which they met with, may perhaps 
Encourage all the Senecas to Joyn them, and ... that Nation consists in the Whole of near 
1000 Fighting Men.'m 
While Niagara braced for a major assault, the small attacks kept coming. On 
October 12, fifty Indians attacked the cattle guard at Fort Schlosser, killing and stealing 
68William Browning to Johnson, Sept. 17, 1763, WJP, 10:816; George 
Etherington to Johnson, Sep. 17, 1763, WJP, 10:817-18; Johnson to Lords ofTrade, Sep. 
25, 1763, NYCD, 7:559-62; Johnson to Amherst, Oct. 6, 1763, WJP, 10:866-70. 
69 Amherst to Johnson, Oct. 1, 1763, WJP, 10:860-61; Amherst to Bouquet, Oct. 3, 
1763, MPHC 19:237-38. 
70Thomas Moncrieffe to Johnson, Oct. 4, 1763, WJP, 4:212-13. 
71Johnson to Amherst, Sep. 30, 1763, WJP, 4:209-11. 
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eleven of the sixteen oxen vital to the portage.72 Around the same time Indians killed a 
man who had lagged too far behind a portage wagon train. Four of Fort Niagara's 
flanking guards had also gone missing, all "without the Noise of a Gun," according to 
Couagne.73 On November 5, Indians killed nine men foraging for firewood near the 
Lower Landing, beheading one ofthem within sight of the post.74 Local Indians did not 
need to lay siege to Fort Niagara when attacking the portage itself inflicted fear and 
crippled British efforts to relieve the beleaguered upcountry posts. 
Amherst believed that dealing quickly and harshly with the Genesee Senecas was 
the answer to Niagara's problems. In November he ordered Niagara's commander 
William Browning to plan the destruction of the Genesee castle itself. "It will Ensure an 
Uninterrupted Communication from Oswego to Niagara," he promised, "And probably 
hinder any further Attacks on the Carrying Place."75 Amherst remained convinced that 
his plan to reduce the number of gifts given to Indians at the posts was sensible and just, 
despite growing suspicions that his restrictions were a major source of animosity among 
rebel Indians. He refused to consent to what he considered to be bribery as a means for 
ending the uprising. 76 By winter, goods were moving again on the portage, and Amherst 
urged Browning to stock supplies at Fort Schlosser so that a relief expedition could be 
sent to Detroit as quickly as possible in the spring.77 But in November Amherst was 
72BrowningtoJohnson, Oct. 22,1763, WJP, 10:906-07. 
73Couagne to Johnson, Oct. 17, 1763, WJP, 10:884. 
74Couagne to Johnson, Nov. 11, 1763, WJP, 10:921-22. 
75 Amherst to Browning, Nov. 11, 1763, in Sir Frederick Haldimand: Unpublished 
Papers and Correspondence, 1758-84, microfilm (London: World Microfilm 
Publications, 1977), reel8, section 21678, 29 (hereafter cited as Haldimand Papers). 
76Amherst to Johnson, Sept. 30, 1763, NYCD, 7:568-69. 
77 Amherst to Browning, Sept. 29, 1763, Haldimand Papers, reel 8, section 21678, 
34-36. 
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recalled to London, leaving the resolution ofNiagara's problems to Johnson and the new 
commander-in-chief, Thomas Gage. 
Even as Gage took over Amherst's command and began planning punitive 
measures against warring Indian groups, Genesee representatives began peace overtures. 
The rebellion was slowing in the West, and the French showed no signs of entering the 
conflict and retaking their lost North American territories. On December 15 three 
Genesee deputies and more than two hundred Indians from other Iroquois League nations 
met Johnson at his new home in the Mohawk Valley. The Genesees agreed to end 
hostilities against the British, blaming their involvement in the uprising on Delaware and 
Ottawa instigation. Johnson dismissed their arguments as "insignificant, & 
dissatisfactory" and warned that Gage would be unlikely to accept their offers of peace. 
Conoquieson, an Oneida representative, scolded the Genesees for endangering the 
Covenant Chain of peace between the Iroquois and the British. "Take Pity of your 
Children, and Families- consider also your Country, if you have any Regard for the 
same, and leave oflt] your silly Pride," he urged the Genesees, "I speak only to you of 
Chenussio, 78 as the rest of the Confederacy have nothing else in View but to keep up that 
Friendship with the English which has so long subsisted - do you the same, and perhaps 
you may live to have white Heads." The Genesee deputies thanked the Oneida speaker 
for the advice. "You have really shook us by the Head so often, that we have not a Hair 
left on it," the Genesee speaker joked, but with most of the Iroquois confederacy eager 
for peace and Gage ready to send a punitive force against them in the spring, the 
Genesees knew their rebellion must end soon. At the end of the conference Johnson 
78Genesee Senecas were called Chenussios in the eighteenth century, but the 
modern pronunciation "Genesee" is substituted throughout this chapter. 
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rewarded all the participants with currency except the Genesee deputies, telling them that 
their returning home empty-handed ''was owing to their own Folly, and Wickedness."79 
Under Gage, Johnson had greater latitude to formulate Indian policy. With the 
Genesees seeking peace he set out to convince Gage not to take too harsh a stand against 
the Senecas. Gage's interpretation ofthe Senecas' involvement in the uprising was purely 
geopolitical. He noted that western Senecas had attacked British trading parties before the 
uprising began, and they had been encouraging the western Indians to revolt since 1761 
with the expectation that France would soon return to retake their possessions in North 
America. With no French aid in sight by the end of 1763, the Genesee Senecas had no 
choice but to seek peace. Gage thought that the Senecas, as supposed British allies, 
should be treated more harshly than belligerent Shawnees, Delawares, Chippewas, and 
Ottawas in negotiating peace terms. 80 Besides, Gage noticed that there were an unusual 
number ofwhite men among the Genesees, and he suspected they were army deserters.81 
Johnson's interpretation was more sympathetic to the Senecas' economic and 
practical problems. He argued that the Senecas were not instigators, but had been "drawn 
in as Auxilliaries" by other rebellious groups. This was possible because of their 
dissatisfaction with the differences between ''the present & former possessors ofNiagara" 
and "the loss they sustained at the carrying place where they used to earn a good deal by 
transporting the Traders & Western Inds goods."82 He asked Gage to allow him to 
separate his negotiations with the Senecas from those with other Indians involved in the 
uprising, and suggested that the Genesee Senecas be induced once again to cede the 
79
"Joumal oflndian Congress," WJP, 10:968-71. 
80Gage to Johnson, Jan. 12, 1764, WJP, 4:290-93. 
81Gage to Johnson, Jan. 31, 1764, WJP, 4:314-15. 
82Johnson to Gage, Jan. 27, 1764, WJP, 4:308-10. 
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Niagara Canying Place to the crown to prevent further attacks there.83 Gage doubted that 
the Senecas would agree, but he believed the effort would be worth a try given the 
strategic value of the portage, which had never been plainer to British authorities than in 
the previous fall. 
In March 1764, Genesee Seneca leaders met at Johnson Hall and gave Johnson 
exactly what he wanted, much to his surprise and delight. A delegation of British-allied 
Senecas from Kanadasego had subsequently visited the Genesees and elicited their 
agreement to cease hostilities and to reaffrrm their adherence to the Covenant Chain. 84 
The Seneca Nation agreed to deliver up two Indians accused of killing a trading party in 
1762 along with all "Prisoners, Deserters, French men, and Negroes" who had taken 
refuge among them. They agreed to give free passage and assistance through their 
country to any British traders or militaty personnel, and promised not to communicate 
with any Indians warring against the British. 
As for the portage, the Senecas ceded to the king full rights to a strip of land 
fourteen miles long and four miles wide on both sides of the river from Fort Niagara 
running south to Fort Schlosser, encompassing the entire carrying place. The Senecas 
agreed "never to obstruct the passage of the carrying place, or the free use of any part of 
the said tract," provided the ceded tract "be always appropriated to H. M's sole use," and 
subject to boundary lines drawn with Seneca witnesses present to avoid disputes. In 
return, Genesee Senecas who had participated in the uprising would receive a full pardon 
and be restored to full membership in the Covenant Chain alliance.85 "The Chenussios & 
83Johnson to Lords ofTrade, Jan. 20, 1764, NYCD, 7:599-602. 
84
"An Indian Conference," WJP, 11:139-40. 
85
"Articles ofPeace Concluded With the Seneca Indians," NYCD, 7:621-23. 
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Enemy Senecas have been here several days," Johnson reported to Gage, "And after due 
consideration on the Articles of peace, have at length agreed to them beyond my 
Expectations."86 Johnson had wrested title to the portage from the Senecas, but as he 
prepared for the main peace conference to be held at Niagara in June rumors and doubts 
still plagued the garrisons there. 
Violence continued at Niagara throughout the spring despite Johnson's peace 
terms with the Senecas. On April10, Browning reported that a soldier ofthe 80th 
regiment had been killed and scalped near the Lower Landing while out "to shoot an 
Eagle," and that Indians had been seen hiding near the portage road and harassing express 
carriers. Furthermore, Henry Gladwin sent word from Detroit that a large group of 
Indians, including Delawares and Senecas, planned an imminent attack on the portage. 87 
Fears of a new Indian offensive against Detroit and the Niagara Carrying Place spread 
throughout the region. By the end of April, Johnson sought to dispel rumors that two 
thousand Indians were massing for such an offensive. "I have little reason to think the 
Senecas would at this time have attempted anything against us," he told Gage, theorizing 
that renegade Delawares, Chippewas, or Mississaugas camped near Niagara had killed 
the soldier, and he doubted that any Indian groups could amass and feed an army two-
thousand strong. Still, Johnson thought it prudent to send a body of Senecas and "a few 
Whites" to Niagara to guard the portage. 88 Gage agreed that the report of a new Indian 
offensive was most likely a rumor or a war plan formulated before the Senecas approved 
86Johnson to Gage, Apr. 6, 1764, WJP, 4:389. 
87Browning to Johnson, Apr. 10, 1764, WJP, 11:124-25. 
88Johnson to Gage, Apr. 27, 1764, WJP, 11:163; Johnson to Colden, Apr. 28, 
1764, The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden, (New York: New York Historical 
Society, 1918-1937), 6:304-05. 
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the peace treaty.89 Meanwhile in Albany, Col. John Bradstreet began organizing an . 
expedition at Niagara to relieve the upcountry posts and to punish warring Indians, for 
which fortifying the portage became a vital priority. 
John Montresor and a detachment of550 men arrived at Fort Niagara on May 19 
to begin building a series of redoubts along the portage road and to improve the defenses 
of smaller posts along the Niagara River. Montresor found morale to be low in the area, 
especially at Fort Niagara where he reported a "Discord in the Service" among the 
garrison and surrounding troops and thought that "disunion" and "dissension" were 
prevalent.90 The engineer spent most of his time at the portage, where he lost no time in 
surveying the entire Carrying Place and the system of"cradles," rope-drawn winches and 
platforms installed to haul goods up the escarpment above the Lower Landing.91 
Reinforced by 110 soldiers from the 46th regiment, Montresor's total command consisted 
of656 men comprised of"Regulars Canadians Provincials, Indian Teamsters & 
Artificers." Their task was to guard the portage, build a series of redoubts along the 
portage road, and keep the wagon trains moving.92 With this large force in place, traffic 
on the portage began to increase; by June 4 provisions moved through the passage 
without escorts. A few days later, Montresor' s men had finished their ten redoubts and 
began palisading and arming the small posts, improving the portage road, and cutting 
89Gage to Johnson, Apr. 25, 1764, WJP, 4:408-09. 
90 
"The Journals ofCaptain John Montresor," ed. G. D. Scull, in Collections of the 
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91Montresor is often credited as the cradles' builder, an attribution that is probably 
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back the woods 150 yards on both sides ofthe path. By the end ofthe month, oxen and 
wagons carried hundred of barrels of goods per day across the route. 
Indians sent to guard the portage maintained a constant presence there during 
Montresor's efforts, though not always to the engineer's benefit. Montresor used his 
assemblage of one hundred Indians to reconnoiter and secure the surrounding woods, and 
Indian disinterest in their mission or outright hostility to the fortification effort 
diminished their effectiveness as guards. On June 8 native guards pursued three "enemy 
Indians" sighted near the portage but did not catch them. The situation became tenser the 
following day when thirty Indians arrived to reinforce Montresor' s detachment. Upon 
approaching Fort Schlosser, the fresh arrivals fired off their guns in salute, which 
panicked and dispersed the encamped Indian detachment. Fort Schlosser's garrison 
mistook the newly arrived Indians for enemies and fired on them, eventually shooting 
three of them in the legs. 93 
The mistake caused anger and grumbling among the encamped Indians that 
diminished their effectiveness as portage guards. On June 22 "Alleghany Indians" killed 
an artilleryman, leaving a hatchet in his skull. Indians from the portage encampment gave 
chase but once again failed to catch the assailants.94 With most ofthe portage work 
complete in early July, Montresor fretted that his Indian detachment had not yet removed 
their camp, and remained "as indolent and inactive as ever."95 Indians employed on the 
portage during Montresor's 'improvements' probably provided an important deterrent to 
attacks by virtue of their presence alone, but their efforts as guards seem to have been 
93Ibid., 14: 261-62; Johnson to Gage, June 29, 1764, WJP, 11:245-46. 
94
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half-hearted. The new redoubts made the Carrying Place an armed British outpost at a 
vital spot in the heart oflndian country. Indians witnessing the transformation could not 
have been pleased. 
While Montresor and his men labored to secure and improve the portage and 
Bradstreet planned his expedition to retake and relieve the Great Lakes posts, Johnson 
prepared for his Niagara peace conference. Johnson chose Niagara because it was 
centrally located for Six Nations, Canadian, and western Indians, and because it lay 
outside the country of the most belligerent groups in the western Great Lakes.96 Of 
course, Niagara sat within the country of the crown's other enemies in the uprising, the 
Genesee Senecas, but this also served Johnson's plan to treat with the Senecas and the 
Great Lakes groups separately in order to drive a wedge between them and to prevent 
further collusion between natives of the two regions.97 Indians throughout the Great 
Lakes had suffered for want of essential trade goods after the siege of Detroit and the fall 
ofMichilimackinac and other trading posts the previous year. Johnson hoped to elicit 
promises of friendship from western Indians already friendly to the British and eager for 
a renewal oftrade. He also hoped to quell hostile groups through the threat ofmilitacy 
force and the inducement oftrade renewal. Finally, he hoped to gain Indian assistance for 
the punitive and relief expeditions to be led by Bradstreet and Bouquet late in the 
summer. Johnson was optimistic about the diplomatic possibilities for the conference, but 
others remained skeptical. Bradstreet thought that Indians would come to Niagara "more 
for the sake of the goods they are to receive and to watch our Motions than any real 
96Johnson to Gage, Jan. 27, 1764, WJP, 4:308-10. 
97Johnson to Lords ofTrade, May 11, 1764, NYCD, 7:624-26. 
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service they intend us.''98 Indeed, Johnson intended to reward Indian attendees 
handsomely; a budget of £25,000 New York currency would be approved for Indian 
provisions at the conference.99 News of the general conference must have seemed a 
godsend to Indians desperate for trade and exhausted by war. 
Johnson arrived at Niagara on June 9 to fmd that several groups of friendly 
Chippewas, Ottawas, and others from the western Great Lakes had been filtering in since 
May. Most ofthose delegations followed a similar three-part appeal with Johnson. First, 
they would remind Johnson of their friendship with the British and the help they had 
provided in the past. For example, Ottawas ofL'Arbre Croche reminded Johnson that 
they had saved the survivors of the Michilimackinac assault the year before. Some groups 
offered the services of some of their young men to aid in Bradstreet's expedition. Second, 
they insisted that they had played no part in or possessed any knowledge of the uprising 
or any attacks on forts. For example, Bindanowan, an Ottawa chief, told Johnson that he 
had no advance knowledge of the attack on Michilimackinac because he lived near 
Montreal, and "only heard a little bird Whistle an Acct of it & on going to 
Michilimackinac I found your people killed." And third, the groups professed their great 
poverty and asked for provisions and permission to trade for ammunition, trade goods, 
and especially rum.100 
Johnson had come to Niagara prepared to reward hostile Indians who agreed to 
suspend violence, and was even happier to offer goods and trade to England's friends. He 
insisted that these groups make it clear to hostile nations that trade would only ensue 
98Bradstreet to Gage, June 4, 1764, Gage Papers AS, vol. 19. 
99
"Montresor's Journals," 14: 275. 
100
"Conference With Indians," WJP, 11 :262-73; "An Indian Congress," WJP, 
11:273-89. 
219 
once the violence ceased. Johnson asked most groups if they knew who had instigated the 
war, but all of them claimed ignorance. Not until July 17 would Johnson meet with actual 
belligerents, a group of Hurons from the Detroit area who claimed that the Ottawas 
forced them to rebel. So far, Bradstreet's suspicions had been partially justified: Most 
Indians saw the Niagara Conference as a trading rendezvous. Once there they told 
Johnson what he wished to hear and either through ignorance or dissemblance gave the 
superintendent little actual war intelligence. 
Indians at the conference took full advantage of opportunities for trade and 
recreation, and an abundant supply of rum helped lubricate the latter. Before the 
conference Johnson wondered if it should be sold at all at Niagara. "I plainly See that 
they will not be satisfied without it," he admitted to Gage, and knew that the Indians 
would "when assembled at Niagara ask for, & make a point of it." Gage agreed that it 
should be provided. "We must at length yield to the immoderate Thirst which the Indians 
have for Rum," Gage wrote, though the sale of alcohol would continue to be 
controversial throughout the colonial period.101 At Niagara, Indians deprived of rum 
during the uprising were happy to find a generous supply in store. Conference visitors 
could purchase a gallon of rum for one beaver skin, half the price of a stroud blanket or a 
calico-lined bed gown.102 Montresor complained of several episodes oflndian 
drunkenness during his tenure at the portage, from his arrival in May, when a group of 
Chippewas and Mohawks left Fort Niagara for the portage "almost all Drunk," to June 
13, when intoxicated Indians in the portage encampment threatened to kill army captain 
101Johnson to Gage, May 11, 1764, WJP, 11:189-90; Gage to Johnson, May 28, 
1764, WJP, 4:432-33. 
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Andrew Montour. On July 17 Montresor reported that the 1,200 Indians attending the 
conference were being given "Rum and Oxen" to "regale with."103 
Liquor caused even more problems for trader Alexander Henry. He arrived on 
July I 0 in command of a 96-man "Indian battalion" from the Lake Erie region, which he 
ordered to Fort Schlosser to join Bradstreet's expedition. After visiting Fort Niagara, 
most of them left immediately for home, and the fourteen who stayed went on to Fort 
Erie and drank until Bradstreet cut off their liquor. Then they went home too, leaving an 
embarrassed Henry without his battalion.104 In addition to any serious diplomatic 
motives, and to the occasional detriment of British plans, Indians intended to enjoy 
themselves at the Niagara Conference. 
Although most attendees were already friendly to the British and treated the 
conference as a trade jamboree, Johnson was still able to make his points. His main 
diplomatic thrust concerned the resumption of trade. "What you suffer by this 
prohibition," Johnson told a group of friendly Ottawas from Michilimackinac eager for 
trade, "Should convince you of the ill consequences of Quarreling with the English who 
Command all the Doors into your Country & without whose Consent you can receive no 
Supplys."105 Johnson made it clear that those loyal to the British must make every effort 
to curtail other Indians' belligerence. "Soon as that is done," he told the Ottawa headman 
Bildanowan, "Trade will immediately flourish, & not before."106 
This was a powerful inducement, as many Indians had been driven to near poverty 
by lack of trade. An Ottawa chief speaking for several nations linked their denials of 
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involvement with requests for aid. "We have not yet lost our Senses, but retain them as 
we did, when we were a numerous People," he told Johnson, "But we are in a great 
Poverty." Speaking for a group ofT oronto Chippewas, the chief claimed that they had 
been reduced to poverty ''through the means of those Indians who became drunk: they 
therefore beg you will Indulge them with a fair Trade."107 Johnson always made it clear 
that Indians needed to choose between the British and the rebellious groups. "They are 
your Enemies, as well as ours," he told a large assembly, "They are the Occasion of your 
being so poor."108 With friendly Western and Six Nations Indians dominating the 
conference, Johnson used promises of England's economic power to convince allies and 
enemies alike that the best way to maintain a balanced, reciprocal trade and diplomatic 
settlement was with peace. But Pontiac and other enemy leaders did not show up at 
Johnson's conference, and by July 23 neither had the Genesee Senecas. A peace 
arrangement with at least one of the major hostile groups was necessary for the 
conference to be called a success. 
Amidst the general commotion caused by a major Indian conference and the 
muster and organization ofBradstreet's large invasion force, the absence ofthe region's 
masters, the Genesee Senecas, must have added great tension for soldiers and Indians 
alike. The Genesees had not yet complied with their treaty obligations. They had not 
delivered up all the prisoners, British deserters, and slaves demanded by Johnson. To 
make matters worse for the British, a band of enemy Delawares had taken refuge near the 
Genesee castle, despite Genesee promises to join the British in opposing rebellious 
107Indians at the conference frequently referred to rebellious groups as being 




Delaware and Shawnee groups.109 And to Johnson's frustration, Genesee representatives 
had neither arrived at the conference on time nor sent messengers to explain their 
absence. Attendees began to ask nervously what Johnson would do about the tardy 
Senecas. On July 20 he told a group of Ottawas that the Gene sees did not seem to be 
sincere in keeping the promises they had made to him in April, and that if they did not 
appear within a couple of days and fulfill their requirements, Johnson would "do himself 
Justice."110 But the Genesees had a perfectly good reason to delay their arrival, though 
Johnson did not know it at the time: A rumor had spread that Johnson had given up on 
bringing them to British submission and would order them killed when he had the 
chance.111 Without a conclusion to the Seneca peace treaty the portage would not be 
secure, and the Bradstreet's military expedition would leave behind a threatened Niagara. 
Much to Johnson's (and everyone else's) relief, the Genesee messengers arrived 
on July 23 and agreed to hold a general meeting the next day. Johnson rebuked them for 
breaching their treaty obligations and keeping him waiting so long at the conference.112 
At the meeting the following day Johnson lost no time in bringing up his latest sore point. 
"I little expected you would have been capable of Acting so bad a Part," he scolded the 
Seneca delegation, "As to give shelter to the Enemy Delawares, after the Promises made 
by your People last Spring."113 He also noted that they brought only four prisoners from 
Genesee. Johnson told them that they must deliver up the Delaware ringleaders within 
thirty days and leave two oftheir chiefs as hostages. "We can reduce you to Beggary 
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without fighting," Johnson reminded them, "by only Debarring you of Trade ... Ifyou 
deceive us any more, or continue Obstinate, your Ruin is inevitable."114 A Genesee chief, 
Tohaditkarawa, answered that their whole party had not yet arrived with the rest of the 
prisoners, and they were prepared to comply with the April treaty. "We Chenussios 
acknowledge our selves to be great Transgressors," the chief admitted, but promised to 
provide young men to fight in the West. They also promised to finalize their cession of 
the land around the Carrying Place. However, they regretted not being able to supply the 
two "murderers" of the trading party as stipulated in the treaty, because one had died 
recently and the other fled upon hearing he was to be given up. The Genesees hoped their 
failure to supply the suspects would not be considered a breach of the treaty. "We are not 
Masters over the Lives of our People," the Seneca chief reminded Johnson, who knew 
well how local Indian politics worked.115 
Johnson was determined to fmalize the Seneca treaty, and over the next few days 
repeated his demands to the full Genesee delegation. On August 5 the Genesees agreed to 
send for the Delaware leaders Squash Cutter and Attyatawitsera and deliver them to 
Johnson, and handed over a total of thirteen prisoners and one British deserter. They also 
provided Bradstreet with twenty-three young men for his expedition. "The most of our 
People being drunk ever since they came here, we are not yet able to collect any more," 







Johnson's only alteration of the original deal, aside from the requirement to 
deliver over the Delaware leaders, was an augmentation to the land cession. "I would 
further recommend it to you to give a higher Proof of your friendship," Johnson insisted, 
''that you should cede to his Majesty the Lands from above your late Gift, to the Rapids at 
Lake Erie on both sides of the Streights, in Breadth as the former, and to include all the 
Islands."117 With this new cession, England would have the entire Niagara Strait from 
Fort Niagara to Fort Erie, four miles in breadth on both sides, "for (the King's) sole use, 
and that of his Garrisons, but not as private property."118 The Senecas agreed to the new 
land cession, though they insisted on designating the islands in the Niagara River as a 
present for Johnson. "We have for some time had it in view to give them to you as a 
small Reward for your great trouble, and Care of us," the Senecas told Johnson, eager to 
prevent British-Seneca hostilities.119 The final treaty, signed by seven Genesee sachems, 
gave Johnson assurance of a safe British portage protected by Seneca neighbors. 
Despite his lofty goals ofWestem pacification, Johnson's main accomplishment 
at the Niagara conference was in laying groundwork for the British subjugation of 
Niagara itself. He did not know the Genesees' intentions toward the British until the very 
end, and Bradstreet's expedition to the western Great Lakes was held hostage to this 
uncertainty. Johnson admitted this to Gage at the conference's conclusion: 
I could not say anything positive till the Arrival of the Enemy Senecas, 
particularly the Chenussios who did not arrive until the 2nd ... this greatly 
Alarmed us, & it was Coli. Bradstreets & my opinion that the Fort and Carrying 
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Place would be greatly exposed Should the Troops proceed before they came 
& had settled Matters, as they could muster immediately above 400 Men of their 
own, & would undoubtedly be supported by the 100 Delawares who took refuge 
amongst them ... we could not be positive but many ofye Western Indians here 
might be tempted to Join them.120 
For their part, the more than two thousand western Indians who attended the conference 
did well for themselves. They were rewarded for their past friendship, allowed to trade at 
Fort Niagara, and charged only with encouraging warring Indians to put down the 
hatchet. In the end, the conference was more about the security of the Niagara passage 
and resumption of trade in the West than it was a harsh subjugation of Indians 
participating in Pontiac's Rebellion. Pressured by Johnson's economic coaxing and the 
warnings of other Six Nations groups, Genesee Senecas seemed to have given up control 
of the most strategically important land carriage on the Great Lakes to the sole remaining 
European superpower in eastern North America. For Johnson the treaty with the Senecas 
was the capstone ofhis diplomatic efforts in 1764, and residents ofthe Niagara forts 
looked forward to peace. But at the end of this turbulent year at Niagara, much remained 
unresolved. 
Johnson was optimistic about the future of the portage when he wrote the Lords of 
Trade on August 30 to crow about his success at Niagara. "The cession made by the 
Senecas is vecy considerable, and will, I hope, put a stop to all future disputes about the 
carrying place," he wrote, noting that the Senecas "have been great loosers by us 
concerning it." Johnson explained that when the French possessed Niagara the Senecas 
enjoyed the sole carrying concession on the portage, but under the English regime oxen 
120Johnson to Gage, Aug. 5, 1764, WJP, 11:324-25. 
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and wagons had replaced the Indian carriers.121 Gage and Johnson briefly discussed 
returning this concession to the Genesees to retain their cooperation, since it would mean 
little to the king who carried goods across the portage, and would mean much to the 
Senecas because of their former employment there. 122 Senecas no longer lived near the 
portage, but still resorted to Fort Niagara from long practice. In February 1764 a group of 
Senecas visited Niagara and tested the friendship of John Vaughan, the fort's new 
commander. He gave them some provisions, and though the group left in good spirits, the 
encounter worried Vaughan. Johnson reminded him that Senecas had little reason to love 
the English after losing the gifts and favors they enjoyed under the French.123 
Keeping Senecas happy was not the only rationale for renewing their carrying 
concession. British carriers had been a source of frustration for the army and traders 
throughout 1765. The civilian portage master, John Stedman, was not in the army's good 
graces in 1765; in fact, Bradstreet caught him overcharging the crown and replaced him 
briefly.124 Gage did not trust any of the ''waggon men," and he warned Vaughan that they 
would leave military stores to rot if a trader paid them more to bring his trade goods 
across.
125 At the end of 1765, Gage still considered the possibility of a Seneca carrying 
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concession at Niagara.126 But economic and military necessity had come to dictate events 
at the portage, and keeping wagons and goods moving overruled Indian diplomacy. 
Senecas would never work at the portage again. While Gage and Johnson 
considered restoring Indian carriers, Stedman and his military partner Lt. Francis Pfister 
had already established themselves among traders as the sole portage masters. Rather 
than shake up the system, Gage awarded Pfister and Stedman the concession in March 
1766, and allowed Pfister to set up shop at Fort Schlosser. This would entail Pfister's 
planting com and keeping cattle at the fort, which worried Johnson just as much as when 
Amherst had proposed the same arrangement four years earlier.127 Indians always 
objected to "the Establishment offamilys, which they know will encrease (when once a 
beginning is made)," he wrote to Gage, and he agreed to talk to the Senecas before they 
interpreted the expanded settlement as an insult. The 1764 treaties only allowed British 
use of the Niagara strip for the crown's business, and under the agreement private 
settlement was strictly forbidden. But the portage trade had become lucrative for Gage's 
British contractors, and their successful enterprise at the portage ensured that Senecas 
would never again work the carrying trade at Niagara, and that ever more Europeans 
would begin to move into the region to stay. 128 
With their role as masters of the Niagara region diminishing each year, Senecas 
began to act out their frustration. In July 1767 Gage asked Niagara's commander John 
126Gage to Johnson, Nov. 24, 1765; WJP, 4:878-79; Johnson to Gage, Dec. 21, 
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Brown to talk to the Senecas about "the Mischief they do upon the Carrying Place."129 
Senecas had been stealing animals, and commissary Norman McLeod met with Castesh 
and other Seneca chiefs in August to sort the matter out. The chiefs agreed to scold their 
"young men" for taking cattle on the portage and promised to return any stolen animals 
they had in their villages. But Castesh reminded McLeod that there were "bad men every 
where," and apart from "advising" the thieves not to steal, there was little they could do. 
As if to prove the chiefs point, on August 25 Senecas stole five pigs and a bullock on the 
portage. One ofthe Seneca speakers, Tacudese, left Fort Niagara on September 17 with 
one of Couagne 's horses. When Castesh left the council, he stole and killed a bullock 
himself. Senecas based their relationships on reciprocity, and if they were to be kicked 
out ofNiagara, they would take whatever compensation they could find. 130 
Over the years the importance of the carrying trade to the Genesee Senecas 
became overstated, and Indians operating the portage under the French regime became 
conflated with the entire Genesee group. For example, in 1777 Indian agent Daniel Claus 
exaggerated that the Genesees' benefits at the Carrying Place "were so lucrative & 
considerable to that Nation, that in a short time they enriched themselves thereby." But 
after the British took over the portage in 1759, the Genesees, whom Claus claimed had 
"for many years entirely depended upon that for their support," had been reduced to 
severe poverty. Claus implied also that the attack at Devil' s Hole was due to the 
129Gage to John Brown, July 28, 1764, Haldimand Papers, reel 8, section 21678, 
89. 
130
"Journal oflndian Transactions at Niagara in the Year 1767," in The 
Documentary History of the State of New York, ed. E. B. 0' Callaghan (Albany, NY: 
Weed, Parsons, 1849-1851), 2:871-80 (hereafter cited as DHNY); Brown to Johnson, Oct. 
26, 1767, WJP, 5:759. 
229 
Genesees' "not easily forgetting injuries," and their continued ill-will against their 
E I. h 131 ng IS usurpers. 
Rethinking the Senecas' participation in the Indian rebellion as a simple labor 
dispute or grudge attack by embittered former portage workers may have helped soothe 
British remorse about Indian displacement in the Niagara region. But there is scant 
evidence about who actually participated in the Devil's Hole ambush, except that 
"Chenussios" were largely responsible. Most Genesees lived sixty miles from Niagara, 
and it is unknown if any of the attackers had ever worked at the portage. Indeed, after the 
1759 siege, there is no mention oflndians living on the portage at all, except on a 
temporary basis during military operations, such as Bradstreet's expedition or 
Montresor' s construction efforts. Johnson himself noted that the Gene sees never 
stipulated any interest in the carrying concession during their 1764 talks. 132 Wage labor at 
the portage was undoubtedly important to those Indians who performed the work under 
the French regime, and it established visibly the Seneca's occupation ofNiagara while it 
lasted, but it was not the cause of the Senecas' rebellion against the British. 
From the summer of 1763 to the fall of 1764, Genesee Senecas used familiar 
methods to preserve a solid footing in the face of increasing European expansion. They 
had always occupied a middle position between the French in Canada and the English in 
New York. But after the British triumph in the Seven Years' War, they foresaw a new 
economic and political climate where the price of goods could rise without possibility of 
redress and their hunting lands might be subject to white settlement. Some of them took 
action immediately after the British victory in 1761 by unsuccessfully trying to stir up 
131Daniel Claus to Alexander Knox, Mar. I, 1777, NYCD, 7:702-03. 
132Johnson to Gage, Dec. 21, 1765, WJP, 11:983. 
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rebellion in the West. More of them actually turned to violence to achieve their ends 
during the Indian uprising of 1763. When the Devil's Hole attack actually worsened their 
lot by ensuring the fortification of the important Niagara portage, Genesee Senecas 
turned away from violence and returned to the tactics of the early eighteenth century. 
They gave away a strip of land that had already been given away in 1701 and 1726, and 
with almost the same terms as before. As long as they could use the lands to hunt and 
fish, they risked nothing. And agreeing to Johnson's terms ensured that none of their 
people would be punished for the Devil' s Hole attack, the worst loss to British arms in 
the entire Indian uprising. But the situation had changed in the thirty-eight years since the 
last cession ofthe Niagara corridor. In 1764, British military authorities and traders had 
the economic and demographic means to begin settling the Niagara region, and over 
subsequent years their alliances with Iroquois groups would mean less and less to their 
plans. Contrazy to Seneca expectations, and unlike their two earlier deeds, the treaty of 
1764 would eventually tum out to be a true land cession. 
When the Senecas lost Niagara, they lost much more than wages. Senecas had 
controlled the Niagara region since the 1650s. Their hunting grounds and plantations 
were there, and for decades they fought against encroachment, restricting the construction 
of both French and British forts as long as they could. Only long after their attachment to 
and dependence on the European trade did the Senecas allow a fort at Niagara, and even 
that was disguised initially as a trading post. Fort Niagara, the portage, and Indian wage 
labor were all manifestations of the European fur trade, and they all worked toward the 
same ultimate, if sometimes unconscious, goal: remaking Indian countzy for the 
Europeans' benefit. Indians caught in the fur trade economy made the best of it, and that 
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sometimes included performing manual labor for wages, a livelihood that seldom 
"enriched" anyone despite what Daniel Claus and others may have thought. Senecas and 
other Indians involved in the Indian uprising acted from economic motives in seeking 
redress for perceived trade and gift-giving improprieties. Genesee Senecas acted 
strategically when they attacked the portage to prevent the British from relieving Detroit. 
But Senecas and other Indians in the rebellion also fought against European 
encroachment and change to protect Indian country, where council fires had been lit and 
ancestors buried for generations. The year that stretched from the summer of 1763 to the 
summer of 1764 showed Genesee Senecas attempting to maintain more than a few jobs 
carrying packs around a waterfall. They attacked at Niagara to defend their territory, and 
when the rebellion failed they agreed to a treaty that they thought would preserve their 
rights to live and hunt on their traditional lands at the cost of a permanent British 
presence. Neither they nor their new British landlord-tenants knew the full extent to 
which events were already moving out of their control. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LIKE STARS THAT FALL: 
Keeping Up Appearances at Fort Chartres, 1765-1772 
In June 1772, a small company of British regular soldiers, newly arrived in the 
Illinois country, ascertained the depth of British authority in Kaskaskia. Fifteen miles 
away, Fort Chartres, the seat ofBritish operations in Illinois for seven years, crumbled 
into the encroaching Mississippi. Thomas Gage had ordered the post's commandant, 
Major Isaac Hamilton, to abandon and destroy the fort. He also instructed Hamilton to 
send fifty men to guard Kaskaskia, the largest trading town in the area. Soon after the 
soldiers' arrival, a small band of visiting Chickasaws entered William Murray's trading 
house and ransacked it. According to Hugh Lord, the British detachment's captain, the 
fifteen Chickasaws entered the house, beat Murray's servants, and broke everything in 
the shop. They seemed bent more on intimidation or revenge than theft. Lord sent an 
officer and some men to turn out the invaders and guard the house until the Indians left. 
The soldiers took one prisoner, a man Lord described as a renegade Chickasaw living in 
Illinois who had "always used his utmost endeavours to breach the peace that has so long 
subsisted between the English and the Chickesaws." When the soldiers reached their 
guardhouse, they heard gunfire. The remaining Chickasaws had begun firing on the 
trader's house, killing one ofMurray's servants. When Lord sent his men back to drive 
off the attackers, the Indians fired at the soldiers and fled, losing two of their number in 
the exchange. Lord and his soldiers might have expected more respect and cooperation, 
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but this native charivari showed that seven years of British occupation had done little to 
impress or intimidate Indians in the Illinois country. 1 
At the conclusion ofthe Seven Years' War, Britain needed badly to make good 
impressions in their newly won territories. This would be especially difficult in Illinois, 
where supply and communication lines stretched for hundreds, even thousands, of miles? 
But Britain had won control of Illinois by treaty and sought to establish its sovereignty. 
France had operated a colony in Illinois for decades, and Britain had to show that they 
could perform as well as their erstwhile enemies. This would entail finding a way to 
garrison Fort Chartres, the seat of French power in the region, and the westernmost of all 
posts ceded to the British. 
Fort Chartres was intended to become a physical manifestation of British 
ambitions in the American interior. Unfortunately for British planners, Indians in the 
Great Lakes area were not cooperative. The Indian uprising of 1763-1764 delayed plans 
for the occupation of Illinois. Even after the uprising ended, belligerent activities 
continued in Illinois, ensuring that British garrisons would encounter resentful, 
confrontational Indian populations during their occupation attempt. British personnel at 
Fort Chartres would need to appear fully capable of meeting the region's Indians on 
British terms. The British mission in Illinois must look as strong and sound as the fort 
itself. For the unfortunate men destined to carry out this mission, this appearance of 
strength would prove elusive. Forts and military initiatives may have proven effective in 
1Lord to Gage, June 10, 1772, Gage Papers AS, vol. Ill; Gage to Johnson, Sep. 
7, 1772, WJP, 8:593. 
2The quickest way out of Illinois was down the Mississippi River, and then by 
ship back to the eastern colonies. The fastest way in for British travelers was down the 
Ohio River. Both ways were time-consuming and dangerous. 
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some other parts of America, but in Illinois during the 1760s and early 1770s, Indians 
remained dominant and unimpressed by the British attempt to master Illinois. 
Despite the appearance of confrontation conveyed by operating forts and 
garrisons deep within Indian country, few British military leaders ever suggested that the 
presence of manned posts alone could intimidate or overawe natives. Dependence on 
European trade could bind Indians to British interests better than force of arms. At any 
rate, military intimidation was impractical in remote regions like Illinois, where British 
units could not be relieved or provisioned easily in the event of an attack. Indians in 
Illinois knew that relatively small British garrisons manning regional outposts could 
never hold off a general native offensive, especially after so many frontier forts fell 
during the Indian uprising of 1763-64. But military units still needed to show Indians that 
they could punish renegade bands of attackers, maintain law and order, and protect 
settlers and traders from small-scale attacks. Fort commandants met with local and 
visiting Indians almost daily and every meeting was a new test of strength. From the 
Indian perspective, these meetings were negotiations of friendship, alliance, and promises 
of future aid. Commandants needed, at least, to manifest the appearance of power and 
potential violence in order to negotiate from a position of strength. 
Even if the appearance of strength could not be maintained, garrisons and their 
commanders could never afford to look foolish or incompetent. They had to show that 
they could live, work, and accomplish their goals in Indian country as well as natives 
could. Susceptibility to disease or other environmental hazards would make newcomers 
appear weak to better-acclimated Indians. Forts needed to seem sturdy enough to 
withstand at least a small attack. Eastern Woodland Indians infused their war culture with 
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rituals and dress that would bring them spiritual power and human respect, and they 
would be quick to notice if British soldiers did not maintain their own regalia. And basic 
proofs of manhood mattered to Indians as well. Soldiers were expected to be able to fight 
and operate in the wild. If men could not hunt, fish, and gather fuel well enough to 
survive in· an environment that provided all these things in abundance, then Indians were 
unlikely to take them very seriously.3 
Penalties for appearing unprepared or foolish in Indians' eyes varied. After the 
bloody examples ofthe Seven Years' War and the Indian uprising, Indians knew that 
forts could be attacked and reduced easily. But a demolished outpost was oflittle use to 
anyone. A functioning outpost, on the other hand, could maintain the flow of European 
goods and provisions to Indians by protecting trade and supplying presents. The latter 
was preferable to Indians, who saw gift-giving as a cementing of reciprocal Indian-
30n Eastern Woodland war rituals and their relationship to power, see Dowd, A 
Spirited Resistance, 9-16. First impressions were particularly important among Indians 
and played a vital role in determining how well Indian-European endeavors would play 
out. Axtell, The Invasion Within, 72-73. Among Illinois Indians, prowess in war was a 
fundamental facet ofleadership, and the Illinois set the bar for success high. A successful 
war leader overcame his enemies without any losses to his own party, and two raids with 
losses could make a war chief lose his status. Charles Callender, "Illinois," in Trigger, 
Handbook, 676. Manliness and gender roles permeated native relations with Europeans. 
This is most noticeable in their use of gender-flavored language and metaphors in formal 
interactions and diplomacy. See Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance Between Men: Gender 
Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the Mississippi," 
Ethnohistory 46:2 (Spring 1999): 239-63, especially 246-48 for Indian and European 
associations ofwar skills and masculinity. During the eighteenth century, the 
"masculine" warrior role was elevated in importance in some native societies, to the 
detriment of traditional Indian gender identifications. This was energized by European 
needs for Indian aid in war and the fur trade. See Claudio Saunt, '"Domestick ... Quiet 
being Broke': Gender Conflict Among Creek Indians in the Eighteenth Century," in 
Cayton and Teute, Contact Points, 151-74. For a full discussion oflndian-white 
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European friendship. Gifts were the physical component of friendship between 
individuals, groups, and even nations. Indians expected them when performing the rites 
and responsibilities of friendship, and felt abused and slighted when gifts were not 
forthcoming. Presents of food, weapons, ammunition, and clothing were also necessities 
that Indians came to depend upon. In regions such as Illinois, where Europeans lived at 
the mercy of potentially hostile natives and an uncompromising environment, the 
importance of alliances with friendly Indians meant ever more opportunities for presents. 
A particularly feeble European presence mandated a greater need to placate Indian allies. 
Soldiers and forts that failed to impress Indians would have to pay well to maintain their 
love and friendship.4 
Looking foolish cannot have been high on the list of concerns for Britons 
contemplating the occupation of Fort Chartres in 1764. Chartres was the remotest of all 
French outposts won in the Se~en Years' War, but was also one ofthe strongest and most 
impressive. Built during the 1750s to counter the growing British threat to New Orleans 
and the Mississippi interior, Fort Chartres was a limestone giant that would have looked 
impressive anywhere in North America. Earlier forts at this site, near the Mississippi 
River about a hundred miles above the confluence of the Ohio, were substantial wooden 
4For Indian concepts of reciprocity, gift-giving and Indian-white exchanges as 
contests of power, see David Murray, Indian Giving, 15-47. Richard White argues that 
presents were not bribery, but instead represented to Indians ''the visible evidence of 
love, devotion, and good faith." The Middle Ground, 112-19; 380. 
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structures that failed to withstand the wet environment of the Mississippi sloughs.5 In 
1751, French authorities began construction of a new stone fort, designed by noted 
engineer Fran9ois Saucier in the popular European Vauban style.6 Compared to other 
French posts in the Illinois country, such as those at Kaskaskia and St. Louis, Fort 
Chartres was huge. Its sides measured 490 feet each, with walls 18 feet tall and more than 
2 feet thick. The interior encompassed almost four acres and several buildings, most built 
of stone two stories high. Fort Chartres usually held garrisons of at least 150 men and 
was defended by at least 20 cannon.7 As a defensive outpost, Fort Chartres must have 
seemed nearly impenetrable to the region's Indians, most ofwhom had probably never 
seen a stone fort. 
But for all its impressiveness, Fort Chartres was not built with intimidation in 
mind. The fort's stone construction was a response to the environmental hazards of the 
Mississippi Valley region, where wooden forts could not expect to last more than a 
couple of decades in the humid, frequently flooded lowlands. Its effectiveness as a 
defensive outpost was never tested by British or Indian attack during the Seven Years' 
5For descriptions of the two earlier wooden French forts, also named Chartres, see 
Jane F. Babson, "The Architecture of Early Illinois Forts," Journal of the Illinois State 
Historical Society, 61 (1968): 17-22, and David Keene, "Fort de Chartres: Archaeology 
in the Illinois Country," in French Colonial Archaeology: The Illinois Country and the 
Western Great Lakes, ed. John A. Walthall (Urbana: University oflllinois Press, 1991), 
30-31. 
6Saucier was a draftsman in great demand in Louisiana and Illinois, and at the 
time ofhis appointment to design Fort de Chartres he was busy planning improvements 
to the French fort at Mobile. See Walter J. Saucier and Kathrine Wagner Seineke, 
"Fran9ois Saucier, Engineer of Fort de Chartres, Illinois," in Frenchmen and French 
Ways in the Mississippi Valley, ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1969), 199-227. The Vauban style of fort was the prevalent plan ofthe day 
for substantial forts in America and Europe, and consisted of a polygonal design with 
bastions at the comers to command the curtains. 
7For a general description of the fort and its surroundings, see Babson, 
"Architecture," 23-28. 
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War, but its main purpose was not military. Fort Chartres acted as the administrative 
center of the French Illinois colony and as the seat of the colony's governors. Though 
protecting the fur trade remained an important consideration at Fort Chartres, most of the 
actual trading took place in the area's trading towns, especially Kaskaskia to the south 
and Cahokia to the north, or deep within Indian country itself. Fort Chartres's garrison 
was more concerned with administering the sale and distribution of farmland and 
maintaining order amongst thousands of nearby settlers and hundreds of slaves. Almost 
all them were engaged in agricultural activities rather than the fur business. With a 
civilian population employed almost entirely in fanning, Illinois resembled the English 
colonies along the Atlantic more than other French colonies based on fishing or fur 
trading. 8 This familiarity should have provided an advantage to incoming English 
administrators. 
Thousands of permanent Indian residents lived alongside the French settlers and 
African and Creole slaves inhabiting the villages around Fort Chartres. Two villages of 
Michigameas lived only a couple of miles from the fort. Fifteen miles to the south, 
8Fort Chartres's occupation as a mercantile administrative center rather than a fur 
entrepot has been established in part through archaeological study of its settlement 
pattern compared with other French sites. See Keene, "Fort de Chartres," 33-41, for a 
discussion and summary of archaeological research on Fort Chartres. Agriculture, social 
patterns, and village organization made French colonial Illinois resemble English colonial 
patterns more than prevalent French ones. Illinois agriculture produced exceptional 
surpluses of grain and provisioned French forts throughout Illinois, as well as sending 
hundreds ofthousands of pounds of food down the Mississippi for export. An incisive 
study of the nature of agricultural life in French Illinois is Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in 
the Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1998). For a briefer description and comparison between French Illinois 
and English colonies, which posits that the shared manorial village experience of English 
and French fanners dictated colonial settlement patterns to a far greater degree than 
religious, national, or legal traditions, see Winstanley Briggs, "Le Pays de Illinois," 
WMQ, 3rd ser. 47:1 (Jan. 1990): 30-56. 
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Kaska ski as maintained a permanent village about a mile from the French village of that 
name. Even at those nearby villages, Indian residents disappeared for months at a time on 
hunting trips. Other Illinois groups, including Peorias and Cahokias from farther north, 
made frequent visits to the French posts up and down the Mississippi. 
Local Indians looked to the French for protection as well as economic · 
opportunities and presents. Through the early and mid-eighteenth century, Illinois groups 
suffered attacks by Fox and Sauk groups from the north, Kickapoos and Potawatomis 
from the Wabash region, and Chickasaws, Creeks, and Cherokees from the southeast. 
Equally powerful Osage, Missouri, and Sioux groups pressured the Illinois region from 
west of the Mississippi. Illinois Indians fought and negotiated with surrounding groups of 
Indians and maintained modest livings through the fur trade. By 1757, Illinois Indians 
reportedly sent several hundred packs of furs down the Mississippi each year.9 Because 
ofFort Chartres's sensitive geographic location, beside the Mississippi between the 
mouths of the Ohio and the Missouri, its garrison would encounter Indian groups from 
throughout the American interior.10 
Indians whom British newcomers met at Fort Chartres were often belligerent. 
Many Illinois groups participated in the 1763 Indian uprising and maintained their 
animus long after the main hostilities ceased. Much of the credit for preparing such a 
9
"Memoir ofBougainville," WHC, 18:176-77. 
1
°For an overview of the many Illinois Indian groups living near Fort Chartres 
during the century preceding the British occupation, see Emily J. Blasingham, "The 
Depopulation ofthe Illinois Indians, Part 1," Ethnohistory 3:3 (Summer, 1956): 193-211. 
Kathleen DuVal provides a full study of Osage and Quapaw dominance in the lower and 
central Mississippi Valley, which presents clues as to why the British would encounter 
difficulties in impressing and negotiating with Indians in the area. The Native Ground: 
Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
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harsh reception for the new British masters of Illinois must go to Pontiac himself, who 
concentrated on fomenting rebellion in the Illinois heartland after his siege of Detroit 
failed. Charlot Kaske, a Shawnee resistance leader, may have accomplished even more in 
turning the region's residents against British rule. Both of these Indian insurgents lobbied 
forcefully for aid in their rebellion from the French commanders in Illinois. When 
rebuffed by them, they organized Illinois Indians and French habitants into anti-British 
cadres who they hoped would prevent the British takeover of the Illinois country. 11 But 
opposition to British rule also came from many grassroots sources, and was remarkably 
heartfelt. 
Indians in the region needed little encouragement to oppose the incoming British 
regime. They feared that it would bring English settlers and expansionist Indian groups 
from the east to displace them. They also worried that British commandants would be 
less generous with gifts than their French forbears. Up and down the Mississippi, Indians 
llUntil recently historians granted Pontiac most of the credit for inciting anti-
British fervor in Illinois. J. H. Schlarman, From Quebec to New Orleans, The Story of the 
French in America: Fort de Chartres (Belleville, IL: Buechler Publishing Company, 
1929), 376-96; Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, 265-87. Pontiac was 
undoubtedly effective at inspiring Illinois Indians, and even better at convincing British 
authorities of his influence. For much of 1764 and 1765, Thomas Gage was convinced 
that Pontiac was the key to effectively implanting British rule in Illinois and that the 
Ottawa headman must either be brought over to British interests or "knocked in the 
head." Gage to Johnson, July 2, 1764, WJP, 11:249-50. Richard White argues that 
Pontiac's status was, at least in part, a creation of British Indian policy. By imbuing the 
Ottawa leader with pan-Indian importance, Gage and Johnson made dealing with him the 
solution to Indian resistance in Illinois. The Middle Ground, 295-300. More recently, 
historians have elevated Kaske' s role in encouraging Indian and habitant resistance to 
British rule. Gregory Evans Dowd suggests that Kaske might have been a stauncher 
advocate of the Delaware Prophet Neolin's message of native cultural rebirth than 
Pontiac himself. Dowd also emphasizes Kaske's close associations and friendships with 
French officials in Illinois and New Orleans. War Under Heaven, 217-19. White 
emphasizes Kaske's role as a resistance leader after Pontiac decided to moderate his anti-
British efforts. The Middle Ground, 300-05. 
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took up anns against English traders and dismissed official French pleas to accept the 
inevitability ofBritish rule.12 Rumors ran rampant that French habitants and traders were 
inciting Indians and preparing to resist British occupiers. This spirit of resistance 
manifested itself during the first futile British attempt to occupy Fort Chartres. 
On February 27, 1764, 12 boats carrying 324 soldiers and 47 women and children, 
under the command of Major Arthur Loftus, attempted to ascend the Mississippi from 
New Orleans. Such ascents, against the river's current, were always arduous, time-
consuming, and dangerous. Three weeks later, about two hundred miles upriver from 
New Orleans, a small party of Tunica Indians attacked the convoy. Already terrified by 
French warnings oflndian depredations on the Mississippi and lacking knowledge of 
local Indian ways, Loftus ordered a full retreat to New Orleans. He blamed Louisiana's 
governor D'Abbadie for encouraging the attacks, despite the governor's many warnings 
against attempting the ascent. But the attack was a warning to Britain and served as a 
harsh welcome to the region for the new masters ofillinois.13 Gage seemed unsurprised 
and somewhat relieved that more people were not lost in the attack; he feared that lavish 
Indian presents would probably be necessary to possess the Illinois country. "We have 
been obliged to do the same with many States in Africa we despise," he wrote glumly to 
12In late 1763, at the height ofthe Indian uprising, French officials could do little 
to placate Indian belligerents in Illinois, despite genuine attempts. Pierre Joseph Neyon 
de Villiers to Jean-Jacques-Blaise D'Abbadie, Dec. 1, 1763, WHC, 18:259-61. 
13For the French account ofLoftus's failed expedition, see Collections of the 
Illinois State Historical Library (Springfield: The Library, 1903-), 10:225-32 (hereafter 
cited as IHC). For Loftus's account of the attack, see Loftus to Gage, Apr. 9, 1764, IHC, 
10:237-38. French leaders criticized Loftus for disregarding their warnings and retreating 
in the face of what they considered a small, routine Indian attack. They estimated the 
number of attackers as about thirty men. Loftus thought 200 Indians had attacked, and he 
and his four officers immediately agreed to retreat all the way to New Orleans. 
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William Johnson. The commander-in-chiefbegan planning for an expensive 
• 14 
occupation. 
For Indians in the region south of Illinois, payment was not the issue. To find out 
why the Tunicas and others had attacked the English convoy, the French commandant at 
Pointe Coupee, D'Esmazellieres, simply called them to his post and asked them why they 
did not keep their promises not to bother the English. The delegation's chiefs, Perruquier 
and Bride le Boeuf, responded disdainfully to their French ally. "Do you find us guilty? 
Have us put in irons and send us to the great chief," they dared the commandant, "We 
shall see if he will have us put to death." When D'Esmazellieres reminded the chiefs that 
the British were determined to pass through their lands and carry on to Illinois, they 
showed remarkable solidarity with their Illinois neighbors, and outlined some of their 
anti-British complaints: 
The red men of that territory will never let them pass. The French, our brothers, 
have never given us any disease, but the English have scarcely arrived, and they 
have caused nearly all our children to die by the smallpox they have brought. 
Notice, father, if we were to let them settle on the river, they would build forts 
and forts; and as soon as they were established, they would kill our brothers, the 
French, and poison us. Father, become angry if you will; our plan is to go and 
await them on the Point aux Ecors; and if they wish to return, we shall have the 
glory of driving them away again.15 
With Illinois still in Indian and French hands at the close of 1764, occupying the 
region began to seem impractical. Reports from the few British intelligence sources in 
Illinois (mostly British traders) confirmed the enormity ofthe undertaking. John 
Bradstreet, fresh from squandering his chance to negotiate a meaningful denouement to 
the Indian uprising in Ohio country, informed his superiors of his views on the Illinois 
14Johnson to Gage, June 9, 1764, WJP, 11:223. 
15 D'Esmazellieres to D'Abbadie, Mar. 14, 1764, IHC, 10:236. 
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problem. He had been assured by "persons lately from the Illinois" that 600 French 
habitants and 1,000 black slaves, all armed and ready to fight, would never allow British 
troops to take possession of the region. Furthermore, French residents had so incited the 
western Indians with tales of imminent British depredations that no convoys would ever 
be allowed up the Mississippi. "The only way to establish ourselves amongst the 
Savages," he opined, "is to begin, by coming upon them by ways unfrequented, 
undiscovered, and with such Force, as shall make such an impression as shall be lasting." 
Bradstreet understood the value of overawing Indians with a strong first impression and 
suggested sending at least three thousand regular troops down the Ohio River quickly and 
quietly. With such a strong and sudden occupation, and with the purchased aid of other 
Indian groups in the region, Illinois and Wabash Indians and habitants would put aside 
their dreams of a French return and accept British authority.16 
If Bradstreet suspected that only a large, rapid invasion could quickly implant 
British rule on the Mississippi, then the terrible thought must have crossed the minds of 
Indian resistance leaders as well. They continued to hope for French help, but as time 
went on it became clear that the long-rumored awakening of the French father in America 
would never happen. 17 After D' Abbadie's death on February 4, 1765, Charlot Kaske lost 
no time in meeting with the new governor of Louisiana, Charles Aubry. Accompanied by 
Illinois chiefLevancher, he was surprised and unhappy to find Aubry accompanied by 
three English officers, including Indian Superintendent for the Southern Department John 
16
"[John] Bradstreet's Thoughts on Indian Affairs," Dec. 4, 1764, NYCD, 7:693. 
17Except for the occasional gossip of French traders, there was probably little 
reason for Indians to expect the French to return. Gregory Evans Dowd has argued 
convincingly that Indians spread such rumors to influence the French and induce them to 
return. Dowd, "The French King Wakes Up In Detroit: 'Pontiac's War' in Rumor and 
History," Ethnohistory 37:3 (Summer 1990): 254-78. 
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Stuart, and his agent Pierce Sinnot. Kaske was polite to the British visitors, but warned 
them to stay out of his own village of Scioto. Shawnees there feared losing their lands to 
settlers, and Kaske could not answer for the safety of any British interloper. 
Levancher was more direct. "I came from the Illinois to see if it were true that the 
country had been ceded to the English and having learned it I am surprised that the 
emperor has ceded it," he groused to Aubry and his visitors. "Since he rejects us, we are 
masters of our bodies and our lands." Turning to the British officers, he warned them that 
it would take some time to earn the Illinois Indians' trust: "You English only ask to kill; 
you have caused the red men to die; do not be surprised if I speak to you likewise; if I 
scold you, my heart is still sore because I have seen so many French and Indians die 
together. When the English conduct themselves well toward the red men, we shall look 
upon them with pleasure."18 With the French governor's influence fading among resistant 
Illinois natives, the British would be on their own in finding a solution to the impasse. 
Through the winter and spring of 1765, individual British emissaries made their 
way to Fort Chartres, with varying degrees of success. Alexander Maisonville and 
Jacques Godfroi, two trader-interpreters with wide and deep connections in Indian 
country, made the trip from Detroit to Chartres in February. They met with several 
Illinois chiefs, who voiced guarded suggestions that they might agree to live under a 
British regime. The next effort, by Lt. John Ross and trader Hugh Crawford, did not end 
as well. Fearful of a rumored incursion into Illinois by Pontiac and three thousand 
followers, Ross and Crawford made haste from Mobile to Fort Chartres in February. 19 
18Speeches of Charlot Kaske and Levacher to Aubry et al., Feb. 24, 1765, IHC, 
10:448-51. 
19Ross to Robert Parmar, Feb. 21, 1765, IHC, 10:442-43. 
245 
There the fort's commandant, St. Ange, arranged for them to meet with headmen of the 
Kaskaskias, Cahokias, Peorias, Michigameas, Osages, and Missouris. These delegates 
declared angrily that they would never submit to British occupation and seemed offended 
at Ross's very presence. Tomeroy, a Kaskaskia chief, ordered Ross and Crawford to 
leave immediately and warned that if any Englishmen tried to return, their warriors would 
make them "fall in the water." An Osage chief, enraged at seeing Ross in St. Ange's 
house, tried to attack the English officer with a hatchet and would have killed him if St. 
Ange had not intervened. When St. Ange heard that Chippewa and Potawatomi chiefs 
were on their way to capture Ross and Crawford, they finally fled for their lives down the 
Mississippi.20 With another major attempt to ascend the river from Mobile scheduled for 
that summer, British advance men marked little success in making favorable impressions 
on the region's Indians. So far, the Indians had done all the intimidating, and more 
diplomacy would be needed.21 
Events in 1765 marked little improvement in making a good British impression on 
the Illinois inhabitants, despite a vigorous campaign of diplomacy and military force. 
Gage ordered veteran Indian agent George Croghan and Lt. Alexander Fraser to travel 
down the Ohio, from Fort Pitt to Fort Chartres, to size up the situation. They were to take 
several respected Shawnee and Delaware chiefs with them to avoid trouble with 
belligerent Indians and to prove that those nations had made their peace with Britain. 
Gage suggested that Croghan remind Indians in Illinois that Cherokees and Chickasaws 
20Ross to Farmar, May 25, 1765, IHC, 10:481-83; "Crawford's Statement," Aug. 
10, 1765,JHC, 10:481-83; St. Ange to D' Abbadie, April 7, 1765, IHC, 10:476-80. St. 
Ange had not yet heard about D'Abbadie's death; news could take months to travel up 
the Mississippi. 
21Dowd, War Under Heaven, 219-21. 
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could be induced to ravage the region on Britain's behalf and that Sauk, Fox, and Sioux 
groups were eager to help as well. Above all, Illinois Indians were to be told that the 
English would not attempt the kind of invasion suggested by Bradstreet, unless the 
Indians "by their own folly and Obstinancy" forced them to do so. At the same time, 
another Mississippi convoy, commanded by Major Robert Parmar, would proceed upriver 
and occupy Fort Chartres and the surrounding towns. 22 
Croghan's expedition began with an unfortunate series of trade-inspired delays. In 
early March, when Croghan and his party set out for Fort Pitt enroute to Fort Chartres, he 
brought along Indian trade goods from the Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Company. 
Since Gage had not yet approved the commencement of British trading in Illinois, 
Croghan hid the goods among presents sent by the crown for the Illinois Indians. Col. 
Henry Bouquet had issued a pass for the presents and Croghan hoped that this pass would 
also protect his illicit goods. This would make him and his allied Philadelphia traders first 
on the scene in Illinois. However, Croghan had not counted on the anti-Indian Paxton 
uprising in Pennsylvania. The "Paxtoners" sought to interdict any provincial supplies 
destined for Indians, and on March 5 they disregarded Bouquet's pass and destroyed most 
of Croghan's trade goods .. When Johnson heard about the attack and the unauthorized 
goods, he warned Croghan that he would have to defend his actions. Gage was less 
sympathetic. "Mr. Croghan thought to take advantage of his Employment, to be first at 
the market and to make his Business an Affair of Trade, instead of Carrying on the 
Service," Gage accused. To make matters worse, Croghan had asked the Shawnee and 
Delaware chiefs and their followers to hold a conference with him at Fort Pitt, causing a 
22Gage to Fraser, and Gage to Croghan, Dec. 30, 1764, Gage Papers AS, vol. 29. 
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necessary but unexpected delay. Though Croghan later cleared himself of wrongdoing by 
proving that he had Bouquet's permission to disguise the trade goods as presents, it was 
an inauspicious start and delay for his Illinois expedition.23 
Fraser grew tired of waiting for Croghan and set out in a bateau with Alexander 
Maisonville and ten other men for Fort Chartres. Fraser, Maisonville, and three of the 
men arrived at Kaskaskia on April 17 and almost immediately encountered suspicious 
Indian enquiring about their mission. Fraser knew that John Ross had been allowed to 
leave Illinois alive on the condition that no other Englishmen would come, so he treaded 
lightly. He left his supply train at Kaskaskia (where they were subsequently attacked and 
plundered), and went to Fort Chartres to meet with St. Ange. Suddenly, Pontiac and 
several of his followers grabbed Fraser and threatened to kill him. St. Ange pleaded 
successfully for Fraser's life. Pontiac agreed to tum him over, though over a course of 
several days Fraser endured more captivities and cruelties by Pontiac's men, especially 
during several alcohol-fueled revels when Pontiac was too indisposed to protect him. But 
unlike Loftus and Ross, Fraser held his ground and managed eventually to make a good 
impression on Pontiac. When St. Ange advised Fraser to flee, he insisted upon staying 
and parleying with the hostile Indians. When Pontiac challenged Fraser's claims that the 
Shawnees and Delawares were at peace with Britain, he did not back down. Illinois 
Indians eventually apologized to Fraser for attacking and holding his men at Kaskaskia; 
they privately claimed that Pontiac made them do it. Fraser fmally did flee down the 
Mississippi, at Pontiac's insistence. He left behind some Illinois Indians more amenable 
23Johnson to Croghan, Apr. 4, 1765, WJP, 4:706-07; Johnson to John Penn, Apr. 
12,1765, WJP, 4:710-ll;GagetoJohnson,Apr.l5, 1765, WJP, 4:717-19;Johnsonto 
Penn, June 7, 1765, WJP, 11:776-77. 
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to British rule, though many other groups, especially Ojibwas and Potawatomis from the 
Great Lakes region, remained "resolved not to admit the English to come into their 
country."24 When another British delegation arrived in June, sent this time by John Stuart, 
they met with similar threats and insults and fled in a similar fashion.Z5 
Croghan found even greater danger on his journey, but more diplomatic success. 
After meeting with Shawnee and Delaware delegates at Fort Pitt and eliciting hopeful 
promises of peace, Croghan felt that he could continue on to Fort Chartres.26 He set off 
down the Ohio on May 15, with a party that included Shawnee and Delaware delegates to 
corroborate his messages of peace to the Western Indians. On June 8, near the mouth of 
the Wabash River, a large party ofKickapoos and Mascoutins attacked the expedition, 
killing five men and wounding everyone else. Three ofthe five dead were Shawnee 
delegates and their deaths made the swprise attack into a major diplomatic blunder for 
the western Indian resistance movement. Threats of British incursions only served to 
anger Illinois and Wabash Indians, but the Shawnees were a known and potent danger in 
the region, and now a blood feud had been incited. Croghan and the other survivors were 
marched to Vincennes and then to Ouiatonen, where he repeatedly tried to convince his 
24
"Report of Alexander Fraser on Indians in the Illinois Country," Gage Papers 
AS, vol. 137:4; Fraser to Gage, May 15, 1765, IHC, 10:491-92; Fraser to Campbell, May 
17, 1765, JHC, 1 0:493-94; Fraser to Gage, May 18, 1765, IHC, 1 0:494-95; Fraser to 
Campbell, May 20, 1765, IHC, 10:495-97; Gage to Johnson, July 25, 1765, WJP, 4:798-
800. 
25This delegation consisted ofPierce Acton Sinnot and Harpain de la Gauterais. 
Croghan to Johnson, August 17, 1765, WJP, 11 :900; Gage to Johnson, June 30, 1765, 
WJP, 4:779. Stuart later claimed unconvincingly that his sending Sinnot to Illinois helped 
the eventual takeover of Fort Chartres. Stuart to Johnson, Mar. 30, 1766, WJP, 12:54-55. 
See also Dowd's description of the Fraser and Sinnot expeditions in War Under Heaven, 
223-25. 
26For a short description of Croghan's dealings at Fort Pitt in 1765, see Jon 
William Parmenter, "Pontiac's War: Forging New Links in the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant 
Chain," Ethnohistory, 44:4 (Autumn 1997): 635-36. 
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captors that peace with Britain would be preferable to war with the Shawnees, Delawares, 
and southern Indian nations. 
Finally, Croghan met Pontiac, just returned from his meetings at Fort Chartres 
with Fraser. After many parleys, Pontiac and Croghan traveled to Detroit to finalize a 
mutually agreeable peace. Pontiac guaranteed that Croghan and other British forces 
would have safe passage into Illinois. The British would be allowed to garrison French 
posts, but not to expand settlements without Indians' permission. Croghan later admitted 
to Johnson, "The Killing ofthe Shawanese Deputies, & Plundering me hath been of more 
Service to his Majesty's Indian Interest, than a considerable Sum Expended in presents." 
The door to Illinois was finally open, due more to an excess of Indian exuberance than to 
any appearance of British strength. To accomplish their goals in Illinois, the new British 
occupants of Fort Chartres would still need to prove their mettle.27 
British authorities at Fort Pitt took advantage of the unexpected peace made at 
Ouiatonen, as well as unseasonably high water levels in the Ohio River, and immediately 
sent a company of the 42nd Infantry under the command of Capt. Thomas Sterling to hold 
Fort Chartres. Sterling's detail made rapid progress through the Ohio country, reaching 
Chartres on October 10. Local Indians were caught by surprise; usually they received 
intelligence from their Shawnee and Potawatomi allies about any large convoy traveling 
down the Ohio. When Sterling's men appeared suddenly, Indians "came running with 
27George Croghan, "Croghan's Journal, 1765," in Rueben Gold Thwaits, ed., 
Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1904-1907), 1:126-66; 
Croghan to Johnson, July 12, 1765, WJP, 11:836-41; Johnson to Gage, Aug. 9, 1765, 
WJP, 11 :880; Croghan to Johnson, Aug. 17, 1765, WJP, 11 :900-01; Johnson to Gage, 
Oct. 26, 1765, WJP, 4:859; Croghan to Johnson, Nov. 1765, NYCD, 7:788. For a fuller 
elucidation of Croghan's "divide and rule" strategy in his 1765 meetings at Ouiatonen 
and Detroit, see Dowd, War Under Heaven, 225-28. 
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pipes and belts." When they discovered that Sterling brought only a small detachment 
and a dozen Indians, they began to act insolently and threaten the soldiers, but by then 
Sterling and his men were safely ensconced in the fort. This was a lucky break for 
Sterling. None of the local chiefs had been at Ouiatonen or knew about the peace made 
there, and might have felt free to attack the British company. 28 
Sterling raised the British colors over Fort Chartres and took official possession of 
what one of his lieutenants described as "one of the prettiest stone forts'' he had ever 
seen. Unfortunately, the fort was almost completely devoid of ammunition and stores and 
the French had removed most of the functioning artillecy.29 Sterling took note of the 
fort's deficiencies and counted the local Indians living near the fort. 30 He then proceeded 
to read Gage's proclamation announcing the new regime to any French habitants that 
remained in the nearby villages of Chartres and Kaskaskia. Sterling reported that only a 
few French troops had garrisoned the fort since the end of the Seven Years' War and the 
Indians had been "quite Masters" of the region, treating the habitants "as they thought 
proper." This, thought Sterling, accounted for so many French residents fleeing to the 
western side of the river. It is more likely that they simply did not wish to remain under 
British rule and reasonably expected violence to erupt during the British takeover.31 This 
remained a possibility for the new garrison. Robert Parmar's occupying force had not yet 
arrived from Mobile and winter was closing in. Surrounded by hostile natives, without 
28The British description of the official surrender of Fort Chartres is in IHC, 
11:275-76. For the reactions of the Indians, see Gage to Johnson, Dec. 30, 1765, WJP, 
11:988; Gage to Johnson, Feb. 10, 1766, WJP, 11:16. 
29James Eddingstone to [unknown], Oct. 17, 1765, IHC, 11:105-06. 
30Sterling counted 150 warriors living in the Kaskaskia Indian village, and 40 
Michigameas and 250 Peorias living in the closest village, about a mile upriver from the 
fort. Sterling to Gage, Dec. 15, 1765,/HC, 11:124-27. 
31 SterlingtoGage,Oct.18, 1765,/HC, 11:107-11. 
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sufficient stores, ammunition, working cannon, or even an interpreter, Sterling and his 
small band faced tense times in the great limestone fort. 
George Croghan was not going to let Sterling's inconveniences interrupt the 
diplomatic momentum he had started at Ouiatonen and Detroit. He wrote exuberantly to 
Johnson, "All doubts are removed respecting our obtaining Possession of the Illinois 
Country; Capt. Sterling being Arrived and received, at Fort Chartres, with open Arms by 
the Natives & without meeting, with the least Interruption, on his Passage thither." 
Despite the region being surrounded by "four very Powerful Indian Confederacys," 
Croghan was happy to note that their possession of Illinois was brought about "with the 
Natives Consent, which however, we could not do by Force, Tho' attempted, at a very 
Considerable expence, for two years past." Of course, a garrison of any size was 
· vulnerable to an Indian siege, especially with long, fragile supply lines leading down the 
Ohio that could be cut off at any time. Croghan recommended making a colony out of the 
Illinois and establishing civil government, as the French had done. With an influx of 
British settlers, the European population would soon exceed that of the Indians and allow 
Illinois to become a profitable agricultural colony instead of a drain on the crown's 
assets.32 
Sterling's stay at Fort Chartres was short. On December 2, 1765, Parmar and the 
34th Regiment arrived to relieve Sterling's men and to begin the occupation of Illinois in 
earnest. It had taken five arduous months for Farmar's convoy to navigate upstream from 
Mobile, partly because his river pilot had deserted enroute. The situation he found offered 
little compensation for his troubles. He immediately realized that Fort Chartres was 
32Croghan to Johnson, Dec. 27, 1765, WJP, 4:886-89. 
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'likely to be carried away by the River" in a matter of months, despite its size and stone 
construction. Furthermore, local farmers could supply no more than 50,000 pounds of 
flour and 1 ,250 pounds of corn meal, which would supply the men of the garrison only 
until July and leave none for the four thousand-or-so Indians from throughout the region 
that could be expected in the summer. Presents would be needed to placate Indian 
visitors, but most ofFarmar's had been ruined in the journey and the rest had been given 
to friendly Indians they met along the way. Finally, Farmar found the remaining 
habitants to be just as hostile to his presence as many of the Indians. But the biggest 
problem might have been Farmar himself, who saw French intrigue everywhere and, 
according to Gage, was "not very knowing in the Treating or Management of Indians." 
Britain had occupied Illinois, but creating an appearance of strength would take more 
time.33 
Farmar's provisioning problems would remain a constant detriment to the British 
occupation of Fort Chartres. Planted in the midst of what Croghan had once called the 
"granary of Louisiana," the British garrison lacked sufficient numbers to police the fur 
trade, placate local Indians, and still provide agricultural labor. French residents had 
always faced a labor shortage in the region, necessitating the use of over a thousand 
slaves. The French had provisioned Fort Chartres twice a year by huge convoys sent from 
New Orleans. With that city under Spanish control, most provisions would have to come 
down the Ohio from Fort Pitt, or through Illinois from Detroit. In March 1766, Farmar 
reported that he would need 50,000 more pounds of flour from local sources before he 
33Farmar to Gage, Dec. 16-19, 1765, IHC, 11:131-34; Gage to Johnson, Mar. 9, 
1766, WJP, 12:39-40. 
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could hope to be provisioned again.34 In April, only 2,000 pounds of wheat flour and 
7,000 pounds of com meal were available from all local sources.35 Buffalo meat could 
sometimes be counted on when grain supplies ran low, but hunting in Indian country 
carried its own hazards. For example, in May 1766 Parmar reported that a Fox Indian raid 
on the Kaskaskias made buffalo hunting too risky. Even when buffalo meat could be 
provided, supplies of cured or salted meat spoiled easily in the Illinois heat. Indeed, in 
early summer, Indians started to arrive at Fort Chartres asking for meat; the French had 
always given it to them, they said. Parmar was reduced to telling them that the British had 
no meat even for themselves. This actually incurred some sympathy from the visiting 
Indians, though probably not much respect. 36 
Part ofthis supply problem was the tenuousness ofthe French habitants' 
affections to the new British regime. Labor shortages remained throughout the British 
occupation, even after some French farmers returned to their lands east of the 
Mississippi. But with the threat oflndian attacks always present, French fanners could 
not be relied upon to help the garrison in times of trouble. In 1770, Joseph Moore, Fort 
Chartres's deputy commissary, noted that even with an abundance of buffalo, Indian 
com, and wheat that could be produced nearby, the French would often withhold their 
stores of food if they feared imminent Indian uprisings. The few English fanners in 
Illinois could probably be counted on to help feed the garrison, but unless a provisioning 
system could be arranged that placed "as Slender a Relyance as possible on the French 
34Farmar to Gage, Mar. 28, 1766, Gage Papers AS, vol. 50. 
35Farmar to Gage, Apr. 8, 1766, Gage Papers AS, vol. 50. 
36Farmar to Gage, May 9, 1766, Gage Papers AS, vol. 51. 
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inhabitants," the fort could never be secured.37 Croghan suggested that sufficient 
provisions could be purchased at Vincennes, the largest settlement between Fort Chartres 
and Detroit, but the farmers there would not take French or British currency as payment. 
Croghan argued that, as dangerous as it might be to ship caches of silver through Indian 
country, buying from Vincennes would still be easier and more convenient than 
provisioning Fort Chartres from Fort Pitt or New Orleans.38 But outside provisioning 
would be needed throughout British tenure at the fort. In the later years of the British 
regime, Fort Chartres and the smaller posts at Cahokia and Kaskaskia had to maintain 
huge, expensive stockpiles of consumable (and perishable) goods in store, in case of 
Indian attacks, Spanish incursions, or any number of other troubles.39 
At the heart ofthe Illinois labor crisis was the number of French settlers fleeing to 
the French/Spanish side of the Mississippi. Many of Kaskaskia's residents had fled and 
those who remained lived haphazardly in scattered houses, where their livestock was at 
the mercy of thieves. Cahokia's inhabitants who remained worked mainly in the fur trade 
and produced few'agricultural goods. Neither town was well guarded; Engineer Philip 
Pittman described the "fort" at Cahokia as differing from the other houses there only "in 
it's being one of the poorest.',..° Chartres Village had been nearly emptied during the 
interlude between the war's end and the British arrival. Now, residents continued to 
abandon their houses without giving notice at the fort, leaving legal titles to the properties 
37Moore to Robert Leake, Aug. 17, 1770, Gage Papers AS, vol. 94. 
38Croghan to Gage, Jan. 12, 1767, WJP, 12:253-55. 
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unclear.41 At Cahokia, this issue created Indian-British land disputes. Indians felt that 
they should be allowed to reoccupy lands they sold to the French settlers after the 
properties had been abandoned. This promised trouble for the British, who had always 
expected to be allowed to purchase French lands previously bought from lndians.42 
· Local Indians also fled from the region during the British regime. Rumors 
persisted throughout the entire British tenure of French plots to tum local Indians against 
the British, and these may have accounted for some Indian dislocation. Farmer and one of 
his officers, Capt. James Campbell, both reported rumors supposedly spread by French 
traders that the English were putting poison in the food and liquor given to Indians. A 
group ofMissouris made a long trip to Fort Chartres in April1766 specifically to discern 
the veracity of this report, and to warn Fannar that if any of their people died from 
poisoned English goods, other nations would avenge them. These Missouris believed the 
rumor to such an extent that they refused to drink any English liquor until they saw 
Fannar and his men drink it first.43 Many Indians who fled across the Mississippi did so 
out of panic that the British would attack them for their roles in the Indian uprising. 
Others believed that the English would kill them to steal their land, or out of pure hatred. 
Some of these natives returned as soon as they saw that the garrison had no interest in 
subduing any local Indians.44 During the first year of the British regime, dislocation of 
41
"Retum ofHouses" Mar. 19, 1766, Gage Papers AS, vol. 50; John Jennings, 
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42Farmar to Gage, Apr. 24, 1766, Gage Papers AS, vol. 50. 
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local populations made stabilizing the region a hard task for the fort's beleaguered 
garrison. 
English attitudes and prejudices toward the French and Indian inhabitants of 
Illinois cannot have made the situation any easier handle. French colonists must have 
been a pretty rough and hardy lot, as were many English backcountry settlers. But the 
vitriol evident in some British communications shows the nationalistic and racial hatred 
that must have impeded British-French-Indian relations. Croghan hated the French of 
Illinois and the Wabash country with a passion, and suspected them of all sorts of lies and 
schemes. He described the residents of Vincennes as "an idle, lazy people, a parcel of 
renegadoes from Canada" who were "much worse than the Indians." He thought that the 
French settlers living near St. Joseph and Detroit were similarly lazy and indolent, "fond 
of breeding mischief, and spiriting up the Indians against the English."45 Fraser held 
much the same attitude. Ofthe Illinois Indians, he wrote: ''Nothing can equal their 
passion for drunkenness, but that of the French Inhabitants, who are for the greatest part 
drunk every day while they can get Drink to buy in the Colony." Fraser derided the 
French settlers for depending on their black slaves, who were "obliged to Labour very 
hard to Support their Masters in their extravagant Debaucheries." Fraser thought that the 
French of Illinois must all be the descendents of convicts and that they were cruel, 
dishonest, and incapable ofhonest labor.46 And these two men were British diplomats; 
one can only imagine what the rank and file of the garrison might have thought about the 
newest British subjects in Illinois. This French-British cultural conflict only served to 
45
"Croghan's Journal, 1765," in Thwaits, Early Western Travels, 1:145-46. 
46Fraser to Haldimand, May 4, I766, IHC, II :228. 
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empower local Indians, who could always play Europeans against one another for their 
own purposes. 
Fannar hoped to pacify local Indians and habitants during his brief tenure on the 
Mississippi, but his efforts met with little success. The Cahokia land controversy 
occupied his final months at Fort Chartres. He called a peace conference to settle the 
issue in the spring of 1766. As an inducement for peaceful relations, he invited a 
Chickasaw chief and eighteen of his men to attend. All of the Illinois Indians knew that 
Britain's numerous Chickasaw and Cherokee allies could be called to the region in case 
of trouble, either to help enforce British policy among the local natives or to proteCt the 
region against trans-Mississippi incursions. Farmar negotiated a tentative treaty of peace 
between the Illinois and Chickasaw groups, but the agreement carried little weight. Two 
Illinois groups, the Peorias and Cahokias, left the conference "in a huff," according to 
Farmar, because the commandant would not let them occupy the former French lands at 
Cahokia. Some ofthem had been making themselves nuisances there, stealing and killing 
cattle and hogs.47 Farmar would not solve this issue during his tenure; Col. John Reed 
relieved him that summer. 
In August, George Croghan arrived in Illinois with a contingent of Six Nations 
and Delaware delegates to settle the Cahokia land issue and to negotiate a meaningful 
peace. More than one thousand Indians attended, from eight nations on both sides of the 
Mississippi. Croghan needed only two days to satisfY the visiting Indians. Several groups 
returned horses they had stolen from the garrison and promised not to steal or kill any 
more stock. Peorias and Cahokias gave up their attempts to occupy lands they had sold to 
47Fannar to Gage, May 9, 1766, Gage Papers AS, vol. 51. 
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French settlers, and all the attendees agreed that the British could purchase such lands 
:from the French owners, rejecting Pontiac's old argument that the Illinois had never 
permanently sold any land in the region. But the Indians retained their rights to use or 
cede all other lands as they saw fit, and agreed to keep the roads to Fort Chartres open 
and safe. "With a little good Usage, they will soon become a very quiet & Peacable 
People," Croghan wrote to Johnson. "At present Indian Affairs [wear] a different Face in 
this Countty." But he also revealed that his generosity with presents had much to do with 
the Indians' amicability. Having given away most of his £3,000 worth of Indian presents 
to Shawnees and others he and his party met at Scioto, Croghan was forced to purchase 
expensive presents and provisions for the conference from local traders. Given the large 
numbers of attendees, Croghan felt .. There was an absolute necessity of Convincing them 
at this time that the English were as able to Support them as the French. ,,4s Croghan's 
lavishness satisfied the conference delegates, but shortages in provisions and high local 
prices continued. If the British government in Illinois wished to convince Indians of their 
effectiveness in meeting their needs, the effort would be expensive. 
Lack of provisions threatened to challenge the garrison's veneer of competence, 
but deadly epidemics must have made Indians wonder if the newcomers could function at 
all in the Mississippi Valley. During the British tenure, hundreds ofEnglish residents fell 
victim to a "disorder of the country," which disabled and killed dozens of people every 
year. Fort Chartres had been constructed, against many objections, in a low-lying region 
that flooded every spring, leaving sloughs and pools of rancid, standing water that served 
as remarkably efficient breeding grounds for disease. Trader George Morgan, who 
48Croghan to Johnson, Sep. 10, 1766, WJP, 12:176-77; "Report of George 
Croghan," Jan. 16, 1767, Gage Papers AS, vol. 61. 
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arrived at Kaskaskia in 1766 to represent the Philadelphia firm ofBaynton, Wharton, and 
Morgan, noted that between June and October 1766, few inhabitants ofFort Chartres or 
Kaskaskia escaped the ague and fever that accompanied the disease. The sickness was 
"not in itself Mortal," according to Morgan, but the frequency and severity of its onsets 
were such that other more deadly diseases became hard to avoid. Morgan reported that no 
Europeans born in Illinois, English or French, lived beyond the age of fifty, and few 
made it past forty.49 During the 1766 conference at Fort Chartres, so much of the British 
garrison was ill that only three officers and fifty men could perform their duties. Croghan 
himself was so sick that he was forced to return down the Mississippi and take ship at 
New Orleans rather than face the more arduous overland journey to Fort Pitt. 5° The 
disorder hit newcomers to the region almost upon arrival, and could incapacitate 
inhabitants for months at a time until they became acclimated, which usually took at least 
two years. 
George Butricke, an ensign who accompanied Col. John Wilkins to Fort Chartres 
in 1768, described the worst outbreak ofthe disease. Butricke observed that the five 
companies of his Royal American regiment appeared perfectly healthy upon their arrival 
at Kaskaskia in early September. Within three weeks, most of the regiment had 
contracted the disease. Wilkins, all ofhis officers, and almost every soldier fell victim to 
the alternating bouts of chills, shakes, and fever at a rate of 20 men per day. After a week 
ofthis epidemiological onslaught, only 19 men remained healthy enough to guard the 
post. By late October, 28 men, 12 womep, and 15 children lay dead. Winter only 
exacerbated the problem, and by February 1769 fifteen more men had died, along with 
49George Morgan, "Voyage Down the Mississippi," Nov. 21, 1766, IHC, 11:439. 
5
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"almost all the Women and thirty-Seven Children that arrived here with the five 
companys in perfect health," according to Butricke. Many of these later deaths were 
attributed to an outbreak of dysentery that roiled the garrison after the initial fevers had 
abated. This "Bluddy flux" continued to strike the garrison throughout 1769, leaving one 
of the largest forts in North America virtually unprotected.51 
To the outnumbered and sickly men ofFort Chartres's garrison, the entire mission 
in Illinois must have seemed mysterious. They could not hope to withstand a general 
Indian uprising without the help of their eastern and southern Indian allies. Capt. Henry 
Gordon, who escorted English traders to Illinois in the summer of 1766, could hardly 
believe the conditions and situation he found at Fort Chartres. The garrison was sickly, 
the Mississippi had moved to within 26 yards of one of the fort's bastions, and provisions 
and ammunition were low. The fur trade, England's main economic mission in the 
region, had not lived up to expectations because of persistent French competition. To 
Gordon, English occupation of Illinois served only one purpose: to make a show of 
British mastery to the Indians. Given the deplorable state of the British presence, the 
show was unlikely to impress anyone. "Coop'd up at Fort Chartres only, we make a 
foolish figure," he complained. Britain could not control either Indians or habitants with 
a post that lacked sufficient funding and p~ovisions. Local residents refused even to 
extend financial credit to the garrison. 52 
51Butricke to Bamsley, Oct. 30, 1768 and Feb. 12, 1769, IHC, 16:448-50, 496-
500; Morgan to Baynton and Wharton, Oct. 30, 1768, IHC, 16:439-40. Disease was a 
common and deadly problem for soldiers and others at forts throughout North America, 
but few locations matched Fort Chartres in mortality and infection rates. McConnell, 
Army and Empire, 114-26. 
52 Harry Gordon, "Gordon's Journal," Aug. 20, 1766, IHC, 11:301. 
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Part of the problem facing the new Illinois government was that the few British 
posts on the Mississippi could scarcely control, or even influence, the vast interior of 
Illinois and the Wabash country. Without some semblance of order in the region, neither 
the fur trade nor export agriculture would ever show a profit. In London, the financially 
strapped government began to lose patience with the Illinois scheme. Gage defended the 
Fort Chartres operation in 1767, suggesting to the Earl of Shelburne that, despite the 
obvious problems and expenses of the Illinois occupation, the post maintained "a kind of 
Superiority over the Indians." He also argued that Fort Chartres might serve as a check on 
the French habitants, whose allegiances would always be questionable, with so many of 
their countrymen living on the opposite shores of the Mississippi. He hoped that 
Croghan's peace terms and Johnson's Indian management would create a social climate 
that would allow the British to profit as well as the French. 53 
By summer 1768, Gage's optimism about Illinois had begun to sour. The Illinois 
occupation was dangerous, expensive, and ineffective. He started to advocate building 
posts closer to Fort Pitt, Vincennes, and Detroit, where supply and communication lines 
would be less dependent on the good graces ofthe Shawnees and Delawares who 
controlled the Ohio River. 54 Many observers of the situation, some with financial 
interests in the British occupation, advised erecting more trading posts and forts in the 
53Gage to Shelburne, Feb. 22, 1767, in Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., The 
Correspondence ofGeneral Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, 1763-1775 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 122. . 
54Gage to Shelburne, June 16, 1768, Carter, Correspondence, 177-78. 
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Illinois interior, to keep out French traders and to better serve Indian consumers. 55 Some 
wondered ifFort Chartres itselfwas worth the money and effort required to save it from 
the river. James Campbell thought it would be a shame to abandon a fort that had cost the 
French tens of thousands of livres to build, just to save a few hundred pounds. But he 
wondered ifthe whole mission would be worth the overall cost. Two years of failing to 
control illegal traders had "entirely Ruined" the fur trade by 1768, according to 
Campbell. Even French and Spanish traders found trouble raising operating capital for 
trading expeditions into the north and west. 56 Fort Chartres was rapidly becoming a post 
without a mission. 
Morgan confirmed this shrinking ofthe trade in late 1767. Reed had hindered 
business by charging traders excessive fines and fees every time they passed the fort. And 
English traders could not operate safely very far from Fort Chartres because British 
troops could not control the region's interior. "An English Trader cannot at present with 
the least Security ofhis Life venture even to Post Vincent (Vincennes) for want of a 
garrison there," he wrote to his partners. Trading farther north was no safer. "To ascend 
the Mississippi or the Illinois Rivers with goods would be certain Death," Morgan fretted, 
"So great is the influence of the French in that Part, by our not having a Post at the Mouth 
55Reed to Gage, July 21, 1767, Gage Papers AS, vol. 67; William Johnson, 
"Review ofthe Trade and Affairs of the Indians in the Northern District of America," 
NYCD, 7:974; Croghan to Johnson, Oct. 18, 1767, WJP, 5:736; William Franklin, 
"Advantages of an Illinois Colony," July 10, 1766, WJP, 5:320-30. 
56Campbell to Gage, June 22, 1768, Gage Papers AS, vol. 78. 
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of the latter."57 For Morgan, the first significant British trader to operate in the region, the 
fault lay with the British insistence on keeping the center of government at the 
Mississippi, instead of distributing military assets closer to busy trade centers like 
Vincennes. Fewer and fewer Indians visited Kaskaskia to trade. With a diminished 
market for Indian trade goods, Morgan's company had to make up their losses through 
the sale of slaves and liquor to habitants and the garrison. 58 Supply and communication 
lines to the east, which were almost wholly dependent on Indian messengers and guides, 
were tenuous and unpredictable. This complicated Morgan's management of the 
company's Illinois venture.59 
Prospects for bringing the region under control were frustrated from the start by 
the garrison's inability to control even the local habitants who looked to the fort for 
protection. Major John Forbes, who succeeded Reed in April 1768, wished to "strike a 
terror" into local Indian groups by convincing them that the French residents of 
Kaskaskia and the English garrison were bound together as one people. To this end, 
57Morgan to Baynton and Wharton, Dec. 10, 1767, IHC, 16:128-32. Morgan's 
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Reed by late 1767 because Reed had confounded Morgan's plan to act as the sole 
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Forbes sent the Kaskaskia habitants a proclamation ordering them to form a militia and to 
muster under arms immediately. The Kaskaskians refused, claiming that their oath of 
allegiance to Britain contained no such requirement. They feared inciting the local 
Indians with a public show of arms. French residents had no quarrel with the nearby 
Kaskaskia Indians, and they were determined to remain neutral in any conflict Britain 
might find itself in, whether against Indians or Europeans. They accused Forbes of acting 
high-handedly and dismissed his threats. Frustrated, Forbes told the Kaskaskians that he 
had no intention of sending their militia into the field, but he insisted that they muster to 
show their allegiance to Britain. When he arrived in Kaskaskia, the residents again 
refused to turn out, threatening to move across the Mississippi if he pressed the point, 
"which indeed they threaten to do whenever any thing happens that displeases them," 
complained Forbes. He eventually convinced them to muster, but the episode reveals the 
complete disdain shown for British government in Illinois. Forbes's successor, Col. John 
Wilkins, was similarly ineffective in encouraging French cooperation, admitting in 1770 
that the locals looked upon him "nearly as a Cypher." Inability to control the eight 
hundred European and enslaved residents ofKaskaskia bode poorly for a garrison hoping 
to impress the thousands oflndians visiting the post every year.60 
Reed, Forbes, and Wilkins sought local French aid for good reason. Throughout 
the British regime, rumors of imminent Indian uprisings raced through the region, 
necessitating a condition of nearly constant alert at the fort. British officers, and Indian 
Department officials such as commissary Edward Cole, were instructed to pass on any 
6
°Forbes to Gage, Apr. 15, 1768, Gage Papers AS, vol. 76; Inhabitants of 
Kaskaskia to Forbes, Apr. 15, 1768, Gage Papers AS, vol. 76; Wilkins to Gage, Nov. 11, 
1770, Gage Papers AS, vol. 98; "Census of Illinois, 1767," IHC, 11:469. 
265 
intelligence of potential Indian trouble. They found no shortage of such news in isolated 
Illinois. Rumors and intelligence filtered back to Gage and Johnson, telling of mysterious 
belts circulating throughout the pays d'en haul and the Mississippi headlands.61 In 
September 1768, a Delaware messenger told Johnson that all ofthe Indians he had met 
near Fort Chartres and in the Wabash country were opposed to the British and would 
attack them as soon as the French and Spanish gave the word.62 In 1770, Johnson warned 
Gage and Wilkins that he had received "secret intelligence" that Kickapoos, 
Piankashaws, and Wawaiaghtanoes would commence a general uprising that summer and 
eject the British from Illinois.63 Luckily for Wilkins and the Chartres garrison, no such 
general attacks took place during their tenure.64 
As in other remote parts of the North American interior, rumors and gossip were 
intelligence, and since little could be done to verity or refute them absolutely, they 
always had to be taken seriously to some degree.65 "Intelligence of this kind is frequently 
sent," Gage wrote to the Earl ofHillsborough, "And tho' very often without Foundation 
is not to be Neglected; for we never can be certain of the Designs of the Indians, who are 
dextrous in Striking a Severe and Sudden Blow when they are least expected."66 Indians 
stood to gain much by spreading these rumors. Specious intelligence of Indian threats 
61Cole to Gage, Oct. 28, 1767, Gage Papers AS, vol. 71. 
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kept the British penned up in their forts and out ofindian country. Intelligence of any 
quality also sustained a constant hunger for more intelligence, which Indians gladly 
provided, expecting presents and friendship in return. "The Truth is We are much in the 
Dark with Respect to all those Nations Notwithstanding the great Sums which have been 
laid out here," Morgan fretted to his partners, having just heard untrue reports that a new 
uprising had begun among the Shawnees and Delawares and that Fort Detroit had fallen. 
Communication between Fort Chartres and Fort Pitt took months, making rumors and 
backcountry gossip the information standard in British Illinois. 
Traders and other British residents living apart from Fort Chartres's protection 
took rumors even more seriously. Morgan's company maintained trading houses in 
Vincennes, Kaskaskia and Cahokia, and the small military blockhouses and garrisons in 
each town offered little protection for traders in the case oflndian attack. By 1769, 
Morgan was frustrated with the lack of protection. He suggested to his partners that the 
military government should declare open war on all Indian troublemakers, especially the 
Wabash Indians near Vincennes and Potawatomis and Kickapoos living near St. Joseph. 
After all, the company might benefit pretty well from a general Indian war, he wrote to 
his partners. Besides, if the British garrison remained "coop'd up" in Fort Chartres 
instead of encouraging and protecting British profits, the whole occupation would be for 
nothing.67 
Morgan's worries had a good basis. Local Indians and rumors of impending 
Indian attacks had troubled his posts since he arrived. In September 1769, one ofhis 
traders reported that a "troublesome" rumor at Kaskaskia caused the whole town to 
67Morgan to Baynton and Wharton, Apr. 24, 1769, IHC, 16:526-27. 
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crowd into the tiny fort for protection.68 Later that year, Indians and possibly French 
allies plundered Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan's trading post at Vincennes, not once but 
twice.69 And a few months later the attacks grew bolder: Indians attacked the company's 
storehouse in Cahokia. They succeeded in stealing only a few blankets, but killed three of 
the company's employees?0 Wilkins sent a detachment to Cahokia to strengthen its small 
fort, but everyone knew that the attackers could return at any time and repeat the 
depredations. Indians even pillaged Morgan's store at Fort Chartres twice in late 1769, 
right under the sickly garrison's guns.71 
The worst attack on Morgan's interests had happened far from Fort Chartres and 
yet still vexed the British command. To provide food for the region, Morgan's company 
sent out parties to hunt for buffalo meat, which was needed for both British and Indian 
provisioning. In April1768, a small party oflndians from Vincennes attacked the boats 
of a hunting party on the Cumberland River, killing twenty men. Indians later brought 
nine scalps and eight packs of peltry taken from the hunting party to Vincennes. One 
young man survived to tell the story at Kaskaskia, and Forbes ordered the garrison on 
alert and began planning his response. He soon heard that the attackers' chiefs meant to 
come to Fort Chartres to beg for forgiveness. Forbes planned to capture and hold them as 
hostages until they turned over the killers.72 Gage did not approve ofForbes's plan; the 
68Windsor Brown to Morgan, Sep. 23, 1769, BWM Papers, reel 5, 824. 
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John Hanson to Wilkins, Gage Papers AS, Apr. 24, 1770, vol. 92. 
71John Finley to James Rumsey, Nov. 1, 1769, BWM Papers, reel6, 11-12; James 
Rumsey to Brown, Nov. 14, 1769, BWM Papers, reel6, 127-28. 
72Forbes to Gage, July 18, 1768, Gage Papers AS, vol. 79; Morgan to Baynton 
and Wharton, July 20, 1768, IHC, 16:354-67; Forbes to Gage, July 28, 1768, WJP, 6:294; 
Wilkins to Gage, WJP, 6:326. 
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general had learned much about Indian notions of justice and reciprocity during his 
tenure, and knew that the chiefs would interpret this taking of Indian ambassadors as a 
"Breach of Pub lick Faith." A Cherokee had also told him that the Indians were actually 
protecting their interests and hunting grounds by killing the party. Had the party restricted 
their activities to hunting only for food, they might have survived. But the company 
hunters had been trapping furs too, and the Vincennes Indians deemed this an unfair use 
oflndian hunting grounds and an infringement on their livelihoods. Wilkins heard of 
these attacks while on his way to take over command of Illinois. Gage ordered him to 
find a way to placate the Wabash and Ohio Indians.73 
Almost a year after his arrival in Illinois, Wilkins called a meeting with 
belligerent Indians from the Wabash and Ohio country. In the intervening year, several 
more confrontations had taken place between the Wabash Indians and the British, 
including another attack on traders.74 Wilkins determined that trying to see the situation 
from the Indians' perspective would be interpreted as weakness, so he decided to use 
more confrontational measures. At the conference, he listed several depredations 
committed by Indians from the Vincennes area, including the attack on traders' boats and 
men, plundering stores, and threatening to kill Indians allied to the British. Wilkins 
warned that even though the British presence at Fort Chartres might appear outnumbered 
and weak, his people could be counted on to avenge Indian insults. "We are a Nation not 
easily made Angry," Wilkins told the delegates, "But when once we are determined on 
73Gage to Hillsborough, Oct. 9, 1768, in Carter, Correspondence, 199; Gage to 
Johnson, Oct 10, 1768, IHC, 16:417; Gage to Wilkins, Oct. 11, 1768, IHC, 16:418-19. 
74Gage to Hillsborough, Aug. 12, 1769, IHC, 16:576. This attack turned out better 
for the English traders; they were able to fend off the assailants ''with the help of an 
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Striking an Enemy, they soon feel the weight of our resentment. Our Numbers are as the 
Stars in the firmament, and it is not in the power of all the Nations in the World to 
destroy us." Without subtlety or equivocation, Wilkins warned that if they did not stop 
threatening the peace, he would take it as an open declaration of war. British soldiers and 
their Indian allies would descend upon the belligerent Wabash and Ohio Indians and 
destroy them.75 
To his surprise, Wilkins's threats were met with open defiance. Maringouin, an 
old chief from the Wabash region, rejected Wilkins's hard-line tactics and threats. "Since 
you entered this country you alone have caused the misfortunes which have come upon 
us," he scolded Wilkins. If the English had more people living among the Illinois Indians 
"as slaves," he suggested, maybe the Illinois would be treated with the same respect as 
the Shawnees, Delawares, and Iroquois. Cadenette, a war chief, went even further. He 
refused to even meet with Wilkins, because if he did, he might think only of all the 
French-allied Illinois killed by British guns and become dangerously angry. Hananaa, 
another war chief and village headman, warned Wilkins that English guns and trade held 
no power over them. Using revitalist language, he told the commandant that depriving the 
Indians of powder and ball would make no difference: 
You must know that I know how to use wood to make my weapons and that with 
this same wood I would kill men. You must be convinced that my father the 
French will not let me die and that he will satisfy my wants. I shall die holding 
his hand ifyou make war on me. You take me for a beast that is destitute of 
reason, Think you that, having neither powder nor ball, I shall die of hunger? No, 
and in the belt which you send us there is a man who shuts up the road between 
us? Do you think that we do not understand this, though I have not as much wit 
as you? 
75Speech of Wilkins to Post Vincent, Wabash, and Ohio Indians, August 1769, 
Native American History Collection, William C. Clements Library, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
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Hananaa even ridiculed Wilkins's metaphor and turned it against him. "You talk 
to me of stars and say that you are as numerous as they are in the sky/' he chided 
Wilkins. "The stars that fall hurt nothing. As for me I am as the trees in the forest; and, 
when a tree falls, it does hann and kills a man." Wilkins knew that Hananaa's comment 
about shutting the road meant that these Indians would never support British interests and 
that anti-British hostility wopld dominate Illinois and the Wabash country despite his 
threats. But Wilkins must have paled before the Wabash Indians' withering verbal 
pummeling, so different from the protestations of poverty and subjection common at 
Indian conferences farther east. Having just arrived in Illinois, Wilkins found out quickly 
how insubstantial the British presence looked to some of the region's Indian population.76 
In addition to attacking Morgan's economic enterprises, Wabash and St. Joseph 
Indians made it clear to the British government at Fort Chartres that their substantial fort 
could not protect everyone. In the summer of 1768, Potawatomis had kidnapped a soldier 
and his wife from Chartres Village and held them as prisoners. Forbes put the fort on 
alert and restricted the garrison to the post. The Potawatomis later returned the prisoners 
and begged for Forbes's forgiveness (and presents), and they promised not to repeat such 
acts, but their point had been made: Indians could grab British soldiers at any time and 
avoid punishment. 77 Local Indians allied to the British were also at risk and suffered at 
the hands of old enemies, despite the garrison's promises of protection. In May 1769, 
Sauk and Fox Indians scalped six Kaskaskias between Fort Chartres and their village.78 A 
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Kickapoo party scalped another soldier and his wife in their bed in April. Wilkins put the 
garrison on alert yet again, and this condition lasted throughout the summer and winter. 
By late December, according to Butricke, the garrison was in a "melancholy situation," 
with no word from Fort Pitt in over six months, and rumors circulating that the Spanish 
had closed off New Orleans to the British. 79 
Fears oflndian attacks only increased after Pontiac's death at the hands of a 
Peoria chief in Cahokia in April 17 69. Several of Pontiac's western allies vowed to 
sweep into Illinois and avenge the revolutionary's ignominious murder. But it is difficult 
to ascertain whether the constant Indian treats and small-scale raids by Potawatomis and 
Kickapoos that did occur were intended as revenge or to provide simple, everyday 
intimidation. Indeed, Edward Cole warned against worrying too much about Pontiac's 
avengers, noting that the Illinois Indians themselves seemed pretty discontented to begin 
with and did not need outside help to make trouble. 80 Gage agreed that the real trouble 
could come from unruly Illinois Indians, not the Shawnees and Ottawas who might 
invade. Indeed, by 1769 Pontiac was a British ally and it was an Illinois chiefthat had 
breached the peace. "It seems very Necessary that Something Should be done to keep 
those Nations in order," Gage told Johnson, "They seem more and more inclined to raise 
Commotions as well with the Indians and the White People."81 But with Indian tempers 
flaring and British military threats unable to enforce security, expensive presents were the 
only sure way to gain Indian cooperation. 
79Butricke to Bamsley, June 27, 1769, IHC, 16:566-67; Butricke to Bamsley, 
Dec. 29, 1769, WHC 18:299. 
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81Gage to Johnson, Aug. 8, 1769, WJP, 7:76-77. 
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From the beginning ofthe British occupation ofFort Chartres, the price for 
British failure to maintain an appearance of power was paid in Indian presents. Croghan 
spent lavishly on presents during his important conference in 1766, but even after the 
amicable conclusion of those negotiations, the cost of conducting Indian affairs at Fort 
Chartres remained high. For example, from July 1 through September 25, 1766, Indian 
Department expenditures at the fort ran to £1,568. This included the cost of provisions 
and presents for Indians, transportation costs, interpreters and smiths, and construction. 
The next six months were almost as expensive.82 Compared to the cost of normal military 
operations at the fort, these sums were immense; for example, the cost of provisioning the 
personnel ofthe Royal Regiment of Artillery and the Civil Branch of Ordinance at Fort 
Chartres for the period between January 1767 and June 1769 amounted to just over £44.83 
Part of the Indian Department's enormous cost derived from the remoteness of the region 
and the high cost of transporting goods. A calculation made in January 1767 estimated 
that to carry goods down the Ohio from Fort Pitt, a convoy of 45 bateaux would cost 
£5,217 sterling, not counting the value of the goods themselves.84 But the expense of 
Indian presents had even more to do with the frequency with which they were given, 
which demonstrated Fort Chartres's precarious social and political position among the 
Illinois natives. 
All ofFort Chartres's commandants lavished presents upon visiting Indians, 
though the problem was worse in the beginning of the British tenure, with memories of 
the Indian uprising still fresh. Gage, whose responsibility it was to justify Indian 
82
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Department expenses to skeptical financial auditors at Whitehall, became impatient very 
quickly. Unlike his predecessor Amherst, who cringed at the very idea of rewarding 
Indians for good behavior, Gage knew perfectly well that presents were needed to 
maintain Indian-British amities. But all things had their limits and Gage wanted his 
remote commanders to give Indians "only what is absolutely Necessary ... and to deal 
out Presents with a Sparing hand." He told John Reed that presents "must not be lavished 
any longer" in March 1767, and ordered Fort Chartres's commissary Edward Cole to 
have the commandant certify all Indian Department bills before remitting them. 85 Cole's 
drafts for Indian expenses had shocked Gage and Johnson, and the commander-in-chief 
warned that if another exorbitant account should cross his desk, he would be "under 
Necessity of refusing Payment to it." He warned Reed to keep an eye on Cole, who met 
with Indians more than anyone else at the fort and was liable to be the most intimidated. 
"The Commissarys at the Posts are not Sent there, to lavish away Presents to every 
Strolling Indian that comes to a Fort," Gage reminded Reed. "Presents are only to be 
given to the Heads ofNations, & then frugally and on particular & necessary 
Occasions. "86 
Cole agreed to have his accounts certified by the fort commandant, but wondered 
how he could manage Indian affairs without giving out extravagant gifts to visitors. 
Indians living near the fort were well enough disposed, though they visited quite often 
and always asked for presents. But it was the droves of Indians coming in from the 
Missouri country that made matters difficult. They told Cole that the French had always 
supplied them in the past and they expected the same from the British. Their animosities 
85Gage to Reed, Mar. 8, 1767, Gage Papers AS, vol. 62. 
86Gage to Reed, Apr. 14, 1767, Gage Papers AS, vol. 63. 
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with the Sauks and Foxes prevented their coming to the fort in great numbers early in 
Cole's tenure, but by summer of 1767 so many had arrived that they took up all of Cole's 
time.87 Cole sent Gage a six-month draft for over £5,000 in March, and the summer 
season would be even more expensive. To make matters worse, the western Indians did 
not bring any trade to the fort; they wanted presents, but sold their furs to French traders 
operating on the Spanish side of the Mississippi. They knew that the British must give 
presents to them as the only way to secure their friendship and prevent them from 
conspiring with the French and Spanish.88 At the end ofthe summer, Reed agreed to try 
keeping costs in check, but worried that it would be impossible with the region under 
constant Indian domination. "There must be expenses attending the Indians, and very 
considerable ones," he warned Gage, "Or the Military and Inhabitants must Starve, 
nothing but Presents prevents them from Destroying the Stock in the Country."89 With 
four thousand Indians visiting Fort Chartres that summer, and with goods costing twice as 
much as in "any other part of America," Reed worried that his next bill would be just as 
enormous.
90 
Indian expenses continued to vex Gage and the Indian Department in 1768. 
Cole's expenses amounted to £10,742 for only one year of activity at Fort Chartres. "This 
is really so monstrous an Account that I hardly know what can be done with it," Gage 
despaired to Johnson. He could not understand why "Missilimakinak and the Detroit 
together ... did not cost more hundreds than the Ilinois has cost Thousands," though he 
87Cole to Croghan, July 3, 1767, WJP, 5:578. 
88Gage to Johnson, July 20, 1767, WJP, 5:600-01; Cole to Johnson, Oct. 25, 1767, 
WJP, 5:748-52; Cole to Croghan, Oct. 25, 1767, WJP, 5:753-55. 
89Reed to Gage, Oct. 28, 1767, Gage Papers AS, vol. 71. 
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suspected it was because oflndian intimidation at Fort Chartres. This was not a good 
enough reason for the commander-in-chief. After all, Detroit was just as vulnerable to 
attack and siege as Fort Chartres, and Michilimackinac had actually fallen to Indian 
attack in 1763. Gage asked Johnson for reasons that he could use to j"':lstify the large 
drafts to London, but the Indian superintendent could offer no help. Johnson was just as 
shocked by the expenses as Gage and embarrassed by a major failure of his department. 
His own man, Cole, was apparently being intimidated into doling out the most lavish gifts 
in North America. Johnson told Gage that if Cole was not up to the job he should be 
withdrawn, and then the post commandant must either retrench the bills or find a way to 
pay them himself. Gage agreed to let Johnson handle the problem for a while. "After first 
taking Possession ofPosts extraordinary Expences may be necessary," Gage admitted, 
"but there is no Reason to continue them."91 
Indian demands for presents stoked all of the old prejudices and mistrusts that had 
preceded the 1763 Indian uprising. For some local natives, presents had become an 
important part of their livelihood. Illinois Indians offered friendship and protection in 
return, but contributed few pelts to the local economy. This must have irked the men of 
the garrison, even if the deal seemed reasonable enough to the natives themselves. After 
all, given the weak position of the British presence at the fort, Indians might have felt that 
there was little the British could offer them except presents. But the growing importance 
and profusion of this wholly gift-based system of alliance had begun to strain nerves. A 
letter to Gage, either from Forbes or one of his officers, paints a harsh picture of the 
British hostilities forming at Fort Chartres: 
91Gage to Johnson, Apr, 4, 1768, WJP, 6: 176-77; Johnson to Gage, Apr. 8, 1768, 
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The immense Expence attending the Indian Department must be a considerable 
Burthn to the Crown if all the other Nations, on the Continent are so plentifully 
Supplyed as those in this Neighbourhood ... I have for some time observed that 
the more Presents they receive, the oftner they Return, and are less contented; and 
that their chief dependence rests more upon his Majesty's Bounty, than their own 
industry; for while they never move from their Village, but beging and hanging 
upon the Inhabitants, which gives them such a habit ofldleness (particularly the 
four Tribes in this District) that they are by the constant use ofSpiritous Liquors 
become Effeminate and Debilitated: so much that nothing can be apprehended, 
from such a Dastardly Race of Cowards, who impute, the bounty they Receive, 
[proceeds] from fear not ofLove.92 
As the year dragged on, the cost of placating Indians at Fort Chartres lessened, but 
remained expensive. Baynton, ~arton, and Morgan billed the crown £1,600 for presents 
supplied :from March through September 1768. The account gives reasons for some of the 
presents, making clear the extent to which the garrison depended on the local Indians' 
good graces. For example, Forbes gave presents to two parties ofVermillion and 
Kaskaskia Indians for a bit of intelligence, flavored with a hint of intimidation; the 
Indians revealed that they had received and rejected a belt asking them to attack the 
English. Black Dog, a Peoria chief, made it clear to Forbes that the French had always 
renewed :friendship with them after the Indians returned from their winter hunt, and that 
the Peorias "expected and begged" the same treatment from the English. Forbes gave 
presents to Black Dog again as he left for the summer hunt, and the Peoria chief 
reminded Forbes that the French and Spanish were always among them, trying to gain 
advantages over English traders. An Osage chief from west of the Mississippi informed 
Forbes that the Spanish commander at St. Louis had demanded that they strike the 
English colors flying over their village. The Osages rebuffed the demand and promised to 
92
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buy only English goods from then on, but Forbes knew that their patronage would only 
continue with abundant gifts. And of course, Pontiac and his retinue needed to be 
supplied when they visited in the spring. He told Forbes that he wished to see "all his 
Brethren the Indians" in the region and that he would warn them to "shut their Ears 
against all bad Birds" if he heard of any anti-British rumors. He also promised not to 
bother Detroit again and to behave himself. None of this promised good behavior came 
for free, as Forbes knew wel1.93 
British occupation ofillinois had become, by late 1768, a cause celebre for 
English politicians opposed to military governance oflndian country. The costs attending 
the operation ofFort Chartres threatened the entire fort system. In August 1768, Gage 
told Johnson that the Board of Trade was considering closing both Forts Pitt and 
Chartres, because ofthe "great and constant Drains of Cash for Indian Presents. The two 
... equal the Expences of half your whole Department."94 Johnson could not provide a 
reason why Reed and Forbes had not been able to retrench expenses. He told Gage that 
Reed, Forbes, and Cole (who kept his job until 1769) could not be entirely blamed, and 
that part of the tendency toward lavishness went with the job. "Gentlemen, whatever their 
sentiments oflndians are previous to their going to the Outposts, seem to alter them when 
there," Johnson admitted to Gage, "And to Consider all Expences incurred as Extremely 
necessary to Publick Service."95 Cole continued to blame the high cost of goods for much 
of the problem, but also blamed their French and Spanish "polite neighbours" across the 
Mississippi for poisoning the Indians' attitudes against the British, so that huge presents 
93
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were needed to keep them friendly. He also pointed out that he was making progress; 
expenses had dropped to about a third of the previous year's total.96 
But even with a retrenchment in cost, the present-based system had become 
deeply engrained in British-Indian relations to a degree that was probably not 
surmountable. Indian Department provisioning had become part of the Indian food 
system, and could not be easily reduced without introducing hardship to native 
populations. From April1766 to Sept. 1768, Fort Chartres issued over 65,000 lbs. of 
flour, 8,000 lbs. of cornmeal, 24,000 lbs. of beef, 8,000 lbs. of pork, and large quantities 
of other necessities to local and visiting Indians.97 Local Indians could not reasonably 
turn away from a relationship that offered them food and presents in proportion to the 
amount of influence they held in the region. Trade could not be used against them 
because French and Spanish competition offered better prices just across the Mississippi. 
Sick and disgruntled, often penned up inside their crumbling fort out of fear, and at the 
mercy oflndian nations on both sides of the Mississippi, the British army could do little 
to compel local Indians to show greater industry in the fur trade. If the British wished to 
stay in the region, presents would be the primary currency of friendship. 
96Cole to Gage, Sep. 13, 1768, Gage Papers AS, vol. 80. Gage's complaints were. 
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Wilkins made reducing the number of presents dispensed at Illinois his top 
priority when he took command in September 1768. Upon arriving with his seven 
companies of the Royal Irish Regiment, he informed George Morgan that his policies 
would revive the moribund Illinois trade and keep local Indians busy and productive. 
"The Chief design of my Talk with the Indians has hitherto been and will in the future to 
encourage them to an Active Life," he told the trader, "And not to encourage Dranes who 
will stroll from Post to Post as Beggars only ... we want to bring the Trade to this place 
and I will act as a Father to the Industrious."98 Wilkins took over the management of 
Indian affairs from Edward Cole in the spring of 1769, after the Board of Trade forced 
the Indian Departments to cease their involvement in trade and to dismiss all 
commissaries, intetpreters, and smiths in the outposts.99 Whether or not Wilkins was able 
to reduce costs enough to please Gage is difficult to know.100 But Wilkins wanted Gage 
. 
to have a full picture of his dealings with Indians visiting Fort Chartres, by keeping a 
detailed Indianjournal covering his entire tenure as commandant.101 The journal reveals 
that, even ifthe amount of presents diminished, Fort Chartres still hosted frequent and 
insistent Indian demands for British favors. 
Most entries in Wilkins's journal describe visits by Illinois Indian neighbors, but 
parties of Osages, Missouris, Kickapoos, Potawatomis, and others also arrived in great 
98Wilkins to Morgan, Oct. 6, 1768, Gage Papers AS, vol. 98. 
99Gage to Penn, Mar. 24, 1769, IHC, 16:516-17. 
100Wilkins frequently stressed his promises to reduce Indian presents, but proof 
that he was successful is difficult to fmd. See Dowd, War Under Heaven, 537, and Max 
Savelle, George Morgan.· Colony Builder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 
51, for claims that Wilkins significantly retrenched Indian expenses. Gage was still 
impatient about them in 1772, when he ordered Fort Chartres closed. Gage to Johnson, 
Mar9, 1772, WJP, 8:417-18. 
101John Wilkins, Journal ofTransactions and Presents Given to Indians from 23d 
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numbers. Groups ofMichigameas and Kaskaskias, who lived a few miles from the fort, 
made frequent visits. Kaskaskias visited the forts at least thirteen times during Wilkins's 
tenure, often accompanied by their influential chief, Tomeroy. Michigameas, whose 
village was only a mile away, were practically residents of the fort, visiting at least thirty-
five separate times and sometimes staying for several days. Peorias and Cahokias were 
also frequent visitors. Local Indians would always stop by the fort on the way to their 
hunting grounds or returning from them, to be greeted and rewarded by the British 
commander. Wilkins almost always gave visitors rum and ammunition and usually 
clothing as well. Visiting Kaskaskias took away a typical complement of gifts on 
December 23, 1768: Four pounds of powder, two pounds oflead, a carrot oftobacco, a 
half-gallon of rum, one breech clout, and one pair of leggings. But Wilkins was just as 
generous to Indians from far away, even those from the troublesome Wabash region. For 
example, when Kickapoos visited the post in January 1769, Wilkins gave them the usual 
complement of goods, plus such extras as a "squaw's lace gown" and a "tincellaced 
hat."1o2 
Wilkins's Indian journal also shows which local headmen visited the fort most 
frequently. Tomeroy tops the list, visiting the fort at least thirteen times during the three 
years of Wilkins's command. Tomeroy's people had determined during the French 
regime to live near the fort and the trading town of Kaskaskia, making the Kaskaskias 
dependents ofthe new British regime. They needed constant updates of information 
about potential enemies and fully expected help from the fort's garrison in the event of 
trouble. Tomeroy forged a personal relationship with Wilkins, based on their mutual fears 
102Ibid., 1-2. 
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of enemy interlopers and their need to maintain security in the immediate locale. 
Tomeroy asked for presents when going to hunt, just as others did, but many of Wilkins's 
entries reveal the Kaskaskia chiefs efforts to scout the area in times of threat. He seems 
to have been one ofWilkins's main sources of reconnaissance and information, though 
the commandant always suspected that his information and efforts were exaggerated to 
obtain more presents. Tomeroy made the fort commandant an important functionary in 
Kaskaskia ritual life, as when he asked Wilkins to hold a ceremony appointing a new 
chief. Of course, Wilkins paid for the ceremony too, which entailed hosting the entire 
Kaskaskia nation.103 Wilkins had no choice but to accede to the local chiefs "requests" 
because of the Kaskaskias' proximity and numbers and Tomeroy's great influence in the 
region. But Wilkins did not trust him. He described Tomeroy as a "great Church going 
man to the French Church, a great Speaker & I believe like most Savages very 
deceitful."104 But deceitful or not, Tomeroy held the upper hand among Indians of the 
region. Wilkins had no choice but to share his regional authority with the influential 
chief. 
Peoria chief Black Dog also visited the post regularly, as did the Michigamea's 
Young Chief and One-Eyed Chief. Unlike Tomeroy, who tried to insert himself in the 
local authority structure and to influence British decisions, Black Dog seemed mainly 
interested in extracting presents from the beleaguered commandant. He would visit on his 
way to hunt, and usually tell Wilkins that he had encountered Indian or Spanish 
troublemakers who wished to turn his people away from the English. Like all recipients 




people. During one unusual visit, he told Wilkins a tear-jerking story about an Indian 
woman who was to be put to death for marrying against her people's customs. Somehow, 
six gallons ofrum would solve the issue, which Wilkins glumly handed over.105 But 
Black Dog commonly told the usual tales of imminent depredations by Kickapoos, 
Potawatomis, Shawnees, or whichever enemy was rumored to threaten the region at the 
time. His ''thundering reports," were very effective at keeping his people well supplied 
with provisions and presents, without providing much in return except promises of 
friendship and alliance. Nearby Michigameas enjoyed a similar relationship. Their 
headmen, the Young Chief and One-Eyed Chief, visited frequently. Since they lived 
almost within sight of the fort, they offered some scouting and information in return for 
their presents. But local Indians did not see this as a quid pro quo relationship; they 
expected presents because of their status as British friends, and received them every time 
they visited the post. 
Fort Chartres was a news outlet as well as a goods store and provisioning center, 
and local chiefs resorted to Wilkins for information about remote Indian activities. For 
example, Black Dog visited in February 1769 to discover whether the Wabash would 
harass his people. Tomeroy and two other Kaskaskia chiefs, Baptiste and Laudeviet, 
arrived a month later to enquire if Chickasaws would invade the area soon. But news 
traveled both ways, and all local Indians knew that they would be rewarded for 
intelligence gained while hunting. On March 22, Indians from all four Illinois nations 
arrived at the fort, bringing rumors of imminent trouble and wishing to know ifthe 
Chickasaws would attack. Wilkins reassured them that the Chickasaws were British allies 
105Ibid., 33-34. 
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and would not bother the Illinois, and gave them all presents. The visitors grumbled about 
the reduced quantities of rum, food, and clothing Wilkins was distributing, and ''talk' d of 
former times, & of going to War & much such Stuff," according to the commandant. 106 
Wilkins even helped Michigameas perform death rituals for two of their chiefs 
killed by Osages. The entire Michigamea nation came to the fort for condolence rites, and 
Wilkins gave them shelter and provisions. Soon, Peorias and Kaskaskias arrived to add 
their condolences and to be provisioned. Such congresses of Indian neighbors were 
common events. Along with their promises of friendship, Indians mustered great numbers 
to remind Wilkins that they could threaten the fort if they wished. For example, in May 
1769, all the Michigamea and Peoria warriors held a congress at the fort. They told 
Wilkins that unnamed Indians had tried to recruit all four Illinois nations to join a general 
uprising, but that they had refused. On that instance, so many armed Indians arrived that 
Wilkins allowed only fifty into the post at a time and put the garrison on parade, just in 
case. But he still gave the warriors presents and allowed them to have their guns 
. d 107 reparre . 
Indians also brought offers of help and expected to be rewarded for them. 
Sometimes these were small favors, such as the time Indians brought back a boat that had 
drifted away in the Mississippi. 108 Indians also offered their expertise as scouts, always 
accompanied by extra requests for presents. On July 17, 1769, chiefs of the four Illinois 
nations descended on the fort with rumors that the Senecas and Potawatomis would soon 





help them prepare for an assault. Wilkins did visit and gave the Michigameas five gallons 
of rum, "As there is no seeing them without a present." He asked that the Michigameas 
scout the area for signs of enemies, but by the 26th they had not yet sent out any scouts. 
They told Wilkins that they could not find anyone willing to reconnoiter the area unless 
the commandant promised them a feast. Wilkins agreed and forty men scouted the area. 
They found no Wabash interlopers and hurried back for Wilkins's party on July 31. 
Though rumors persisted ofPotawatomis and Kickapoos hiding in every shrub, the 
Michigameas and Kaskaskias insisted that the danger had passed and "in very pressing 
terms desir'd they might be indulg'd to drink & feast on the occasion," Wilkins noted. He 
gave them ten gallons of rum for their revels because their nations were too "numerous" 
to refuse it, though he admitted that he was suspicious of their rumors and intelligence.109 
Indians displayed great confidence in visiting the fort. In fact, Wilkins frequently 
noted that Indians "demanded" presents. This may only mean that they "needed" them, 
but it is a choice of words that implies Indian social parity, at least, in their meetings with 
British personnel. For example, he notes that Kaskaskias demanded powder and lead to 
defend their nation against Pontiac in March 1769. In May of that year, Peoria chiefs and 
warriors demanded a meeting with Wilkins to discuss how the Indians and British would 
protect each other. In August, Peorias leaving on a hunting trip "demanded assistance." 
And in March 1770, Black Dog and other Peorias "demanded Strongly" that they be 
allowed to move their village next to Fort Chartres.110 Indian demands for British 
resources continued throughout Wilkins's tenure and he noted few examples where 
Indians returned the favors. Throughout his journal, whether Wilkins intended this or not, 
10~bid., 17-21. 
1101bid., 6-7, 11-12, 26-27. 
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his language implies that native visitors and neighbors held the upper hand in 
negotiations. They used the fort as a repository of free goods, demanding them as friends, 
but demanding them still. With much of his garrison perennially stricken with disease, 
and with military relief hundreds of miles and at least two months away, Wilkins could 
only agree to such friendly demands. 
Indian demands for presents increased with new diplomatic efforts. The days 
when Cole and Croghan could dole out almost £1,000 in presents in a single day were 
long gone by 1771, but Wilkins was still willing to be generous with the crown's money 
in the interests of a profitable Indian policy. In April, a party of thirty Chickasaws, 
"ornamented and well-appointed," arrived unexpectedly at Fort Chartres. This sent shock 
waves throughout the immediate region; Kaskaskias raised an alarm in their village, 
expecting that the long-awaited Chickasaw incursion had finally come. But the 
Chickasaw delegation wanted only to meet with Illinois chiefs and make peace, though 
they admitted that they carried no diplomatic mandate to speak for their nation. Wilkins 
was delighted that the Chickasaws might offer their help to defend Illinois against attacks 
by increasingly troublesome Wabash Indians. He hoped that the Chickasaws might even 
be induced to live near Fort Chartres. The delegation stayed for a week, meeting with all 
local Indians and many ofthe French habitants. Of course, Wilkins gave them many 
presents, and even a draft for £20 that they could cash in for rum with British traders in 
their own country. After a week of dancing and feasting, Wilkins had no desire to 
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introduce even more alcohol into the local social mix.lll 
Wilkins had plenty to worry about by 1771 and the prospect of Chickasaw aid 
would solve many ofhis problems. Much of his time was taken up by trade and land 
disputes involving George Morgan, William Murray, and several French traders.112 Since 
his arrival in 1768, much ofthe garrison had been employed shoring up the Mississippi 
banks to prevent further erosion, so the fort was not in immediate danger. But new 
rumors of imminent uprisings dominated the early part ofthe year, and Wilkins once 
again confined the garrison to the fort. 113 In March, a party ofPotawatomis from St. 
Joseph killed a soldier, who had left the fort to hunt ducks in defiance of Wilkins's 
restrictions. Fear spread rapidly, and Wilkins worried there might be as many as 500-600 
hostile Indians surrounding the fort, though only 12 had been seen.114 Wilkins kept his 
men penned up in the fort, which did not inspire the garrison's Indian neighbors. 
In May, Tomoroy visited Wilkins to warn him that all of the area's Indians were 
preparing for an invasion, and he asked how the English could help them. Wilkins told 
the chief not to be afraid and boasted that the Potawatomis would pay dearly for the 
soldier they had killed. By then, Wilkins had learned a little about the proper use of 
metaphors. He told Tomoroy that the English "were as numerous as the Trees in the 
111Ibid., 39-42; Wilkins to Gage, May 11, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 102. No 
record is available for how much Wilkins spent on the visiting delegation, but Ensign 
William Connolly, who commanded the small Kaskaskia fort, entertained the delegates 
for a couple of days and recorded Indian expenses for January to June of just over £194. 
The Chickasaw visit accounted for much of this amount. "Payment Order of William 
Connolly," June 28, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 109. , 
112For an overview of Wilkins's contentious dealings in Illinois, which eventually 
involved litigation and disgrace for the commandant, see Savelle, George Morgan: 
Colony Builder, 55-75. 
113Gage to Hillsborough, Jan. 16, 1771 and Mar. 6, 1771, in Carter, 
Correspondence, 289, 292; Croghan to Edmonstone, Feb. 19, 1771, WJP, 7:1149. 
114Wilkins to Gage, Mar. 26, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 101. 
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Woods," and that even if the British could not come in time, their new Chickasaw friends 
would happily help them destroy the Wabash Indians.115 This pleased Tomoroy, but not 
Gage when he was told about Wilkins's Chickasaw threat. He knew that such threats of 
southern Indian incursions, if spread as rumors, would only confirm the Potawatomis' 
and Kickapoos' worst fears and make the situation even more dangerous. Gage felt that 
Wilkins should have used his own men to chastise the Indians who killed his soldier, 
rather than treating with the Chickasaws to do it for him. "You talk of the Party (of 
Potawatomis) being 5 or 600 Strong. All the Indians of St. Joseph would scarcely amount 
to Sixty Warriors," Gage admonished Wilkins. 116 
Wilkins also continued to defend his record in reducing Indian expenditures. As is 
well documented in his journal, Indians made regular requests for goods and made it 
clear that friendship depended upon the giving of gifts. "Every Art is used to Influence 
me to be more liberal or lavish of the publick money in presents to Indians," he 
complained to Gage. He also fretted that his "schemes of Oeconomy" were not being 
taken seriously. Wilkins argued that his measures had reduced Indian expenses to a 
twentieth of those at another unnamed post, and he promised to reduce expenditures even 
more. "Savages are easily Satisfied if properly managed," he confidently told Gage in 
June. Wilkins beamed with confidence and felt that he alone had succeeded where other 
commandants had failed. 117 
By September Wilkins's tune had changed. "Several Scalping parties of the 
Kickapous & Potawatomis being about us, my Garrison very Sickly & hardly a relief for 
115Wilkins to Gage, May 11, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 1 02. 
116Gage to Wilkins, Aug. 20, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 105. 
117Wilkins to Gage, June 9, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 103. 
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the Guard, hands wanted to face the Bank & the Necessary Escort in our present Scattar 
Situation," he complained, had pushed the Illinois mission to the limit. At the same time, 
he was fending off complaints from British and French traders and was unable to send 
any troops into the interior to protect the trade.118 Gage's patience with the Illinois 
mission was almost at an end. With new reports that Kickapoos had attacked George 
Morgan's plantation, killing two people and kidnapping a trader, the region was 
practically in a state of uprising. Gage ordered Wilkins to instruct his men in "scouting 
and wood Fighting," and to muster friendly Indians to chastise the Potawatomis and 
Kickapoos. 119 But even after six years ofBritish occupation, the downtrodden men ofthe 
garrison seemed barely capable of helping themselves, let alone of carrying a war deep 
into the Illinois interior. 
By late 1771, Wilkins's position had worsened significantly. He spent much ofhis 
time fending off complaints and lawsuits by local traders and farmers. Morgan, by this 
time a staunch enemy of Wilkins, fought with the commandant over a plan to set up a 
distillery and brewery at Kaskaskia. More and cheaper liquor was the last thing the 
British garrison needed in the region, but Gage overruled Wilkins's initial refusal to 
allow it.120 Threats against the British regime from the Illinois interior only increased 
with time, compounded by the near outbreak of war with Spain in 1770-1771. Disease 
continued to shake the military foundations ofthe Illinois government. In May, Fort 
Chartres seemed sure to be destroyed by the next Mississippi flood, and Gage wrote to 
118Wilkins to Gage, Sep. 5, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 106. 
119Gage to Johnson, Sep. 24, 1771, WJP, 8:278-79. 
120George Morgan, "Some Reasons Why the Distillation of Spirits from Grain 
Ought to be Encouraged at the Illinois," Gage Papers AS, vol. 88; Wilkins to Gage, Feb. 
20, 1771, Gage Papers As, vol. 100; "Proclamation," Apr. 12, 1771, Gage Papers AS, 
vol. 102. 
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ask, sarcastically, if Wilkins might find a new location where disease would not decimate 
121 the troops. 
As a final humiliation for the garrison, the troops were threadbare or not in 
unifomi by the end of 1771. When Wilkins first came to Fort Chartres in 1768, he and his 
regiment had brought along only one years' worth of clothing. Unfortunately, their 
replacement clothing ended up in the Ohio River in May 1770, when an inexperienced 
lieutenant commanding a convoy had to dump his cargo near the Falls of the Ohio.122 In 
September 1771, Wilkins finally requested more replacement uniforms, complaining that 
many of his men still wore the same clothing they brought with them three years earlier. 
Others had resorted to buying clothing from local traders, at high Illinois prices. Gage 
was unsympathetic. He scolded Wilkins for not bringing replacement clothing with him 
in the first place, and for not requesting more from Fort Pitt after the cargo was lost.123 
Sickly, disheveled soldiers in worn out or civilian clothing must have been quite a sight 
to local and visiting Indians. As for Gage, he had already joined the anti-Illinois chorus. 
Fort Chartres's future was nearly sealed. 
Wilkins tried one last gambit to save the Illinois mission. In May 1771, he 
formulated a new Illinois plan that would involve destroying Fort Chartres, establishing a 
civil provincial government, attracting thousands of British settlers to the new province, 
and reducing Indian expenses to only £500 per annum. Gage had heard such plans before. 
He rejected everything except the proposal to reduce Indian expenses, which he thought 
121Gage to Wilkins, May 13, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 103. 
122Lewis Wynne to Wilkins, May 3, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 92. 
123Gage to Wilkins, Sep. 16, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 106. 
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needed no new form of government to put into action.124 Increasing the western flow of 
settlers would be the worst possible development, according to Gage. "I would be happy 
for Britain, that there was neither Settler nor Soldier in any part of the Indian Country," 
he had written to Wilkins earlier. "Indians alone render this Country of the least Benefit 
to England, who will decrease as White People increase, and then there will be an end to 
Commerce." The enormous cost of presents made Gage wish the French had never left 
them any forts or settlements. With the revolutionary spirit of"leveling" growing 
throughout the eastern colonies, Britain might need every available troop and shilling to 
maintain its North American holdings. 125 Illinois had not enriched Britain, and 
resentment against the British occupation had only caused the effects of the 1763 Indian 
uprising to linger on in Illinois and the Wabash country. Wjth new reports at the end of 
1771 that Wabash, Miami, and Potawatomi groups would fall on Fort Chartres in the 
spring and cut off the OhioRiver supply line, Gage finally reached the breaking point. 
Only a new punitive expedition could reduce the hostilities and chastise belligerent 
Indians, and a costly Indian war was exactly what Gage and Johnson could not have.126 
In September 1771, Gage ordered Major Isaac Hamilton to take over command of 
the Illinois from Wilkins and to form a force to chastise the Wabash Indians. Hamilton 
and his men arrived at Fort Pitt too late in the year to set out on the Ohio. When they 
finally embarked in February 1772, Fort Chartres's fate had already been sealed in 
London. Weary ofthe ridiculously high expenses at the fort, "which has proved to be of 
124Gage to Wilkins, Aug. 21, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 105. 
125Gage to Wilkins, Aug. 27, 1770, Gage Papers AS, vol. 95; Gage to Wilkins, 
Dec. 2, 1770, Gage Papers AS, vol. 98. 
126Gage to Johnson, Dec. 11, 1771, WJP, 8:343; Johnson to Gage, Dec. 23, 1771, 
WJP, 8:348. 
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so little Use or Benefit to the Publick," according to Gage, Whitehall had pulled its 
support for the entire mission. The fort's regulars were needed in the East to garrison 
Boston and manage increasingly unruly colonists. Fort Chartres would be razed as 
cheaply as possible; preferably by assisting "the Torrents of the River" by ceasing to 
reinforce the banks. British settlers were to be evacuated from Vincennes and all interior 
posts. All interpreters, smiths, surgeons, and artillerymen would be ordered out of · 
Illinois. A small, temporary post would be established at Kaskaskia to guard British trade 
interests there. And Indian presents would be sent only as needed; no more bills from 
traders would be approved. Johnson worried about how the Illinois Indians would 
interpret such a precipitous withdrawal of troops, but he hoped that he could handle it 
with more diplomacy, and a few well-placed gifts.127 
Many factors contributed to Fort Chartres's failure to establish British mastery 
over the Illinois country. Its commandants were corrupt and combative. The region was 
simply too far from supply centers to be affordably supported. The mission always faced 
opposition, both from governmental figures who did not want the great expense, and 
from provincial supporters of a civil government and colony in Illinois. But the 
impression left by the sources is that the British occupation always foundered, even 
during the rare times when it was adequately supported. Gage frequently noted his 
disapproval of the post's inability to manage the local Indians, except through lavish use 
of presents. But this inability came honestly to the post's beleaguered garrison. 
127Gage to Wilkins, Sep. 20, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 106; Gage to Hamilton, 
Sep. 20, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 106; Hamilton to Gage, Nov. 18, 1771, Gage Papers 
AS, vol. 1 07; Gage to Hamilton, Feb. 24, 1772, Gage Papers AS, vol. 1 09; Edmonstone 
to Gage, Mar. 1, 1772, vol. 109; Gage to Johnson, Mar 9, 1772, WJP, 8:417-18; Gage to 
Wilkins, Mar. 9, 1771, Gage Papers AS, vol. 109; Johnson to Gage, Sep. 2, 1772, WJP, 
8:588. 
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Undermanned, insufficiently funded, laid low by disease, and surrounded by unimpressed 
Indians and resentful habitants, the post could never hope to impress Indians enough to 
make the Illinois into a profitable operation for Britain. It could have been worse for 
everyone involved. Had Gage not aborted the British mission and abandoned Fort 
Ch~res, the long-rumored prospect of a new Indian uprising might have become a 
reality. Instead, the status quo of small-scale British-Indian conflict continued into the 
Revolutionary period, when George Rogers Clark and the American independence 
movement imposed a new, destructive identity on the contest for political and cultural 
control oflllinois and the Wabash.128 
Indian impressions and British appearances figured prominently in the story of 
Fort Chartres. The British attempt to garrison Fort Chartres was an abject failure by any 
measure. But more important than its failure to survive and establish physical and 
political control was its inability to impose the idea of British mastery on the Illinois 
128The exploits of Clark and his band ofKentucky volunteers during the American 
Revolution, which included their taking of Kaskaskia and Cahokia and victory over 
Henry Hamilton's forces at Vincennes, have long been the stuff of American heroic 
myth. As a backcountry "Indian fighter" who overcame a much larger British force with 
a small band of volunteers, he has been seen as an epitome of American republican 
virtues who "won the West." Clark stirred up French and Indian anti-British animosities 
in Illinois more than anyone since Pontiac and Kaske, and attracted a full-scale British 
invasion ofthe Wabash country for the first time. His military achievements were 
ultimately of little note: he could not control Illinois or challenge Detroit as he had hoped. 
But his subsequent battles with British-allied Iroquois, Shawnees, and Miamis in the 
Ohio Valley sparked an American-Indian war that did not abate until the 1790s. Because 
of his virulent hatred oflndians and questionable record as a military leader, recent 
scholars have avoided him and his operations in treatments of the Revolutionary War. 
Such biographies that have appeared in recent decades have sought to reify his heroic 
image, as in Lowell H. Harrison, George Rogers Clark and the War in the West 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1976). For a more nuanced approach to the 
violent events in the Illinois and Wabash country in the years after the fall of Fort 
Chartres, see White, The Middle Ground, 368-78. For a traditional "heroic" biography, 
see John Edwin Bakeless, Background to Glory: The Life of George Rogers Clark 
(Philadelphia: Lipincott, 1957). 
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Indian population. Without proper resources, the fort's personnel could never hope to 
project images of strength, manliness, and mastery upon their native audience. From the 
earliest British attempts to send agents into Illinois, the region's Indians proved that they 
could easily confront British representatives in ways other Indian groups could not. When 
they wished, they could attack convoys, harass traders, plunder storehouses, and kill 
livestock. In essence, they could carry on an uprising against British rule without 
worrying about the consequences. Indians, both friendly and hostile, would wait in vain 
for the British garrison in Illinois to avenge these affronts with violent chastisement. Fort 
Chartres's men could not hope to carry out a punitive war. They could only respond to 
threats of violence with harsh words and threats, accompanied by presents. 
Even Illinois Indian allies, who had thrown their lots in with the new British 
regime, understood their dominant position and demanded frequent and extravagant 
presents in return for their friendship. Sick, threadbare, and exhausted, Fort Chartres's 
garrison finally left Illinois to the Indians, at least for a while. No sense of inevitability, 
no invisible, deterministic historical or economic forces, could have convinced Illinois's 
Indian populations that Europeans were capable of overcoming native hegemony in the 
region. In the confrontation of cultures in North America, natives had overcome 
newcomers in the cultural battle of Fort Chartres. As predicted by Hananaa, stars had 
fallen from the firmament, and hurt nobody. 
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CONCLUSION 
CANAJOHARIE: THE MOHAWKS' NEW WORLD 
Poulous could not understand why a man he barely knew had taken his rum. The 
Mohawk had lived for years in the small British fort adjacent to his village of 
Canajoharie and kept a "Cagg ofRum" there for his own use. In March 1756 his peaceful 
life took an unexpected turn. A British officer and twenty-five regular soldiers arrived to 
garrison the fort, named for the famous Mohawk sachem "King" Hendrick. After months 
of insulting the Canajoharie Mohawks, the garrison went even further. In September, the 
new men proceeded to bar Poulous from his own home, not to mention his rum. 
Ironically, Fort Hendrick had been built at the Mohawks' request several years earlier and 
recently renovated. Now it was demonstrating the extent to which Mohawks had left the 
in-between world of forts and villages and joined the new colonial world oftheir 
longtime British allies. 
Canajoharie, the Mohawk River "Upper Castle," had been a Mohawk population 
center since early in the eighteenth century. The village was surrounded by a light 
stockade and probably contained 20-30 houses and some 200 inhabitants by the 1740s. 
Canajoharie Indians enjoyed convenient access to Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario and 
William Johnson's home at Fort Johnson. They also maintained a longstanding and firm 
alliance to British interests. Since early in the century, Mohawks at Canajoharie had 
received British missionaries and teachers in their village, and by the 1 7 40s almost all of 
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them had converted to Christianity. 1 Johnson was considered a kinsman by the Mohawks, 
and he would later take Molly Brant, an influential Canajoharie Mohawk of the Wolf 
Clan, as his common-law wife. So when the British and French brought warfare into the 
Mohawks' country, the natives felt it was only fair that the British build them a protective 
fort at Canajoharie. 
The first requests for a fort at the Upper Castle came during King George's War 
in 1747. George Clinton ordered Johnson to build a small fort ''without blockhouses" at 
the Mohawk village, which cost New York £49. The fort must not have been very hardy. 
When the Seven Years' War broke out six years later, the Mohawks again requested forts 
at their castles for their families' protection. New York's governor again agreed to this 
reasonable request; £500 was a small price to pay for the allegiance of the Mohawks and 
their powerful Six Nations allies. But this time a fort was not enough. The Canajoharies 
wanted a substantial garrison at the fort to protect their town and their families. They 
probably desired status equal to the Mohawks of the Lower Castle ofTiononderoge, who 
had a fort (Fort Hunter, built in 1710) and a significant garrison. Johnson sent an officer 
and twenty-five men to the Canajoharie fort in March 1756.2 
Then the complaints began. Mohawk headmen began to fret that the regulars of 
the new garrison were acting as if the Mohawk fort was not a proper place for Indians. 
British affronts began almost immediately. A delegation of Canajoharie headmen 
complained to Johnson that they were not satisfied with the "Red Coats," and wanted 
1William N. Fenton and Elisabeth Tooker, "Mohawk," in Trigger, Handbook, 
474. 
2Clinton to Johnson, July 2, 1747, WJP, 1:103-04; Johnson to Clinton, July 28, 
1748, WJP 9:30; James De Lancey to Johnson, May 3, 1755, WJP, 1 :484-85; Johnson to 
De Lancey, Aug. 1755, WJP 1:842; Johnson to Shirley, Apr. 1756, WJP, 9:416. 
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them replaced with local men who understood their ways. Johnson knew that the 
Mohawks' friendship with Britain was staunch, and immediately wrote to commander-in-
chief Loudoun for reinforcements. But Johnson was suspicious of some of the local 
settlers and recommended that the men be hired from Albany or Schenectady rather than 
the immediate area of Canajoharie. He also asked Loudoun to order his officers not to 
give or sell the Mohawks any rum and to avoid the Indians whenever they could. 
Loudoun issued the orders, but the garrison took them too far.3 
When Poulous left his house one day in late summer, the new commandant 
confiscated his keg of rum and took it to his own apartment. He posted sentries and 
ordered them to shoot any Indian who came into the fort looking for the rum. When 
Poulous returned and found his keg missing, he walked right past the very sensible 
sentries into the officer's house and took back his property. The commandant was livid 
upon returning and finding the rum gone. "Did I Nott order you to Shute any Indian that 
should Come of itt?" he railed at a sentry. "I see No Indian you have Shott." He.confined 
the sentries and whipped one of them severely. When four Mohawk headmen went to the 
fort to complain about Poulous's treatment, they gave the officer a way to compensate for 
the insult. The Mohawks noted that the officer's "fatt Catle" had been foraging in their 
plantations and that Warroghioggy (Johnson) would surely want the garrison to 
compensate them for the loss. The officer told them to complain all they wished to 
Johnson. The fort belonged to the king, the officer told the shocked Mohawks, and he 
answered to the king, not to Johnson. 
3Johnson to Shirley, May 26, 1756, WJP, 9:461. 
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When the four sachems complained to Johnson, they were polite but firm. They 
made it very clear that the Canajoharies wanted a dependable garrison made up of local 
"Country People, who understood Indian· ways and would respect them. The "Red 
Coats, and their officer must be sent away before conflict ensued. "He has Slept hear as 
we May Say butt One Night and we are Afread if he Sleeps hear a Second Night we Shall 
all be Distroyd,', warned the sachems.4 
The army had bigger worries in 1756, and the regulars stayed in Fort Hendrick. 
Mohawk complaints continued into the following year. Mohawk sachem Nickas claimed 
that the soldiers would not let the Indians into the fort at all, saying it was the king,s 
property and the Mohawks had "nothing to do with it." Men of the garrison also warned 
that if the French attacked, the Indians would not be allowed inside, although the fort was 
built for their protection. This confused and enraged Nickas. "It is on our Land & built 
with our Timber,'' he protested to Johnson, "Therefore we have a right to it, at least to 
protection in time of danger, but they tell us not., Nickas issued an ultimatum: either 
Johnson withdraw the garrison or the Mohawks would not send their warriors to help the 
British in their war. Johnson denied the charges and promised that the king had no 
designs on their land. He offered to withdraw the men if the Mohawks insisted, but he 
advised against it. Johnson then berated them for issuing such an unfriendly ultimatum 
and warned that such tactics could endanger their friendship and alliance. The men 
remained at Fort Hendrick. Johnson wrote off the complaints to Indian drinking and the 
rabble-rousing oflocal Dutch settlers who possessed long ties to the Mohawks and 
resented the presence ofBritish troops in the region. Nickas later complained that Fort 
4
"Complaint of the Canajoharie Indians/' Sep. 27, 1756, WJP, 9:546-48. 
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Hendrick's soldiers were cutting trees on Indian land without first offering Mohawks the 
opportunity to supply them with fuel for payment. Instead of answering the complaint, 
Johnson sent an advertisement to be posted in the area offering a £20 reward for 
information about any "evil low designing People among the Inhabitants" who might be 
stirring up the Indians against the garrison. 5 
Fort Hendrick had started out as a temporary measure designed to protect Iroquois 
lives and property. By the 17 60s it reflected the new Indian-British world that 
Canajoharie had become. In 1761 the fort had lapsed into disuse and the Canajoharies 
had moved toward a more Anglicized existence. Johnson sent them a new schoolteacher 
in March. Mohawk headmen asked if Johnson might let them use one ofthe fort's 
blockhouses as a school, but reconsidered when they found out local settlers were already 
using it as a stable. Fort Hendrick finally disappeared in 1768 when local farmers pulled 
it down to reuse the materials. Its last mention in Johnson's papers are a Mohawk request 
that the land be cleared so that they could build a Christian church.6 
This small episode in Canajoharie's evolution as an Indian-British place reveals 
many of the themes and problems that occupied the lives oflndians who lived near forts. 
The fort was built at the behest of the Iroquois, but outside considerations created a 
confusing and maddening situation for the Indians who occupied the liminal world of 
Cananjoharie-Hendrick. As in other places, Indian leaders sought to mediate the authority 
ofthe commanders of such posts, but with less success than at the five forts examined in 
this study. 
5
"An Indian Conference," Feb. 7, 1757, WJP, 9:600-01; Archibald McAulay to 
Johnson, Dec. 2, 1758, WJP 10:56; "An Advertisement," WJP, 10:63. 
6
"Journal oflndian Affairs," WJP, 10:219, 228; Johnson to Gage, July 20, 1768, 
WJP, 12:555. 
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Trade, presents, and respect for native customs mattered just as much to the 
Canajoharie Mohawks as it did to other Indians throughout eastern America. But the 
Mohawks faced a problem that those other Indian groups did not: Britain took them for 
granted. Britain needed the Mohawks' military help during the Seven Years' War and 
again during the Revolutionary War, but during times of peace they needed only their 
docility. Mohawks no longer commanded their country the way Illinois and Cherokee 
Indians controlled their regions. They could not use their knowledge of foodways to 
make themselves useful the way Ottawas and Ojibwas did at Michilimackinac. As 
longstanding allies of Britain whose numbers decreased every year, they could not wield 
violence and diplomacy with the same vigor that their Seneca brethren used at Niagara. 
And without much to offer their British allies except their friendship, they could do little 
to address the dearth ofhospitality shown them at Fort Hendrick. Canajoharie Mohawks 
evinced just as much influence and agency as other native groups who had requested 
British forts to protect their homes. But instead of revealing the unsettled nature of the 
contest for cultural domination of Indian country, as had happened in many places 
throughout North America, Canajoharie's experience in fort-building only laid bare the 
extent to which they had already moved into a state of European social and cultural 
domination. By attaching themselves firmly to British culture, the Mohawks had joined 
the European club. The dynamic social and cultural interplay that dominated other fort-
Indian sites in the continent no longer provided the advantages to the Mohawks that 
Indians enjoyed near other forts. 
Canajoharie is a reminder that native cultural and demographic loss is a common 
end to stories oflndians and British forts. While Indians may have employed substantial 
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adeptness in affecting and reordering British military imperatives in Indian country, their 
futures held depressingly consistent scenarios of dispossession and poverty. The 
Canajoharies actually did better than most Indian groups that interacted with forts. As 
New York citizens, they were able to live with relative economic success. But even as 
they .sought to assimilate themselves into the British colonial world, the Mohawks 
continued unsuccessfully to search for coexistence strategies to help them maintain their 
lands and ways in the midst of ever-increasing numbers of European settlers. It was not 
poverty or disease that caused them to leave Canajoharie; rather, it was their strong and 
effective roles as British loyalists during the Revolution that caused their eventual 
migration to Canada. 
Indians' fort experiences do not reveal a historical landscape where Indians ended 
up as winners. But forts did not introduce devastation to Indian country or greatly 
contribute to native loss. Instead they implanted opportunities for new coexistence and 
resistance strategies that Indians used effectively to maintain as much of their tradit~nal 
ways as possible for as long as they could. In this sense, most Indians who interacted with 
British fort communities resisted the European invasion, using mixtures of 
accommodation, intimidation, cooperation, and occasional violence. Such efforts may 
lack the drama of more confrontational resistance movements, such as those led by 
Pontiac and Tecumseh. But Indians should not be criticized for trying to find reasonable 
methods of coexistence and cooperation just because their efforts do not satisfY modem 
desires for heroic narratives. If Indians were eventually dispossessed of their lands and 
cultures, it is the fault of the invaders, not the invaded. 
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Finally, the Canajoharie episode stands out because ofNickas's bold statement of 
Indian proprietorship. He pointed out to Johnson directly what other Indians must have 
said to fort commandants throughout the continent. Whether constructed by Dutch, 
French, Spanish, or British newcomers, forts were built on Indian land .with the natural 
materials natives had used for generations. Forts were Indian objects in that respect, just 
as if they were canoes or shelters. But by the mid-1700s, Indians in eastern North 
America understood European notions of reciprocal exchange and merged them with 
their own traditions. If forts were to occupy their country then some consideration must 
be made for the social and cultural changes they brought with them. So the back-and-
forth process of diplomacy, presents, intimidation, and politeness emerged whenever 
forts sprang up in the backcountry, reducing the invasion of America to small, local 
exchanges in remote forests and plains. The closer one looks at the experiences of people 
living in these remote arenas, the more it becomes clear that British military outposts and 
fort personnel were not usually the agents of continental change imagined in subsequent 
American fiction and mythology. In retrospect, it might be more fruitful to reflect on how 
experiences with Indians changed the occupiers, many of whom later became traders and 
took native wives. 
Forts implanted new worlds in Indian country. In these worlds, where liminal fort 
cultures made creative cultural negotiations an everyday activity, both Indians and 
Europeans could separate themselves partially from their cultural imperatives and 
sometimes fmd new paths to cooperation. But forts were not isolated from outside 
demands and responsibilities, either for Europeans or Indians. Competing meanings and 
levels of social power dominated these negotiations. Each side sought advantages as 
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much as they did cooperation and safety. This made the worlds ofbackcountry forts 
dangerous as well as complex. In every case, Indians acted as full participants in ordering 
life and deciding outcomes in these contact points. 
The traditional view of British outposts bristling with bayonets as places of 
military refuge is deserved; both settlers and Indians sought their protection in times of 
trouble. But cultural refuge was harder to come by for British fort personnel. To live in 
Indian country one had to meet Indians on their own terms to some degree. For Old Hop, 
Matchekewis, Teedyuscung, and thousands of others who chose to absorb forts into their 
cultural orbits, officers and garrisons were their best chance at affecting or controlling the 
terms of the invasion of their countries. That the British culture behind the forts 
eventually came to dominate Indian country should not diminish the efforts of Indians to 
decide their own fates in the shadows ofthe newcomers' bulwarks and palisades. 
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